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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
1.1 The Problem of the Legitimacy of the People 
We live in a world of states. The modern state is a particular, and currently 
predominant, form of political organisation which claims to exercise legitimate 
political authority over a territory and its population. A state’s legitimacy 
typically refers to “the complex moral right it possesses to be the exclusive 
imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply with these 
duties, and to use coercion to enforce the duties.”1 It goes without saying that a 
state’s claim to legitimacy raises the question as to what constitutes its normative 
source. It is commonplace among liberal and democratic theorists to argue that a 
state’s legitimacy ought to be based on the consent of the governed. According to 
the underlying idea of popular sovereignty, the governed should in some qualified 
sense have the possibility to control those who exercise political authority over 
them and be able to understand themselves as the authors of the laws that are 
imposed on them. In other words, the view of the people as the source of 
legitimate political authority depicts an image of political society as a democratic 
                                                   
1 A. John Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” Ethics, 109 (1999), p. 746. For an excellent 
discussion of the salient characteristics of modern states, see also Christopher W. Morris, An 
Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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community of individuals – a “people” – who are collectively self-governing in 
some sense. 
What it means to be collectively self-governing in a democratic way is of 
course subject to different interpretations and (therefore to) ongoing debate. 
What matters for our purposes here (as we shall see in a moment), is that 
collective self-government, regardless of which specific variant one endorses – 
e.g. Schumpeterian democracy, liberal democracy, radical democracy or 
deliberative democracy – typically consists of two related elements. It involves 
(a) democratic decision-making procedures, such as majority or consensus voting, 
which specify the conditions under which decisions are binding on all members 
of the political community, and (b) a set of underlying, fundamental democratic 
values or normative ideals, such as equality and freedom, that justify these 
procedures. 
Notwithstanding the importance of drawing attention to the people as the 
source of legitimate political authority, and of thinking through its implications 
for the proper interpretation of the democratic ideal of collective self-governance 
(in terms of a and b) – which is part and parcel of the domain of political theory – 
this dissertation asks for the people’s own legitimacy. It does so in the light of 
another aspect of collective self-government: (c) the logical truth that the practice 
of collective decision-making requires a collective, i.e. a group of individuals who 
are bound together as a people for the purpose of collective self-government, and 
possibly set apart from other people(s) – who are correspondingly excluded.2 
This dissertation accepts the idea of the people as the source of legitimate 
political authority, only to proceed by making the people into an object of 
legitimacy themselves by asking the logically prior, and therefore more 
fundamental, question: How to determine who legitimately make up the people? 
In other words, what constitutes the legitimate demarcation of the political units 
within which democracy will be practiced?3 
This question, which is referred to variously as “the problem of the legitimacy 
of the people,” “the democratic boundary problem,” or “the demos problem,” has 
received relatively little attention in political theory. Indeed, it is, as Robert A. 
                                                   
2 I deliberately write that a group of individuals who bind themselves together as a people for 
the purpose of collective self-government can, in the process, “possibly” set themselves apart 
from other people(s). If the people are not global in scope, i.e. if the people do not include all 
individuals in the world, then it follows that the constitution of the people results in the 
exclusion of a number of individuals. There is, however, a strand of cosmopolitan thinking which 
advocates the abolition of all existing states and the subsequent establishment of a single world-
state under which all individuals would be subsumed. In that case, the constitution of the people 
does not result in the exclusion of any individual. 
3 I borrow the distinction between “the people as the source of legitimacy” and “the people as the 
object of legitimacy” from Sofia Näsström. See her “The Legitimacy of the People,” Political 
Theory, 35 (2007), pp. 624-658. 
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Dahl writes, “a problem almost totally neglected by all the great philosophers 
who write about democracy.”4 This is remarkable because I take it to be fairly 
obvious that the constitution of the people is a problem of great practical 
relevance. To see this, one only has to take a brief look at the many disputes that 
may – and historically do – arise concerning (the drawing of peoples’) 
boundaries. 
Consider, for instance, the Northern Ireland sovereignty referendum of 1973. 
In that year, the British government tried to resolve the long-raging Northern 
Irish conflict between the Protestant Unionists (loyal to the United Kingdom) and 
the Catholic Nationalists (who had never accepted the partition of Ireland that left 
the North out of the independent Irish Republic) by handing the decision to “the 
people of Northern Ireland.” The result of this border poll was a resounding 98.9 
per cent in favour of remaining within the United Kingdom. Although the 
Protestant Unionists (in a majority) hailed the verdict as an evident expression of 
the will of the sovereign people, the Catholic Nationalists (in a minority), knowing 
that they would be outvoted, called the boundaries of the electorate itself into 
question and abstained massively from the referendum. They argued that passing 
the decision concerning the constitution of the people to the “people of Northern 
Ireland” in effect settled the question in advance.5 
The 1973 border poll in Northern Ireland nicely illustrates the practical 
significance of the problem of the legitimacy of the people. What we have here is 
essentially a dispute concerning secession, i.e. the act of breaking up a larger state 
into smaller political units (whereby the people are divided into multiple ones). 
Because of their impact on the composition of peoples, secessionist conflicts, 
which have become increasingly more common,6 fundamentally constitute 
                                                   
4 Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1970), p. 60. 
5 I borrow this classic example from Margaret Canovan, The People (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2005), pp. 110–111. 
6 In fact, as Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr demonstrate, self-determination movements 
are the most frequent source of violent conflict in the international system today. Barbara F. 
Walter writes that 146 ethnic groups in 78 countries demanded greater territorial autonomy or 
independence from their central government in the second half of the twentieth century, and 
that the number of groups demanding secession has doubled in the last 25 years. Despite the fact 
that such demands have been, and still are, frequently met with governmental opposition, the 
pace at which secessionist movements succeed in creating separate states is rapidly growing. 
Notable examples include: South Sudan in 2011, Kosovo in 2008, Montenegro in 2006, Eritrea in 
1993, Somaliland in 1991, the Soviet and Yugoslav cases of the early 1990s. For an overview, see 
Monty G. Marshall, and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict, 2003: A Global Survey of Armed 
Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy (University of Maryland, College Park: 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2003); Barbara F. Walter, 
“Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,” American 
Journal of Political Science, 50 (2006), pp. 313–330; and Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality 
of Political Divorce From Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). 
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specific articulations of the problem of the legitimacy of the people. The question 
here becomes one of determining who should be included in the demos or the 
constituency, when a collective decision has to be made concerning the 
separation of a part of the territory and population of an existing state, and the 
acquisition of that population’s right either to form a new sovereign political unit 
or to accede to another state. Should the relevant constituency consist of those 
individuals only who wish to secede from the democratic state of which they are 
currently (still) members? Or should this constituency be demarcated more 
broadly, and if so, how much more? For example, should the constituency not 
only include all would-be secessionists but also all other members of the political 
community from which they wish to secede? Or should the constituency perhaps 
be expanded even further so as to encompass all human beings inhabiting the 
globe? 
Of course, each of these questions is suggestive in the sense that each 
implicitly contains the (or at least a possible) answer one is looking for. I merely 
ask these questions to highlight the importance of solving the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. The importance stems, first, from a recognition that the 
legitimacy of collective decision-making concerning the proper demarcation of 
(peoples’) boundaries depends, at least in good part, on the legitimacy of the 
demarcation of the relevant constituency, and second, from the empirical 
observation (exemplified by the border poll in Northern Ireland) that the 
demarcation of the constituency “generally determines substantive political 
outcomes.”7 
The problem of the legitimate demarcation of peoples is, however, not limited 
to disputes over secession. On the contrary, the problem has a much broader 
practical relevance. In addition to secession, immigration, which is a phenomenon 
that is also becoming increasingly more common,8 constitutes a specific 
articulation of the problem of the legitimacy of the people. This is so because 
immigration, which involves the movement of individuals from one state to 
                                                   
7 Frederick G. Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” in Liberal 
Democracy, eds. R. J. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 
p. 41. See also pp. 22-23. Note that self-determination movements do not always wish to 
secede.They do not always demand the separation of a part of the territory and population of an 
existing state in order to form a new sovereign political unit. Instead, they frequently wish to 
achieve a more limited degree of autonomy or independence by demanding federalism, 
devolution or decentralisation. This, however, does not change the fact that the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people also arises in these cases. 
8 The International organization for Migration (IOM) has estimated the number of international 
migrants at 214 million worldwide today. In the last 10 years alone, furthermore, the total 
number of international migrants has increased from an estimated 150 million in 2000 to 214 
million persons today. For a detailed overview, see: http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-
migration/facts-and-figures/lang/en. 
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another (whereby membership of one people is substituted for that of another), 
has an impact on the composition of peoples. Here, the question typically is 
whether a democratic state has a right to control its borders by adopting and 
imposing unilaterally, i.e. exclusively in the name of its own citizens, certain 
immigration policies on would-be immigrants. How to determine who constitute 
the relevant constituency in this case? Should the relevant constituency consist of 
those individuals only who already share membership in a political community? 
Or should this constituency be demarcated more broadly, and if so, how much 
more? For instance, should the constituency also include any would-be 
immigrants or should it be global in scope? 
In addition, there is growing interest in transnational or global forms of 
democracy. Since the rise of the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty in the 
seventeenth century, it has been taken for granted for a long time that the nation-
state constituted the proper political unit within which collective decisions were 
to be made democratically. Recent developments, however, in particular 
processes of globalisation, have incited intense debate on the question whether it 
is morally desirable and practically possible to replace the nation-state by some 
transnational or global alternative (e.g. a world state). But clearly, this question 
immediately raises another: how to determine who legitimately constitute such a 
transnational or global “people”? 
From a practical perspective, then, there is ample reason to embark on a 
quest for the legitimacy of the people. Of course, this raises the question of what 
moral grounds we have to appeal to in order to decide how to constitute the 
people. There are, after all, many ways in which the people can be constituted. 
One might, for instance, appeal to the values of economic efficiency, freedom of 
association or national self-determination.9 If, however, one appeals to a 
                                                   
9 The idea of national self-determination comes in many forms. The particular form it takes is 
dependent on the underlying conception of nationalism. In his Blood and Belonging: Journeys into 
the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995),  pp. 3-9, Michael Ignatieff 
makes a distinction between two types of nationalism: civic (or liberal) nationalism and ethnic 
nationalism. Following him, we can say that civic nationalism understands the nation as a 
political entity whose core identity is defined in terms of common citizenship. The civic nation 
consists of all those individuals who subscribe to its political creed, regardless of ethnicity, race, 
colour, religion, gender or language. It refers to a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, 
united in patriotic attachment, to a shared set of political practices and values. Indeed, civic 
nationalists go to great lengths to demonstrate that the kind of nationalism endorsed by them is 
compatible with liberal values of freedom, equality, tolerance and individual rights. Finally, the 
kind of community envisaged by civic nationalists is not only liberal but also democratic in the 
sense that it vests sovereignty in all of the people (all citizens); a civic nation-state claims self-
governing rights, as well as rights for its citizens vis-à-vis other nation-states. This right to 
national self-determination is frequently defended by civic nationalists on the grounds that 
individuals need a national identity in order to lead meaningful, autonomous lives and that 
liberal democracies need a national identity in order to function properly. See, for instance, Will 
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democratic framework for guidance on the best political institutions and 
decision-making procedures to be adopted, then one should, in order to remain 
consistent, demand not only that decisions within an already constituted people 
(whose domain is fixed) be made democratically, but also that the decision as to 
who is included in the collectively self-governing political unit be made 
democratically. Let me explain this. 
One reason to hold this view can be stated as follows. If we define politics in 
terms of the question “Who gets what, when, how?”10 and if we think that 
decisions concerning political questions should be made democratically, then it 
follows that the question of the legitimacy of the people is a political question and 
as such needs to be answered democratically. What makes the constitution of the 
people a political question is that any demarcation of it – e.g. because of a state’s 
refusal to admit would-be immigrants to its territory or a state’s decision to grant 
a right of secession to a group of citizens who share a national or cultural identity 
– establishes a particular distribution of “insiders” and “outsiders.” In the case of 
the legitimacy of the people, then, the distribuendum or “what” in the political 
question “Who gets what, when, how?” is defined in terms of membership. 
A second reason for insisting that the demarcation of the political units within 
which democracy is to be practiced ought to be resolved democratically, has to do 
with the problematic consequences resulting from the failure to do so. Consider, 
for instance, the situation in which a (classic) utilitarian impartial spectator, a 
perfectly rational individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of 
others as if they were his own, is confronted with the problem of the legitimacy of 
the people. Presumably, this highly sympathetic person, by ascertaining the 
intensity of individuals’ desires and by assigning them their appropriate weight in 
the over-all system of desire satisfaction, will eventually stumble upon a 
                                                                                                                                                               
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); and David Miller, On 
Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
 Unlike civic nationalists, ethnic nationalists claim that an individual’s deepest attachments do 
not result from a rational commitment or choice but rather from inheritance. It is the national 
community which defines the individual and not the other way around. Essentially, the nation is 
not defined by a set of shared political rights but certain pre-political, ascriptive characteristics – 
i.e. features or traits that are ascribed to individuals independently of their choice. According to 
this view, the ethnic nation consists of those individuals who share a common heritage, which 
normally includes a common language, religion, customs and traditions. Characteristic of ethnic 
nationalism is that there is a “natural” political and moral order – and so a “natural” demarcation 
of peoples – which is defined in terms of certain ascriptive characteristics shared by groups of 
individuals. Historically, ethnic nationalism has been developed in a number of notorious ways. 
Think, for instance, of Aristotle’s biological metaphysics (which provided the basis for 
distinguishing between human and non-humans, such as slaves) and German romantic 
nationalism (which provided fertile ground for the development of the Nazi racial ideology). 
10 The classic formulation of this definition of politics can of course be found in Harold D. 
Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Whittlesey House, 1936). 
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demarcation of political societies that maximises the over-all system of desire 
satisfaction. Or consider an alternative situation in which a platonic philosopher 
king, because of his superior moral insight, determines who constitute the people. 
If we demarcate a particular people by appealing to the model of the 
utilitarian impartial spectator or the platonic philosopher king, it is not obvious at 
all why decision-making within that demarcated people should be democratic. 
Since both the model of the utilitarian impartial spectator and the platonic 
philosopher king – just like the democratic model – ultimately provide a general 
account of legitimate decision-making, we should, in order to remain consistent, 
not only apply them to the particular decision as to who constitute the people, but 
also to the subsequent particular decisions that will have to be made within the 
demarcated people. Consequently, we cannot consistently combine democratic 
decision-making within a people with a utilitarian or platonic demarcation of that 
people, because then we integrate two mutually exclusive and ultimately 
irreconcilable accounts of legitimate decision-making into a single normative 
theory. 
In sum, then, it is necessary to appeal to a democratic framework when 
thinking about the question of democracy’s domain in order to prevent ourselves 
from becoming enmeshed in moral controversy. The next question, of course, is 
what a democratic solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people should 
entail. My analysis of the Northern Ireland sovereignty referendum has already 
shown that the problem of the legitimacy of the people cannot be solved 
democratically simply by taking a vote on it (For whose consent is required?). Yet 
this is exactly what is sometimes suggested by philosophers. The literature on 
secession, for instance, contains a strand of theories that aspire to provide a 
democratic justification of the right to secede. These so-called “plebiscitary 
theories of secession” are based on majoritarian democratic theory, and hold that 
any group of individuals within an existing state may secede if a majority of the 
individuals residing within that particular group choose to have their own state.11 
                                                   
11 Traditionally, philosophical work on secession has been concerned with the moral justification 
of unilateral secession, i.e. the moral right to secede unilaterally. Allen Buchanan provides a 
helpful typology of theories supporting such a unilateral right to secede. See his “Uncoupling 
Secession from Nationalism and Intrastate Autonomy from Secession,” in Negotiating Self-
Determination, eds. H. Hannum and E. F. Babbitt (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 82-84. He 
divides these theories into two groups: Remedial Right Only theories and Primary Right theories. 
Remedial Right Only theories understand the right of secession as analogous to the right of 
revolution, and consequently as a remedy of last resort for persistent and grave injustices. Thus 
conceived, the right to unilateral secession is not primary, but rather derivative upon the 
violation of other, more basic rights. Primary Right theories, by contrast, hold that the right to 
unilateral secession is not remedial but primary instead: a group can have it regardless of 
whether it has been subject to any injustice (though injustice may still provide one – but not the 
only – possible justification for unilateral secession). 
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The basic idea is that “any group of individuals within a defined territory which 
desires to govern itself more independently enjoys a prima facie right to self-
determination – a legal arrangement which gives it independent statehood or 
greater autonomy within a federal state.”12 Ultimately, then, a group of 
individuals has a right to secede because their collective decision to do so tracks 
“the will of the people.” 
But this, of course, begs the question. I have argued that the legitimacy of 
collective decision-making depends in good part on the legitimacy of the 
demarcation of the relevant constituency. However, by claiming that a group of 
individuals within a state has a right to secede unilaterally if the majority of that 
group’s members vote to have their own state, plebiscitary views without 
argument pass the decision concerning the (secessionist) demarcation of the 
people to a particular constituency. Consequently, plebiscitary views fail to 
provide a democratic legitimisation for secession: their proposal to resolve the 
issue of secession by means of a majority vote does not confer legitimacy on the 
people but instead presupposes its legitimacy. 
What this gap in democratic theories of secession illustrates, then, is that we 
need to find a democratic way to demarcate the people that does not presuppose 
the people’s legitimacy but truly concedes legitimacy to it. The need for this, 
however, immediately seems to create the following insurmountable problem: 
the very requirement of democratic decision-making itself, i.e. the demand that 
decisions be made collectively, causes an infinite regress when applied to the 
demarcation of the people. Suppose that the decision as to who should be a 
                                                                                                                                                               
 Within the category of Primary Right Theories, one can distinguish between Ascriptivist and 
Plebiscitary views. The former hold that particular groups of individuals have a unilateral right 
to secession by virtue of their members sharing certain ascriptive characteristics. The most 
common form of ascriptivist theory holds that culturally or ethnically distinct groups have a 
right to self-determination as nations (see footnote 9). Plebiscitary views, as we have seen, 
endorse the view that any group of individuals within an existing state may secede if a majority 
of the individuals residing within that particular group choose to have their own state, 
regardless of whether they share any ascriptive characteristics (such as culture or ethnicity) 
other than the desire for independence. 
 With the exception of plebiscitary views, each of these types of theories of secession are 
fundamentally non-democratic in nature – instead, they provide a nationalist or liberal 
justification for the remedial or primary right to secession. Given the requirement that the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people should be solved in a way that is compatible with a 
democratic framework, and given that the problem of secession is a specific articulation of the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people, (only) plebiscitary theories of secession are of particular 
relevance here. 
12 Daniel Philpott, “In Defence of Self-Determination,” Ethics, 105 (1995), p. 353. See also Harry 
Beran, “A Liberal Theory of Secession,” Political Studies, 32 (1984), p. 23; Harry Beran, The 
Consent Theory of Political Obligation (Crook Helm Publishers: London, 1987), pp. 39-42; and 
Harry Beran, “A Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination for a New World Order,” in 
Theories of Secession, ed. P. B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 39-40. 
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member of a particular group of individuals, a group that is bound together as a 
people and set apart from other people(s) for the purpose of collective self-
government, should be made democratically. The fundamental problem that 
arises here is, as we have seen, that before a collective decision can be made on 
the substantive issue as to who constitute the people, a prior decision has to be 
made as to who constitute the collective (i.e. the constituency). In order to remain 
consistent, however, this prior decision, which will be determinative of the 
ensuing substantive issue, requires a collective decision for it to be legitimate as 
well. But, clearly, this only begs the question as to who constitute the collective 
once more, thus causing an infinite regress of collective decision-making 
procedures from which no procedural escape is possible. It is, as Frank I. 
Michelman so succinctly expresses the problem, as if “someone told you to write a 
book whose every chapter started with the terminal sentence of an immediately 
preceding chapter”:13 you would not know where to begin; indeed, you would be 
unable to begin at all. 
This conclusion has led Frederick G. Whelan, in one of the first serious 
discussions of the boundary problem, to conclude that: 
 
democratic theory cannot itself provide any solution to disputes that 
may – and historically do – arise concerning boundaries. [D]emocracy, 
which is a method for group decision-making or self-governance, 
cannot be brought to bear on the logically prior matter of the 
constitution of the group itself, the existence of which it presupposes.14 
 
Following Whelan, many political philosophers believe that any attempt to 
solve the problem of the legitimacy of the people within a democratic framework 
is bound to cause an infinite regress of collective decision-making procedures 
presupposing prior collective decision-making procedures necessary to legitimise 
the posterior ones.15 In a more recent contribution to this discussion, Sofia 
                                                   
13 Frank I. Michelman, “How Can the People ever Make the Laws? A Critique of Deliberative 
Democracy,” in Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. J. Bohman and W. 
Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 151. 
14 Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” p. 40. 
15 See for instance Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), p. 35; Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 
p. 207; Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty 
and Citizenship,” in Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, eds. C. Ciaron and P. de 
Greiff (Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 115-116; Jürgen Habermas, “Constitutional 
Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?,” Political Theory, 29 (2001), pp. 
774; Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); 
Bonnie Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory,” 
American Political Science Review, 101 (2007), pp. 1-17; Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox 
(London: Verso, 2000); Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005); Sofia 
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Näsström, for instance, draws a similar conclusion. She argues that there is a “gap 
at the heart of democracy in the sense that “the people” – in order to constitute 
the legitimate source of political authority – would have to be prior to itself.”16 As 
a result, democracy as collective self-legislation is essentially impossible as a 
legitimate form of rule. For the very constitution of the “people” that embodies 
sovereignty cannot itself be established in a democratically legitimate way. 
Consequently, some philosophers have suggested that if the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people cannot be solved by appealing to democratic method or 
procedure, then this conclusion must be taken to its logical extremes: the 
demarcation of the people cannot be part of a democratic account of legitimacy 
but must be guided by factors independent of it, such as the contingent forces of 
history.17 This strategy, however, is not without problems, as Bernard Yack 
tellingly writes: 
 
Resignation to the contingencies of history does not at all fit with the 
rhetoric of popular sovereignty. Yet, in effect, that is what many liberal 
democratic theorists seem to demand from peoples uncomfortable with 
the shape of their communities: that they should accept whatever 
potential injustices history has served up to them with the boundaries 
of states so that we can all get on with the task of establishing liberal 
democratic forms of government. That this advice almost invariably 
comes from people who are quite comfortable and unexposed within 
the given boundaries of states, people who, in effect, are happy with the 
partners they were given when the music stopped playing at the dance 
of history, makes it harder to accept than it would otherwise be.18 
 
The appeal to history is not an innocent or neutral one, for by asking us to 
accept that the boundaries of political societies are the result of a history of 
accident, force and fraud, it reproduces the normative idea that we ought to 
embrace membership of the particular society in which we live simply because 
we are born in it or are addressed as subject to the rules of its political 
                                                                                                                                                               
Näsström, “What Globalization Overshadows,” Political Theory, 31 (2003), pp. 808-834; 
Näsström, “The Legitimacy of the People”; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and The 
First and Second Discourses, eds. S. Dunn and G. May (New York: Yale University Press, 2002); 
and Bernard Yack, “Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism,” Political Theory, 29 (2001), pp. 517-
536. 
16 Näsström, “What Globalization Overshadows,” p. 808. See also Näsström, “The Legitimacy of 
the People.” 
17 See Näsström, “The Legitimacy of the People,” esp. pp. 627–634, 641; and Yack, “Popular 
Sovereignty and Nationalism,” esp. pp. 522-523, 526-530. Both provide excellent critical 
discussions of this strategy. 
18 Yack, “Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism,” p. 529. 
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institutions.19 Essentially, then, the resignation to the contingencies of history, far 
from excluding the demarcation of the people from the (democratic) realm of 
legitimacy, itself constitutes an account of the legitimacy of the people – an 
account which, of course, cannot possibly be justified if one is committed to 
liberal democracy’s underlying values (popular sovereignty and human rights in 
particular). In the end, then, there is no way to avoid or to externalise the 
question as to what constitutes the legitimate demarcation of the people: all we 
can, and indeed must do, is to continue the quest for the legitimacy of the people. 
Unlike those philosophers who believe that the demarcation of the people 
cannot be part of a democratic account of legitimacy, there are others who, 
despite their conviction that the problem of the legitimacy of the people cannot 
be solved, nevertheless continue to take it seriously. Instead of solving the 
problem, one approach for instance aims at preventing it from arising, and in this 
manner from becoming a morally relevant problem, at all. This is the so-called 
strategy of avoidance, according to which it is possible to prevent the problem of 
the legitimacy of the people from arising by perfecting justice within existing, i.e. 
already demarcated, political societies. Others, again, have adopted what might be 
called an agonistic approach to the boundary problem, according to which the gap 
in the constitution of the people is not a problem but is productive; it is a 
“generative device that helps foster new claims for legitimacy” and calls for a 
politics of contestation.20 
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is important to focus on what it is that 
these otherwise diverging approaches to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people – i.e. the strategies of externalisation, avoidance and agonism – have in 
common: an acquiescence in the alleged impossibility of demarcating the people 
in a democratically legitimate way. The argument for acquiescence, however, 
proceeds too quickly. It only holds if it is actually impossible to develop a solution 
to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that is incompatible with a 
democratic framework. In this dissertation, I shall argue that it is possible to 
provide such a solution. 
In theory, this solution can take two forms. There is, first, a weak sense in 
which a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people can be said to be 
“compatible with a democratic framework”: when a particular non-democratic 
solution to it does not rule out democratic decision-making within a non-
                                                   
19 Ibid., p. 523. See also Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), pp. 19-20; Näsström, “The Legitimacy of the People,” pp. 628-629, 633; and Rogers 
M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 137. 
20 Näsström, “The Legitimacy of the People,” pp. 626-627. See also Honig, Democracy and the 
Foreigner; Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory,” 
Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox; and Mouffe, On the Political, ch. 2. 
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democratically demarcated people. This, however, is not the sense in which I wish 
to “solve” the problem. The reason for this is that it is actually no democratic 
solution at all and as such violates the requirement that both decisions within an 
already constituted people and decisions concerning the constitution of the 
people must be made democratically. A proper solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people should be compatible with a democratic framework in a 
strong sense: the demarcation of the people itself should be democratic. 
Consequently, devising a “weak solution” becomes a serious option only if it turns 
out to be impossible to provide a “strong solution.” For in that case, we have no 
choice but to step beyond the idea of democracy itself in order to obtain an 
answer to the problem of the legitimacy of the people. 
Let us therefore take a closer look at the nature of a strong solution to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people. What would such a solution have to look 
like in order to succeed? There are two ways in which a solution to the problem 
of the legitimacy of the people can be said to be compatible with a democratic 
framework in the strong sense. One way would be to demarcate the people by an 
appeal to democratic procedure, i.e. a method for group decision-making or 
collective self-governance. Those who wish to traverse this road, however, face 
an enormous burden of proof: their challenge is to develop a collective decision-
making procedure that is capable of generating a solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people that does not result in an infinite regress – and this, as we 
have seen above, is almost universally considered to be impossible. 
Suppose, however, that the problem of the legitimacy of the people cannot be 
solved by appeal to democratic procedure. What is important to see, as David 
Miller rightly argues, is that it does not follow from this that the problem cannot 
be solved “by appeal to democratic theory, understood to mean the underlying 
values, such as political equality, that justify procedures like majority voting.”21 
The argument, then, that any attempt to provide a democratic legitimisation of 
the people is futile conflates democratic theory, as a set of substantive values or 
normative ideals, with democratic method, as a set of procedures for collective 
decision-making that can be derived from these values or ideals. Those who wish 
to argue along these lines would have to face the challenge of deriving an account 
of the legitimate demarcation of the people from a particular democratic theory. 
This is the second way in which the demarcation of the people might be 
compatible with a democratic framework in the strong sense. 
                                                   
21 David Miller, “Democracy’s Domain,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 37 (2009), p. 204, my 
emphasis. See also Gustaf Arrhenius, “The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory,” in 
Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations I, ed. F. Tersman (Stockholm: Stockholm University 
Press, 2005), pp. 14-28. 
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As a result, the argument that the quest for the democratic legitimacy of the 
people is bound to fail is premature (at best). It holds if and only if it turns out to 
be impossible to provide a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people 
that is compatible with a democratic framework in either of the two strong 
senses described. That is to say, it holds if and only if it is impossible, first, to 
develop a collective decision-making procedure that is capable of generating a 
solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that does not result in an 
infinite regress, and second, to derive an account of the legitimate demarcation of 
the people from a particular democratic theory. The question I wish to answer in 
this dissertation is whether it is possible to provide such a strong solution to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people. Is it possible to meet this challenge? 
1.2 A Social Contract Approach 
In this dissertation, I argue that it is possible to meet this challenge: the problem 
of the legitimacy of the people can be solved in a way that is strongly compatible 
with a democratic framework. More specifically, I will do so by proposing a social 
contract approach to the problem of the legitimacy of the people. Why approach 
this problem by appealing to the grounds offered by the tradition of the social 
contract? To begin with, modern democratic thought can be understood as an 
outgrowth of the tradition of the social contract, and so it seems only natural to 
engage in the quest for the legitimacy of the people using the conceptual tools of 
this tradition.22 Social contract theory, which is one of the most popular models to 
evaluate political structures and (interpersonal) acts, works from the intuitive 
idea of agreement among free and equal individuals. The appeal to this notion 
stems from the fundamental liberal-democratic idea that social cooperation ought 
to be based on individuals’ deliberately and freely given consent. 
All social contract theories subscribe to different and ideally complete yet 
competing sets of implicit background assumptions and explicit arguments that 
logically lead to the conclusion of a particular social contract. As Samuel Freeman 
aptly puts it: 
 
Social contract views differ according to how the idea of agreement is 
specified: Who are the parties to the agreement? How are they situated 
with respect to one another (status quo, state of nature, or equality)? 
                                                   
22 Beran, The Consent Theory of Political Obligation; Samuel Freeman, “Reason and Agreement in 
Social Contract Views,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (1990), pp. 122-157; Samuel Freeman, 
“Contractarianism in Ethics and Political Philosophy,” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Volume 2, ed. E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 657-665; and Whelan, 
“Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” p. 24. 
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What are the intentions, capacities, and interests of these individuals, 
and what rights and powers do they have? What is the purpose of the 
agreement? Is the agreement conceived of in historical or nonhistorical 
terms? Since these and other parameters have been set in different 
ways, it is difficult to generalize and speak of the social contract 
tradition. Hobbes’s idea of agreement differs fundamentally from 
Rousseau’s, just as Gauthier and Buchanan conceive of agreement very 
differently than Rawls and Scanlon.23 
 
Despite the fact that social contract theorists have set the parameters of 
agreement by answering these and other questions in different ways, there is (at 
least) one question they have dealt with in the same way. Social contract theorists 
have altogether ignored the fundamental question “Who make up the parties to 
the agreement?” I do not mean to suggest that social contract theories lack an 
account of the kinds of actors involved in the agreement, for they clearly have 
such an account: the relevant actors are either individuals or citizens (or their 
representatives) with some set of rational and/or moral capacities (e.g. the 
capacity for utility maximisation and/or reasonableness). However, I do mean to 
suggest that social contract theories, regardless of the kind of actor involved in 
each of them, lack an account of the legitimate demarcation of the actors who are 
included and excluded as parties to the agreement. Let me illustrate this. 
Classical social contract theorists (such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and 
Kant), as Whelan correctly notes, were primarily concerned with answering the 
normative question of how political authority can be established among a group 
of previously unattached individuals, rather than with confronting the logically 
prior, and therefore more fundamental, normative question of “how determinate 
communities come to be set off from one another in the boundary-less state of 
nature” in the first place.24 The same goes for modern social contract theorists, 
who have been, and still are, mainly interested in developing principles of justice 
(e.g. Rawls and Buchanan), or of morality in general (e.g. Gauthier and Scanlon), 
among the citizens of an already existing political society, usually a democratic 
nation-state. They do not, however, confront the prior normative questions of 
how political societies can be demarcated legitimately, and why the nation-state 
is the proper political unit within which agreement on principles of justice is to be 
reached. 
Instead of answering these questions concerning the legitimate constitution 
of the people – which one would have expected them to confront – both classical 
and modern social contract theorists essentially work from the assumption of a 
                                                   
23 Freeman, “Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views,” p. 122. 
24 Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” p. 24. 
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“given” people: they simply presuppose what requires legitimisation, namely the 
existence of a delimited group of individuals, and subsequently ask how they 
could agree among themselves to establish a political and moral order. This 
observation leads to a second reason why this dissertation aims at providing a 
social contract theoretical (instead of another) solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people: doing so enables me to fill up a gap in social contract 
theory, thereby making it a more complete moral theory. More specifically, 
approaching the problem of the legitimacy of the people from the perspective of 
social contract theory allows me to meet the challenge with which I ended the 
previous section, and subsequently to demonstrate that the claim – the alleged 
impossibility of demarcating the people in a legitimate way – on which a number 
of (otherwise diverging) approaches to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people, such as the exclusionist strategy, the strategy of avoidance and the 
agonist strategy, converge is not merely premature but simply mistaken. 
If one, like social contract theorists, endorses the intuitive idea that structures 
of social cooperation ought to be based on agreement, then it follows not only 
that (a) the legitimate constitution of political authority and a set of moral 
principles for the general regulation of a given group of individuals requires 
consent, but that (b) the legitimate constitution of this group of individuals as a 
people itself, precisely because it is a structure of social cooperation, requires 
consent as well. At first glance, however, there seems to be little point in 
approaching the problem of the legitimacy of the people from a social contract 
perspective. The reason for this, or so it might be thought, has to do with the 
nature of social contract theory itself. Social contract theorists explicate the idea 
of agreement in terms of a bargaining or deliberation procedure in which free and 
equal individuals collectively determine the appropriate terms of their political 
association. Under terms all can agree to, they bind themselves to one another 
and thereby constitute a political society in which live under a common political 
authority. 
This standard interpretation of the tradition of the social contract is of course 
susceptible to the same argument we encountered in the previous section: social 
contract theory’s requirement of agreement reveals a commitment to the idea of 
collective self-government, which, when applied to the boundary problem, causes 
a social contract theoretical quest for the legitimacy of the people to result in an 
infinite regress. After all, before a unanimous decision can be made on the 
substantive issue who constitute the people, a prior decision has to be made as to 
whose (unanimous) consent is required. In order to remain consistent, however, 
this prior decision, which will be determinative of the ensuing substantive issue, 
requires unanimous consent for it to be legitimate as well. But, clearly, this only 
begs the question as to whose (unanimous) consent is required once more, thus 
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causing an infinite regress of unanimous decision-making procedures from which 
no procedural escape is possible. 
Notwithstanding this apparently strong argument for dismissing a social 
contract approach to the problem of the legitimacy of the people, I argue that by 
doing so one fails to do justice to the approach, and to a variety of ways in which 
it is actually capable of solving the problem – albeit unintentionally. Although 
social contract theorists nowhere in their writings explicitly claimed to address 
the democratic boundary problem, their theories nevertheless provide us with 
ample conceptual tools to solve the problem of the legitimacy of the people. I will 
argue so by building on the distinction between democratic procedure and 
democratic theory. The same distinction can be found in the tradition of the social 
contract as well. The tradition of the social contract works from the fundamental 
idea that structures of social cooperation should be based on agreement among 
free and equal persons. This tradition contains a variety of social contract 
theories – most notably Lockean, Hobbesian (or contractarian) and Kantian (or 
contractualist) views. These theories specify, albeit it in mutually exclusive and 
ultimately irreconcilable ways, the fundamental idea of agreement as the 
outcome of a suitably defined initial situation in which a set of contracting 
parties, endowed with a particular capacity for practical reason, try to reach, by 
means of a collective decision-making procedure, a rational compromise or 
reasonable consensus on a set of moral and/or political principles for the general 
regulation of their social interaction. In each of these social contract views, 
furthermore, the characterisation of both the initial situation (including the 
collective decision-making procedure) and the practical rationality of the 
contracting parties is derived from an underlying set of values or ideals (that are 
supposed to justify each of these characterisations). In other words, the 
procedural and theoretical elements of the democratic framework are also at 
work in the tradition of the social contract. I shall argue in this dissertation that 
the tradition of the social contract is capable of providing a number of solutions 
to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that are compatible with a 
democratic framework in either of the two strong senses described in the 
previous section. Depending on the kind of social contract theory involved, it is 
either possible to develop a collective decision-making procedure that is capable 
of generating a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that does 
not collapse into an infinite regress, or to derive an account of the legitimate 
demarcation of the people from the underlying set of democratic values or ideals 
that justify these collective decision-making procedures. 
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1.3 Plan of the Dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I provide a historical overview of the tradition of the social contract, 
and construct a typology of it which paves the way for a critical discussion of the 
potential of (each type of) social contract theory to solve the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. The next three chapters are devoted to a critical analysis 
of these types of social contract theory in the light of the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. 
Chapter 3 develops a Lockean political voluntarist account of the legitimate 
constitution of the people. I shall argue that this account is capable of providing 
us with a procedurally democratic solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people that does not cause an infinite regress. Central to this approach is the so-
called None Rejected Principle, according to which the group of individuals that 
sets itself apart and binds itself together as a people ought to include all and only 
those individuals each of whom is not rejected by any of the others as a member. 
Chapter 4 centres around the Hobbesian or contractarian approach to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people. Contractarians, such as Buchanan and 
Gauthier, endorse the view that moral principles are justifiable if they can be the 
object of a rational compromise or mutually advantageous agreement among 
utility-maximising individuals whose (given) interests are partially overlapping 
and conflicting. This rational compromise is the result of a contractarian 
bargaining procedure – to which I shall refer as the “Open and Serial Consensual 
Binding procedure.” This procedure yields a particular account of the legitimacy 
of the people, according to which the people are understood as a cooperative 
venture for mutual advantage, and accordingly consist of all and only those 
individuals for whom it is mutually beneficial to bind themselves together for the 
purpose of collective self-government. I shall argue that this contractarian 
approach is fully capable of providing a procedural solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people that does not result in an infinite regress, and that is 
compatible with the framework of democratic theory. 
In chapter 5, I approach the problem of the legitimacy of the people from a 
Kantian or contractualist perspective. Contractualists, such as Rawls and Scanlon, 
endorse the view that moral principles are justifiable if free and equal persons 
could reasonably be expected to accept them as a basis for agreement. 
Reasonable principles are those that are the outcome of a suitably defined 
deliberative procedure – the categorical imperative procedure (CI-procedure) – 
in which individuals, who are subject to a number of conditions guaranteeing the 
impartiality of their deliberations, through the use of public argument and 
reasoning among themselves, collectively decide on a public conception of justice 
that is to regulate their social interaction. Adopting a Rawlsian contractualist 
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interpretation of the CI-procedure, I shall argue that it is possible to solve the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people in a way that is strongly compatible with 
a democratic framework. Unlike Lockean political voluntarism and 
contractarianism, however, Rawlsian contractualism does not offer a democratic 
solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that is purely procedural. 
Instead, it appeals both to democratic procedure and democratic theory. 
In Chapter 6, I conclude the dissertation by recapitulating the central 
argument. I offer a comparative summary of the Lockean political voluntarist, the 
contractarian and the Rawlsian contractualist solutions to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. Finally, I shall provide some reasons for believing that 
the Rawlsian contractualist solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people should in the end be preferred to the Lockean political voluntarist and 
contractarian solutions. 
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Chapter 2  
 
The Tradition of the Social Contract:  
A Typology 
In this chapter, I provide a historical overview of the tradition of the social 
contract. I shall explain how this tradition has developed historically in response 
to various practical and theoretical challenges. Doing so enables me, first, to 
introduce and elucidate a variety of elements that are central to social contract 
theory. It also allows me to defend the tradition against a number of historically 
important critiques (most notably those of Hume, Hegel and Marx). In turn, this 
makes it not only possible for me to elucidate further the nature of social contract 
theory (many criticisms of social contract theory spring, as we shall see, from 
fundamental misconceptions about its nature), but also to present a coherent 
contract theoretical framework for analysing moral problems, such as that of the 
legitimate demarcation of the people. 
Finally, and even more importantly, I shall, on the basis of this historical 
overview, identify three types of social contract theory: (1) Lockean political 
voluntarism, (2) contractualism and (3) contractarianism. The first type is an 
actual social contract theory according to which political society ought to be a 
voluntary association. This means that an entire group of individuals in a given 
territory is subject to the legitimate political authority of a state (or its 
government or institutions) if and only if each member of that group has actually 
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given his deliberate and free consent to this subjection. The second and third 
types of social contract theory are both hypothetical in nature. According to the 
second, contractualist type of contract theory, moral and/or political principles 
are justifiable if free and equal individuals could reasonably be expected to accept 
them as a basis for informed and unforced agreement. In the third, contractarian 
type of contract theory, moral and/or political principles are justifiable if they can 
be the object of a rational compromise or mutually advantageous agreement 
among utility-maximising individuals whose (given) interests are partially 
overlapping and conflicting. What is important about this threefold typology is 
that it makes possible a more systematic analysis of the problem of the legitimacy 
of the people in the ensuing three chapters. For in the next three chapters, I shall 
investigate whether, and if so how, each of these three types of social contract 
theory is capable of solving the problem of the legitimacy of the people in a way 
that is compatible with a democratic framework. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 2.1, I locate the roots of the 
tradition of the social contract in Greek and Roman political philosophy. Next, I 
discuss how the idea of a social contract evolved in medieval political thought 
(Section 2.2), and eventually received its mature expression in early modern 
social contract theories (Section 2.3). It is in the latter section that I also 
introduce the first type of social contract theory, Lockean political voluntarism, 
and defend it against three influential and classic critiques: Humean, Hegelian 
and Marxist. Having rebutted each of these critiques, I continue by discussing the 
two principal ways in which contemporary social contract thinkers – the so-called 
contractualists and contractarians – have further developed the tradition of the 
social contract in the second half of the twentieth century (Sections 2.4 and 2.5). 
Doing so enables me to introduce the other two types of social contract theory. 
Section 2.6 offers a summarising conclusion. This paves the way for the ensuing 
discussion of the problem of the legitimacy of the people in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
2.1 The Social Contract in Greek and Roman Political Philosophy 
The roots of the tradition of the social contract can be traced back as far as to two 
of Plato’s dialogues: his Crito and Republic. In the former, Socrates, who has been 
tried for criminal activities (corrupting the minds of young citizens and believing 
in false deities), explains why he should stay in prison and accept his death 
sentence, rather than escape Athens and go into exile in another Greek city-state 
or colony. He identifies three grounds or justifications for his obligation to obey 
Athens’s commands. The third reason is particularly relevant here. It entails that 
citizens, once they come of age, and have seen how their city-state handles its 
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public affairs, can choose whether to stay in the city without protesting to its laws 
or to take their possessions and leave the city if they are displeased with it. 
Staying, however, implies a deliberate and voluntary agreement to abide by the 
city’s laws (including the punishments they administer). Socrates, then, asserts 
that his decision to stay in Athens commits him to the view that he has 
deliberately and freely, although implicitly, agreed to abide by the verdicts of its 
court.25 
Implicit in Socrates’s argument is a transactional account of political 
obligation. According to such an account, an individual’s political obligation to 
obey the commands of a political authority is grounded in certain morally 
significant interactions or transactions between them; in this case, a voluntary 
and deliberate agreement between Socrates and the city-state of Athens. By 
appealing to a consensual transaction, Socrates introduces an idea that would 
later take centre stage in the writings of social contract theorists – though hardly 
any of them would characterise the consensual nature of the transaction in 
Socrates’s terms of tacit consent through residence.26 
Let us now turn to Plato’s most famous dialogue: Republic. In Book II, a 
Sophist called Glaucon offers a social contract explanation of the nature and 
origin of justice. According to him, individuals have a natural inclination to act on 
their own interests. What they would want most is to commit injustice against 
others without fear of retribution, and what they would want to avoid most is 
being treated unjustly by others without being able to retaliate. If individuals 
have both done and suffered injustice (and so have experience of both), and if 
they are unable to avoid the one and obtain the other, they will recognise that the 
                                                   
25 Plato, Crito, in The Dialogues of Plato, ed. R. E. Allen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 
51d-52d. 
26 John Locke is the great exception here. He (notoriously) defended the moral doctrine of 
consent through residence. See his Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), Treatise II, sec. 119. Though the doctrine is introduced by 
Socrates in Plato’s Crito, it was Locke who further developed it and made it an essential part of 
what is nowadays recognised as the paradigmatic expression of a political voluntarist type of 
social contract theory, according to which individuals’ actually given deliberate and free consent 
is a necessary condition for them to acquire political bonds. Modern proponents of this 
approach, most notably Harry Beran, Michael Otsuka and A. John Simmons, are in one way or 
another indebted to Locke’s paradigmatic account. See Harry Beran, The Consent Theory of 
Political Obligation, pp. 45-46; Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2003), ch. 5; A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), esp. ch. 1, 8; A. John Simmons, “The Anarchist 
Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987), pp. 269-279; A. 
John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); A. 
John Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993); and Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy.” For a more 
detailed account of Lockean political voluntarism, see (this chapter’s) Section 2.3, as well as 
Chapter 3. 
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resulting state of affairs will be intolerable. In due course, then, self-interested 
individuals will come to understand that it is in their interest to agree among 
themselves to have neither. Consequently they will, through multilateral acts of 
consent, agree to covenants and laws that oblige them to limit their self-
interested behaviour (in order to avoid these extremes). Justice, Glaucon 
concludes, is merely what the agreed-upon laws command, and men agree with 
one another to accept those laws because it is in their interest to do so.27 
Admittedly, the social contract view represented by Glaucon is rather sketchy 
and rudimentary in form, and what is more, he merely offers this view for 
Socrates to refute, not to defend (as opposed to the contract view presented by 
Socrates in the Crito). Nonetheless, by appealing to the ideas (1) of self-interest as 
the central human motivation, (2) of covenanting among such self-interested 
individuals and (3) of a pre-political situation (at which he implicitly hints by 
claiming that justice originates in a first covenant), Glaucon roughly anticipates 
the position actually defended by later social contract theorists (particularly 
Thomas Hobbes, James M. Buchanan and David Gauthier, as we shall see below). 
Having analysed both of Plato’s dialogues independently of one another, we 
can conclude that each contains some ideas that were to play a significant role in 
later social contract theories. A comparison between both dialogues, however, 
enables me to highlight a further important aspect of a social contract theory. In 
both Plato’s Crito and Republic, political obligations are grounded in the 
deliberate and voluntary performance of particular consensual transactions by 
individuals. Still, the mere fact that a political obligation is based on a consensual 
transaction does not necessarily warrant talk of a social contract; it is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition. After all, the transaction in question can, but 
certainly need not be, social or contractual in nature. Transactions can be divided 
into two kinds: unilateral and reciprocal. A unilateral transaction creates a set of 
obligations for the person who made it (and normally a set of correlated rights for 
the person to whom the transaction is made), but it does not create obligations 
for other persons. Though this kind of transaction can be understood in 
consensual terms, e.g. when it is based on a deliberate and voluntary decision of 
the person performing it, the unilateral nature of such a consensual act makes it 
impossible to characterise the transaction as a contractual one. For contractual 
transactions are by definition reciprocal. This means that they are based on the 
idea of a quid pro quo, i.e. something given for something received – what persons 
exchange are called “considerations” in common law – and thereby create a set of 
rights and obligations, mutually, for all persons involved. The undertaking 
resulting from a reciprocal transaction is properly called a “contract”; it is an 
                                                   
27 Plato, The Republic, trans. R. E. Allen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 358b-359b. 
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exchange of considerations or promises, by which each contracting party acquires 
an obligation to act in a particular way, and a correlated right that the other 
contracting parties also act in a particular way. This reciprocal relationship 
between parties is put forward by social contract theory as the ultimate ground of 
legitimate political authority. 
In both of Plato’s dialogues the kind of consensual transaction involved is 
clearly reciprocal. What distinguishes them from one another, however, is the 
kind of reciprocal transaction involved. Reciprocal transactions can be divided 
into bilateral and multilateral undertakings, each corresponding with a particular 
kind of contract theory: an individual contract view and a genuinely social 
contract view.28 In the former, legitimate sets of obligations and/or institutions 
(e.g. political obligations, states or constitutional rules) originate from a series of 
bilateral or private agreements among separate pairs of individuals. This kind of 
contract view is evidently present in Plato’s Crito, where Socrates, through his 
continued residence in Athens, binds himself independently of any other citizen 
to the city and its laws.29 In a proper social contract view, by contrast, the sets of 
obligations and/or institutions in question are grounded in a multilateral or 
public agreement among all individuals involved (instead of paired subsets of the 
total set of individuals involved).30 This is, as we have seen above, precisely the 
case with the contractual account of the origin and nature of morality sketched by 
Glaucon in Plato’s Republic. 
Though Glaucon’s contractarian view is ultimately rejected, this does not 
diminish the fact that we find a distinctively “social” element being incorporated 
into the idea of agreement in Plato’s Republic; a notion that is not present in his 
Crito. It is with the introduction of a “social contract” that a new moral tradition 
was born and would, from that moment on, be developed in various ways by 
philosophers. It is to these ways that we should turn now. 
In Epicurianism (named after its founder Epicurus), a classical (i.e. ancient 
Greek) philosophical tradition, we find the next rudimentary outline of a social 
contract theory. Epicureans endorsed a hedonist theory according to which 
human beings are psychologically predisposed to maximise pleasure and 
minimise pain. Consequently, the goodness or badness of objects or states of 
affairs for a particular individual consists wholly in the pleasant or unpleasant 
                                                   
28 Here, I follow James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000), pp. 43-44; and Freeman, “Contractarianism in Ethics and 
Political Philosophy.” 
29 For a contemporary example of this kind of contract view, see: Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 12-17. 
30 All of the famous philosophers (with whom we will in one way or another be concerned in this 
dissertation), such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Rawls, Scanlon, Gauthier and Buchanan, 
are genuine social contract theorists. 
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experiences they generate for him. Epicureans advanced a social contract theory 
not unlike that developed by Glaucon – it is, indeed, nothing more than a 
reiteration of his Sophistic social contract view. In their view, political 
community, and in particular the conception of justice that is supposed to 
regulate it, is based on nothing more than a social agreement among self-
interested individuals to band together for mutual protection. Given individuals’ 
natural (hedonist) inclinations, Epicurus argued, justice arises from “a pledge of 
reciprocal usefulness, neither to harm one another nor be harmed.”31 Individuals 
will enter into such a political association because it enables them to avoid pain. 
By adopting a (1) psychological egoist conception of practical rationality, and (2) 
by stressing the conventional character of political society and justice, 
Epicureanism continued the contractual line of reasoning we already 
encountered in Plato’s Republic. 
The Stoics, however, constituting another classical philosophical tradition 
(founded by Zeno), rejected this line of reasoning. They argued against the 
Epicureans that political society and justice are not conventional but natural. 
Their claim that some object or state of affairs is natural can be understood by 
taking a closer look at the underlying, and therefore more fundamental, 
framework of the natural law tradition. Stoics endorse the idea that there exists an 
independent, knowable moral order. According to this moral realist view, certain 
objects or states of affairs are part of the natural moral order of things, an order 
which can be apprehended through rational intuition of the so-called “natural 
laws.” These natural as opposed to conventional laws consist of a set of natural 
rights and correlated duties, examples of which are the natural duty not to harm 
or to kill another person without just cause, the natural duty to help others in 
distress and the natural duty to keep promises.32 Contrary to the psychological 
egoist conception of practical rationality implicit in the views of Glaucon and 
Epicurus, the Stoics endorsed an alternative, epistemological conception of 
practical rationality, namely as an individual’s capacity for apprehending the 
natural laws and drawing inferences from these for the general regulation of his 
actions in daily life through rational intuition (regardless of the possible impact 
this might have on his experiences, painful or otherwise). Against this 
background, then, it is clear that the Stoics’ claim that political society and justice 
                                                   
31 Brad Inwood, and L. P. Gerson, trans., Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), A5.XXXI. 
32 A natural right is possessed equally by all men (who are capable of choice or rational agency) 
in virtue of their humanity; and it is a right that, as opposed to other moral rights, holds 
unconditionally. Here I closely follow Hart and Rawls, who both provide excellent discussions of 
natural rights. See Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?,” The 
Philosophical Review, 64 (1955), pp. 175-191; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), sec. 19. 
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are natural refers to a natural law which stipulates that individuals have a natural 
duty to live with each other in political union according to certain precepts of 
justice. 
The same nature-convention debate (which we find not only between 
Epicureans and Stoics, but, as Brian R. Nelson shows, throughout ancient Greek 
philosophy33) can be found in Roman political philosophy. This can be seen by 
looking at the ideas developed by one of the most eminent philosophers of the 
Roman period, Marcus Tullius Cicero (who was an influential statesman as well). 
In his well-known dialogue Commonwealth (or De Republica), the members of a 
philosophical debate group known as the “Scipionic Circle” discuss the ideal 
political society. Scipio (who reflects Cicero’s own views) starts the discussion of 
the best form of constitution for political society with defining the commonwealth 
(i.e. political society). “The commonwealth,” he says: 
 
(...) is the people’s affair; and the people is not every group of men, 
associated in any manner, but is the coming together of a considerable 
number of men who are united by a common agreement about law and 
rights and by the desire to participate in mutual advantages.34 
 
For our purposes, it is interesting to focus on the way in which a number of 
individuals become a political unity. At first sight, it might be thought that Scipio’s 
definition of the commonwealth leaves no room for interpretation at all because 
it implies a contractual theory of the origin of political society. Indeed, this is 
precisely what Philus, one of the more prominent discussants, suggests. In a way 
that is very much reminiscent of the positions defended by both Glaucon and 
Epicureans, Philus argues that people contract with one another to form a 
political society because it is in their self-interest to do so. It is their fear of the 
anti-social tendencies of mankind and its love for injustice that makes it rational 
for individuals to unite themselves for mutual protection from one another. 
Ultimately, then, political society is not natural; there is no natural moral order of 
things. Rather, it reflects nothing more than this kind of conventional justice that 
results from self-interested social agreement.35 
On closer inspection, however, matters are not so clear-cut as Philus wants to 
make us believe. It is precisely to this extent that Laelius, the third important 
participant in the debate, accuses Philus of reading into Scipio’s definition of the 
                                                   
33 Brian R. Nelson, Western Political Thought. From Socrates to the Age of Ideology (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1996),  p. 84. 
34 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Commonwealth, trans. G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith (New York: 
Macmillan, 1976), p. 129. 
35 Ibid., p. 210. 
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commonwealth a contractual account of the origin of political society that is in no 
way implied by it. On the alternative interpretation he offers, the “common 
agreement” on which the commonwealth is founded and the “mutual advantages” 
that are secured by that agreement, should not be understood in contractual 
terms. Rather, and in Stoic fashion, Laelius argues that rational intuition into the 
natural moral order of things yields knowledge of the unchangeable and true 
natural laws. These natural laws reveal that human beings are (as Aristotle had 
already taught) by nature “political animals” and they provide the substance of 
the requirements of justice that apply to all political societies. Justice is indeed 
(partially) defined in terms of mutual advantage but what constitutes mutual 
advantage is explicated not by convention but instead by natural law. Likewise, 
common agreement on precepts of justice should not be understood in terms of a 
number of individuals deliberately and voluntarily binding themselves to one 
another through multilateral acts of consent, but rather as being implied by 
natural law itself. That is to say, if one truly grasps the natural moral order of 
things, then it follows that membership of one’s political society is required and 
that one has a moral obligation to obey the positive laws of that society (provided 
that these are consistent with natural law). So, on Laelius’s view, consent is not 
voluntarily given by persons but imputed upon them by natural law. (In other 
words, persons’ membership of political society and their obligation to obey its 
laws are grounded not in consent but natural law). Contrary to what Philus 
claims, then, political society and justice are natural; not conventional.36 
There is considerable disagreement in the literature concerning the position 
actually defended by Cicero (or his alter ego, Scipio) himself. Some, as Walter 
Nicgorski thoroughly demonstrates, have viewed Cicero as the last of the major 
ancient (i.e. Stoic) political thinkers before the Christian assimilation of important 
currents of classical moral and political thought in the medieval period, whereas 
others consider him as the first modern political philosopher, a social contract 
theorist indeed.37 This much is clear, however: in Cicero’s philosophical work we 
find a number of ideas (most notably those articulated by Philus) that would 
prove to lend themselves very well for social contract theories yet to be 
developed. In fact, Cicero had a profound impact on Roman and ultimately 
Western social and political thought by integrating Roman ideals with earlier 
Greek philosophy. It was largely through him that this ancient Greek tradition 
                                                   
36 Ibid., pp. 215-216. 
37 Walter Nicgorski, “Cicero: A Social Contract Thinker?,” paper delivered at the 2005 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington D.C., 2005), pp. 1-28, esp. pp. 
1-7. 
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was transmitted to the Western world after the demise of Rome; to begin with the 
medieval Western world.38 
2.2 Medieval Social Contract Theory 
In the medieval period, social contract theories have been developed largely in 
response to the doctrine of the divine right of kings. According to this religious 
doctrine of legitimate royal political authority, the monarch is not subject to any 
worldly authority, but instead derives his right to rule directly and exclusively 
from the will of God (as opposed to the will of his people,39 the aristocracy or any 
other estate of the realm). Since the doctrine entails that the monarch only 
answers to God (since God alone can judge his moral qualities), it follows that any 
attempt to resist the divinely ordained institution of the monarchy (e.g. by 
deposing or restricting the monarch) runs contrary to God’s will and therefore 
constitutes a sacrilegious act. 
Medieval social contract theorists, such as Manegold of Lautenbach, Engelbert 
of Volkersdorf and Mario Salamonio, challenged this legitimisation of political 
authority. They did so on the normative ground that all men are naturally free and 
equal – a ground which was, as Michael Lessnoff observes, already widely 
accepted by scholars in medieval Europe, largely through the influence of Roman 
law and the writings of the Christian fathers.40 The relationship between 
medieval social contract theory and the doctrine of the divine right of kings can 
be characterised both by continuity and discontinuity. Their relationship is 
characterised by continuity in the sense that both doctrines are embedded in the 
aforementioned framework of the natural law tradition (which they inherited 
from the ancient Greeks and Romans, most notably the Stoics and Cicero). As 
such, they share a commitment to the moral realist idea that there exists an 
independent, knowable moral order. Furthermore, they both understand this 
moral order in religious terms. This means that they locate the ultimate basis for 
                                                   
38 Nelson, Western Political Thought. From Socrates to the Age of Ideology,  pp. 69, 81. See also 
Giovanni Reale, The Systems of the Hellenistic Age. Third Edition, ed./trans. J. R. Catan (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 357. 
39 Relevant here is a frequently quoted phrase of Alcuin of York, (735-804), the principal scholar 
of the Carolingian Renaissance: “Vox populi, vox Dei.” Taken by itself, this phrase appears to be an 
early call for popular sovereignty. This meaning of the phrase, however, is opposite to that 
actually intended by Alcuin. In a letter to Charlemagne (in 800), he writes that “those people 
should not be listened to who keep saying the voice of the people is the voice of God (Vox populi, 
vox Dei), since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness.” See Alcuin of York, 
Alcuin of York – His Life and Letters, ed. S. Allott (York: William Sessions Limited, 1974). 
40 Michael Lessnoff, “Introduction: Social Contract,” in Social Contract Theory, ed. id. (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 3. See also Michael Lessnoff, Social Contract (London: Macmillan, 
1986), pp. 23-24. 
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the public justification of moral claims, such as someone’s (or some institution’s) 
claim to legitimate political authority, in the self-evidence of God’s natural laws. 
Finally, both positions endorse the same epistemological conception of practical 
rationality (which we encountered in our discussion of Stoic thought as well): 
individuals’ capacity for rationally intuiting the natural laws and drawing 
inferences from these for the general regulation of their daily behaviour – though 
they can and usually do differ with respect to who are ultimately capable of 
apprehending God’s laws (e.g. any individual or a selective person or group of 
persons, such as the monarch or the Church). 
In another, and more important sense, however, the relationship between 
medieval social contract theory and the doctrine of the divine right of kings is 
characterised by discontinuity. Despite their similarities, they fundamentally 
differ with respect to the proper interpretation of God’s natural laws concerning 
the legitimacy of political authority. Defenders of the divine right theory endorsed 
the view that the king had a natural right to rule, which correlated with a natural 
duty on the part of the king’s subjects to obey his commands. Medieval social 
contract theorists, by contrast, held the view that mankind’s natural freedom 
referred to a natural right. The relevant natural right here is the natural right to 
freedom or, alternatively formulated, the natural right to personal self-
determination: the right to live one’s life as one sees fit, without interference from 
others, within the limits of natural law.41 Medieval social contract theorists 
anticipated a distinction frequently made by early modern and even 
contemporary social contract theorists. They, as A. John Simmons puts it, 
“recognized a distinction between two sorts of moral bonds, the natural and the 
“special,” and denied that political obligation could be natural.”42 On this view, an 
individual can give up his natural freedom and become bound by political 
obligations only by deliberately and voluntarily entering special transactions or 
relationships. These special obligations are distinct from natural duties in that 
they do not hold unconditionally for all men in virtue of their humanity, but 
relatively to those individuals only who, by having performed certain voluntary 
acts, such as consenting, have clearly expressed their intention to become so 
bound. Our political bonds, then, are special obligations; and it is therefore up to 
individuals to determine for themselves (in the light of their desires and 
circumstances), without interference from others, whether to acquire political 
bonds or not. In other words, the natural right to personal self-determination 
                                                   
41 Cf. Anthony Black, Political Thought in Europe 1250-1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), pp. 28-33. 
42 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, p. 63. 
 31 
 
entails a right to political self-determination.43 By rationally intuiting God’s 
natural laws in such a way as to disentangle individuals’ political bonds from the 
realm of natural duties and to make them the object of special transactions 
between free and equal individuals, medieval social contract theory (and all 
subsequent incarnations of it) marked a radical break with its predecessor’s 
doctrine of the divine right of kings.44 Indeed, the idea that divine and natural law 
support the view that legitimate political authority ultimately lies in the voluntary 
and contractual submission of the ruled to the ruler would soon become, as Otto 
von Gierke aptly puts it, a “philosophical axiom” in medieval Europe.45 
Notice that medieval social contract theory also marked a fundamental break 
with the traditional way of framing the nature-convention debate. In the ancient 
Greek and Roman period morality was thought of as either conventional or 
natural. However, by making a distinction between natural and special bonds, 
and by subsuming political bonds under the latter category (i.e. by claiming that 
an individual can acquire political bonds only by deliberately and voluntarily 
entering special transactions or relationships), medieval political philosophers 
offered a synthesis. In their view, that part of morality which concerns individuals’ 
political obligations is conventional, whereas the remaining part of morality 
(concerning, among others, the requirements of justice) is natural. Of course, the 
ways and extent to which political bonds were based on “contractual 
transactions” varies, as we shall see shortly, widely among medieval political 
philosophers. Let us therefore take a closer look at the various stages in the 
development of the idea of a social contract in the medieval period. 
The earliest medieval contract theoretical analysis of political authority is (to 
our present knowledge) provided by Manegold of Lautenbach. In his Ad 
Gebehardum Liber of 1085, this Alsatian monk, who took up scholarly disputes on 
behalf of Pope Gregory VII against his enemy the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV, 
offers a comprehensive discussion of kingship. He makes the following, original 
and frequently commented, argument: 
                                                   
43 Cf. Black, Political Thought in Europe 1250-1450, p. 30; Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the 
Middle Age, translated with an introduction by F. W. Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1913), pp. 37-61. 
44 Moreover, by doing so social contract theorists enabled themselves to transcend what is 
nowadays known as the authority-autonomy antonym. According to this antonym, the existence 
of political authority (royal or otherwise), which implies some individual’s or institution’s right 
to rule over others, is logically incompatible with individuals’ autonomy, which implies the duty 
to be free. By resting the legitimacy of political authority on the agreement of the ruled, however, 
social contract theorists ensured that the political obligation undertaken by the ruled to obey 
their ruler expressed, instead of negated, their nature as autonomous beings. For the classic 
expression of the authority-autonomy antonym, see Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism 
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 3-19. 
45 Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, pp. 39-40. 
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King is not a name of nature but a title of office: nor does the people 
exalt him so high above it in order to give him the power of playing the 
tyrant in its midst, but to defend it from tyranny. So soon as he begins to 
act the tyrant, is it not plain that he falls from the dignity granted to 
him? Since it is evident that he has broken the contract by virtue of 
which he was appointed. If one should engage a man for a fair wage to 
tend swine, and he finds means not to tend but to steal them, would one 
not remove him from his charge? (...) Since no one can create himself 
emperor or king, the people elevates a certain person over itself to this 
end, that he govern and rule it according to right reason, give to each 
one his own, protect the good, destroy the wicked, and administer 
justice to every man. But if he violates the contract under which he was 
established to set in order, then the people is justly and reasonably 
released from its obligation to obey him.46 
 
What we find here is a general contractual analysis of the political authority 
relationship between two contracting parties: the ruler and his people. The 
contract Manegold has in mind typically takes the form of a periodically re-
affirmed agreement in an already existing, ongoing society between the ruler on 
the one side and all of his subjects on the other, and with God as their ultimate 
witness. The periodic re-affirmation of political authority is symbolised by 
consecutive coronation oaths establishing a conditional authority of specific 
rulers over their people. The authority, as Manegold’s quote shows, is conditional 
in the sense that it is based on the ruler’s recognition of certain limits to his 
authority. His authority exists only to meet certain basic interests of his people 
(e.g. the preservation of certain liberties), and is therefore morally valid only for 
as long as he acts in their interests.47 
Manegold offers what might be called a rudimentary form of social contract 
theory. This is so, first, because it is unclear whether the role of the notion of 
agreement employed in his account is merely symbolic or justificatory (or 
legitimising) – indeed, it is highly doubtful that agreement played any 
fundamental role in early medieval social contract theories.48 The second reason 
why this is a rudimentary account of social contract has to do with its limited 
                                                   
46 Quoted in D. G. Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel (London: Sonnenschein, 1983), p. 203; and 
Alexander James Carlyle, Medieval Political Theory in the West (London: Blackwood, 1915), pp. 
163-166. 
47 Manegold’s Ad Gebehardum Liber is important not only because it provides us with the earliest 
medieval contractual account of political authority, but also because in it we find the roots of the 
well-known theory of the “King’s Two Bodies.” See Ernst H. Kantorowicz’s seminal The King's 
Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
48 See, for instance, John Wiedhofft Gough, John Locke’s Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p. 59; and Lessnoff, “Introduction: Social Contract,” p. 6. 
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ambitions. It only aspired to provide a contractual explanation of individuals’ 
motivations for binding themselves to a particular person as their ruler. It did not 
aim to explain the origin of political authority, i.e. individuals’ motivations for 
establishing political authority in the first place. 
In so far as there can be any doubts concerning the role and object of 
agreement, these were certainly removed as the tradition of the social contract 
grew more mature. For later medieval social contract theorists introduced an 
idea that was, especially in the early modern or Enlightenment period of the 
social contract, to become known as the “original contract.” In early medieval 
social contract theories, such as Manegold’s, the idea of a contract is used as a 
model for analysing existing political authority relations between the ruler and 
ruled in an ongoing (i.e. already founded) society. Implicit in this view was the 
idea that membership of a particular political society, as opposed to the ruler’s 
exercise of political authority over the members of that society, is not voluntary 
but natural (and hence did not require an additional contractual legitimisation). 
Early medieval social contract theorists, then, did not completely abandon the 
ancient Greek and Roman (or, to be more precise, Stoic and Ciceronean) thesis of 
the naturalness of political society. They only rejected one aspect of it: the alleged 
naturalness of the political authority relation between the ruler and his subjects. 
By contrast, late medieval social contract theorists, such as Engelbert of 
Volkersdorf and Mario Salamonio, did reject the thesis of the naturalness of 
political society altogether – indeed, the very idea has been almost universally 
rejected by later social contract theorists (late medieval, early modern and 
contemporary alike).49 Instead, they, in one way or another, took the idea of 
mankind’s natural freedom to its logical consequences (or extremes, one might 
say). According to them, not only the specific political authority relation between 
the ruler and his people, but also the original establishment of political society 
has its basis in a contract. 
In the fourteenth century (in about 1310), Engelbert of Volkersdorf was the 
first to go beyond Manegold by offering a contract theoretical analysis of the 
origin of political authority. He argued that all kingdoms originated when 
individuals, following instinct and reason, chose among themselves one 
                                                   
49 There is, to my knowledge, only one important exception. The contractualist type of social 
contract theory – which has its roots in Immanuel Kant’s and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings, 
and which has nowadays been defended by John Rawls and Thomas Michael Scanlon – is 
premised (among other things) on the rejection of the idea of political society as a voluntary 
association. Rawls is most explicit on this point. See his A Theory of Justice, p. 296; and Political 
Liberalism, with a new Introduction and the “Reply to Habermas” (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), pp. 136, 276. In Chapter 5, especially Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, I provide 
a more detailed discussion of contractualists’ rejection of the thesis of political voluntarism and 
explain its relevance for the contractualist quest for the legitimacy of the people. 
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individual as ruler and jointly bound themselves to him in a contract of subjection 
(“pactum subiectionis”), which they made in order to be ruled, protected and 
preserved.50 In making this move, Engelbert (at least implicitly) incorporated into 
the contractual framework the notion of a pre-political phase in human history – 
what early modern (or Enlightenment) social contract theorists, such as Hobbes, 
Pufendorf, Locke and Rousseau, were to call the “state of nature.”  
Two centuries later, Mario Salamonio wrote the De Principatu (between 
1511-1513). What is remarkable about this text is that Salamonio adds a 
significant element to the social contract theoretical framework introduced by 
Engelbert. Both appeal to a pre-political phase in the history of mankind in which 
individuals lived prior to their having deliberately and voluntarily acted in ways 
which bound them politically. It is by incorporating this baseline into their social 
contract theories, that Engelbert and Salamonio (as well as all later medieval 
social contract theorists) tried to explain the origin of political authority. Their 
explanations, however, take different forms. 
In one form, introduced by Engelbert, the original contract in the state of 
nature concerned a special transaction between a group of individuals on the one 
hand and a ruler on the other. The consensual transaction in question created a 
ruling authority, and established the conditions for the legitimate exercise of its 
political authority. Under conditions acceptable to all, both the group of 
individuals and the ruler, through multilateral acts of consent, bound themselves 
to one another, and consequently left the state of nature for political society. 
(Depending on the particular social contract theory involved, this original 
contract is or is not thereafter re-affirmed by elective succession.) What is 
important to see here is that the formation of the political community – the 
people indeed! –  is not prior to the creation of political authority. Instead, 
political society is created by means of a single original contract establishing the 
legitimate political authority relation between a group of individuals and a ruler – 
the so-called “Herrschaftsvertrag.”51 
According to Salamonio’s alternative view,52 the original establishment of 
legitimate political authority is the result of a process in which two consecutive 
contracts are involved. The first contract is that by which the political community 
                                                   
50 See George Bingham Fowler, Intellectual Interests of Engelbert of Admont, second edition (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 167-170; and Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle 
Age, p. 39n. 
51 I borrow this classic term from Otto von Gierke. See his Natural Law and the Theory of Society. 
Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), pp. 48, 107-108. This kind of original 
contract is also found in Hobbes’s Leviathan. 
52 Mario Salamonio, De Principatu (Milan: Giuffre Editore, 1955), esp. pp. 27-29. See also John 
Wiedhofft Gough, The Social Contract: A Critical Study of its Development (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1957), p. 47; and Lessnoff, “Introduction: Social Contract,” pp. 7-8. 
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itself is originally founded and its fundamental laws are established. This 
particular contract, which is known as the “Gesellschaftsvertrag,”53 specifies the 
conditions under which previously unattached individuals in the state of nature, 
through multilateral acts of consent, decide to bind themselves together as a 
people and set themselves apart from other individuals, who are subsequently 
excluded. The second, posterior contract is the “Herrschaftsvertrag,” by which 
“the people” establish political authority.54 
What is interesting about Salamonio’s introduction of two consecutive 
original contracts is not only the fact that he makes an innovative contribution to 
the tradition of the social contract. His social contract approach is not only 
interesting for what it offers but also for what it fails to offer. Original contract 
views, such as those developed by Engelbert and Salamonio, beg the question as 
to how a group of previously unattached individuals can (legitimately) become a 
unity capable of contracting with a ruler in the first place.55 The kind of 
contractual explanation of the origin of political authority involved in Engelbert’s 
contract view completely ignores this question, and so implicitly works from the 
assumption of a given people. Salamonio’s dual contract view, on the other hand, 
seems to hold out the explicit promise of addressing this question. In his 
alternative view, after all, the Herrschaftsvertrag is supposed to explain the origin 
of political authority, and the prior Gesellschaftsvertrag is meant to explain how 
the individuals in the state of nature can become a unity capable of engaging in 
political authority relationships. In other words, we might say that the former’s 
aim is to provide us with an account of the legitimacy of political authority, while 
the latter’s purpose is to give us an account of the legitimacy of the people. 
Unfortunately, this is only apparently so. The question of the legitimacy of the 
people is addressed not nearly as thoroughly as could have been done by 
Salamonio – or any other proponent of the second contractual explanation of the 
origin of political authority for that matter. Though proponents of the second, 
alternative view stress the importance of providing an account of the legitimate 
constitution of the people, and claim that this account should be contractual, they 
                                                   
53 Ibid. This kind of dual original contract can also be found in the early modern (or 
Enlightenment) social contract theories of Pufendorf and Locke. See Samuel Pufendorf, On the 
Duty of Man and Citizen, ed. J. Tully and trans. by M. Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), esp. bk. II, ch. 6; and Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Treatise II, sec. 
95-99. 
54 What distinguishes this Herrschaftsvertrag from the one involved in the singular contractual 
explanation of the origin of political authority is that rulers are bound to the fundamental laws 
that have already been established by the people in the prior Gesellschaftsvertrag. Limitations 
on the ruler’s political authority are not the result of contractual negotiations between him and 
his people; instead the ruler’s authority is limited by the people in advance. 
55 See Otto von Gierke, The Development of Political Theory (London: Allen & Unwin, 1939), pp. 
98-102. In this book he argues for the logical necessity of some such explanation. 
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nevertheless fail to take these considerations to their logical consequences. After 
all, one would have expected them to ask the fundamental question concerning 
the legitimate (contractual) demarcation of the group of individuals that is to 
constitute itself as a people in the first place. Instead of asking this question, 
however, they simply presuppose what requires legitimisation, namely the 
existence of this delimited group of individuals, a people. It is a consequence of 
their doing so that they reduce the question of the legitimate constitution of the 
people to the question of the conditions under which a given (i.e. already 
constituted) group of individuals could agree among themselves to co-exist in a 
political community. Despite appearances, then, the effect of this is that the 
second kind of contractual explanation of the origin of political authority, when 
analysed in terms of the legitimate constitution of the people, does not 
fundamentally differ in the end from either the first kind of contractual 
explanation or the rudimental contractual analysis of the political authority 
relation between the ruler and his people in an already existing, ongoing political 
society. In one way or another, each of them works from the assumption of a given 
people. 
2.3 Early Modern Social Contract Theory 
In the previous section, I have argued that Engelbert and Salamonio incorporated 
into the contractual framework the idea of a pre-political phase in human history. 
In doing so, they introduced an element that would come to lie at the very heart 
of all social contract theories to be developed – early modern and contemporary 
alike. It would in various sophisticated ways feature prominently in all social 
contract theories to come. Early modern (or Enlightenment) social contract 
theorists, such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, famously 
referred to this pre-political situation as the “state of nature.” The state of nature 
describes a situation – actual or hypothetical56 – in which individuals live prior to 
their having deliberately and voluntarily acted in ways which bind them 
politically. Their contractual framework, then, consists of two parts: a particular 
characterisation (1) of the anarchic state of nature, and (2) of the nature (i.e. 
practical rationality) of the individuals in it. Based on mutually exclusive and 
ultimately incompatible interpretations of each of these two elements, early 
                                                   
56 In this and the next two sections (2.4 and 2.5), the difference between actual and hypothetical 
social contract theories will be the object of discussion. In the first case, the state of nature refers 
to a state of affairs that historically existed, and in which a number of parties have, as a matter of 
fact, signed an original contract. In its latter meaning, the state of nature is a counterfactual 
device that shows what moral principles idealised agents under similarly idealised 
circumstances would choose. 
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modern philosophers developed a variety of conflicting contractual accounts of 
the legitimacy of political authority. They all explained how individuals, endowed 
with a particular capacity for practical rationality, and subject to the 
circumstances of a particular state of nature, agreed with one another to found a 
political society and subject themselves to a higher political authority. 
Hobbes’s state of nature, for instance, refers to a pre-political situation in 
which individuals have a natural right to everything, and in which human 
interaction is marked by infrequent fighting and constant fear of violent death. 
Under these conditions, Hobbes argued in his Leviathan, self-interested 
individuals, concerned with their own preservation, will agree that it is mutually 
advantageous to engage in stable cooperative interaction by founding a political 
society in which they lay down every right, and transfer it to an almost absolute 
political authority to which they subject themselves as the sole keeper of their 
safety and peace.57 
In his Second Treatise of Government, Locke argued that human nature is not 
such that a Hobbesian war is inevitable. Human interaction in Locke’s state of 
nature is more social because it is regulated by a natural law according to which 
individuals do not have a natural right to everything, but rather a natural duty to 
preserve mankind both negatively and positively. In the Lockean state of nature 
conflicts arise as well, of course, but not necessarily, or even primarily, because of 
individuals’ tendency to pursue their interests in ways incompatible with the 
freedom of others (as is the case in the Hobbesian state of nature), but mainly 
because of genuine disagreements on the proper interpretation of the natural 
law. The inconveniences caused by these disagreements, Locke argued, will lead 
individuals to agree with one another to found a political society in which they lay 
down their natural right to execute the natural law, and transfer it to a common 
political authority to which they subject themselves as the supreme interpreter, 
judge, and enforcer of the natural law.58 
Despite their different characterisations of the state of nature and the 
contracting parties in it, there is an important element that early modern social 
contract thinkers (such as Hobbes and Locke) – as well as their medieval 
predecessors – are frequently supposed to have in common: that the original 
contract referred to an actual historical event. This, however, is dubious. Though 
Locke offers a clear example of an actual contract view – he cites historical 
examples showing that “there can be little room for doubt” about the fact that all 
                                                   
57 I refer to Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). I will henceforth, when referring to it, mention the relevant chapter, followed by the 
relevant original page number. In this case: Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14, 15, 17, pp. 64-65, 80, 87-
88. 
58 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Treatise II, sec. 4-13, 87-90, 95-99, 124-131. 
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governments, in so far as their origin was peaceful, have a contractual 
foundation59 – it is highly doubtful that all medieval and early modern social 
contract theorists grounded the original constitution of political society (and 
political authority) in an actual moment of consensual founding.60 Hobbes, for 
instance, writes that he believes that the condition of mankind has never 
generally been that of a state of nature, nor that of the accompanying state of war. 
Nonetheless, he argues, it may be “perceived what manner of life there would be, 
where there no common Power to feare; by the manner of life, which men that 
have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a 
civill Warre.”61 This suggests that Hobbes endorsed a hypothetical contract view. 
In his view, the point of referring to a state nature of nature lies in its usefulness 
as an analytical or heuristic device, a device that is meant to explicate why 
hypothetical persons (of a certain kind) under hypothetical circumstances (of a 
certain kind) would agree to unite themselves politically and subject themselves 
to a common political authority. 
Whether all medieval and early modern social contract thinkers can 
justifiably be taken as having offered actual contract theories or not, the idea of 
an actual social contract itself was soon to become the object of a serious 
criticism. The classic formulation of this objection can be found in David Hume’s 
famous essay “Of the Original Contract.” He criticised the idea of an original 
contract for being redundant and historically absurd. Let us take a closer look at 
the arguments he offers for his view. Doing so is important because it makes 
possible the introduction of other elements and interpretations of the idea of a 
social contract. More specifically, it enables me to analyse the nature of the first of 
three types of social contract theory I have promised to develop in this chapter: 
actual social contract theory. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, I shall complete the threefold 
                                                   
59 Ibid., sec. 100-104. Locke’s social contract theory is generally understood as the paradigmatic 
example of an actual contract theory. The only interpretation of Locke as a hypothetical contract 
theorist (that I know of) is provided by Hannah Pitkin in her “Obligation and Consent – I,” 
American Political Science Review, 59 (1965), pp. 990-999. A. John Simmons, however, has 
convincingly argued against the position defended by Pitkin in his “Tacit Consent and Political 
Obligation,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 5 (1976), pp. 282-285. 
60 Though there were, of course, many social contract theorists who, just like Locke, defended the 
claim that their appeal to an original contract was historically accurate. In the Vindiciae Contra 
Tyrannos (written in 1579), for instance, “Stephanus Junius Brutus,” a pseudonymous French 
Huguenot, invokes as evidence Old Testament descriptions of such covenants at the 
inauguration of Hebrew kings. See Stephanus Junius Brutus, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, ed. and 
trans. G. Garnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Likewise, Baruch Spinoza cites 
the establishment of the Hebrew state, with Moses as the absolute sovereign, as a historical 
example of a social contract. See his Theological-Political Treatise, in Spinoza. Complete Works, 
ed. M. L. Morgan and trans. S. Shirley (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), ch. 17, 
pp. 540-541. 
61 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, p. 63. 
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typology by discussing the basic elements of hypothetical social contract theory 
(which comprises two types). 
In his essay, Hume argues first that the appeal to an original contract is 
redundant. When we ask the question “Why should we obey our government?,” 
social contract theorists’ answer is, because “We have promised to obey our 
government” and “We should keep our promises.” Hume challenges this 
argument by asking the question “Why are we bound to keep our word?” In his 
view, social contract theorists find themselves embarrassed when confronted 
with this question. The reason for this is, he thinks, that any answer to this 
question would “immediately, without any circuit,” i.e. irrelevant consensual 
detour, account for our political obligations. Hume argues that we should keep 
our word because “society could otherwise not subsist.” This, moreover, is also a 
sufficient answer to the question “Why should we obey our government?” Hume 
claims that both the obligation to obey one’s government and to keep one’s 
promises “stand precisely on the same foundation”: they are both necessary 
conditions for civilised life. Since our political obligations stem from the obvious 
advantages (i.e. utility) of government, there is consequently no need to derive 
political obligations from an original contract.62 
Though the appeal to an original contract is certainly not without problems 
(as we shall see shortly), this specific Humean argument against it fails. This can 
be seen by considering Harry Beran’s reply to Hume’s critique.63 According to 
Beran, Hume fails to distinguish between two kinds of questions: “Why do we 
have the institution of the state?” and “Why does a particular state stand in a 
particular political authority relation with some particular individuals?” Beran 
argues that it is certainly possible to answer the first question by appealing to the 
state’s utility (i.e. its necessity for civilised life). However, he continues, “the 
utility of the state cannot in itself explain why a particular state stands in an 
authority relation to some particular individuals.”64 Here Beran advances the 
claim that an appeal to the state’s utility as the ground of political obligation 
                                                   
62 David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in David Hume. Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, 
ed. E. F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), pp. 465-487, esp. pp. 480-481. Will Kymlicka 
adopts a similar position. According to him, Hume clearly demonstrated that the very 
considerations which put in doubt the naturalness of individuals’ political obligation to obey 
their rulers equally well put in doubt the naturalness of individuals’ personal obligation to keep 
promises. Consequently, Kymlicka concludes that early modern (or Enlightenment) social 
contract theory was a defective “stop-gap response to the dissolution of the pre-Enlightenment 
ethics – it simply replaced one questionable natural duty with another.” See Will Kymlicka, “The 
Social Contract Tradition,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. P. Singer (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd., 1993), p. 188. 
63 Beran, “In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority,” Ethics, 87 
(1977), pp. 260-271, esp. pp. 264-265. 
64 Ibid., p. 265. 
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cannot meet the so-called “particularity requirement.” This requirement, which is 
almost universally accepted by political philosophers, holds that a theory of 
political obligation must (among other things) be able to bind an individual to one 
particular state above all others, namely the one in which he is a citizen.65 
Framing the answer to the question as to why the state is worth having in terms 
of utility, however, does not yet enable one to meet this requirement. On the 
contrary, instead of binding individuals to their particular state, it binds them to 
all states. Consequently, as Beran argues, an individual’s “political obligation to a 
certain state cannot be explained directly in terms of the utility of the state.”66 By 
adding an original contract to the equation, however, it suddenly becomes 
possible to satisfy the particularity requirement. After all, a contract is, as we 
have seen, a kind of special transaction which creates a set of rights and 
obligations that only bind the parties involved in it; in this case, the particular 
individual and the particular state with which he deliberately and voluntarily gets 
into a political authority relation. Clearly, then, these considerations enable Beran 
to draw the sound conclusion that Hume does not demonstrate that “the 
admittedly speculative appeal to an act of promising is an unnecessary shuffle.”67 
However, even if the original contract is not redundant and instead does have 
justificatory force, one can still wonder about the nature of the relationship of 
actual social contract theory to historical fact. An actual social contract theory 
should not be misunderstood as a purely descriptive and/or explanatory account 
that tries to unravel the historical antecedents of the state.68 This is not to say, 
however, that empirical observations are not a central part of the normative 
framework of actual contract theories, for they clearly are. Classical social 
contract theory was conservative in that it aimed at providing a positive account 
of the legitimacy of existing states (or governments). John Locke was perhaps 
most explicit on this point. In one famous passage of the Two Treatises of 
Government, for instance, he wrote that he wanted “to establish the Throne of our 
Great Restorer, Our present King William; to make good his Title, in the Consent 
of the People.”69 An actual consent theorist, such as Locke, deduces such a 
positive account (of the king’s “Title,” for instance) from two basic premises: (1) a 
normative premise, according to which legitimate states (or governments) ought 
to be grounded in an original contract; and (2) an empirical premise, according to 
                                                   
65 For the classic expression of the particularity requirement, see Simmons, Moral Principles and 
Political Obligations, pp. 31-35. 
66 Beran, “In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority,” p. 265. 
67 Ibid., p. 265. 
68 Gough, The Social Contract: A Critical Study of its Development, p. 4. 
69 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Preface. 
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which all states are, as a matter of historical fact, based on an original contract 
among groups of individuals inhabiting an actually existing state of nature. 
According to Hume, however, social contract theorists’ appeal to an actual 
original contract is historically absurd. This is the second line of criticism he 
develops in his “Of the Original Contract.” Although actual agreement, he writes, 
“is surely the best and most sacred” foundation of legitimate political authority, 
one cannot deny the fact that almost all “governments which exist at present, or 
of which there remains any record in history, have been founded originally, either 
on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or 
voluntary subjection of the people.”70 Furthermore, even if it is historically 
accurate to claim that states (or governments) have their origin in a social 
contract, then this contract cannot create any duties – let alone political 
obligations – for future generations.71 If individuals are naturally free (i.e. have a 
natural right to personal self-determination, a right which includes political self-
determination), then it follows that they cannot be bound by anyone’s consent 
but their own. The only possible exception to this is when the individual who 
gives his consent is authorised by another individual, and as such acts as his 
representative on the matter. But, as Simmons makes clear, “the descendants of 
the “original contractors” could not have authorized the making of the original 
contract!”72 
In defence of actual contract theorists, it must be said that the idea of a 
historical contract is not so absurd as Hume wants to make us believe. In fact, one 
can plausibly interpret quite some historical events in terms of an original 
contract. Think, for instance, of the Conspiracy of the Batavians under Gaius 
(Julius) Civilis (Civilis and the other chiefs of the Batavians agreed with one 
another to ally against the Romans in 69), the Magna Carta in 1215, the 
Mayflower Compact in 1620, the English Glorious Revolution in 1688-1689, the 
Amercian Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the constitution of the 
Batavian Republic in 1795.73 That said, however, this observation does nothing to 
remedy the problem that an actual, historical contract cannot bind future 
generations. 
Social contract theorists can reply to these objections in two ways. The first, 
most radical response would be to give up entirely on the social contract 
theoretical quest for legitimate political authority. Indeed, the Humean critique of 
the social contract in part helps to explain the demise of the theory in the 
nineteenth century. Interestingly, however, there is no reason to adopt this 
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71 Ibid., pp. 470-471. 
72 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, p. 60. 
73 See also note 60. 
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attitude, i.e. to reject social contract theory altogether, because the Humean 
critique need not be fatal for social contract theorists. It seems, to me at least, that 
they still have an alternative option left (which has in one way or another actually 
been chosen by a number of later social contract theorists). 
Social contract theorists can continue to hold on to the requirement that 
legitimate political authority should be grounded in actual agreement, but give 
up, for reasons already discussed, their commitment to the highly problematic 
notion of an actual original contract. This strategy is best characterised as 
“political voluntarist” (which grounds political bonds not narrowly in actual, 
historical agreement but instead more widely in actual, personal agreement, as 
we will see shortly). This strategy has its origin in Locke’s political philosophy. 
Indeed, Locke’s social contract theory constitutes the paradigmatic formulation of 
the voluntarist model of political association. Modern proponents of this 
approach, most notably Harry Beran, Michael Otsuka and A. John Simmons, are all 
indebted to his account. 
According to Locke, the aforementioned natural right of individuals to 
political self-determination underpins the thesis of political voluntarism, 
according to which an individual’s actually given deliberate and free consent is a 
necessary condition for him to acquire political bonds.74 On this approach, the 
political bonds between individuals (or individuals and the state) are no longer 
grounded in an original contract but instead in personal consent. Notwithstanding 
the many problems that are generally associated with Locke’s version of political 
voluntarism (about which I will say more in Chapter 3), Beran, Otsuka and 
Simmons think that these can be overcome (for instance, by re-interpreting or 
reconstructing Locke’s theory).75 
On one interpretation of Lockean political voluntarism, the requirement of 
actual, personal consent constitutes the basis for a positive contractual account of 
political obligation. This account is deduced from two basic premises: (1) a 
normative premise, according to which political society ought to be understood 
as a voluntary association: an entire group of individuals in a given territory is 
subject to the legitimate political authority of a state (or its government or 
institutions) if and only if each member of that group has actually given his 
deliberate and free consent to this subjection; and (2) an empirical premise, 
                                                   
74 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II, 95, 119, 131, 173, 192. 
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according to which all political societies are, as a matter of historical fact, 
voluntary associations. 
This kind of Lockean political voluntarism, however, can be criticised on the 
ground that it fails according to its own standards. The empirical claim can, in 
Humean vein, be rejected because most of us have never been actually given the 
option to consent to our state (or government). If, however, one holds the view 
that Lockean political voluntarism must be capable of generating a positive 
contractual account of political obligation, then one is committed to the view that 
one’s theory has to be able to ground the political obligations of all (if not most) 
citizens of states in acts of personal consent. But if this is correct, then it follows 
that the rejection of the implausible empirical claim spells doom for this view 
(and so nothing is won in comparison to the problematic appeal to an original 
contract). 
The only way out here for actual contract theorists is to reject the 
requirement that their theory should be capable of providing a positive account 
of political obligation. Social contract theory’s aim should not be to establish the 
political obligations of all (if not most) citizens of states, but rather to establish 
the conditions under which individuals can legitimately acquire political bonds. In 
that case, the discrepancy between (normative) theory and practice will result in 
a moral condemnation of the latter. This means that the fact that most of us have 
never been actually given the option to consent to our state (or government) does 
not count as evidence against the moral standard upheld by actual contract 
theorists. It simply means that no actually existing state is legitimate – which is 
not to say that states cannot become (more) legitimate, for they clearly can by 
politically organising themselves in such a way that they approach the Lockean 
ideal voluntary association as closely as possible. It is this interpretation of 
Lockean political voluntarism that I take to be the most plausible one, and to 
which we will turn in Chapter 3 in order to see whether it has the potential for 
solving the problem of the legitimacy of the people. 
Thus far, the historical overview of the tradition of the social contract has 
enabled me to elucidate the nature of one important type of social contract 
theory: Lockean political voluntarism. Before we move on to complete the 
threefold typology by discussing the other two types of social contract theory, 
types that have been developed by contemporary social contract thinkers, I want 
to close this section by discussing two further critiques of social contract theory. I 
have argued that the Humean critique of the social contract in part helps to 
explain the demise of the theory in the nineteenth century. A complete 
explanation, however, should also take into account the Hegelian and Marxist 
critiques. Analysis of both critiques does not only enable me to complete the 
historical overview of the pre-modern era of the social contract, it also makes it 
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possible for me to further highlight some aspects of social contract theory, as well 
as to pave the way for my discussion (in Section 2.4 and 2.5) of the two principal 
ways in which the tradition of the social contract has been revived in the second 
half of the twentieth century: contractualism and contractarianism. 
Let us start, then, with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s objection to social 
contract theory – an objection we also find in the philosophical writings of many 
contemporary communitarians (such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael J. Sandel and 
Charles Taylor76). According to Hegel, social contract theory is incoherent because 
it is based on an excessive political voluntarism. In his view, social contract 
theorists misapply norms and values appropriate to the economic sphere (civil 
society) to the political sphere (the state). They essentially reduce political bonds 
to economic, i.e. bargaining and exchange, relations among self-interested or 
egoistic individuals. This has the effect that social contract theorists conceive of 
political relationships as the object of a voluntary and conditional agreement that 
is the outcome of an unconstrained bargaining process among self-interested 
individuals. The agreement is voluntary and conditional in the sense that 
individuals decide for themselves whether or not to acquire political bonds, and 
for how long – which is dependent on the degree to which the terms of the social 
contract (continue to) further their interests. The agreement is unconstrained in 
the sense that it is the outcome of a bargaining process that does not impose on 
the contracting parties any limits concerning what they can and cannot freely 
agree to. 
In a way that reminds one of the nature-convention debate we have already 
encountered above, Hegel argues that membership of political society is neither 
optional nor conditional but rather natural. In his view, individuals do not chose 
but instead have a duty to acquire political bonds. The main reason for this 
assertion is that political society, particularly the set of social and political 
institutions of which it is comprised, is a precondition (in the sense that it 
provides the unique context) for the development and exercise of individuals’ 
capacities for free and rational agency. Consequently, Hegel argues that the state 
of nature, because it refers to a state of affairs in which isolated individuals with 
already fully developed capacities for freedom and reason determine what 
common arrangements, if any, it is rational for them to agree to, is a fantasy of 
social contract theory. Under these pre-social circumstances, where the 
preconditions of rational agency are wholly absent, individuals would be without 
                                                   
76 See for instance: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory (London: 
Duckworth, 2003); Michael J. Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” 
Political Theory, 12 (1984), pp. 81-96; and Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” in Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 
187-210. 
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language, reason and any capacities for rational choice. Consequently, they would 
be unable to engage in the sort of social interaction involved in contracting. 
Ultimately, then, social contract theorists underestimate what we owe to political 
society.77 
In one sense the Marxist critique of contract theory is similar to Hegel’s. Like 
Hegel, Marxists criticised social contract theorists for their understanding of 
political relationships as the object of a voluntary and conditional agreement that 
is the outcome of an unconstrained bargaining process among self-interested 
individuals. The arguments brought forward by them, however, differ in an 
important way. Whereas Hegel rejected the framework of social contract theory 
because it is ignorant of the fundamental importance of the state for realising 
individuals’ capacities for human agency, Marxists primarily rejected social 
contract theory because it is based on a capitalist ideology. Karl Marx compared 
the logic of the social contract, which, in his words, “brings naturally independent, 
autonomous subjects into relation and connection by contract,” to the 
mechanisms operating in a contract-based capitalist market economy.78 
According to him and later Marxists, as Lessnoff writes, “[s]ocial contract theory 
seeks to legitimate the bourgeois state – which safeguards the self-seeking of 
property owners – in the name of the interests of all.”79 In their view, the 
unconstrained nature of the bargaining process, i.e. the absence of any limits 
concerning what the contracting parties can and cannot agree to – limits that are 
necessary to neutralise the unequal bargaining positions of the contracting 
parties – enables a strong party to exploit the weakness of another party in 
contract. Despite appearances to the contrary, then, the social contract does not 
serve the interests of all contracting parties. Rather, Marxists argue, the social 
contract is used by the bourgeois (the strong) as an ideological tool to 
subordinate the proletarians (the weak). The imagery of the social contract is 
used by the bourgeois to install into the minds of the proletarians a “false 
                                                   
77 For Hegel’s discussions of social contract theory, see: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements 
of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A. W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), sec. 
75A, p. 258; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie, 4 vols., ed. K. H. 
Ilting (Stuttgart: Fromman Verlag, 1974), vol. 3, pp. 265-272, vol. 4, pp. 251-254; Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts: Die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817-
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Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 3 vols., trans. E. Haldane (Lincoln: 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 116-118/98-99, 145-146/122. 
78 Karl Marx, Grundrisse (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 83. 
79 Lessnoff, “Introduction: Social Contract,” p. 17. 
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consciousness”: the idea that capitalist society, because it is based on a social 
contract, actually serves the interests of all of its members.80 
From a historical perspective it is relatively easy to see that the Humean, 
Hegelian and Marxist critiques of social contract theory explain why it largely 
disappeared from view in the nineteenth century. From a philosophical 
perspective, however, the demise of social contract theory is far more difficult to 
understand. In fact, and as a number of philosophers have argued, it is hard to see 
why the Hegelian and Marxist critiques of contract theory would be any more 
fatal than the Humean critique is (and we have already seen how unsuccessful the 
latter critique is). 
The validity of Hegel’s critique of social contract theory has been questioned 
for a number of reasons. To begin with, it has been argued that hypothetical social 
contract theory is impervious to Hegel’s criticism. Proponents of this kind of 
social contract view put emphasis on what it would be rational or reasonable to 
choose for hypothetical individuals under hypothetical circumstances, rather 
than on what individuals (often irrationally) actually choose. This means, as Alan 
Patten thinks, that they can “avoid Hegel’s objection by arguing that it would be 
irrational for individuals not to select institutions that foster and encourage their 
capacities for free and rational agency.”81 
Hegel’s criticism, in so far as it is directed at actual social contract theory, has 
been problematised as well. In response, for instance, it has been claimed that 
Hegel’s argument fails because it equivocates between society and political 
society (or state). “Hegel,” to use  Gough’s words, “fails to distinguish between 
society and state, and attributes to citizenship what is more truly due to 
membership of society.”82 According to this line of reasoning, social contract 
theorists could object to Hegel by claiming that it is necessary to make a 
distinction between society into which we are born, that shapes us and to which 
we owe our identity in large part, and political society (or the state), understood 
as a community of people acting as a single body for political ends, membership 
of which requires deliberate and voluntary agreement. Based on this distinction, 
                                                   
80 See, for instance, Crawford Brough MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), ch. 2, 5; and Evgeny B. 
Pashukanis, Law and Marxism (London: Ink Links, 1978), pp. 81-82, 103. 
81 Alan Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 119. 
82 Gough, The Social Contract: A Critical Study of its Development, p. 185. For a similar objection, 
see Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 197-200; and 
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by defenders of the State, including classical Aristotelian and Thomist philosophers, is to leap 
from the necessity of society to the necessity of the State.” See also Murray N. Rothbard, Power 
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social contract theorists could argue against Hegel that it is not political society 
but society that is a precondition (in the sense that it provides the unique 
context) for the development and exercise of individuals’ capacities for free and 
rational agency. If the distinction between political society and society is sound, 
then it follows, contrary to what Hegel claims (and must claim if his critique is to 
be valid), that social contract theorists are not, and need not be, committed to the 
view that the state of nature refers to a pre-social situation.83 In that case, social 
contract theorists can hold the view that the state of nature refers to a pre-
political state, and so are perfectly capable of avoiding Hegel’s charge of 
incoherency. 
As for the Marxist critique of social contract theory, Lockean political 
voluntarism is immune to it. In this type of social contract view, individuals have 
a natural right to personal self-determination, which means that they have a right 
to a private sphere of non-interference in which they can freely, i.e. without being 
subjected to, or made dependent upon, the arbitrary will of another individual, 
(re)formulate and pursue their ends.84 Exploitative contracts, however, violate 
individuals’ natural right to personal self-determination. The nature of an 
exploitative agreement is such that it is coercively extracted by the stronger from 
the weaker party to it (and contains harsh terms). It is typical of this kind of 
agreement that the coercion or duress involved does not stem from threats of 
violence or force, but rather from the unequal bargaining position of the parties 
to the contract itself, and the unfair advantage taken of that inequality by one of 
the parties in contract. But if this is the case, then the weaker party to the 
                                                   
83 I disagree with those who hold the view that the Hobbesian state of nature (necessarily) refers 
to a non-social or pre-social situation. See, for instance: Freeman, “Reason and Agreement in 
Social Contract Views,” pp. 129-130; and Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of 
Inequality Among Mankind, in The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses, eds. S. 
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Though it is undeniably true that Hobbes endorses an extreme view of the state of nature, he 
does not, and need not, understand it as a pre-social phase in human history. Instead, as I have 
already argued, it refers to a pre-political situation in which individuals have a natural right to 
everything, and in which human interaction, which is social by definition, is marked by irregular 
violent conflict. Under these conditions, Hobbes argued, self-interested individuals will agree 
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84 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Treatise II, sec. 4, 6, 7, 22, 57. In Chapter 3, I shall provide 
a more detailed account of Lockean political voluntarism and the problem of exploitative 
agreements. 
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exploitative agreement is indeed subjected to, or made dependent upon, the 
arbitrary will of another, stronger party. It follows, then, that Lockean political 
voluntarism is not vulnerable to the Marxist critique of social contract theory. 
This rebuttal of the Humean, Hegelian and Marxist critiques of social contract 
theory concludes my historical overview of the pre-modern era of the social 
contract. I now want to continue by discussing the two principal ways in which 
contemporary social contract thinkers – the so-called “contractualists” and 
“contractarians” – have revived the tradition of the social contract in the second 
half of the twentieth century. 
2.4 Hypothetical Social Contract Theory in Contemporary Political 
Philosophy 
Though the Humean, Hegelian and Marxist critiques (despite their flaws) help to 
explain the demise of social contract theory in the nineteenth century, they did 
not prevent the theory from re-appearing in the second half of the twentieth 
century. In so far as there can be any doubts concerning the hypothetical or actual 
nature of the social contract in pre-modern views, modern social contract 
thinkers, such as Rawls, Scanlon, Buchanan and Gauthier, have been explicit 
about the hypothetical nature of their theories. Let us, then, focus our attention to 
(their) hypothetical social contract theories. 
Hypothetical social contract theories are different from actual social contract 
theories in that they do not work from the fundamental idea of an (actual) 
agreement among a group of original contracting parties in the past which still 
binds us today. Instead, they work from the fundamental idea of an (hypothetical) 
agreement which a group of idealised individuals would reach under idealised 
circumstances. Following Cynthia A. Stark,85 we can say that hypothetical contract 
theory, in its most abstract and general form, aims to justify a set of principles by 
positing an idealised (or counter-factual) choice situation which is occupied by 
idealised agents who have to agree to a set of rules for the general regulation of 
their interactions with one another when they are in actual, non-idealised society. 
The nature of the idealisation of the agents and circumstances in hypothetical 
social contract theories varies greatly. Hypothetical contract views can, 
nonetheless, be defined by the answers they give to two questions concerning the 
conceptualisation of the agents involved in, and circumstances under which, they 
have to reach a social agreement. The first question concerns the motivation or 
practical rationality of the agents who are choosing principles. We are to ask 
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whether the agent is appropriately idealised in contractarian terms as a person 
who is instrumentally rational in that he seeks to take efficient and efficient 
means to whatever (given) ends he has or, alternatively, in contractualist terms 
as a person who is committed not to acting on any desire or end he might have, 
but rather to controlling, revising and taking responsibility for his ends by 
proposing and acting from principles that everyone could reasonably agree to. 
The second question is concerned with the information available to the agents. 
The question to ask here is whether the choice situation in which the agents are 
to reach social agreement is appropriately understood in historical or a-historical 
terms: are the agents allowed knowledge of their personal identity (e.g. character 
traits and interests) and circumstances (e.g. social and economic position) or not? 
These questions and answers give us two dichotomies, and when these are 
cross-tabulated we get the following table with four cells (see Figure 2.1): 
 
 
 
 
Motivation of Agents 
   
 
 
Contractarian Contractualist 
Information Available  
to Agents 
Historical Buchanan, Gauthier Scanlon 
 
A-historical 
 
Rawls 
    Figure 2.1. A Typology of Hypothetical Social Contract Theories 
 
 
The left-hand and right-hand sides in Figure 2.1 correspond to the traditional 
distinction made between the two basic forms of contemporary social contract 
theory, and to which I shall henceforth refer as contractualism and 
contractarianism.86 In the following two sub-sections, I analyse both forms of 
                                                   
86 My contractualism-contractarianism dichotomy corresponds closely to similar disctinctions 
made by others (which only differ from one another with respect to the particular labels 
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and “mutual advantage” contractarianism. See his “The Social Contract Tradition,” pp. 186-196. 
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“bargaining theory contractarianism.” See Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (1990), pp. 227-252. 
Freeman, to add one more example, discriminates between “right-based contract views” and 
“interest-based contract views.” See his “Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views,” pp. 
122-157. 
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hypothetical social contract theory. In Section 2.4.1, to be more specific, I discuss 
the main features of the kind of social contract theory defended by Rawls and 
Scanlon: contractualism. As we shall see, Rawls endorses an a-historical 
contractualist view, whereas Scanlon defends a historical contractualist view. In 
Chapter 5, I will provide a more detailed account of contractualism. Though 
Rawls’s and Scanlon’s views are conceptually distinct, I will devote substantially 
more time and space to discussing Rawls’s contractualism than to the version 
endorsed by Scanlon. The reason for this is, as I shall argue in Chapter 5.1.2, that 
nothing of significant importance is left out by focusing on Rawls primarily. 
In Section 2.4.2, I give a brief outline of the kind of social contract theory 
defended by Buchanan and Gauthier: contractarianism. In Chapter 4, especially 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2, I shall provide a more detailed account of contractarianism, 
as well as of the particular versions of it endorsed by Buchanan and Gauthier. It 
should be noted beforehand, however, that the lower left-hand side of Figure 2.1 
– depicting “a-historical contractarianism” – is necessarily empty. An a-historical 
contractarian view is, as I shall argue more fully in Section 2.4.2, internally 
contradictory. Consequently, contractarian views, such as those held by 
Buchanan and Gauthier, are necessarily historical. 
2.4.1 Contractualism 
Immanuel Kant was the first political philosopher who explicitly abandoned the 
idea of an original contract and developed a hypothetical contract instead. In his 
view, the social contract does not refer to a historical event. What, then, does it 
refer to? Central in Kant’s political philosophy is the idea that individuals are 
autonomous beings. As with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose views deeply 
influenced Kant, autonomy is not understood in terms of negative but positive 
freedom. Freedom as autonomy is not conceived of as the capacity to act without 
any external impediments, such as those imposed by individuals or laws. Rather, 
it is understood as the ability to act from laws that are in some sense of one’s own 
making. According to Kant, to be more precise, an individual is autonomous if he 
acts only in accordance with that maxim through which he can at the same time, 
and without contradiction, “will” that it should become a universal law – 
Rousseau would say that to be autonomous is to act in accordance with, and for 
the sake of, the “general will.”87 This is Kant’s famous categorical imperative, 
which essentially provides a procedure for moral reasoning (henceforth CI-
procedure). It constitutes a criterion for testing whether a particular (moral) 
                                                   
87 Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses, eds. 
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principle for the general regulation of interpersonal interactions is impartial in 
the sense that it is capable of being universalised. Kant’s categorical imperative 
conveys the idea that the positive laws imposed by rulers or states are legitimate 
if all individuals subject to it could in some qualified sense understand 
themselves as its authors.88 The idea of a social contract is reflected in the CI-
procedure. For Kant, then, the social contract was an “idea of reason” which has 
“undoubted practical reality” in the sense that “it can oblige every legislator to 
frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united 
will of a whole nation.”89 
Contractualism has Kantian roots. This can be seen by looking at the way in 
which contractualists, such as John Rawls and T. M. Scanlon, build moral 
substance into their description of both the hypothetical agents and their 
circumstances, and thereby place moral constraints on the (kind of) agreement to 
be reached by the agents. With respect to the hypothetical agents, the moral 
substance comes in the form of a particular “counter-factual” conception of the 
person.90 The agents are conceived of as naturally free and equal moral persons. 
They are so in virtue of their having a dual moral capacity, containing both a 
rational and reasonable component. A person’s rationality refers to the ability to 
form, revise and rationally pursue a conception of his rational advantage or 
good.91 This aspect of a person’s moral capacity constitutes his rationality and 
mirrors Kant’s hypothetical imperative with its directive to take effective and 
efficient means to one’s self-imposed ends.92 The reasonableness of a person 
consists in his having a normally effective desire (a) to interact with others on 
terms that can be publicly justified, i.e. terms that other, similarly motivated 
individuals can reasonably endorse (or alternatively, cannot reasonably reject); 
                                                   
88 Immauel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ed. M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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Press, 2000), pp. 191-197. 
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and (b) to act from, as opposed to merely in accordance with, these terms.93 This 
element of a person’s moral capacity constitutes his reasonableness and 
corresponds to Kant’s categorical imperative, according to which, as we have 
seen, the validity of a person’s precept for practical action has to be determined 
by asking whether it “could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving 
of universal law.”94 
One of the most famous interpretations of Kant’s CI-procedure, has been 
developed by Rawls. In his seminal A Theory of Justice, he invites us to engage in a 
thought experiment: the original position. He wishes us to imagine a group of 
human beings coming together to reach a social agreement on principles. These 
human beings, however, are placed behind the so-called veil of ignorance that 
causes them to suffer from temporary amnesia with respect to certain morally 
irrelevant (i.e. arbitrary) facts, such as the relative distribution of their desires, 
talents, convictions and ends, as well as the particular economic, political and 
cultural circumstances of their own society.95 Making it impossible to tailor 
principles to one’s advantage, the veil of ignorance guarantees that the 
hypothetical parties in the counter-factual original position only select principles 
that would be acceptable from the perspective of every conceivable position each 
of them might turn out to occupy in actual, non-idealised society (once the veil of 
ignorance is lifted).96 Consequently, the original position constitutes a particular 
CI-procedure that enables us to test the universalisability of principles. 
Given that the veil of ignorance deprives the parties in the original position of 
knowledge of their personal identities and circumstances, Rawls’s hypothetical 
social contract view is a-historical. This, in combination with the specific account 
of moral motivation implicit in his conception of the person, justifies placing him 
in the lower right-hand side of Figure 2.1. What distinguishes Rawls’s version of 
contractualism from that of Scanlon is that the latter, though it is premised on 
                                                   
93 For instance, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 16-17, 19, 49-50; John Rawls, “Social Unity and 
Primary Goods,” in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. S. Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard University 
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exactly the same motivational account, works from the idea of historical 
agreement (and is hence placed in the upper right-hand side of Figure 2.1). 
Like Rawls, whose original position models “the natural equality of moral 
status, which makes each person’s interests a matter of common or impartial 
concern,”97 Scanlon includes moral claims in his description of the hypothetical 
contractual circumstances as well. This follows from his contractualist formula, 
according to which “[a]n act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances 
would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of 
behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement.”98 Each of these three qualifiers – that agreement on 
principles ought to be reasonable, informed and unforced – can, if violated, 
provide grounds for rejection. What is interesting to see, however, is that Scanlon, 
unlike Rawls, does not model the contractual circumstances in such a way that 
the parties involved cannot, for instance, be “forced to accept an unconscionable 
agreement by being in a weak bargaining position.”99 Rawls’s veil of ignorance 
ensures that the parties in the original position have no basis for bargaining. 
According to Scanlon, it is unnecessary to impose a veil of ignorance on the 
parties in order to make sure that their deliberations result in a non-coercive 
agreement – let alone any agreement at all. Instead, Scanlon’s hypothetical agents 
are allowed full knowledge of their personal identities and circumstances, 
because he thinks that their moral motivation creates a pressure that is 
sufficiently strong to reach (reasonable, informed and unforced) agreement.100 
Consequently, the circumstances in which Scanlon’s hypothetical agents have to 
reach an agreement on principles are counter-factual in that they abstract from 
considerations that are unreasonable, uninformed or subject to coercion, but he 
models these counter-factual circumstances in such a way that the agreement 
reached in it is (still) historical. 
2.4.2 Contractarianism 
Contractarianism can be defined as a type of social contract theory in which 
moral principles are justifiable if they can be the object of a rational compromise 
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or mutually advantageous agreement among utility-maximising individuals 
whose (given) interests are partially overlapping and conflicting. Glaucon, as we 
have seen in Section 2.1, can be interpreted as offering a proto-contractarian 
account of morality in Plato’s Republic. Elements of the same contractarian view 
can also be found in ancient Greek Epicurean thought and the Roman period (as 
exemplified by Cicero’s Philus). It was Thomas Hobbes, however, who provided 
us with the first mature form (i.e. exposition and defence) of contractarianism in 
his Leviathan. He does so, as David Gauthier rightly points out, by transforming 
“the laws of nature, which lay at the core of Stoic and medieval Christian moral 
thought, into precepts of reason that require each individual, acting in his own 
interests, to give up some portion of the liberty with which he seeks his own 
survival and well-being, provided others do likewise.”101 In turn, Hobbes is the 
ancestor of the theory of morality defended by the contemporary contractarians 
James M. Buchanan and David Gauthier, who have developed the most 
sophisticated forms of contractarianism to date. Their great achievement is that 
they have been able to embed Hobbes’s particular natural law view within a 
modern scientific framework. They have re-interpreted Hobbes’s contractarian 
view in such a way that it operates from both a conception of practical reason and 
of the person that are part of what they consider to be the best explanatory 
theory in the social sciences: economic theory (in particular, decision and game 
theory).102 In short, there is a distinctive and continuous line of contractarian 
reasoning in the tradition of the social contract that can be traced back all the way 
to ancient Greek philosophy. 
Essentially, the step from a contractualist to a contractarian view, i.e. the step 
from the right-hand side to the left-hand side in Figure 2.1, involves a reductionist 
move: the reduction of morality to (instrumental) rationality. The basic 
assumption underpinning contractarian views is, as Freeman puts it, that “for 
each person A, there is a set of primary desires he has at any time t, which are 
given to him by his nature and circumstances, and which provide the necessary 
basis for his having any reasons for acting.”103 It follows that moral principles 
regulating interpersonal relations make an ineliminable reference to a person’s 
given desires. This means that whatever moral “force” principles have, “they must 
have by virtue of their instrumental relation to each agent’s more particular 
                                                   
101 See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 10; and 
Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14, pp. 64-65. 
102 See Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, esp. xvi-xvii, 9-10, 21; 
and Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, esp. pp. 8, 10, 316. 
103 Samuel Freeman, “Contractualism, Moral Motivation, and Practical Reason,” The Journal of 
Philosophy, 88 (1991), p. 290. 
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concerns.”104 Ultimately, then, moral principles are but an extension of principles 
of rational individual choice; they (merely) provide hypothetical imperatives with 
their directive to take effective and efficient means to one’s ends. 
Hobbes notoriously defended the idea that “private Appetite is the measure of 
Good”105 – an idea the essence of which was later to be captured nicely by David 
Hume’s dictum that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”106 
We find the same reductionist move in the contemporary contractarian views of 
Buchanan and Gauthier, in which, to use the latter’s words, morality is “generated 
as a rational constraint from the non-moral premisses of rational choice.”107 It 
follows from this that contractarians do not include any moral claims in the 
description of the hypothetical agents and circumstances. The agents involved in 
contractarianism are conceived of as naturally free and equal persons, though not 
in a moral sense, as is the case with contractualism, but rather in the non-moral 
sense that they are physically and mentally free and equal utility-maximisers. 
The counter-factual circumstances are those of a (particular interpretation of 
a) non-cooperative state of nature in which hypothetical agents have to decide 
whether or not it is rational to engage in a scheme of cooperative interaction with 
each other. Given their equal freedom, agents will agree to engage in a scheme of 
cooperative interaction only if the utility that each of them expects to gain from 
doing so exceeds the utility that each of them expects to gain from continued non-
cooperative interaction. In other words: cooperative interaction among a group of 
individuals will only arise under conditions that are mutually advantageous for 
all of the parties involved.108 Essentially, then, contractarians conceive of 
agreement as an idealised economic bargain, i.e. a mutually advantageous 
compromise, between a set of utility-maximising individuals who have partially 
overlapping and conflicting interests.109 
                                                   
104 Freeman, “Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views,” pp. 128-129. 
105 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 80. 
106 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Second Edition, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978), bk. I, pt. 3, sec. 3, p. 415. 
107 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, p. 4. See also James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The 
Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1999), pt. I, pp. 3-39; and Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, p. 11. 
108 For instance, see Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, pp. 31-45, 
69-95; and Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, pp. 12-14, 60-82, 113-122, 128-146. 
109 This might lead one to think that contractarianism morally sanctions exploitative agreements, 
and therefore is vulnerable to the Marxist critique of social contract theory (see Section 2.3) – 
exploitative contracts (such as the notorious “slave contract”) can, after all, be mutually 
advantageous, i.e. instrumental to the realisation of the interests of both the weak and strong 
party to it. In Chapter 4, especially Section 4.7, I shall provide a more detailed analysis of this so-
called “problem of moral standing” in contractarian views. For now, it suffices to see that the 
Marxist critique of social contract theory still does not succeed entirely should it turn out to be 
the case that contractarianism is ultimately incapable of answering it. For in that case, the 
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Let us now turn to the upper and lower left-hand side of Figure 2.1, and 
discuss the (a-)historical character of the notion of agreement employed in 
contractarianism. The upper left-hand side of the figure can be read as follows. 
The kind of agreement involved in contractarianism is historical in the sense that 
it is in the light of their personal identities (i.e. their preference ordering) and 
circumstances (i.e. the non-cooperative baseline of the state of nature) that the 
hypothetical agents jointly decide whether engaging in cooperative interaction 
with each other is mutually advantageous. But what about the lower left-hand 
side of Figure 2.1? How should this cell of the figure be read or understood? The 
cell in question is empty, which is not a coincidence. Let me explain this. 
The step from a “historical” to an “a-historical” contractarian view involves 
removing from the hypothetical agents some degree of knowledge of their 
personal identities, interests, desires and/or circumstances. Now, however 
minimal this removal of information might be, doing so is deeply problematic 
because it inevitably compromises the contractarian aim of deriving morality 
from the non-moral premises of rational choice. By denying the hypothetical 
agents knowledge of their personal identities, interests, desires and/or 
circumstances, one determines what is included and excluded as the “possible” 
object of individuals’ preferences. In contractarian views, individuals are 
conceived of as maximising the satisfaction of whatever preferences they happen 
to have. But if this is correct, then it is the case that any a priori restriction on the 
content of these preferences comes at the cost of internal inconsistency and 
incoherence. In so doing, contractarians would tacitly incorporate into their 
theory the very moral substance that should instead result from it.110 It follows 
from this that any move from the upper to the lower left-hand side of Figure 2.1 
will inevitably result in ending up in the lower right-hand side of the figure, as a 
result of which it is no longer possible to talk of a contractarian view. In other 
words: the empty cell in Figure 2.1 does not merely signify the non-existence of 
any (examples of) a-historical contractarian views. Rather, and more importantly, 
it shows that there can be no such views for any attempt to conceptualise the 
notion of a-historical contractarianism is bound to collapse into a-historical 
contractualism. 
                                                                                                                                                               
Marxist has only succeeded in showing that his critique applies to one specific type of social 
contract theory: contractarianism. But the Marxist needs to establish more than that; he needs to 
demonstrate that all social contract theories are necessarily exploitative. As I have already 
argued above, however, this is an impossible enterprise because both the Lockean political 
voluntarist and the contractualist kind of social contract view are immune to the Marxist 
critique. 
110 Again, I will return to this point in Chapter 4, especially Section 4.7, where I provide a more 
detailed discussion of it. 
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2.5 The Object of Agreement in Hypothetical Social Contract Theory 
Having discussed the traditional distinction made between the two basic forms of 
contemporary social contract theory – contractualism and contractarianism – we 
are now in a position to discuss the object of agreement in hypothetical social 
contract theories. Let me begin by briefly discussing the frequently voiced 
argument that hypothetical agreements cannot actually ground political 
obligations.111 In relation to Rawls’s particular version of hypothetical agreement, 
Ronald Dworkin says: “hypothetical contracts do not supply an independent 
argument for the fairness of enforcing their terms. A hypothetical contract is not 
simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all.”112 Concerning the 
obligations supposedly generated by hypothetical consent, he writes, 
furthermore: 
 
If (...) I am playing a game, it may be that I would have agreed to any 
number of ground rules if I had been asked in advance of play. It does 
not follow that these rules may be enforced against me if I have not, in 
fact, agreed to them. There must be reasons, of course, why I would 
have agreed, if asked in advance, and these may also be reasons why it 
is fair to enforce these rules against me even if I have not agreed. But 
my hypothetical agreement does not count as a reason, independent of 
these other reasons, for enforcing the rules against me, as my actual 
agreement would have.113 
 
As a criticism of hypothetical social contract theory, however, Dworkin’s 
criticism is beside the point. If the creation of political obligations is the object of 
hypothetical social contract theory, Dworkin’s criticism would certainly hold. The 
problem with Dworkin’s argument, however, is that this is not the objective of 
                                                   
111 It is commonplace for philosophers to argue that hypothetical consent is not binding and so 
cannot generate political obligations. See Daniel Brudney, “Hypothetical Consent and Moral 
Force,” Law and Philosophy, 10 (1991), pp. 235-270, esp. pp. 235-240; Ronald Dworkin, “The 
Original Position,” in Reading Rawls. Critical Studies on Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, ed. N. Daniels 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 16-53, esp. pp. 17-21; Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy 
(Boulder: Westview, 1997), pp. 65-66; Jean Hampton, “Feminist Contractarianism,” in A Mind of 
One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, eds. L. Antony and C. Witt (Boulder: 
Westview, 1993), pp. 227-255, esp. 233-235; Henry Phelps-Brown, Egalitarianism and the 
Generation of Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 494-496; Thomas 
Michael Scanlon, “Rawls’ Theory of Justice,” in Reading Rawls. Critical Studies on Rawls’s A Theory 
of Justice, ed. N. Daniels (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 169-205; A. John Simmons, “Liberal 
Impartiality and Political Legitimacy,” Philosophical Books, 34 (1993), pp. 213-223, esp. pp. 220-
221; Stark, “Hypothetical Consent and Justification,” pp. 313-334; and Jonathan Wolff, An 
Introduction to Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 48-50. 
112 Dworkin, “The Original Position,” pp. 17-18. 
113 Ibid., pp. 18. 
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hypothetical social contract theories. Why this is so can be seen by taking a look 
at Scanlon’s contractualism once more. Scanlon is very clear about the idealised 
nature of this conception of the person. The moral motivation to find and agree 
on principles which no one who had this desire could reasonably reject is, as he 
explicitly explains, a “counter-factual assumption”; it “characterises only the 
hypothetical agreement with which morality is concerned, not the world to which 
moral principles are to apply.”114 The underlying idea here is that in so far as we 
accept this contractualist account of moral motivation as being expressive of our 
conception of ourselves, then it commits us to the view that we have a moral 
reason to accept and act on and from the principles that would be chosen by 
hypothetical agents thus motivated. 
The same idea can be found in Gauthier’s “The Social Contract as Ideology.” In 
this article, he claims that the ideology of our society is becoming increasingly 
more contractarian – although he offers hardly any conclusive evidence for this 
claim.115 If we think that contractarianism is expressive of our self-conception, i.e. 
if we conceive of ourselves as rational utility-maximisers (which we do, according 
to Gauthier), then the contractarian thought experiment, in which ideally rational 
agents under ideal circumstances interact with one another, helps us to see what 
this view commits us to. 
The same reasoning can be applied to other versions of hypothetical 
agreement. What is important to see here is that although the hypothetical 
agreement of idealised agents under idealised circumstances can, if we are 
committed to the underlying contractarian or contractualist “ideology,” provide 
us with moral reasons for practical action, it does not follow that this also creates 
a right for us to enforce these moral reasons for action on other individuals. 
Utilising a familiar distinction between “justification” and “legitimacy,”116 we 
might say that the object of the contract-theoretical thought experiment is to 
provide us with a correct or true account of the substance of morality (where 
“correct” or “true” is relative to the particular interpersonal standpoint 
exhibited). Its object is not, however, to explain why we have a political obligation 
to obey just states, i.e. states that are regulated by principles that express the 
correct or true substance of morality.117 If this is correct, then it is easy to see why 
                                                   
114 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” p. 111. 
115 David Gauthier, “The Social Contract as Ideology,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1977), pp. 
130-164. 
116 See Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” pp. 739-771. Stark makes a similar distinction 
but labels it differently. In her view, the disctinction between “justification” and “legitimacy” is 
the same as that between “political legitimacy” and “political obligation.” See Stark, 
“Hypothetical Consent and Justification,” pp. 323-326. 
117 As we shall see in Chapter 5, Rawls’s contractualism provides a perfect example of the 
distinction between justification and legitimacy that is at work in hypothetical social contract 
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Dworkin’s critique of hypothetical social contract theory is beside the point: it is 
simply not a criticism of hypothetical social contract theory that it cannot ground 
political obligations because this is not, and need not be, its aim.118 So, 
hypothetical social contract theory still stands. 
If the aim of hypothetical contract theorists is not to ground political 
obligations, but to justify principles, what kind of principles are we talking about 
then? It is possible to distinguish between moral and political hypothetical 
contract views. The former seek to justify moral principles for the general 
regulation of interpersonal relations (e.g. Scanlon and Gauthier), whereas the 
latter aim at justifying political principles, such as principles of distributive 
justice (Rawls). What is interesting to see is that these otherwise diverging 
approaches have something in common: a complete negligence of the question of 
the legitimacy of the people. Instead of asking this question, however, they, just as 
is the case with classical social contract theory (as we have seen in Section 2.2), 
simply presuppose what requires legitimisation, namely the existence of a 
delimited group of idealised agents in idealised circumstances. In one way or 
another, each of them works from the assumption of a given people. In this 
dissertation, particularly Chapters 4 and 5, I will investigate whether the two 
basic forms of contemporary social contract theory identified and discussed 
above – contractualism and contractarianism – have the potential to solve the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided a historical overview of the tradition of the social 
contract. In the course of this overview, I have explained how the idea of the 
social contract has evolved historically. This has enabled me to introduce various 
central elements of social contract theory, and to defend it against a number of 
historically important criticisms. Furthermore, it has made it possible for me to 
uncover three types of social contract theory: (1) Lockean political voluntarism, 
(2) contractualism and (3) contractarianism. The first type, which has its 
conceptual roots in Plato’s Crito, is an actual social contract theory. According to 
this theory, the paradigmatic account of which can be found in Locke’s Second 
                                                                                                                                                               
theories. Rawls’s contractual device of the original position is supposed to justify a set of 
principles for the general regulation of the basic structure of society, whereas the natural duty of 
justice is supposed to legitimise just states. 
118 An additional consequence of this conclusion is that the Humean critique of original social 
contract theories, contrary to what I have suggested in Section 2.3, cannot be answered by 
transforming actual contract theory into hypothetical contract theory. For the latter cannot 
provide a positive account of our political obligations either. The only way out for social contract 
theorists, then, is to adopt Lockean political voluntarism. 
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Treatise of Government, political society ought to be a voluntary association. This 
means that an entire group of individuals in a given territory is subject to the 
legitimate political authority of a state (or its government or institutions) if and 
only if each member of that group has actually given his deliberate and free 
consent to this subjection. 
The second and third types of social contract theory are both hypothetical in 
nature. According to the second, contractualist type of contract theory, moral 
and/or political principles are justifiable if free and equal persons could 
reasonably be expected to accept them as a basis for informed and unforced 
agreement. I have shown that there is a distinctive and continuous line of 
contractualist reasoning in the tradition of the social contract, the origins of 
which can be traced back to the philosophical works of Rousseau and Kant, and 
whose main modern representatives are Rawls and Scanlon. In the third, 
contractarian type of contract theory, moral and/or political principles are 
justifiable if they can be the object of a rational compromise or mutually 
advantageous agreement among utility-maximising individuals whose (given) 
interests are partially overlapping and conflicting. I have argued that there is a 
distinctive and continuous line of contractarian reasoning in the tradition of the 
social contract that can be traced back all the way to ancient Greek philosophy. 
Rudimentary forms of contractarianism can, for instance, be found in Plato’s 
Republic (Glaucon), Epicurean political thought, and Cicero’s Commonwealth 
(Philus). In Hobbes’s Leviathan, subsequently, contractarianism received its 
mature expression and defence. And nowadays, it features in its most 
sophisticated form in the writings of Buchanan and Gauthier. 
The historical overview of the tradition of the social contract, particularly the 
resulting threefold typology of social contract theory, enables me to approach the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people in a more systematic way. The central 
question in this dissertation, as we have seen in Chapter 1, is whether it is 
possible to provide a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that 
is (strongly as opposed to weakly) compatible with a democratic framework. That 
is to say, is it possible to develop a collective decision-making procedure that is 
capable of generating a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people 
that does not cause an infinite regress? Or, alternatively, is it possible to derive an 
account of the legitimate demarcation of the people from a particular democratic 
theory? In the next three chapters, I shall investigate whether, and if so how, each 
of the three types of social contract theory identified is capable of solving the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people in a way that is (strongly) compatible 
with a democratic framework. 
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Chapter 3  
 
The Lockean Legitimisation of the People: 
Political Voluntarism 
In this chapter, I analyse the first of the three types of social contract theory 
identified above: Lockean political voluntarism. My aim is to see whether this 
Lockean type of social contract theory is capable of solving the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people in a way that is strongly compatible with a democratic 
framework. Since the argument pursued in this chapter goes somewhat beyond 
the confines of Locke’s consent theory, I deliberately call this a “Lockean” instead 
of “Locke’s” approach to the problem of the legitimacy of the people. Like all 
classical social contract theorists, as Whelan correctly notes, Locke was primarily 
concerned with answering the normative question of how political authority 
comes to be established among a given group of previously unattached 
individuals, rather than with confronting the logically prior, and therefore more 
fundamental, normative question of “how determinate communities come to be 
set off from one another in the boundary-less state of nature” in the first place.119 
Nonetheless, it is possible to argue that Locke’s contract theory implicitly 
contains an approach to the boundary problem – albeit unintentionally of course. 
This is one reason why I will call this approach Lockean as opposed to Locke’s: 
although Locke nowhere in his writings explicitly claimed to address the 
                                                   
119 Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” p. 24. 
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boundary problem, his contract view nevertheless provides us with the 
conceptual tools to do so. Another reason why the argument developed in this 
chapter goes beyond Locke’s theory, and is therefore best described as Lockean, 
is that I will not only appeal to and build on ideas central to Locke’s political 
thought, but that I will also reject and revise some of these ideas – though never, I 
think, in such a way as to depart from the Lockean framework altogether. 
In the next section (3.1), I begin with providing an outline of Lockean political 
voluntarism. Having introduced the central elements of this view, I shall explain 
(in Section 3.2) how the resulting Lockean framework provides us with the 
conceptual tools to address the problem of the original constitution of the people. 
This is the problem of how “in the beginning” free and equal individuals can 
legitimately set themselves apart from other individuals in the state of nature, 
and join together in a political community in which they live under a common 
political authority. In my view, Lockean political voluntarism is perfectly capable 
of providing us with a procedurally democratic legitimisation of the original 
constitution of the people – and so offers a solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people that is strongly compatible with a democratic framework. 
Having established this conclusion, I continue my analysis of Lockean political 
voluntarism by discussing its implications for those specific articulations of the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people that arise – and can only arise – against 
the background of an already existing world of political communities: migration 
(Section 3.3) and secession (Sections 3.4 and 3.5). 
3.1 Lockean Political Voluntarism: An Outline 
I take John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government to be the paradigmatic example 
of a political voluntarist view. Let us see, then, whether this voluntarist model of 
political association has the potential for solving the problem of the legitimacy of 
the people. Wherein does the Lockean solution to the boundary problem consist? 
Locke’s theory is underpinned by a specific natural law-based interpretation of 
the moral values of freedom and equality. This interpretation starts from the 
thesis that all individuals are naturally free.120 One should not take this thesis to 
refer to an actually existing state of affairs. For then it would obviously be false: 
individuals, by being born into a particular political society, are as a matter of fact 
not free but subject to the political authority of that society’s government (and 
                                                   
120 I refer to John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). Since it contains two treatises, I will henceforth, when referring to it, 
mention the relevant treatise (I or II), followed by the relevant section number. In this case: 
Locke, II, 4. 
 63 
 
institutions).121 However, if the thesis of natural freedom should not be 
understood as an empirical claim, then why does Locke endorse what he calls the 
admittedly “strange Doctrine” that “we are born Free”?122 
Man’s natural freedom refers to a natural right. This is a right that is 
possessed equally by all men (who are capable of choice or rational agency) in 
virtue of their humanity; and it is a right that, as opposed to other moral rights, 
holds unconditionally.123 According to Locke, then, individuals are free in the 
normative sense that they have a natural right “to order their Actions, and 
dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit.”124 This does not mean, 
however, that individuals have a right to act without any moral constraints at all; 
it is not a “State of Licence,” i.e. a “Liberty for every Man do what he list.”125 Locke is 
very clear about this when he writes: “we must consider what State all Men are 
naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect Freedom to order their actions (…) 
within the bounds of the Law of Nature.”126 Although individuals are naturally 
free, their freedom is nevertheless limited by the rules of natural law – the so-
called natural duties.127 This law teaches us that we have a natural duty to 
preserve mankind both negatively and positively.128 According to Locke, mankind 
is best preserved negatively by securing individuals a private sphere of non-
interference in which they can freely, i.e. without being subjected to, or made 
dependent upon, “the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another 
Man,” (re)formulate and pursue their ends.129 An individual’s natural freedom, 
however, entails not only a negative right to act without external constraints and 
a correlated negative duty on others not to harm him in his life, liberty and estate. 
Since the Law of Nature requires the positive preservation of mankind as well, an 
individual’s freedom also entails, as a minimum necessary condition of an 
effective or meaningful pursuit of one’s ends, a positive right to the means for 
subsistence (if he cannot provide for these himself), and a correlated duty of 
charity on others to provide these (provided they can do so at little or no costs to 
                                                   
121 Of all social contract theorists, Jean-Jacques Rousseau is perhaps most explicit on this point. 
In his Social Contract (I.i), he writes: “Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains.” 
122 Locke, II, 9 and 61, emphasis in original. 
123 Here I closely follow Hart and Rawls, who both provide excellent discussions of natural rights. 
See H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?,” The Philosophical Review, 64 (1955); and 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 19. 
124 Locke, II, 4, emphasis in original. See also II, 190. 
125 Ibid., II, 6, 57, emphasis in original. 
126 Ibid., II, 4, emphasis in original. 
127 Ibid., II, 4, 6, and 57. 
128 Ibid., II, 6, 7, 16, 134, 135, 149, 159, 171, 183. 
129 Ibid., II, 22. See also II, 4, 6, 7, 57. 
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themselves).130 Essentially, then, man’s natural freedom refers to what might be 
called the natural right to personal self-determination: the natural right to live 
one’s life as one sees fit, within the limits of natural law (i.e. without others’ 
interference but with others’ help given the relevant circumstances). 
On Locke’s view, an individual can give up his natural freedom and become 
bound by obligations only by deliberately and voluntarily entering special 
transactions or relationships. These special obligations are distinct from the 
aforementioned natural duties in that they do not hold unconditionally for all 
men in virtue of their humanity, but relatively to those individuals only who, by 
having performed certain voluntary acts, such as consent, have clearly expressed 
their intention to become so bound. According to Locke, our political bonds are 
special obligations; they are (in some more specific sense to be identified below) 
acquired through the deliberate and voluntary performance of consensual 
transactions by individuals. It follows that individuals’ natural right to personal 
self-determination extends to political matters as well. In other words, the 
natural right to personal self-determination includes a right to political self-
determination. 
In order to know what it means for someone to exercise his natural right to 
political self-determination, it is helpful to make a Hohfeldian distinction between 
claim rights and liberty rights. Claim rights and liberty rights both refer to an 
individual’s freedom to do or have x. However, they are different from one 
another in that an individual’s claim right to x correlates with a duty on others 
not to interfere with or to enable him to do or have x, whereas this is not so in the 
case of an individual’s liberty right to x.131 From the preceding discussion of 
Locke’s natural law doctrine, it should be clear that an individual’s natural 
freedom to live his life as he sees fit consists in a claim right to do so; for it 
correlates with a negative and positive duty on others to non-interference and 
charity. Since freedom of personal political self-determination is an essential 
constituent part of an individual’s natural freedom, it constitutes a claim right as 
well. 
What kind of claim right is this? In a Lockean view, the natural claim right to 
personal self-determination does not entail a positive claim right to acquire 
political bonds but merely a negative claim right to be free from political bonds. 
Political relationships cannot be forced upon individuals any more than personal 
relationships – marital, friendship, work or otherwise. Consequently, an 
individual only has a liberty right to acquire political bonds; his natural freedom 
                                                   
130 Ibid., I, 41-43, II, 22-24; and John Locke, “Venditio,” in “Justice and the Interpretation of 
Locke’s Political Theory,” J. Dunn, Political Studies, 16 (1968), pp. 84-87. 
131 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, ed. W. Cook (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1919). 
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to become politically bound to other individuals does not correlate with a duty 
for others to non-interference (let alone a duty for others to assistance). The right 
to acquire political bonds is a liberty that can be justifiably limited by others’ 
negative claim right to non-interference.132 
The negative natural claim right to personal political self-determination 
underpins Locke’s endorsement of what I have called “the thesis of political 
voluntarism” (in Chapter 2). According to this thesis, “political relationships 
among persons are morally legitimate only when they are the product of 
voluntary, willing, morally significant acts by all parties.”133 Originally, political 
voluntarism has been developed by early modern social contract theorists as an 
account of political obligation. Thus understood, a state’s legitimate exercise of 
political authority requires the consent of the governed. In other words, an 
individual’s deliberately and freely given actual consent is a necessary condition 
for him to acquire an obligation to obey some political authority. It is a 
consequence of this thesis that political society is understood as a voluntary 
                                                   
132 Consider, however, the following objection. It might be argued that the natural claim right to 
personal self-determination correlates, as I have argued, both with a negative and positive duty 
to preserve mankind, and that it follows from this that individuals do not only have a correlated 
negative claim right to be free from political bonds but also a positive claim right to acquire 
political bonds. Suppose, for instance, that a would-be immigrant would appeal to his positive 
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correct to say that he has a claim right to incorporate himself in that state? This might, for 
instance, be the case when a person flees his country of birth in order to avoid unjust 
persecution (such as torture and capital punishment in an evidently unjust regime) and asks 
political asylum in another state. Under these circumstances, it might be argued, the admission 
of the political refugee is not optional, i.e. the state cannot choose to withhold its consent, but 
has to act on its positive duty of charity and grant that person political asylum. Consequently, the 
argument might continue, the political refugee can incorporate himself in another state by 
means of a unilateral as opposed to reciprocal consensual transaction. 
 This argument, however, is mistaken for two reasons. First, although individuals have a 
positive claim right to personal self-determination (and a correlated duty to assistance for 
others) in Locke’s view, I do not think it follows that individuals have a positive claim right to 
acquire political bonds as well. It is normally not the case that an individual can discharge his 
positive duty to preserve mankind only by becoming politically bound to those individuals with 
respect to whom he has this duty. Second, even in those special cases where an individual cannot 
act on his positive duty to preserve mankind other than by becoming politically bound to other, 
relevant individuals, I do not think it follows that the individual in question has a positive duty to 
become so bound. That is to say, I believe that, even under these circumstances, there is still a 
qualified yet morally significant sense in which this individual’s (deliberate and voluntary) 
consent is required in order to become politically bound. After all, a state (and its citizens) still 
has the right to insist that those who wish to become members of it agree to obey its rules. The 
state can require from would-be members, including political refugees, that they do not only 
receive the benefits (i.e. political rights) but also accept the burdens (i.e. political obligations) of 
membership. It follows then, even in the case of political refugees, that the admittance of would-
be immigrants to a particular state requires a contractual transaction. Cf. Beran, The Consent 
Theory of Political Obligation, p. 29. 
133 Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society, p. 36. 
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association: an entire group of individuals in a given territory is subject to the 
legitimate political authority of a state (or its government or institutions) if and 
only if each member of that group has actually given his deliberate and free 
consent to this subjection.134 
The aim of this chapter, however, is not to provide a Lockean political 
voluntarist account of political obligation, but rather to see what the implications 
of Lockean political voluntarism are for the legitimate constitution of the people. 
Though the two can be related, as we shall see below, they nevertheless are, and 
should be kept, conceptually distinct. In the one case, as I have argued in Chapter 
1.1, the state is the object of legitimacy, whereas in the other case the people are 
the object of legitimacy. The question, then, is whether, and if so how, it is 
possible to develop a Lockean political voluntarist account of the legitimacy of the 
people that is, moreover, compatible with a democratic framework (in the strong 
sense identified above). 
I want to approach this question by making a distinction between two types 
of “constitutional moments” of the people. A Lockean political voluntarist account 
of the legitimacy of the people should, to begin with, be able to explain how “in 
the beginning” free and equal individuals can legitimately set themselves apart 
from other individuals in the state of nature, and join together in a political 
community in which they live under a common political authority. This is the 
problem of the original constitution of the people. As said before, however, we 
live in a world of already founded political communities (states). It follows that 
Lockean political voluntarism, if it is to be not only of historical interest but of 
practical relevance to us nowadays as well, should also be capable of providing a 
solution to those specific articulations of the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people that arise – and can only arise – against the background of an already 
existing world of political communities. Here, as we have seen in Chapter 1, we 
can think of migration and secession. In other words, Lockean political 
voluntarism should be able to explain how those individuals who are born into an 
                                                   
134 It is worthwhile to notice the difference between the kind of voluntarism endorsed by 
philosophers such as John Locke and A. John Simmons on the one hand and philosophers such as 
Murray N. Rothbard on the other hand. Though Rothbard is a voluntarist, in the sense that he 
defends the view that all forms of human association should be voluntary, he is, unlike Locke and 
Simmons, not a political voluntarist. In his view, political society (or the state), whatever form its 
government may take, inherently violates the fundamental libertarian principle of self-
ownership, and so cannot be legitimate. (Even in a democracy, he argued, citizens partially own 
each other, i.e. they are each other’s slave masters, as a result of which they cannot consistently 
be considered to own themselves completely.) Consequently, Rothbard categorically rejects any 
level of coercive state intervention in the lives of individuals. He envisions a “contractual 
society” as an alternative to political society (or the state). This is “a society based purely on 
voluntary action, entirely unhampered by violence or threats of violence.” See Rothbard, The 
Ethics of Liberty, p. 162; and Rothbard, Power and Market, ch. 2. 
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already existing political community created by the original “founding fathers and 
mothers,” can legitimately become members of it or of some other (already 
existing or yet to be newly created) political community. I shall discuss the 
Lockean political voluntarist account of both constitutional moments of the 
people in turn, starting with the problem of the original constitution of the 
people. 
3.2 “In the Beginning...” 
The problem of the original constitution of the people concerns the question how 
to determine who constitute the group of individuals who can legitimately set 
themselves apart from other individuals in the state of nature, and join and unite 
together in a political community in which they live under a common political 
authority. “This,” Locke writes, “any number of Men may do, because it injures 
not the Freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the Liberty of the State 
of Nature.”135 Sofia Nässtrӧm provides an interesting critique of Locke’s view: 
 
The point he [i.e. Locke] makes (…) is that since individuals are free to 
enter or not enter into society, the persons dissenting are self-excluded. 
They disagree from the very start, which means that they form part of a 
different community. The problem of constitution-making thereby 
resolves itself spontaneously, since everyone who enters society does 
so voluntarily, as a free and equal individual. But while this is a clever 
way of addressing the boundary question, it does not provide us with 
an answer as to what makes it legitimate. The composition of 
individuals who unite into society is one thing, and legitimacy 
another.136 
 
At first glance, Nässtrӧm’s critique is rather puzzling. However, one of the 
footnotes accompanying the part just quoted from Nässtrӧm’s article is 
illuminating. There she further elaborates her critique by claiming that Lockean 
political voluntarism is unable to solve the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people ultimately because “society is not only a matter of self-exclusion.”137 After 
all, the original constitution of a people concerns the process through which a 
group of individuals is set apart from other individuals in the state of nature, who 
are self-excluded, and is bound together as a people. In other words, the 
constitution of the people does not only involve (negative) acts of self-exclusion 
                                                   
135 Locke, II, 95. 
136 Näsström, “The Legitimacy of the People,” p. 639. 
137 Ibid., p. 655 n62. 
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but also, and more importantly, (positive) acts of inclusion. According to 
Nässtrӧm, Locke does not provide us with such an account. This is troublesome 
because it is precisely the inclusionary aspect of the constitution of the people 
that triggers the problem of the legitimacy of the people. This is so, Nässtrӧm 
believes, because unlike the act of exclusion, the act of inclusion should not be an 
individual act but instead a collective act of all parties involved, and (as we have 
seen in Chapter 1.1) it is this requirement of democratic, i.e. collective decision-
making, that inevitably causes an infinite regress when applied to the 
demarcation of the people.138 
I agree with Nässtrӧm that a Lockean political voluntarist approach to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people – or any other such approach for that 
matter – should contain an account of the inclusionary aspect of the constitution 
of the people, and that this account should be compatible with a democratic 
framework. I also agree with her that Locke does not explicitly discuss the 
inclusionary aspect of the constitution of the people. About this we need not 
quarrel. But I believe it is too quick to dismiss Lockean political voluntarism, as 
Nässtrӧm does, on this ground. From the fact that Locke does not provide an 
account of the inclusionary aspect of the constitution of the people, it does not 
follow that Lockean political voluntarism cannot provide it. On the contrary, I 
shall argue that Lockean political voluntarism does in fact contain the conceptual 
tools to develop such an account. Why this is so can be seen by taking another 
look at what Locke calls the “Liberty of the State of Nature.” In the previous 
section, we have seen that the natural right to personal political self-
determination is an essential constituent part of this state of natural freedom. 
This right entails a negative claim right to be free from political bonds as well as a 
positive liberty right to acquire political bonds. When Locke claims that the 
creation of political society by its original founding parties is legitimate on the 
condition that it does not violate “the Freedom of the rest,” who “are left as they 
were in the Liberty of the State of Nature,” he is indeed merely invoking 
individuals’ natural negative claim right to be free from political bonds as the 
ground for this claim. Clearly, Locke is concerned here with the exclusionary 
aspect of the constitution of the people: each individual is naturally free to decide 
for himself, without interference from others, not to acquire political bonds. 
What is interesting to see – and what Nässtrӧm fails to see – is that a Lockean 
can also account for the inclusionary aspect of the original constitution of the 
people. He can do so by invoking individuals’ positive liberty right to acquire 
political bonds. This right, as we have seen, constitutes a liberty that can 
justifiably be limited by others’ negative claim right to non-interference. It 
                                                   
138 Ibid., pp. 626-627, 629-630, 639, 641, 655 n61 and 62. 
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follows, at least in a Lockean political voluntarist view, that the original 
establishment of political relationships among a group of individuals in the state 
of nature is legitimate if and only if it is based on an agreement. (Otherwise, of 
course, the demarcation of the people violates individuals’ negative right not to 
have political bonds forced upon them.) 
In Chapter 2.1, I have argued that the idea of agreement can be specified in 
two ways, depending on how one understands the reciprocal nature of the 
consensual transactions involved. When consensual transactions are reciprocal, 
this means that they are based on the idea of a quid pro quo, i.e. something given 
for something received, and thereby create a set of rights and obligations, 
mutually, for all persons involved. The undertaking resulting from a reciprocal 
transaction is properly called a “contract”; it is an exchange of promises, by which 
each contracting party acquires an obligation to act in a particular way, and a 
correlated right that the other contracting parties also act in a particular way. 
Reciprocal transactions can be divided into bilateral and multilateral 
undertakings, each corresponding with a particular kind of contract theory: an 
individual contract view and a genuinely social contract view. In the former, 
legitimate sets of obligations and/or institutions (e.g. political obligations, states 
or constitutional rules) originate from a series of bilateral or private agreements 
among separate pairs of individuals. In a proper social contract view, by contrast, 
the sets of obligations and/or institutions in question are grounded in a 
multilateral or public agreement among all individuals involved (instead of 
paired subsets of the total set of individuals involved). 
Based on this understanding of the reciprocal (i.e. bilateral and multilateral) 
nature of the consensual transactions, we can now see that a Lockean political 
voluntarist account of the inclusionary aspect of the original constitution of the 
people, precisely because it should be cast in terms of agreement, can take the 
form either of an individual contract view or of a social contract view. I shall now 
continue to analyse each of these accounts in turn, and consider their potential 
for solving the problem of the original constitution of the people in a way that is 
strongly compatible with a democratic framework. 
Let us begin with the individual contract view. It is perfectly conceivable that 
the original constitution of a political community and authority is based on a 
series of bilateral acts of consent performed by separate pairs of individuals. In 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, for instance, Robert Nozick, a modern Lockean, 
develops an “invisible-hand” explanation of the (minimal) state. In the state of 
nature, he argues, an individual may (for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency) 
decide that it is in his interest to hire another individual to perform protective 
functions for him rather than to (continue to) perform these himself. Other, 
similarly motivated individuals may do the same, and so we arrive at a situation 
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in which some of the inhabitants of the state of nature independently of one 
another happen to contract with one protective agency and some might in the 
same way join another. Individuals A, B, C and D would, for instance, 
independently contract with E, who, for a certain price agreed upon, provides a 
set of protective services for A, B, C and D separately. Every subsequent individual 
entering the scene could similarly contract with E or, alternatively, with another 
individual F for instance, should he meet him. What would ultimately result from 
the “spontaneous groupings, mutual-protection associations, division of labor, 
market pressures, economies of scale, and rational self-interest” is, Nozick argues, 
a single dominant protective agency (e.g. E) or a group of geographically distinct 
dominant protective agencies (e.g. E and F) “very much resembling a minimal 
state.”139 
In Nozick’s version of political voluntarism, the constitution of the state is not 
the object of the contracting parties’ agreement. That is to say, it is not the 
intended result of a number of individuals who, through multilateral acts of 
consent, collectively decide to bind themselves to one another for the purpose of 
constituting a political society in which they live under a common political 
authority. It is, rather, an unintended consequence supervening upon a series of 
bilateral agreements between pairs of individuals. Guided by an “invisible hand” 
cooperative interaction between individuals gradually evolves into a spontaneous 
(as opposed to constructed) order that de facto possesses all the characteristics of 
a state.140 To this I should now add, crucially, that Nozick’s argument does not 
only yield an invisible-hand explanation of the state but of the people as well: for 
the constitution of the people is essentially a side effect of any number of 
individuals who independently of one another happen to act in the same way by 
binding themselves to the same (dominant) protective agency through bilateral 
acts of consent.141 
                                                   
139 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 12-17. 
140 In addition to Nozick’s invisible-hand explanation of the (minimal) state, see also Friedrich A. 
Hayek’s theory of spontaneous order. Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Vol. 1: 
Rules and Order (London: Routledge & Paul Keagan, 1973); Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, 
and Liberty. Vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976); and 
Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty. Vol. 3: The Political Order of a Free People 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979). In turn, Hayek, in developing his notion of 
spontaneous order, followed Adam Ferguson in his observation that social structures of all kinds 
(thus including the people) are “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human 
design.” See his An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. F. Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pt. 3, sec. 2. 
141 A qualification is in order. For it is the philosopher, instead of the contracting parties, who, in 
providing an invisible-hand explanation of the constitution of the people, retrospectively ascribes 
the predicate “people” to the order that emanates from their spontaneous cooperative 
interaction. 
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Unfortunately, there are two reasons why the kind of individual contract view 
endorsed by Lockeans such as Nozick cannot offer a legitimisation of the original 
constitution of the people that is strongly compatible with a democratic 
framework. The first reason has to do with the notion of legitimacy that is at work 
in a democratic theory. Within a democratic framework, a political state of affairs 
is legitimate if it is the object of a collective decision. If this is correct, however, 
then it follows that the side effects of such a collective decision (if there are any) 
are democratically illegitimate, because they are by definition not part of the 
object of agreement. Unfortunately, this is precisely the case with an individual 
contract theory in which the people emerge as a side effect of a series of private 
agreements. (Of course, this is not to say that this way of constituting the people 
is necessarily illegitimate, but it is certainly undemocratic.) 
The same conclusion can be reached in a slightly different way as well. In an 
individual contract theory, there is no collective decision-making process 
generating a people at all. What we find here instead is a multiplicity of 
individuals who independently of one another, and as a matter of coincidence, 
happen to act similarly by binding themselves to the same entity (e.g. a protective 
agency). Though each of these separate bilateral agreements are democratic (they 
can be said to be the result of a collective decision-making process involving two 
parties), their side effect, “the people,” does not have a democratic origin. Though 
individual contract theory shows that individuals can become bound to one 
another as a people independently of one another, individuals cannot 
independently of one another bind themselves to each other as a people through 
multilateral acts of consent. Yet this is exactly what is required for their becoming 
bound to one another to qualify as democratic. Consequently, the legitimisation of 
the original constitution of the people cannot be understood in democratic terms 
if it involves a series of bilateral acts of consent. 
This brings us to the second contractual form a Lockean political voluntarist 
account of the original constitution of the people might take, namely that of a 
social contract view. In such a view, as said, legitimate sets of obligations and/or 
institutions are grounded in a multilateral or public agreement among all 
individuals involved (instead of paired subsets of the total set of individuals 
involved). This way of understanding consensual transactions features 
prominently in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government. At various places, he 
explains how in the beginning free and equal individuals, through multilateral 
acts of consent, can deliberately and voluntarily agree with one another to leave 
the state of nature by joining together in a political community and subsequently 
putting themselves under a common political authority. He writes, for instance, 
that the “only way whereby one devests himself of his Natural Liberty [in the 
state of nature], and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other 
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men to joyn and unite into a Community.”142 Moreover, Locke is careful to 
emphasise that this agreement is based on consent that is given by individuals “in 
a multitude together.”143 
Does the account of the original constitution of the people derived from 
Locke’s contract view take us any further than that derived from Nozick’s 
contract view? I believe it does. Notice, to begin with, that Locke’s social contract 
view is not susceptible to the criticism just levelled at Nozick’s individual contract 
view. We have seen that a political state of affairs is democratically legitimate if it 
is the object of public agreement. If this is correct, then it follows that Nozick’s 
political voluntarist account of the original constitution of the people is not 
democratic because then the people originate as an unintended consequence 
from a series of private or bilateral (as opposed to public or multilateral) 
agreements between individuals. Since the people are the immediate object of 
public agreement in Locke’s social contract view, his political voluntarist account 
of the original constitution of the people is immune to this critique, and should 
thus be preferred to Nozick’s account. 
Of course, this does not yet answer the fundamental question – indeed, 
Nässtrӧm’s question – how Locke’s social contract view, even though it is 
democratic in character, offers a proper solution to the problem of the legitimacy 
of the people. It is, after all, one thing to claim that the original constitution of the 
people should be based on multilateral acts of consent, but quite another thing to 
explain how this requirement of democratic decision-making itself, i.e. the 
demand that decisions be made collectively, does not cause an infinite regress 
when applied to the demarcation of the people. What needs to be shown, in other 
words, is that Locke’s political voluntarism is capable of providing a solution to 
the problem of the original constitution of the people that is strongly compatible 
with a democratic framework. The possibility of this can be demonstrated by 
analysing Locke’s political voluntarism from a different angle. Given that 
individuals’ natural right to political self-determination entails a negative claim 
right to be free from political bonds and a positive liberty right to acquire political 
bonds, it follows that in Locke’s social contract view the group of persons that 
sets itself apart and binds itself together as a people ought to include, to use 
Robert E. Goodin’s words, “all and only those persons each of whom is not 
rejected by any of the others as a member.”144 Let us call this the None Rejected 
Principle.145 
                                                   
142 Locke, II, 95, emphasis in original. See also, II, 96-97, 99, 171. 
143 Ibid., II, 117. 
144 Robert E. Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 35 (2007), pp. 41-42. Alternatively, the None Rejected Principle could be 
formulated as the All Accepted Principle, in which case the people ought to include all and only 
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What makes the None Rejected Principle interesting is that it enables us to 
develop a Lockean political voluntarist solution to the problem of the legitimacy 
of the people that is strongly compatible with a democratic framework. In order 
to prove this claim, Francis Cheneval’s analysis of the None Rejected Principle 
offers a good starting point. He has argued that this principle specifies a 
procedurally democratic solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people 
that does not result in an infinite regress. In his view, this is so because of the 
underlying conception of democracy. According to this conception, democracy 
does not refer to “a procedure of decision making in which individuals hold 
participating rights and are subjected to collective decision making rules,” but 
rather to “a decision making procedure in which every individual participates and 
has the right to reject any decision of any other individual or group.”146 Now, if we 
understand democracy as a collective decision-making procedure, then, or so 
Cheneval claims, the infinite regress is inevitable. The fundamental problem that 
arises here is, to repeat once more, that before a collective decision can be made 
on the substantive issue as to who constitute the people, a prior decision has to 
be made as to who constitute the collective (i.e. the relevant constituency). In 
order to remain consistent, however, this prior decision, which will be 
determinative of the ensuing substantive issue, requires a collective decision for 
it to be legitimate as well. But this only begs the question as to who constitute the 
collective once more, thus causing an infinite regress of collective decision-
making procedures from which no procedural escape is possible. If, however, we 
conceive of democracy as an “individual mutual acceptance” procedure, as 
Cheneval calls it, then the infinite regress never arises. “In this case,” he argues: 
 
we do not presuppose a dêmos, only a procedure in which every 
individual has the same right to choose its fellow citizens to constitute 
                                                                                                                                                               
those individuals each of whom is accepted by any of the others as a member. Following Brian 
Barry, I do not think anything crucial turns on the distinction between formulating the Principle 
in terms of non-rejectability or acceptability, and so I shall use these terms interchangeably. See 
his Justice as Impartiality, pp. 69-70. 
145 Notice that the None Rejected Principle, because it requires that the people ought to consist of 
all and only those individuals each of whom is not rejected by any of the others as a member, is 
incompatible with individual contract views, such as Nozick’s. Individual contract views violate 
this requirement because in those views the people are a side effect of any number of individuals 
who independently of one another happen to act in the same way by binding themselves to the 
same (dominant) protective agency through bilateral acts of consent. What is interesting to see, 
though, is that Nozick has developed, in addition to his individual contract theory, an alternative, 
social contract theory of the origin of political society. See his Anarchy, State and Utopia, ch. 10. 
146 Francis Cheneval, “Constituting the Dêmoi Democratically,” National Centre of Competence in 
Research (NCCR): Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, Working Paper No. 50 (2011), pp. 
4-5. 
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the demos. The dêmos is not presupposed, only a participatory 
procedure of individual (and not of collective) choice.147 
 
Though I agree with Cheneval that the people are not presupposed by the 
Lockean political voluntarist account of the legitimacy of the people, I do not 
accept the reason he gives for this view. According to Cheneval, the None Rejected 
Principle does not cause an infinite regress because it yields a democratic 
procedure involving individual as opposed to collective choice. This is a mistake. 
Following Nässtrӧm, I have argued that the original constitution of the people 
contains both an exclusionary and inclusionary aspect, and that the latter aspect, 
unlike the former, requires collective as opposed to merely individual action in a 
Lockean political voluntarist view. Although individuals can unilaterally decide to 
exclude themselves from political relationships, they cannot unilaterally decide to 
become politically engaged with others. The None Rejected Principle is consistent 
with this reading of Lockean political voluntarism. It demands that the people 
consist of those individuals only who do not reject each other as a member. If, for 
instance, individual A chooses as his fellow citizens individuals B and C, then this 
does not yet suffice to constitute a people (including A, B and C). In turn, B and C 
still have to accept A, as well as each other, as fellow citizens to constitute a 
people. But if this is the case, then the legitimate constitution of the people, at 
least in so far as we are concerned with the inclusionary aspect of it, is best 
understood not as the result of individual choice but rather as the result of a 
collective choice that is subject to the condition that it is made unanimously. 
Basically, the None Rejected Principle insists that any individual has a veto over 
all proposed political relationships involving him. What this individual veto-right 
implicit in the None Rejected Principle highlights, then, is that the decision to 
constitute a people is legitimate if and only if it is the object of actual agreement 
among all parties involved. Surprisingly, this is what Cheneval himself seems to 
suggest as well when referring to the participatory procedure of individual choice 
as a “procedure of individual mutual acceptance.”148 Even in the case of this 
procedure, he seems to realise that the individual wills of the participants still 
need to be transformed into a collective will if the people are to be constituted at 
all; and, as the name of the procedure itself already suggests, this transformation 
has to be based on reciprocal consensual transactions. 
To be sure, the democratic procedure does involve individual choice in the 
sense that each individual determines for himself, on the basis of his own reasons, 
whether or not to accept another individual. It does not follow, however, that 
                                                   
147 Ibid., p. 5. 
148 Ibid., my emphasis. 
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individual choice is what legitimises the constitution of the people. On the 
contrary, it is, rather, individuals’ mutual acceptance of each other, expressed 
through multilateral acts of consent, that ultimately legitimises the constitution of 
the people. That consent is given on the basis of personal reasons does not 
change the fact that the ensuing decision, precisely because it should not violate 
individuals’ veto right, involves reciprocal consensual transactions and therefore 
is a collective one. Consequently, and contrary to what Cheneval claims, it is not 
true that the None Rejected Principle does not cause an infinite regress because it 
generates a democratic procedure involving individual as opposed to collective 
choice. Since the former procedure, just like the latter, inevitably produces a 
collective choice, the problem of the legitimacy of the people still forces itself 
upon us. And so we are still faced with the fundamental question how to 
determine which individuals have a right to choose their fellow citizens to 
constitute the demos. 
Fortunately, we do not have to appeal to Cheneval’s problematic distinction 
between a participatory procedure of individual and collective choice in order to 
be able to explain why the people are not presupposed by the Lockean political 
voluntarist account of the legitimacy of the people. If we want to solve the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people by appealing to a democratic procedure, 
then we have to make sure that no individual is a priori excluded from it. 
Otherwise, this procedure would already presuppose the us/them distinction that 
it is meant to generate, and this would trigger an infinite regress of collective 
decision-making procedures presupposing prior collective decision-making 
procedures necessary to legitimise the posterior ones. The question, then, is 
whether the collective decision-making procedure derived from the None 
Rejected Principle excludes any individuals from the start. Interestingly, this is 
not the case. The None Rejected Principle “assumes a foundational situation in 
which potential members choose each other openly and freely.”149 What this 
means is that the None Rejected Principle yields a democratic procedure that is 
“open” in the sense that all individuals inhabiting the state of nature are always 
free to approach one another in order to find out whether they are (un)acceptable 
to one another as members of the people. Since nobody is a priori excluded from 
this procedure, it follows that the people are not presupposed by but instead the 
genuine result of it, and so the infinite regress never arises because the necessity 
of legitimising a “presupposed” us/them distinction is absent. It is this aspect of 
the Lockean political voluntarist democratic procedure, rather than what 
Cheneval misidentifies as the individual choice resulting from it, that ensures the 
infinite regress does not arise. It is, to put it differently, this aspect of the 
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procedure that ensures that it “will not beg the question of who chooses the 
choosers.”150 
The upshot of this line of reasoning is as follows. I have made a distinction 
between two ways in which Lockean political voluntarism can be understood: 
either as an individual or as a social contract view. Next, and contrary to 
Nässtrӧm, I have demonstrated that Lockean political voluntarism, when 
understood as a social (as opposed to individual) contract view, contains the 
conceptual tools to provide an account of the (exclusionary and inclusionary 
aspect of the) original constitution of the people that is strongly compatible with 
a democratic framework. Central to this kind of contract view is the None 
Rejected Principle, according to which the people consist of all and only those 
individuals each of whom is not rejected by any of the others as a member. The 
composition of the people is determined by means of a democratic procedure in 
which all individuals, as potential members of a people, can freely participate in 
order to find out whether they are (un)acceptable to one another as members of 
the people. And since no individuals are a priori excluded from this procedure, 
Lockean political voluntarism offers a procedurally democratic solution to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people that does not cause an infinite regress. 
In the remaining part of this section, I want to consider one specific objection 
to my conclusion. Doing so enables me further to elucidate and defend the 
Lockean political voluntarist account of the original constitution of the people. In 
turn, this allows me to pave the way for the ensuing debate in this chapter, as well 
as the next one (as we shall see later in Chapter 4.3). The objection is that Lockean 
political voluntarism is fundamentally non-democratic, and consequently cannot 
offer a democratic account of the legitimate demarcation of the people. The 
reasoning leading to this conclusion is as follows. For democrats, as Michelman 
succinctly writes, “rights ultimately are nothing but determinations of prevailing 
political will,” while for liberals, especially Lockeans, “some rights are always 
grounded in a “higher law” of transpolitical reason or revelation.”151 According to 
Lockean political voluntarists, this higher law comes in the form of the doctrine of 
natural law. According to this moral realist doctrine, there is a knowable moral 
reality, which exists independently of and prior to (political and moral) practice, 
and which provides the ultimate standard for the general regulation of 
individuals’ pursuit of their ends. This natural moral order of things can be 
apprehended through rational intuition of the so-called “natural laws.” These 
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natural as opposed to conventional laws consist of a set of rights (and correlated 
duties). These rights, as we have seen above, are possessed equally by all 
individuals (who are capable of choice or rational agency) in virtue of their 
humanity; and they hold, as opposed to other moral rights and duties, 
unconditionally. In other words, these rights are not possessed by a specific set of 
individuals in virtue of their having collectively decided to accord these to one 
other. They are not the product of “political will” but are instead revealed to, and 
imposed on us by natural law; they are pre-political. Moreover, the unconditional 
nature of these individual natural rights is such that they restrict the ways in 
which collective decision-making can even proceed. Individuals’ natural rights 
constitute a set of conditions that no democratic majority – no matter how large it 
is – can justifiably violate. In a Lockean framework, then, or so the objection runs, 
it is not the people but natural law that is sovereign. This implies that the Lockean 
political voluntarist account of the legitimacy of the people does not operate from 
a democratic logic (in which the doctrine of popular sovereignty takes centre 
stage) but instead from a liberal logic (in which the doctrine of the rule of law 
takes centre stage). 
Though it is true that natural law plays a fundamental role in a Lockean 
framework, I do not think this conclusion follows. I have argued that natural law 
stipulates that individuals have a (pre-political) natural claim right to political 
self-determination, and that this right entails both a negative claim right to be 
free from political bonds and a positive liberty right to acquire political bonds. It 
follows, at least on one interpretation of Lockean political voluntarism, that the 
original constitution of the people has to be consistent with the None Rejected 
Principle. In turn, this principle generates a democratic procedure (1) that is open 
in the sense that all individuals inhabiting the state of nature are equally free to 
approach one another in order to find out whether they are (un)acceptable to one 
another as members of the people; and (2) the outcome of which – namely, the 
original constitution of a people – is based on multilateral acts of consent on the 
part of all and only those individuals who do not reject each other as a member of 
it. What this demonstrates is that natural law, although it is sovereign in a 
Lockean framework, ultimately requires that the constitution of the people 
follows a democratic logic. This suffices to show that Lockean political 
voluntarism generates a procedurally democratic account of the original 
constitution of the people. 
It might be argued, however, that this reply does not really address the 
original objection. In fact, by explicitly grounding the Lockean political voluntarist 
account of the legitimacy of the people in the pre-political natural claim right to 
personal self-determination, the reply seems to grant the fatal point, namely that 
Lockean political voluntarism is fundamentally non-democratic. I do not think 
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this is the case, however. In my view, liberalism and democratic theory have in 
common a normative conception of human beings as autonomous, i.e. free and 
equal, individuals. The democratic principle of collective self-government follows 
from this normative ideal of individual autonomy: given the autonomous nature 
of individuals, they should be able to understand themselves as co-authors of 
laws for the general regulation of social life. Democrats, however, typically insist 
that the substance of individual autonomy (i.e. the set of rights entailed by it) has 
to be specified by means of a collective decision-making procedure as well. But 
this is only partially true. The substance of the ideal of individual autonomy has to 
be specified by means of a collective decision-making procedure only in so far as 
it is not presupposed by the democratic ideal of collective self-government itself. 
So, if it is possible to demonstrate that the ideal of individual autonomy entails 
some set of rights that are not the outcome of collective self-government but 
instead a necessary presupposition of it, then that set of rights does not stand in 
need of a procedurally democratic legitimisation. In fact, I think this is possible 
because collective self-government presupposes, as a bare minimum, 
autonomous individuals in the sense that they are what Arash Abizadeh (who in 
turn paraphrases Joseph Raz) calls “independent, that is, free from subjection to 
the will of another through coercion or manipulation.”152 Importantly, this right 
to independence is conceptually equivalent to what Locke calls the natural 
negative claim right to personal self-determination, which, as we have seen in 
Section 3.1, is the freedom to formulate, pursue and revise plans freely, i.e. 
without being subjected to, or made dependent upon, “the inconstant, uncertain, 
unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man.”153 The ideal of collective self-
government presupposes the natural negative claim right to personal self-
determination in the sense that collective self-government is desirable only if 
individuals are conceived of as independent beings – or what Rawls has called 
“self-authenticating sources of valid claims.”154 Otherwise, laws can simply be 
imposed on individuals without their having to be able to understand themselves 
as the co-authors of these laws. 
What this analysis shows is that the natural negative claim right to personal 
self-determination is an essentially constitutive element of the ideal of individual 
autonomy, and that it, precisely because it is a necessary presupposition of 
collective self-government, does not have to be specified by means of a collective 
decision-making procedure. But if this is correct, then it follows that the Lockean 
political voluntarist account of the legitimacy of the people, even though it is 
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grounded in the pre-political natural negative claim right to personal self-
determination, is still fundamentally democratic. The ideal of individual 
autonomy is basically an indispensable part of a democratic theory, i.e. an 
underlying set of substantive normative ideals that justify collective decision-
making procedures.155 In a Lockean political voluntarist view that is predicated 
on the idea of social agreement, the None Rejected Principle translates the ideal 
of individual autonomy into a specific democratic procedure according to which 
the constitution of the people is the result of multilateral acts of consent on the 
part of all and only those individuals who accept (or do not reject) each other as a 
member. 
There is an important caveat, however. I have argued that, in a democratic 
theory, the substance of the ideal of individual autonomy has to be specified by 
means of a collective decision-making procedure only in so far as it is not 
presupposed by the ideal of collective self-government itself. It follows that if 
there is a tension between Lockean political voluntarism and democratic theory, 
then it cannot arise from the fact that Locke, unlike the democrat, conceives of the 
right to independence as a pre-political right – after all, the democratic ideal of 
collective self-government itself presupposes the pre-political right to 
independence. This is not to say, however, that there is no tension between both 
theories, only that it arises at another level: unlike democrats, Locke conceives of 
all rights, even those not presupposed by the democratic ideal of collective self-
government, as pre-political ones. In that regard, Lockean political voluntarism is 
not a democratic but liberal theory: all (positive) laws, which specify rights and 
duties, are legitimate not in so far as they track the will of the people but natural 
law. “The Natural Law,” Locke writes: 
 
(...) stands as an Eternal Rule to All Men, Legislators as well as others. 
The Rules that they make for other Mens Actions, must, as well as their 
own and other Mens Actions, be conformable to the Law of Nature, i.e. 
to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration, and the fundamental 
Law of Nature being the preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction 
can be good, or valid against it.156 
 
According to Locke, individuals are autonomous not in the sense that they are the 
authors of (positive) laws but rather in the sense that these laws do not violate 
their pre-political rights. 
There is, however, another, and for our purposes significant, sense in which 
individuals are autonomous as well: in a Lockean framework, individuals are 
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autonomous in the sense that they are the authors of their political relationships 
– though not of the laws regulating these. Although the fundamental natural law 
stipulates that we have a natural duty to preserve mankind, it does not stipulate 
that individuals have a natural duty to live with each other in political union. On 
the contrary, since individuals have a natural negative claim right to personal 
(political) self-determination, the constitution of political society ought to be 
based on deliberately and voluntarily performed mutual consensual transactions. 
However, the conditions under which any number of individuals can bind 
themselves to one another are, by contrast, neither the object of a rational 
compromise (as is the case with contractarianism, as we will see in Chapter 4) 
nor of a reasonable consensus (as is the case with Rawlsian contractualism, as we 
shall see in Chapter 5). Rather, these conditions are derived from natural law. 
Though individuals can agree with one another to become politically bound, 
natural law specifies the nature of their political relationship: if they decide to 
bind themselves to one another as a people, then the fundamental natural law 
demands that all individuals involved lay down their natural right to execute the 
natural law, and transfer it to a common political authority to which they subject 
themselves as the supreme interpreter, judge and enforcer of natural law. Locke 
is very clear about the ends of political society and government. According to him, 
the fundamental law of nature stipulates that “the great and chief end” – indeed, 
the only end – of individuals uniting into political society, and putting themselves 
under government, “is the Preservation of their Property.”157 (“Property” should 
be taken broadly to refer to individuals’ “Life, Liberty, and Estate.”158) So, any 
number of individuals can set themselves apart from other individuals in the 
state of nature, and bind themselves together as a people, in a way that is 
consistent with the None Rejected Principle. If they do so, however, natural law 
requires that they all have to give up their natural freedom and transfer it to a 
higher political authority for the sole purpose of preserving themselves. 
What this shows is, of course, just how limited the “democratic moment” in 
the Lockean political voluntarist account of the original constitution of the people 
is. Locke’s understanding of autonomy limits the way in which individuals are to 
be conceived of as authors of political relationships, and thus limits the way in 
which these relationships stand in need of a democratic legitimisation. In his 
view, individuals’ autonomy requires that they be able to understand themselves 
as the authors of their political relationships but not of the laws regulating their 
political ties. Though this creates an obvious tension between Lockean political 
voluntarism and democratic theory (which requires that individuals ought to be 
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able to understand themselves as the authors of the laws regulating their political 
relationships), it is a tension that is nevertheless irrelevant for my present 
purpose. My aim is to see whether Lockean political voluntarism has the potential 
to provide a legitimisation of the constitution of the people that is strongly 
compatible with a democratic framework. Given this aim, the tension between 
Lockean political voluntarism and democratic theory is irrelevant because for all 
its limitedness, the founding moment in the Lockean political voluntarist account 
of the original constitution of the people is still fundamentally democratic. This is 
so because I have argued that: (1) the natural negative claim right to personal 
self-determination is a (pre-political) right that is not the outcome of but instead 
presupposed by the democratic ideal of collective self-government; and (2) the 
democratic None Rejected Principle translates this right into a specific 
democratic procedure according to which the composition (but not the set of 
laws that is regulative) of the people is the result of multilateral acts of consent 
on the part of all and only those individuals who accept (or do not reject) each 
other as a member. Of course, we may insist – as democrats and, as we shall see in 
the next chapters, contractarians and Rawlsian contractualists do – that the 
people should be able to understand themselves as the authors of the laws 
regulating them. However, since the democratic character of the demarcation of 
the people, which primarily concerns its composition, does in no way depend on 
the democratic character of the laws regulating the people, I conclude that 
Lockean political voluntarism is perfectly capable of providing us with a 
procedurally democratic legitimisation of the original constitution of the people – 
and so offers a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that is 
strongly compatible with a democratic framework. 
Having established this conclusion, I now want to continue my discussion of 
Lockean political voluntarism. More specifically, I want to examine whether this 
approach can offer a solution to those specific articulations of the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people that (as we have seen in Section 3.1) arise – and can only 
arise – against the background of an already existing world of political 
communities: migration and secession. 
3.3 Migration 
The idea of the state of nature is, as we have seen above, fundamental to Locke’s 
political philosophy. My analysis of the problem of the original constitution of the 
people in the previous section – the problem, that is, of how, in the beginning, a 
group of previously unattached individuals can set themselves apart from other 
individuals, and bind themselves together as a people in the boundary-less state 
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of nature – may have given the impression that the Lockean state of nature refers 
to a pre-political period, i.e. a time in the history of mankind preceding (the 
establishment of) political communities (i.e. peoples). This, however, is not how I 
understand the Lockean idea of the state of nature. Instead, the importance of the 
state of nature, I want to suggest, stems from the fact that it constitutes a 
heuristic device which, through the intuitive distinction between natural duties 
and special obligations, models individuals’ natural freedom and helps us to think 
through its (voluntaristic) implications for our political bonds. The idea of the 
state of nature describes individuals prior to their having voluntarily acted in 
ways which create special rights and obligations, political or otherwise.159 Thus 
understood, the idea of the state of nature does not refer to a pre-political period 
in the history of mankind. Rather, it is what Simmons calls a “relational 
concept”160: individuals are in the state of nature with respect to one another if 
they have not (yet) performed any deliberate and voluntary acts which create 
political relationships between them. And, as we have seen above, political 
relationships among individuals are morally legitimate if and only if they are 
consistent with the None Rejected Principle – i.e. if these political relationships 
are based on multilateral acts of consent on the part of all and only those 
individuals who do not reject each other as parties to it. 
This way of understanding the idea of the state of nature has a distinctive 
advantage when applied to the problem of the legitimacy of the people: it makes 
the state of nature a heuristic device that is not only helpful in analysing the 
problem of the original constitution of the people, but also helpful in analysing 
the problem of the reconstitution of the people. It enables us, in other words, to 
analyse those specific articulations of the problem of the legitimacy of the people 
that arise – and can only arise – against the background of an already existing 
world of political communities (each of which are founded by the original 
contracting parties). Here, as I have already said, we can think of migration and 
secession. Consequently, I shall, in this and the next two sections, use the 
relational concept of the state of nature that lies at the heart of Lockean political 
voluntarism in order to draw out the implications for emigration and 
immigration (this section), as well as for individual secession (Section 3.4) and 
group secession (Section 3.5). 
Let us begin, then, by looking at what a Lockean political voluntarist solution 
to the problem of the reconstitution of the people entails in the case of migration. 
In Section 3.1, I have argued that it is a consequence of the Lockean thesis of 
political voluntarism that political society is understood as a voluntary 
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association: an entire group of individuals in a given territory is subject to the 
legitimate political authority of a state if and only if each member of that group 
has actually given his deliberate and free consent to this subjection. However, this 
Lockean legitimisation of political authority immediately seems to be faced with 
the following objection. If an individual is subject to a government’s political 
authority only if he has actually given his free and deliberate consent to this 
subjection, and if a government is legitimate only if it has political authority over 
all of its subjects, then, as A. John Simmons aptly notes, this “makes a 
government’s legitimacy or illegitimacy turn implausibly on the possibility of one 
citizen refusing to give his consent”161 – and this is not such a long shot at all 
considering that most of us have never been in a position to bind ourselves to our 
government through a deliberate and voluntary act of express consent. (This is the 
problem we have already encountered in Chapter 2.3.) 
Interestingly though, Locke confronted this problem by incorporating the 
idea of tacit consent through residence into his account of political voluntarism. He 
famously argued that “every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any 
part of the Dominions of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and 
is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the Laws of that Government.”162 For Locke, 
owning land in a state, lodging in a house in a state, travelling on the highway in a 
state, and even, indeed, mere residence in a state, all constitute signs of tacit 
consent, and as such are all sufficient conditions of subjection to political 
authority.163 Conceptualising tacit consent in terms of residence, then, makes it 
possible for Locke’s political voluntarism to satisfy the unanimity requirement. 
As we have seen, however, only a voluntarily performed act can legitimately 
bind an individual to a political authority. This means that legitimately binding 
consent is given under conditions that make it genuinely free. Consequently, if 
residence is to be taken as a sign of (tacit) consent, then an individual’s residence 
within the boundaries of the territory over which a political authority has 
dominion can generate a political obligation for him to obey it only if his 
residence can be genuinely understood as a free choice. In a Lockean theory, this 
is a choice made under conditions that are non-violative of individuals’ natural 
freedom, in particular here of individuals’ natural right to political self-
determination. Of course, this requirement raises the crucial question as to 
whether the Lockean choice situation can be modelled accordingly. 
According to Locke, this is possible because of the nature of tacit consent. 
Although tacit consent is a sufficient condition of subjection to political 
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obligation, it is insufficient to make this subjection perpetual and indispensable. 
Locke writes: 
 
But since the Government has a direct Jurisdiction only over the Land, 
and reaches the Possessor of it (…) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys 
that: The Obligation any one is under, by Virtue of such Enjoyment, to 
submit to the Government, begins and ends with the Enjoyment; so that 
whenever the Owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit Consent to 
the Government, will, by Donation, Sale, or otherwise, quit the said 
Possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other 
Commonwealth.164 
 
Here, Locke depicts an image of political society as a voluntary association in 
the following dual sense: (1) a group of individuals is subject to the legitimate 
political authority of a state by virtue of each member of that group having 
unilaterally and tacitly consented to this subjection by deliberately and freely 
residing within the boundaries of the territory over which that state has 
dominion; and (2) this subjection is dispensable and non-permanent, lasting only 
for as long as they remain within the boundaries of the territory over which it has 
dominion.165 
In order to know what it means for someone to exercise his natural right to 
political self-determination, it is important to take a closer look at the nature of 
the “liberty” that Locke ascribes to an individual “to go and incorporate himself 
into any other Commonwealth.” According to Lockean political voluntarism, 
individuals have a natural right to political self-determination. Given that this 
right entails a negative claim right to be free from political bonds and a positive 
liberty right to acquire political bonds, I have argued that a Lockean political 
voluntarist, in so far as he endorses the idea of social (as opposed to individual) 
agreement, is committed to the view that the group of individuals that sets itself 
apart and binds itself together as a people ought to be consistent with the None 
Rejected Principle. This, as we have seen in Section 3.2, is a democratic principle 
that justifies an open democratic procedure, according to which the legitimate 
constitution of the people is the result of multilateral acts of consent on the part 
of all and only those individuals who accept (or do not reject) each other as a 
member. 
Now, suppose that an individual wishes to leave the state in which he lives. In 
that case, the state (and its citizens) cannot refuse to allow this individual to 
emigrate because that would constitute a violation of the None Rejected 
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Principle: the people would no longer consist of all and only those individuals 
each of whom is not rejected by any of the others as a member. The would-be 
emigrant, after all, wants to become a member of another people, and so rejects 
any and all of the other citizens of the state in which he is currently residing as 
members of a people including him.  
Suppose, next, that the same individual actually leaves the state of which he 
no longer wants to be a citizen, and applies for citizenship in another state. This 
individual is in the state of nature with respect to the citizens of that state: they 
have not (yet) performed any deliberate and voluntary acts which create political 
relationships between them. Given that political relationships among individuals 
are morally legitimate if and only if they are consistent with the None Rejected 
Principle, it follows that this individual, although he can unilaterally decide to 
exclude himself from a people by emigrating, cannot unilaterally decide to include 
himself in another people by immigrating to whatever state he wants to. Just as 
the state (and its citizens) cannot force political bonds on a would-be emigrant, a 
would-be immigrant cannot force himself on the state (and its citizens) of which 
he wants to become a member. The None Rejected Principle, after all, demands 
that the people ought to include all and only those individuals each of whom does 
not reject any of the others as a member. Through his membership application, 
the would-be immigrant expresses his willingness to engage in a political 
relationship with the citizens of the state he wants to enter. In turn, however, the 
citizens of this state still have to decide whether or not to reject the would-be 
immigrant as a new member. If the citizens do not reject the would-be immigrant, 
they bind themselves to one another through multilateral acts of consent, and so 
reconstitute the people.166 
In sum, then, the Lockean political voluntarist solution to the problem of the 
reconstitution of the people, as it appears in the case of migration, is as follows. 
Since emigration offers one possible way of expressing one’s refusal to accept 
other individuals as members of a people including oneself (I shall discuss 
another way in Section 3.4), it follows, to use the Hohfeldian distinction between 
claim rights and liberty rights introduced in Section 3.1, that the None Rejected 
Principle implies a negative claim right to emigration. Since immigration is one 
possible way of reconstituting the people (I shall discuss another way in Section 
3.5), it follows that the None Rejected Principle implies a positive liberty right to 
immigration. Consequently, the None Rejected Principle demands that the 
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boundaries of a state ought to be structurally “open” and “fluid”167 in the 
following sense: the people are an open-ended entity the composition of which is 
the ever temporary result of ongoing (a) unilateral acts of self-exclusion on the 
part of those individuals who wish to leave a state, and (b) multilateral acts of 
consent on the part of (the citizens of) the state and those individuals who wish to 
enter it. 
3.4 Individual Secession: Degrees of Membership 
Given the Lockean commitment to the idea of tacit consent through residence, an 
individual is subject to the political authority of a state only for as long as he 
resides within the boundaries of the territory over which it has dominion. 
Consequently, individuals can withhold their consent by leaving the society in 
which they currently reside and (subsequently) by incorporating themselves into 
another state. However, Locke’s political voluntarism is often criticised for the “If 
you don’t like it, leave it!” type of attitude that is supposed to be implicit in it. 
Discussing this criticism, and its implications for both Locke’s political 
voluntarism and the boundary problem, will enable me to further elucidate and 
broaden the Lockean account of the legitimacy of the people. 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that states do not impose any legal 
restrictions on emigration and immigration. Does this make the decision to stay 
in a particular country or to leave for some other sufficiently free? In his famous 
essay “Of the Original Contract,” David Hume, for one, suggests that it does not 
when he argues, rhetorically: 
 
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to 
leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and 
lives from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as 
well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the 
dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, 
and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.168 
 
Here Hume criticises the idea of tacit consent through residence on the ground 
that it is insufficiently free to generate political obligations because of the 
economic costs and civic integration barriers involved in withholding one’s 
consent by leaving the political society in which one lives. 
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Others have extended Hume’s critique by arguing that Locke’s account of tacit 
consent through residence flies in the face of the (morally relevant) fact that 
individuals are socially embedded beings. Individuals are born in a particular 
society within which they over the course of their lives form all kinds of 
attachments to their friends, family, home, neighbourhood, profession, way of life, 
culture, society, etc. Typically, these attachments (in part) define an individual’s 
personal identity, and as such constitute an essential part of his self-
understanding. Since these attachments are a constitutive element of an 
individual’s personal identity, they are normally too strong to be given up 
(freely). The loss of them (usually) comes at a high (non-economical) price: it is a 
deeply disruptive experience that calls into question the very person that one is. 
It is for this reason that leaving the society in which one is born and raised is a 
grave step: it involves a severing of all social, cultural and historical bonds; a 
(perhaps partial but nonetheless significant) severing, indeed, of one’s personal 
identity. Consequently, Locke’s exit option comes at the cost of a loss of personal 
identity that seriously undermines the voluntariness of residing within a political 
society.169 
The point made here is not that the Lockean, as many communitarians have 
argued, goes wrong right from the start by taking an implausible or otherwise 
objectionable principle as fundamental, namely individuals’ capacity for self-
government (i.e. autonomous, free choice).170 Rather, the point is that the 
Lockean, by demanding that only a voluntarily performed act of tacit consent 
through residence can legitimately bind an individual to a political authority, 
develops a theory that fails by its own standards. 
However, Harry Beran has attacked this position. According to him, the 
demand that only a genuinely free choice generates binding consent can be 
understood as “a compendious way of claiming that a promissory obligation is 
created only if none of the defeating conditions hold.” Among the more important 
of these defeating conditions, he lists “deception, mental incapacity, coercion or 
undue influence, and unfair bargaining position.”171 According to Beran, however, 
both the original and extended version of Hume’s argument against tacit consent 
through residence are untenable, because none of the defeating conditions hold in 
the case of the individual who has to consent or emigrate. 
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In Beran’s view, “[n]ot even the coercion defense applies.”172 He argues that 
Locke’s state makes a non-coercive offer, because “Hume’s peasant is prevented 
from leaving his state not by any threat of harm by the state should he attempt to 
leave, but by his ignorance and poverty.”173 Assuming that the state is not 
responsible for the peasant’s ignorant and poor predicament either, Beran claims 
that the peasant’s decision to obey is not coerced by the state but by 
circumstances. In other words, the peasant, as Jeffrie G. Murphy eloquently notes, 
has to confront nothing more than the “legitimate inequalities of fortune” – i.e. “a 
sad fact about the human condition rather than any unjust disadvantage brought 
on by the wrongful actions of others against us”174 – as a result of which his 
decision cannot be characterised as involuntary (though certainly as hard). “In 
general,” Beran claims, “it simply does not follow from one’s being unable to leave 
a state that there is present one or more of the conditions which prevent one’s 
promise to obey that state from creating an obligation.”175 
Elsewhere, Beran rejects the extended version of Hume’s critique of consent 
theory on similar grounds when he writes: 
 
People who do not wish to consent to the government under which they 
live but cannot bear the thought of losing homeland, family, and friends, 
could perhaps truly be said to be ‘forced by circumstances’ to consent 
nevertheless. But common moral opinion does not endorse the claim 
that being ‘forced by circumstances’ to consent to something 
necessarily prevents such consent from creating a right and an 
obligation.176 
 
On the basis of this analysis, Beran concludes that the objection to consent theory 
from the high cost of emigration is not a sound one.177 
However, others, such as Jeffrie G. Murphy and A. John Simmons, have replied 
to Beran by arguing that the absence of threats of force and violence is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for non-coercive agreement. The reason for 
this is that they consider the state’s offer to consent or emigrate to be what the 
law of contracts calls unconscionable: it is an exploitative agreement that is 
coercively extracted by the stronger from the weaker party to it, and that 
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contains harsh terms.178 It is typical of an unconscionable contract that the 
coercion or duress involved does not stem from threats of violence or force, but 
rather from the unequal bargaining position of the parties to the contract itself, 
and the unfair advantage taken of that inequality by one of the parties in contract. 
However, it is, to me at least, not at all obvious that the offer made by Locke’s 
state is unconscionable. This is so because the state’s offer does not meet all the 
conditions necessary to disqualify it as unconscionable. If a contract is to count as 
unconscionable, then three conditions must be met. First, there must be coercive 
intent in the sense that the stronger party’s sole purpose in making his proposal is 
to force the weaker party to do its bidding by signing the contract. Second, there 
must be coercive effect in the sense that the stronger party (e.g. the state) closes 
the options of the weaker party (e.g. the family man) in such a way that it is left 
with a forced choice between two evils, (e.g. consent and emigration), one of 
which (e.g. emigration) is intolerable and therefore ineligible to it, while the other 
(e.g. consent) is revolting but the lesser of the evils it has to choose between. 
Finally, the contract must contain (3) harsh terms, making the offer properly 
exploitative instead of merely opportunistic.179 
Although it is obvious that there is coercive intent in the state in the sense 
that it demands from all individuals residing within the territory over which it 
has jurisdiction that they either consent or emigrate, it is not clear that it coerces 
them to make this choice with the intention of forcing them to do its bidding by 
making a promise to consent instead of emigrate (or vice versa). Although the 
state’s demand that a choice be made between the range of alternatives it offers 
certainly reveals coercive intent in it, its demand may at the same time reveal 
genuine indifference in it with regard to which of these alternatives are chosen – 
as is the case indeed with many liberal democratic states, where every citizen is 
free to emigrate. Moreover, regardless of the possibility of their (actually) being 
so, it also follows from Lockean political voluntarism that legitimate states ought 
to be indifferent between these options. Consequently, the “argument from 
unconscionability” put forward by Murphy and Simmons does not hold. 
Still, it does not follow from this that Beran is right in claiming that none of 
the defeating conditions of promissory obligations hold in the case of tacit 
consent through residence. For nothing said so far changes the fact that the state 
still coerces individuals to do its bidding by forcing them to choose between the 
particular options to consent or to emigrate. Regardless of the state’s indifference 
between the options it offers, the fact remains that it has selected these from an 
                                                   
178 Murphy, “Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices,” pp. 88-92; and Simmons, On the Edge of 
Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society, pp. 236-244. 
179 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 247, 249-253. 
90  
 
infinite number of other conceivable options, and this prior selection, which by 
definition expresses preference rather than indifference, requires justification.180 
In order to determine the range of alternatives to consent that the state can 
justifiably offer to its citizens, it is helpful to invoke the Lockean state of nature 
once more. According to Locke, any number of men can legitimately join together 
in political society on the condition that their doing so “injures not the Freedom 
of the rest,” who “are left as they were in the Liberty of the State of Nature.”181 
The state of nature, we have seen, is a relational idea; individuals are in the state 
of nature with respect to one another if they have not (yet) performed any 
deliberate and voluntary acts which create political relationships between them. 
Since the natural claim right to political self-determination, a right that entails 
both a negative claim right to be free from political bonds and a positive liberty 
right to acquire political bonds, is an essential constituent part of this state of 
natural freedom, it follows that political relationships among individuals are 
morally legitimate if and only if they are consistent with the None Rejected 
Principle. The underlying idea is that each individual should be able to 
understand himself as the author of political relationships involving him. 
Consequently, no person may be forced to acquire political bonds because that 
would make him dependent on the wills of others instead of his own will, which 
would “injure” his natural freedom and therefore be impermissible.182 
Since individuals who do not want to acquire politically bonds are to be “left 
as they were in the Liberty of the State of Nature,” it follows that the range of 
alternatives to consent that the state can justifiably offer to any dissenting 
individuals has to be compatible with their natural freedom. Locke’s state of 
nature is a heuristic device which, through the intuitive distinction between 
natural duties and special obligations, models individuals’ natural freedom and 
helps us to think through its (voluntaristic) implications for our political bonds. 
Individuals who are in the state of nature with respect to each other have not yet 
deliberately and voluntarily acted in ways which create special rights and 
obligations, political or otherwise. Thus situated, individuals’ freedom to act is 
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subject only to the rules of the Natural Law. This “Liberty of the State of Nature” 
constitutes the moral baseline against which the alternatives to consent that the 
state offers individuals are to be measured. The question, then, is whether 
emigration as the (only) alternative to consent is compatible with the natural 
freedom of the state of nature. 
The following arguments demonstrate that it does not. In the state of nature, 
to begin with, any individual has a negative natural right to act without external 
constraints correlating with a negative natural duty on others not to harm him in 
his life, liberty and estate. This means that individuals are free to develop all 
kinds of special attachments to others (friends, family, etc.), and that they, given 
the pre-political character of the state of nature, can do so independently of their 
having established any political bonds. If these personal relations are voluntarily 
established or affirmed, thus satisfying the demands of natural law, then it 
follows that a state cannot force dissenting individuals to emigrate if that would 
harm them in their capacity to maintain these attachments (e.g. by breaking up a 
family) – which is often the case, of course. Measured against the moral baseline 
of the state of nature, doing so would constitute an unjustifiable limitation, i.e. 
violation, of the natural freedom of those individuals who cannot bear the 
thought of losing their friends and family (provided, of course, that these persons 
share the same feelings). 
It also follows from Locke’s theory of justice that the state cannot force 
individuals who have rightful holdings in land to consent or to emigrate. Locke 
endorses what David Miller has called a “proprietary theory of justice.”183 It is a 
theory in which justice is defined in terms of the fundamental notion of property, 
and is consequently conceived of as an attribute of the distribution of goods. 
Justice, for Locke, is in particular an attribute of everyone possessing that to 
which they have a moral right (“Title”).184 Individuals are naturally free and 
therefore own themselves and the fruits of their labour. By mixing their labour 
with natural goods, including parts of the earth itself, according to rules and 
limits on natural appropriation (i.e. the proviso to leave enough and as good for 
others), individuals have a just (natural) claim right to ownership and security in 
them.185 
According to Locke, the end of men uniting into political societies is the 
preservation of their “Lives, Liberties and Estates,” which he calls by the general 
name “Property.”186 We have already seen that an individual’s actually given 
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deliberate and free consent is a necessary condition for him to become bound to a 
state and to acquire a dispensable and non-permanent obligation to obey its 
government. Interestingly, we can now add to this that by consenting an 
individual incorporates not only himself but also his rightful holdings in land 
(“Estate”) into the territory over which a state has jurisdiction. In other words, a 
state’s jurisdiction over a demarcated territory is derived from the political 
authority it has over all individuals who have bound themselves (and, as a 
consequence, their estates) to it through reciprocal acts of consent.187 Essentially, 
then, as Charles Beitz writes, “the territory of the commonwealth is like a quilt 
patched together from individual holdings in land.”188 
The state of nature models the idea that a state’s territorial jurisdiction is 
derived from the rights it has over its subjects. It describes men prior to their 
having incorporated themselves and (consequently) their rightful holdings in 
land into a political society. Consequently, a state has no moral right to force 
dissenting individuals to quit their rightfully acquired estates and to emigrate. 
For doing so would be incompatible with the liberty of the inhabitants of the state 
of nature. It would constitute an unjustifiable limitation, i.e. violation, of their 
negative natural right to (rightfully acquired) property. 
There is, however, a more general reason why the state cannot justifiably 
offer emigration as the only alternative to consent; general in the sense that the 
state cannot make this offer to any individual (instead of the ones discussed 
above only). What is more, this reason does not appeal to pre-political rights to 
interpersonal relationships (with friends and family) or property, but rather to 
the democratic None Rejected Principle. Given that individuals’ natural right to 
political self-determination entails a negative claim right to be free from political 
bonds and a positive liberty right to acquire political bonds, it follows that the 
constitution of the people should be consistent with the None Rejected Principle. 
Since the None Rejected Principle requires that the people consist of all and only 
those individuals each of whom is not rejected by any of the others as a member, 
an individual can, if he rejects any and all of the others as members of a people 
including him, unilaterally decide to exclude himself from the people. This is, of 
course, precisely what the “dissenter” does: he is unwilling to become (or remain) 
politically bound to the state (and its citizens). As a consequence, the dissenter 
and the state (as well as its citizens) are in the state of nature with respect to each 
other; they have not acted in morally relevant ways which create political 
relationships between them. What it means for persons to stand in a particular 
political relationship is that they have certain political rights and obligations with 
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respect to one another. Conversely, then, the liberty of the state of nature can be 
characterised in radically anarchic terms, namely as the complete lack of political 
rights and obligations. Given that political relationships among individuals are 
morally legitimate if and only if they are consistent with the None Rejected 
Principle, it follows that the state should offer any dissenting persons an 
alternative to consent that is compatible with this characterisation of the liberty 
of the state of nature. 
The state might do so by offering different citizenship grades or packages, 
allowing individuals to acquire a combination of the possible benefits of 
citizenship (i.e. political rights) at the expense of a combination of the possible 
burdens (i.e. political obligations) – with the lowest grade, the one that comes as 
close as possible to the anarchic “Liberty of the State of Nature,” being that of the 
non-citizen resident, who has no political rights and obligations at all; and the 
highest grade being that of the full member, who has all of the corresponding 
political rights and obligations.189 
This analysis enables me to defend the following three claims. First, the 
Lockean state has, at the very least, a moral duty to offer a dissenting person the 
lowest grade of membership. If the constitution of the people is legitimate to the 
extent that it is consistent with the None Rejected Principle, then an individual 
can, if he rejects any and all of the others as members of a people including him, 
unilaterally decide to exclude himself from the people. This individual’s refusal to 
accept others as members of a people including himself is essentially a refusal to 
become bound to others in a way that creates political rights and obligations. 
Since, in an already existing world of political communities (i.e. peoples), 
assuming the status of non-citizen resident offers a possible way of expressing 
one’s refusal to become politically bound to others, it follows that the None 
Rejected Principle implies a negative claim right to non-citizen residency or, to put 
it another way, a claim right to individual secession. This claim right correlates 
with the state’s (and its citizens’) duty to offer individuals the possibility of 
becoming a non-citizen resident. 
This is not the case, however, with more comprehensive citizenship packages 
– which is the second claim I want to defend. Given the None Rejected Principle, 
an individual cannot be forced to become a citizen of a particular state any more 
than he can force himself on that state (and its citizens). If the people consist of all 
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and only those individuals who do not reject each other as members, then it 
follows that the people are a layered entity the composition of which is the ever 
temporary result of multilateral acts of consent on the part of all and only those 
individuals who accept each other as a member of some kind (where the kind of 
membership is expressed in terms of a specific combination of political rights and 
obligations). 
The third, and final, claim I want to make is that the argument just developed 
ultimately shows that Beran is wrong in claiming that none of the defeating 
conditions of promissory obligations hold in the case of tacit consent through 
residence. If emigration is the only alternative to consent that the state offers 
individuals, then the state, regardless of whether it is indifferent between the 
options it offers, violates the None Rejected Principle. In addition to the option of 
emigration, this principle, which lies at the heart of Lockean political voluntarism, 
demands that the state offers individuals the option of non-citizen residency as an 
alternative to consent. Consequently, the state’s offer is no longer “If you don’t 
like it, leave it!” but rather “If you don’t like it, either emigrate or become a non-
citizen resident!” Consequently, the idea of tacit consent through residence can be 
part of an internally consistent political voluntaristic account of the legitimacy of 
the people, but only if it is supplemented with the idea of non-citizen residency. It 
is this modification of Lockean political voluntarism, particularly of the choice 
situation imposed on the individual by the state, that makes an individual’s 
consent sufficiently free to generate political bonds. 
Where does this leave us now? What the argument in this section shows is 
that Lockean political voluntarism can be modified in such a way that it 
constitutes a coherent and internally consistent account of the moral conditions 
under which membership of a people comes as close to a voluntary scheme as 
possible. And this modification, in turn, makes possible a broader understanding 
of the Lockean account of the legitimacy of the people. It is broader in the 
following sense. In the previous section, I have argued that the None Rejected 
Principle requires that the boundaries of a state should be structurally open and 
fluid, thereby making the people an open-ended entity the composition of which is 
the ever temporary result of ongoing unilateral acts of self-exclusion on the part 
of those individuals who wish to leave it, and multilateral acts of consent on the 
part of (the citizens of) the state and those individuals who wish to enter it. The 
argument developed in this section demonstrates that Lockean political 
voluntarism requires more than this; it demands in addition that the people are a 
layered entity the composition of which is the ever temporary result of (a) 
ongoing unilateral acts of self-exclusion on the part of those individuals who wish 
to become a non-citizen resident, and (b) multilateral acts of consent on the part 
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of all and only those individuals who accept each other as a member of some kind 
(expressed in terms of a specific combination of political rights and obligations). 
Notwithstanding the clear implications of my interpretation of Lockean 
political voluntarism for the boundary problem, however, one only has to take a 
brief look at the many disputes that may – and historically do (as we have seen in 
Chapter 1) – arise concerning (the drawing of peoples’) boundaries to conclude 
that this Lockean account of the problem of the reconstitution of the people is still 
incomplete. For although this account is helpful in settling disputes concerning 
migration and individual secession, I have not (yet) said anything that might 
guide us in settling disputes concerning group secession. Given that disputes 
concerning emigration, immigration, as well individual and group secession, 
constitute specific articulations of the (general) problem of the legitimacy of the 
people, a complete Lockean approach to the legitimacy of the people should be 
able to address each of these issues (in an internally consistent and coherent 
way). 
3.5 Group Secession 
In the previous two sections, we have discussed Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent 
through residence. According to this doctrine, Locke writes, a dissenting 
individual is “at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other 
Commonwealth.”190 I have argued that emigration is not the only alternative to 
consent that a state can justifiably offer to individuals residing within its 
boundaries. Given that a coherent and consistent Lockean view entails that 
individuals do not only have a claim right to emigration but also to non-citizen 
residency, I have argued that the state has a correlated duty to offer to dissenting 
individuals the option of becoming a non-citizen resident in addition to that of 
emigration as an alternative to consent. 
What is interesting to see is that Locke himself suggests, in the same section 
just quoted, that the state is even justified in making yet another offer to 
dissenting persons. In his view, a dissenting person is not only “at liberty to go 
and incorporate himself into any other Commonwealth” but also “to agree with 
others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the World, they can find 
free and unpossessed.”191 This is, of course, a rather problematic suggestion. After 
all, even if there have ever been “empty lands” – Locke clearly had America in 
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mind at the time he wrote the two treatises, ignoring its indigenous peoples192 – it 
is a simple fact of our political lives that we now live in a world that is divided 
into states, all of which claiming to exercise legitimate political authority over a 
demarcated territory, and leaving virtually no part of the usable earth as 
unsubjected territory available for appropriation or (re)settlement. 
Consequently, resettlement in the manner proposed by Locke is not an option – if 
it ever was. Although Locke’s “assumption of vacuis locis” is not, or at the very 
least no longer, tenable, it does not follow, however, that Lockean political 
voluntarism lacks the conceptual tools to legitimise an alternative way in which a 
group of individuals can set itself apart and bind itself together in a new political 
society: secession. 
What would a Lockean political voluntarist account of secession look like? As 
said, it is possible to distinguish between individual and group secession. In the 
case of individual secession, the None Rejected Principle, as we have already seen 
in the previous section, stipulates that an individual, if he rejects any and all of the 
others as members of a people including him, can unilaterally decide to exclude 
himself from the people (and subsequently to become a non-citizen resident). The 
case of group secession differs in an important sense from that of individual 
secession. Unlike individual secession, group secession does not only involve the 
severing of political bonds but also the creation of new ones. In other words, 
secession involves both an exclusionary and an inclusionary moment. Based on 
our discussion of the Lockean political voluntarist account of the legitimacy of the 
people in the previous sections, it is not hard to see what such an account entails 
in the case of secession. According to the None Rejected Principle, any number of 
individuals can exclude themselves from an already existing people, and 
subsequently bind themselves together as a people of their own, provided that 
this group includes all and only those individuals each of whom is not rejected by 
any of the others as a member. In other words, the None Rejected Principle 
implies a liberty right to membership of a secessionist group, the demarcation of 
which is based on multilateral acts of consent on the part of all and only those 
individuals who accept (or do not reject) each other as a member of it; and once 
constituted this group of individuals has in turn a claim right to secession. 
The Lockean political voluntarist solution to the problem of the reconstitution 
of the people, as it appears in the case of group secession, is this. Lockean political 
voluntarism portrays an ideal society as one that comes as close to a voluntary 
scheme as possible. The argument developed in this section shows that Lockean 
political voluntarism does not only require that the people should be an open-
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ended and layered entity. In addition, it requires that the boundaries of a state are 
structurally flexible, thereby making the unity of the people themselves voluntary, 
and the ever temporary result of multilateral acts of consent on the part of all and 
only those individuals who accept each other as members of a secessionist group 
that sets itself apart and binds itself together as a new people.193 
This concludes my analysis of Lockean political voluntarism. I have argued 
that this type of social contract view is fully capable of providing us with a 
procedurally democratic legitimisation of the original constitution of the people – 
and so offers a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that is 
strongly compatible with a democratic framework. Furthermore, I have discussed 
its implications for those specific articulations of the problem of the legitimacy of 
the people that arise – and can only arise – against the background of an already 
existing world of political communities. 
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Chapter 4  
 
The Contractarian Legitimisation of the People: 
An Open and Serial Consensual Binding Procedure 
In this chapter, I shall approach the problem of the legitimacy of the people from 
a contractarian perspective. The challenge is to see whether the contractarian 
approach can provide us with a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people that is (strongly as opposed to weakly) compatible with a democratic 
framework. That is to say, (1) is it possible to develop a collective decision-
making procedure that is capable of generating a solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people that does not cause an infinite regress? Or, alternatively, 
(2) is it possible to derive an account of the legitimate demarcation of the people 
from a particular democratic theory? 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, I begin with 
presenting an outline of contractarianism. This provides me with the means to 
argue that contractarianism is capable of generating a procedural solution to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people that does not result in an infinite 
regression (Sections 4.3 and 4.4). In Section 4.5, I shall argue next that this 
contractarian procedure – which I will refer to as the “open and serial consensual 
binding procedure” – constitutes a genuine democratic decision-making 
procedure. This allows me to conclude that the contractarian account of the 
legitimacy of the people is strongly compatible with a democratic framework (in 
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the first of the two senses identified). In the final two sections of this chapter (4.6 
and 4.7), I discuss two familiar problems that seem to strike at the heart of the 
contractarian approach: the compliance problem and the problem of moral 
standing. Should either of these problems turn out to be unsolvable, then 
contractarianism, together with its solution to the problem of the legitimacy of 
the people, becomes untenable. Based on a critical analysis, I shall argue that 
contractarianism does not only contain the conceptual tools to provide a solution 
to the problem of the legitimacy of the people, but also provides a solution to the 
problems of compliance and moral standing. 
4.1 A Subjective Theory of Value 
In Chapter 2, I have argued that there is a distinctive and continuous line of 
contractarian reasoning in the tradition of the social contract that can be traced 
back all the way to ancient Greek philosophy. Rudimentary forms of 
contractarianism can be found in Plato’s Republic (Glaucon), Epicurean political 
thought, and Cicero’s Commonwealth (Philus). It was not until Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, however, that contractarianism received its mature expression and 
defence. In his Leviathan, which is considered to be one of the greatest works of 
political thought, Hobbes embedded his social contract theory within the 
tradition of natural law. In the previous chapter, we have already seen that 
natural law plays a fundamental role in Locke’s contract view as well. Despite the 
importance both Hobbes and Locke attach to natural law, their characterisation 
of it differs radically. This, as we will see, has far-reaching consequences for the 
kind of social contract theory one endorses, which, in turn, has broad implications 
for what counts as a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people. Based 
on a Lockean interpretation of natural law, I have already developed a political 
voluntaristic account of the legitimacy of the people. In this chapter, I analyse the 
particular notion of natural law underpinning Hobbes’s classic contractarian 
view, as well as the specific form in which it re-appears in James M. Buchanan’s 
and David Gauthier’s modern incarnations. This enables me to elucidate the 
distinctive features of the contractarian view and next to consider its potential for 
solving the problem of the legitimacy of the people. 
Let us begin, then, by taking a closer look at Hobbes’s interpretation of 
natural law. Hobbes understands a law of nature as “a Precept, or generall Rule, 
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive 
of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same.”194 The dictates of 
any of the nineteen laws of nature Hobbes identifies can be understood in two 
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ways, namely either (a) as “Conclusions, or Theorems concerning what conduceth 
to the conservation and defence” of individuals, or (b) “as delivered in the word of 
God, that by right commandeth all things.”195 Both ways of understanding the 
laws of nature are underpinned by mutually exclusive and irreconcilable theories 
of value. 
The first (a) is based on a subjective theory of value. According to this theory, 
objects or states of affairs considered in themselves have no moral value; they are 
not intrinsically valuable. People can (and actually do) ascribe moral value to 
states of affairs, but moral value is not an inherent feature of objects or states of 
affairs, existing independently of people’s affections and desires. This is a moral 
anti-realist position – which more often than not, indeed, has moral relativist 
underpinnings – that entails a denial of the possibility that there is (non-
empirical) knowledge of a moral reality which exists independently of people’s 
affections and desires, and which can be apprehended through some form of 
rational intuition (differing from sense-experience). Furthermore, the non-
existence of such a unique, moral value-oriented cognition makes it not only 
impossible to conceive of moral values as existing independently of people’s 
affections and desires, but also, and partly because of this, impossible to conceive 
of moral values as providing a standard to regulate their affections and desires. 
The essence of a subjective theory of value is nicely captured by David Hume’s 
dictum that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”196 
With this at the backs of our minds, it is possible to characterise the basic 
assumption of the subjective account of value as follows: 
 
[F]or each person A, there is a set of primary desires he has at any time 
t, which are given to him by his nature and circumstances, and which 
provide the necessary basis for his having any reasons for acting.197 
 
It follows that every moral principle reflects a set of private reasons, i.e. 
reasons making an ineliminable reference to a person’s (present or antecedent) 
primary desires. Consequently, whatever moral force principles (and the set of 
reasons they reflect) have, “they must have by virtue of their instrumental 
relation to each agent’s more particular concerns.”198 Ultimately, moral principles 
are but an extension of principles of rational individual choice; they provide, at 
                                                   
195 Ibid., ch. 15, p. 80. 
196 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. I, pt. 3, sec. 3, p. 415. Modern proponents of the 
Humean account of rationality are: Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
197 Freeman, “Contractualism, Moral Motivation, and Practical Reason,” p. 290. 
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best, hypothetical imperatives with their directive to take effective and efficient 
means to one’s ends. On this view, then, morality is essentially reducible to 
rationality; it is “a subordinate notion, grounded in individuals’ antecedent 
desires and interests.”199 
According to an objective theory of value, by contrast, objects or states of 
affairs are not to be evaluated in purely private terms, i.e. merely on the basis of 
instrumental considerations taken into account by individuals who are concerned 
to advance their given interests. Instead of making an ineliminable reference to 
their contingently held private interests, desires and ends, individuals’ reasons 
for acting (morally) ought to be public. On one, moral realist interpretation, public 
reasons refer to an independent, knowable moral reality, which provides an 
objective standard (of value) for the general regulation of the pursuit of 
individuals’ idiosyncratic ends. This view is clearly exemplified by the second (b) 
way in which Hobbes thinks the laws of nature can be understood, namely as 
God’s commands. From the preceding discussion of Locke’s natural law doctrine 
(in Chapter 3), it should be clear that his account of natural duties and rights is 
underpinned by an objective, indeed theological, theory of value. 
Contrary to what Hobbes seems to suppose, however, it is important to note 
that an objective theory of value need not necessarily be underpinned by such a 
moral realist position. Contractualists, such as Rawls and Scanlon (with whom we 
shall be occupied in Chapter 5), endorse an objective theory of value but are not 
committed to the moral realist position just described. As we have seen in 
Chapter 2.4, both contractarians and contractualists aim to justify principles by 
positing an idealised choice situation in which idealised agents have to agree on 
rules for the general regulation of their interactions with one another when they 
are in actual, non-idealised society. Unlike contractarians, however, who derive 
morality from instrumental rationality (as I will explain in more detail in a 
moment), contractualists build moral substance into their description of both the 
hypothetical agents and their circumstances, and as such place moral constraints 
on the (kind of) rational agreement to be reached by the agents. Though this 
reveals contractualists’ commitment to an objective (instead of subjective) theory 
of value, it is not a commitment that presupposes a moral realist position. It is, 
rather, based on a moral constructivist approach to morality. This approach 
entails that objectivity is specified not with reference to a prior and independent 
moral order but instead with reference to a suitably constructed interpersonal 
standpoint (such as the original position). According to contractualists, as Samuel 
Freeman writes, “judgment from this standpoint specifies the realm of moral 
                                                   
199 Ibid., p. 123. 
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facts. Objectivity is, as it were, prior to the universe of moral “objects.””200 This 
interpersonal perspective provides an objective point of view from which to 
assess the validity of our moral judgments and social conventions. Our moral 
judgments are true if they are consistent with principles that every individual 
could reasonably be expected to accept from this perspective.201 
Regardless of the differences between the contractualist and the moral realist 
interpretation of the objective theory of value, the important point to notice here 
is that they are premised on an explicit rejection of the reductionist aspect of 
contractarianism. They do not work from the idea that morality is derivable from 
rationality but rather from the opposite idea that rationality is subordinate to 
morality. Both the moral realist’s independent moral order and the 
contractualist’s interpersonal standpoint serve as an objective standard for the 
general regulation of individuals’ (pursuit of) interests. 
Having discussed the theories of value underlying both ways in which Hobbes 
deems it possible to understand the laws of nature, the next question is which 
one he endorses himself. Now, since I have already suggested that contractarians 
derive morality from rationality, and since I have characterised Hobbes as the 
arch-contractarian, it will come as no surprise that the answer to this question 
should be that Hobbes endorses a subjective theory of value. Consider the 
following passage from his Leviathan: 
 
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, 
which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and 
Aversion, Evill (…) For these words of Good, Evill (…) are ever used with 
relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and 
absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from 
the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man.202 
 
In Chapter 15, and fully in line with the above quote, Hobbes furthermore 
claims that “private Appetite is the measure of Good.”203 To explain this claim, he 
                                                   
200 Freeman, “Contractualism, Moral Motivation, and Practical Reason,” pp. 287-288. 
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then immediately gives an example. If individuals agree that peace is good, and 
that compliance with the laws of nature as “the way, or means of peace” is 
(therefore) good as well, then these natural laws come to be praised by these 
individuals (only) because they are conducive to the realisation of their “private 
Appetites,” namely their “peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living.”204 By 
parity of reasoning, the same goes, of course, for the appraisal of the good of 
peace itself. In so far as furthering peace promotes individuals’ antecedent 
purposes, it is the most rational course of action for each of them to take in order 
to pursue their prior and independent interests. So, it is clear then that Hobbes 
endorses an interpretation of the laws of nature that ties it to a subjective theory 
of value.205 
The same subjective theory of value is found in the contractarian views of 
Hobbes’s successors Buchanan and Gauthier (though, as we shall see, their 
understanding of “the Law Of Nature” differs from that of Hobbes). To begin with 
Buchanan, he explicitly rejects what he calls a “truth-judgment conception of 
politics,” which is the conceptual analogue of what I have called an “objective 
theory of value.” Proponents of this conception, he writes, “retain a Platonic faith 
that there is a “truth” in politics, remaining only to be discovered and, once 
discovered, capable of being explained to reasonable men.”206 In their view, 
political society should aim at the realisation of some “metaphysically superior 
value” or “higher law.” The “true and unique nature” of this value or law does not 
make an ineliminable reference to individuals’ interests but instead to a prior and 
independent moral reality “that is “out there” for the finding of it” and that 
provides the ultimate standard for the general regulation of the “good society.”207 
Buchanan is deeply sceptical of this view. According to him, we do not live 
together “because society offers us a means of arriving at some transcendental 
common bliss.” Instead, and this is where his endorsement of a subjective theory 
of value becomes apparent, he claims that we live together “because social 
organization provides the efficient means of achieving our individual 
objectives.”208 A situation is “good” not because some external observer, such as a 
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utilitarian impartial spectator or a Platonic philosopher king, deems it so. Instead, 
Buchanan claims that a “situation is judged “good” only to the extent that it allows 
individuals to get what they want to get, whatsoever this might be, limited only 
by the principle of mutual agreement.”209 In other words, “good” is that which 
tends to emerge as the object of mutual agreement from a process of voluntary 
personal interactions among a set of individuals who are each concerned to 
further their antecedent interests.210 
Gauthier holds a similar position. He makes a distinction between objective 
and subjective conceptions of value. If one conceives of value as objective, then it 
exists independently of the affections of persons, and provides a norm or 
standard to regulate (the pursuit of) their affections. Gauthier explicitly rejects 
the objective conception of value. “Value is,” he claims, “not an inherent 
characteristic of things or states of affairs, not something existing as part of the 
ontological furniture of the universe in a manner quite independent of persons 
and their activities.”211 Like Hobbes and Buchanan, Gauthier rejects the moral 
realism underlying the objective conception of value, and embraces the subjective 
conception of value, according to which value is dependent on affective 
relationships.212 In a way clearly reminiscent of Hobbes’s remark that “private 
Appetite is the measure of Good,” Gauthier claims that “[v]alue is a measure of 
individual preference” – and not vice versa.213 That is to say, values are “created 
or determined through preference”; they are “products of our affections.”214 
Based on this analysis of Hobbes’s classic contractarian view and the 
predominant modern incarnations of it, namely those of Buchanan and Gauthier, I 
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conclude that contractarianism is premised on a subjective theory of value. Or, to 
formulate this conclusion in a slightly different way, a social contract theory 
qualifies as contractarian if and only if it is based (among other things) on a 
subjective theory of value. At the most fundamental level it should be radically 
reductionist: it should strictly aspire to derive morality from instrumental 
rationality.215 
4.2 Practical Reason, Homo Economicus and the Initial Bargaining 
Situation in Contractarian Views 
Wherein lies the relevance of the conclusion drawn in the previous section? The 
subjective theory of value constitutes the fundamental building block of the 
contractarian view. Although social contract theories work from the intuitive idea 
of agreement among free and equal individuals, they differ, among other things, 
with respect to how individuals’ freedom and equality are to be understood. The 
contractarian subjective theory of value provides us with a non-moral 
interpretation. After all, if an agreement, and presumably the initial deliberation 
or bargaining situation leading to it, were to reflect the moral equality and 
freedom of the parties involved, then it would be underpinned by an objective 
theory of value. However beneficial a particular agreement might be to the 
realisation of an individual’s personal interests, in that case its substance would 
always have to be compatible with the moral values of individual freedom and 
equality for it to be legitimate. In other words: rationality would be subordinate 
to morality. Yet if “private Appetite is the measure of Good,” if “[v]alue is a 
measure of individual preference, or if “good” is whatever agreement emerges 
from voluntary personal interactions among “self-interested” individuals – as 
contractarians would have it – then morality is, to use Gauthier’s words, 
                                                   
215 Notice that this should not be taken to mean that contractarians endorse the view that all 
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“generated as a rational constraint from the non-moral premisses of rational 
choice.”216 
Of course, Hobbes did not use the modern language of rational choice. One of 
Buchanan’s and Gauthier’s great achievements is that they have been able to 
embed Hobbes’s particular natural law view in a modern scientific framework. 
They have re-interpreted Hobbes’s contractarian view in such a way that it 
operates from a conception of practical reason and of the person that is part of 
what they consider to be the best explanatory theory in the social sciences: 
economic theory (in particular, decision and game theory). Their aim has been to 
develop an economic approach to morality which enables them to justify the 
emergence of moral principles governing interpersonal relations (Gauthier), of 
social structures (Gauthier), and of political principles for the regulation of 
political society (Buchanan).217 
It is by taking a closer look at these premises of economic or rational choice, 
that we can discover in what non-moral sense individuals are equally free. 
Understanding morality in terms of, and as being derived from, rational choice, 
presupposes the following specific conceptions of practical reason and of the 
person: a maximising conception of rationality and a homo economicus. Economic 
man is instrumentally rational in that he seeks to maximise his utility by taking 
effective and efficient means to his ends. Here individuals are depicted as equally 
free in the sense that they all have the capacity to form, revise and rationally 
pursue a conception of their own good, and are equally capable to do so. In 
addition, individuals are not only considered to be equally strong in mind, but 
also in body by virtue of their being strong enough to harm one another.218 
Since morality is derived from rationality, it follows that the self-chosen ends 
pursued by individuals are taken as given in contractarian views. This means that 
there is nothing inherently right or wrong about the ends an individual decides to 
pursue, or about the means by which an individual pursues these ends – indeed, 
not even when these means involve harming others. It follows that the world 
portrayed by contractarians is one in which individuals have no inherent moral 
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status; they do not have any negative or positive claim rights (e.g. to non-
interference), but instead a liberty right to everything.219 
Like all social contract views, contractarianism consists of two fundamental 
elements: (1) a characterisation of the (practical rationality of the) parties to the 
social contract, and (2) a characterisation of the initial situation. With regard to 
the first of these elements, we have just seen that contractarians endorse a 
conception of the person as a homo economicus with a maximising capacity for 
practical reason. Let us therefore turn our attention to the second fundamental 
element of contractarianism: the initial situation. Contractarians normally refer 
to this situation as the “initial bargaining situation.” It constitutes the no-
agreement point, i.e. the situation to which individuals return in case of their 
failure to reach an agreement. Essentially, the initial bargaining situation 
functions as the non-cooperative baseline against which the rationality of 
engaging in (contractual) cooperative interaction is evaluated by each of the 
contracting parties. 
The most famous (or should I say notorious) characterisation of the initial 
bargaining situation is, of course, the one provided by Hobbes. The initial 
situation described by him, “the state of nature,” refers to a pre-political situation 
in which interaction among individuals, who have a right to everything, is marked 
by infrequent fighting and constant fear of violent death. His explanation for this 
is as follows. Given the insatiability of individuals’ conflicting desires and the 
(relative) scarcity of natural resources, mankind is naturally competitive. Utility-
maximising individuals will recognise each other as competitors for the scarce 
resources required for an effective and efficient pursuit of their ends. As a result, 
individuals will try to dominate or even destroy one another so as to be more 
successful in acquiring scarce resources. Given individuals’ rational and physical 
equality, however, the critical point will soon be reached where, in the absence of 
a common political authority, mankind’s competition over scarce goods will 
degenerate into a war of every man against every man, making human life 
“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”220 
This conjunction of the relative scarcity of natural resources on the one hand 
and individuals’ natural inclination towards self-interested behaviour on the 
other hand, is in the political philosophical literature captured under the term 
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“the circumstances of justice.”221 Interestingly, these circumstances are not only a 
source of competition but also a potential source of cooperation. Here lies the key 
to understanding how morality can be generated as a rational constraint from the 
non-moral premises of rational choice in a contractarian view. Seeing the ever 
present threat of mutually destructive conflict in the state of nature, Hobbes 
argues that rationally and physically equal and self-interested individuals 
recognise that they are better off by refraining from destroying, dominating or 
otherwise harming others, provided these others do so as well. In the state of 
nature, therefore, individuals, concerned with their own self-preservation (as a 
means to further their self-chosen ends), will agree with one another that it is 
mutually advantageous to establish a political society in which they lay down 
their right to everything, and to transfer it to a common political authority to 
which they subject themselves as the sole keeper of their safety and peace.222 
Following Hobbes, Buchanan also describes the initial bargaining situation as 
an anarchic state of nature in which individuals have no rights – indeed, it is, as 
he explicitly acknowledges, essentially a Hobbesian anarchy in which individuals 
have a “right” to everything (to put it the other way around). In this situation, 
where relative scarcity obtains, individuals will invest time and effort in 
productive, defensive and predatory activities. Utility-maximising individuals 
spend resources in acquiring and defending goods and in securing goods initially 
acquired by others. Their behaviour creates a “reciprocal externality 
relationship”: they are engaged in non-cooperative or mutually exploitative 
interaction in which each of the parties, given the absence of (enforceable) law, 
tries to maximise his utility by imposing external costs or “diseconomies” on the 
other. For instance, individual A tries to locate and take a good X from the stock of 
another individual B instead of producing it himself because doing so enables him 
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to further his interests more effectively and/or efficiently.223 Individuals’ 
productive private activities and non-cooperative military (i.e. defensive and 
aggressive) interaction results in a particular (highly unstable) equilibrium 
distribution of goods, which Buchanan calls the “natural distribution.”224 In 
Buchanan’s view, this distribution is not based on a formal agreement, and 
therefore cannot be adequately classified as a “structure of rights,” though he 
allows for the possibility that there exists mutual recognition of the appropriate 
bounds on individual action.225 The natural distribution, which is “the result of 
the actual or potential conflict over the relative proportions of goods” to be 
consumed by individuals, is fundamental to Buchanan’s contractarian approach 
because it constitutes his (Hobbesian) characterisation of the initial bargaining 
situation; it functions as the non-cooperative baseline “from which contractual 
agreement becomes possible.”226 
In the natural equilibrium, each individual uses resources to defend himself 
against and to attack other individuals. In this situation, Buchanan claims, there is 
potential for mutually advantageous cooperative interaction. In general, 
cooperation holds the promise of reduced costs and increased benefits in 
comparison to what one could expect in a non-cooperative state of nature. Given 
the particular circumstances of the anarchic state of nature, it is rational for 
utility-maximising individuals to engage in cooperative interaction, because in 
doing so each individual can be made better off; they can reduce their private 
investment in attack and defence so that more resources can be employed in the 
production of goods. It follows, Buchanan concludes, that rational individuals will 
sign a basic contractual agreement that involves the mutual acceptance of 
disarmament and property rights, and subject themselves to a higher political 
authority that enforces their agreement.227 
Let us discuss one final, and highly influential, contractarian account of the 
initial bargaining situation for completeness’s sake: Gauthier’s. His version of 
contractarianism deviates from those of Hobbes and Buchanan with respect to 
(among other things) the description of the initial situation. Though Gauthier, like 
Hobbes and Buchanan, identifies the initial bargaining situation with the non-
cooperative baseline, he does not merely equate it with the non-cooperative 
outcome. When discussing Buchanan’s contractarian view, Gauthier argues that 
agreement reached from the natural distribution: 
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(...) yields an optimal outcome in which predatory/defensive efforts are 
absent. But the effect[s] of these efforts remain present, since each 
party brings to the bargaining table the fruits of her 
predatory/defensive activity, and takes them (or their utility 
equivalents) away from the bargaining table as part of the overall 
outcome. They do not enter the cooperative surplus, which is 
constituted (in Buchanan’s example) entirely by the agreement of each 
party to cease imposing costs on each other.228 
 
According to Gauthier, it follows from the contractarian conceptions of 
practical rationality and of the person that a necessary condition of agreement is 
that “its outcome must be mutually advantageous.”229 Such agreement, however, 
“does not elicit the rational, voluntary compliance of both (or all) parties, if the 
natural distribution is in part the result of coercion.”230 Consequently, Gauthier 
adopts what he calls the “Lockean proviso,” which “prohibits bettering one’s 
situation through interaction that worsens the situation of another.”231 Gauthier 
deduces from this proviso a structure of personal and property rights, and argues 
that it is rational for utility-maximisers to accept this structure as a condition of 
being voluntarily acceptable to other individuals as a party to cooperative 
interaction. Contrary, then, to Buchanan’s (and, of course, Hobbes’s) view, in 
which the structure of personal and property rights is the object of rational 
agreement from the natural distribution, Gauthier holds that this structure of 
rights is not the product but a necessary precondition of such agreement.232 The 
Lockean proviso “constrains natural interaction to determine an initial position 
from which a fair and optimal outcome may be attained.”233 In Gauthier’s view, 
then, the baseline against which the rationality of engaging in mutually 
advantageous cooperative interaction is to be assessed is that of the non-
cooperative outcome plus the Lockean proviso. 
At this point, I should note that we need not discuss the validity of Gauthier’s 
claim. That is to say, we do not have to determine whether a proper contractarian 
characterisation of the initial bargaining situation has to be limited to the non-
cooperative outcome (such as Buchanan’s natural distribution) or has to be 
expanded so as to include the Lockean proviso as well. This is so for the following 
reason. In Chapter 1, I have argued that a complete contract theoretical account of 
the legitimacy of the people should be able to generate a solution to the problem 
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of the legitimacy of the people that is strongly compatible with a democratic 
framework. In this chapter, I argue that this requirement can be met once what I 
will call the “open,” “serial” and “democratic” character of the contractarian 
“consensual binding procedure” is established. Although the characterisation of 
the initial bargaining situation, through the inclusion or exclusion of the Lockean 
proviso for instance, may affect the conditions of cooperative interaction, and 
may even affect the composition of the individuals engaging in cooperative 
interaction, it does not affect the open, serial and democratic character of the 
contractarian consensual binding procedure. Since these three elements are 
necessary and, taken together, also sufficient conditions of a complete account of 
the legitimacy of the people, any additional requirements, such as the Lockean 
proviso, are strictly speaking irrelevant to solving the problem of the legitimate 
constitution of the people (though they may still affect its composition). In what 
follows, I will assume, for this reason, as well as for simplicity’s sake, that the 
initial bargaining situation is equivalent to the non-cooperative outcome (without 
the Lockean proviso). 
Based on the analysis of Hobbes’s, Buchanan’s and Gauthier’s views, it is now 
possible to articulate the basic contractarian intuition they share. This intuition 
can be formulated in the following general way. In a contractarian view, political 
society is understood as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. Central to 
this view, is the conception of persons as (rationally and physically) free and 
equal utility-maximisers, who collectively determine the terms of their political 
association by means of a (suitably defined) bargaining procedure. Under 
mutually advantageous conditions (i.e. conditions maximising individuals’ 
expected utility, measured in terms of how well these enable them to realise their 
given ends), these individuals bind themselves to one another through 
multilateral acts of consent, and thereby found a political society in which they 
subject themselves to a common political authority. 
For our present purposes, however, it is important to emphasise that a 
significant element is missing from the contractarian view. While contractarians 
legitimise the constitution of political society in terms of a mutually advantageous 
agreement among a given group of free and equal individuals, they never ask the 
question whether, and if so how, this group itself can be legitimately constituted. 
This is peculiar since demarcating the people is an essential part of the 
constitution of political society. 
Buchanan’s contractarian view nicely illustrates this crucial point. In The 
Limits of Liberty, he develops a two-stage contractual process. At the first stage, 
the initial leap from Hobbesian anarchy to political society is made. Starting from 
some natural distribution, a set of individuals negotiate the terms under which 
they are prepared to found a cooperative venture for mutual advantage: a state. 
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These mutually acceptable terms are laid down in what Buchanan calls the 
“constitutional contract.” This contract sets “the rules of the game”; it (a) places 
limits on the behaviour of individuals with respect to the positions of other 
individuals in the community; (b) defines positive rights of ownership; (c) makes 
explicit the terms and conditions under which the state can act as the “enforcing 
agent” of the community which protects its members from aggression, theft, 
breach of contract and fraud; and finally (d) makes explicit the terms and 
conditions under which the state can act as the “collective agency” of the 
community which makes and implements decisions concerning the production of 
public goods.234 The first stage, in which political society is created and a 
constitutional contract is negotiated for the general regulation of it, creates a 
realm of potentially mutually advantageous trade in private and public goods 
among the members of that society. This constitutes the second stage of 
“postconstitutional contract” in which it becomes possible to play the game within 
the (constitutional) rules.235 
I take it to be fairly obvious that the first stage of this contractual process is of 
particular relevance to our investigation. It is, after all, at this particular level that 
a number of previously unattached individuals bind themselves together as a 
people, and set themselves apart from other people(s). So, the problem of the 
legitimate constitution of the people is an essential part of the constitutional 
stage of Buchanan’s contractarian view, and naturally one would have expected 
him to address it at some moment during his discussion of this first tier of the 
contractual process. Unfortunately, however, Buchanan makes no mention 
whatsoever of this problem. At various places, he talks of “members” or 
“membership” of (separate) groups” or (inclusive) “communities.” From a natural 
distribution in the Hobbesian state of nature, for instance, Buchanan argues that 
““constitutional contracts” may be made among members of groups of any two or 
more persons, with internal assignments of rights, while as among the separate 
groups conflict continues.”236 Yet he never provides a contractarian explanation of 
how (membership of) each of these collective entities comes into existence in the 
state of nature. Perhaps even more telling is the following example. When 
discussing the nature and role of agreement in his contractarian view, Buchanan 
writes: 
 
The analysis suggests that “social contracting,” defined as those 
negotiations which involve all members of the community, may take 
place conceptually at two levels or tiers: at some initial stage of 
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constitutional contract, in which agreement is reached on an 
assignment of individual rights, and at some postconstitutional stage in 
which individuals agree on quantities and cost shares of jointly 
consumed goods and services.237 
 
At the post-constitutional stage it is indeed clear to what collective entity the 
“community” refers, namely the members of an already constituted people. At the 
prior, constitutional stage, however, the stage in which the people are to be 
founded, there is, at least initially, no such community yet. If, nevertheless, “all 
members of the community” have to be involved in the negotiations at the 
constitutional stage, as the quoted passage obviously suggests, then it follows that 
Buchanan simply assumes what requires legitimisation: a (demarcated) 
people.238 
Contrary to Buchanan, Gauthier does not even incorporate a constitutional 
moment in his theory. The reason for this is that their views concerning the object 
of agreement diverge. Unlike Buchanan, who develops a political contractarian 
view, Gauthier endorses a moral contractarian view in Morals by Agreement. The 
former’s aim is to justify the emergence of political principles for the regulation of 
political society, while the latter’s aim is to justify the emergence of moral 
principles governing interpersonal relations (see Chapter 2.4 and Section 4.2). 
Since political bonds are a subset of interpersonal relations, however, the 
questions pertaining to the problem of the legitimacy of the people will 
eventually arise in Gauthier’s contractarian view as well. It is interesting to see, 
then, that Gauthier, even when he develops a political contractarian view in his 
“Political Contractarianism,” still does not address the question of the legitimacy 
of the people. In this article, he offers contractarian “answers to certain questions 
about how social practices and institutions may be justified in a democratic 
society.”239 At no time, however, does Gauthier provide a contractarian 
justification for the (original) constitution of such a democratic society. 
The same goes for James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock who, in their 
seminal The Calculus of Consent, aim to provide a contractarian “explanation for 
the emergence of a political constitution from the discussion process conducted 
by free individuals attempting to formulate generally acceptable rules in their 
                                                   
237 Ibid., p. 44, my emphasis. 
238 This view is supported by Gauthier’s attempt to think through the radical implications of 
extending the contractarian view to all social relations. See his “The Social Contract as Ideology” 
(though Gauthier does not relate this extension to the social relations involved in the 
constitution of the people). 
239 Gauthier, “Political Contractarianism,” p. 132. 
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own long-term interests.”240 Nowhere, however, do Buchanan and Tullock answer 
– let alone ask – the question as to who should be a member of this particular 
group of individuals, a group that is bound together as a people and set apart 
from other people(s) for the purpose of collective self-government. 
All of this is, of course, not to say that a contractarian legitimisation of the 
people is impossible. On the contrary, I will develop a complete contractarian 
account of the legitimacy of the people in Sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. What it does 
mean, however, is that such an account is notably absent from contractarian 
views. With these illustrations, then, I conclude my discussion of the basic 
features of the contractarian view. We are now in a position to investigate 
contractarianism’s potential for solving the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people. In what sense does the contractarian view have the conceptual tools to 
provide a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that is strongly 
(as opposed to weakly) compatible with a democratic framework? 
4.3 The Contractarian Constitution of the People: Open and Serial 
Consensual Binding 
Recall from our discussion above that the requirement of democratic decision-
making is generally taken to cause an infinite regress when applied to the 
demarcation of the people. In this and the next section, however, I argue that the 
contractarian view is capable of providing a procedural solution to the problem of 
the legitimacy of the people that does not result in an infinite regress. In order to 
see how this is possible, let us to take a more detailed look at the process leading 
to the constitution of the people in a contractarian view. 
The way in which the process leading to agreement is interpreted in 
contractarian views deviates from the standard interpretation of it. According to 
the standard interpretation, social contract theorists ask us to engage in a thought 
experiment. We are to imagine a counterfactual initial situation, usually called the 
state of nature, in which a given group of politically unattached individuals freely 
“gather around the table.” By putting ourselves in these persons’ shoes, we are 
subsequently to ask ourselves the question under what conditions we would 
agree to establish a common political authority among ourselves (e.g. Locke, 
Rousseau and Kant) or, alternatively, would agree to develop a set of moral 
principles for the regulation of our society (e.g. Rawls). 
For our present purposes, it is interesting to analyse the metaphor of a given 
number of individuals gathering around the table. For this metaphor is not just an 
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elegant figure of speech, but also, and indeed more importantly, a powerful tool 
for social contract theorists that enables them to simplify an immensely complex 
context for decision-making by reducing it to a fairly straightforward meeting 
between a given set of individuals. Considering the purposes for which social 
contract theories have originally been developed – the justification of political 
authority among a given group of individuals or the development of moral 
principles for a given society – this is a fruitful simplification; there is no need to 
conceptualise the boundaries of the people or society. However, when it comes to 
a contract theoretical legitimisation of the constitution of the people, the limits of 
the metaphor come to light. For in that case the metaphor conceals – as if it were 
a black box – precisely what needs to be revealed, namely how the parties 
gathering around the table are to be demarcated. So, by endorsing the metaphor 
of a given group of individuals gathering around the table, contract theorists 
oversimplify the context for decision-making, and consequently never subject 
that which is in the given, the people, to moral scrutiny. It is, to borrow a phrase 
from Rawls, as if the people has “simply materialized, as it were, from 
nowhere.”241 
Furthermore, the metaphor may create the impression that both the 
establishment of political authority and the development of moral principles are 
the result of a single agreement struck between a (given) number of individuals at 
one moment in time. Although this characterisation of the process leading to 
agreement is certainly endorsed in a number of social contract views, most 
notably the contractualist kind, it is not endorsed in others. Contractarian views, 
for instance, portray a far more intricate view of the bargaining process leading to 
the conclusion of a social contract, which, as we will see below, enables them to 
provide an internally consistent and coherent account not only of the legitimate 
constitution of political authority or of moral principles, but of the constitution of 
the people as well. Note that this is not to say that contractualism is incapable of 
providing an account of the legitimacy of the people – this indeed remains to be 
seen in Chapter 5. Rather, it is to say that the metaphor, because it portrays an 
oversimplified image of the process leading to the conclusion of a social contract, 
keeps us blind to an alternative conceptualisation of that process, an alternative 
which provides the tradition of the social contract with the conceptual tools to 
question the assumption of a given people and to provide an account of a 
legitimate people. 
How, then, can this alternative process leading to agreement on the 
constitution of the people be conceptualised? In a contractarian view, the 
legitimate constitution of the people can best be characterised as the result of an 
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open and serial process of consensual binding. Let me explain this. Given the 
circumstances of justice, there is potential for mutually advantageous 
cooperation. Since cooperation holds the promise of reduced costs and increased 
benefits in comparison to what one could expect in a non-cooperative state of 
nature, it is rational for utility-maximising individuals to try to engage in it. This 
means that a rational utility-maximising individual – who knows that he has 
nothing to lose and much, if not everything, to gain from cooperative interaction – 
at the very least wants to see what another individual, as a potential partner for 
mutually advantageous cooperative interaction, brings to the bargaining table. So, 
utility-maximising individuals will opt for a bargaining procedure that is 
accessible to any individual. It is important to see, however, that this choice for an 
open bargaining procedure itself is not the object of rational agreement, but 
rather a necessary presupposition of such agreement. Because the possibility of 
reaching a mutually advantageous agreement on the establishment of a particular 
scheme of cooperative interaction, which it is rational for utility-maximising 
individuals to seek, requires two or more individuals to participate in it; and 
because every individual is conceived of as a potential partner for mutually 
advantageous cooperative interaction, it is rational for each utility-maximising 
individual to accept a bargaining procedure that is free for all. Rejection of the 
open character of this bargaining procedure would be contradictory to the idea of 
rational cooperation.242 
It follows from the open character of the contractarian bargaining procedure 
that the joint decision of two individuals, who happen to encounter each other in 
the state of nature, to start negotiations in order to see whether mutually 
advantageous cooperative interaction is possible between them, does not reflect a 
deliberate decision on their part to exclude others from participating in that 
process. Rather, it reflects nothing more (or other) than a deliberate decision on 
their part to meet each other at the bargaining table. Though it is undeniably true 
that their decision results in a de facto demarcation between individuals who do 
and who do not participate in the bargaining process, this demarcation does not 
                                                   
242 See the analogy of this line of reasoning with Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative 
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these rules to be necessary presuppositions underlying every rational, moral discussion, the 
violation of which leads to a “performative contradiction.” This is what he refers to as the 
“transcendental-pragmatic strategy of justification.” See Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness 
and Communicative Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch. 4, esp. 65-115, 
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mark the difference between those who are and those who are not considered as 
potential partners for mutually cooperative interaction. Instead, it only marks the 
difference between the individuals currently involved in the bargaining process 
and the individuals not involved in it because they have not been encountered 
hitherto. These individuals have, so to speak, simply not appeared on the 
bargaining scene yet. Whether these individuals appear on the scene or not, and 
encounter other potential partners for mutually advantageous cooperation or 
not, is dependent on all kinds of contingent factors. What matters, however, is 
that (physically and mentally) free and equal utility-maximising individuals, 
when they happen to encounter each other, will always agree to engage in a 
bargaining process because that is the most rational course of action to 
perform.243 
                                                   
243 It might be replied that my argument – namely, that rational utility-maximisers, when they 
happen to encounter each other, will always agree to engage in a bargaining process – is only 
correct on the false assumption that there are no transaction costs involved in the bargaining 
process. The relevant costs here are those incurred by the parties during the bargaining process 
and which may cause them to refrain from engaging in a new bargaining process when another 
individual enters the fray. Consider, for instance, the case in which two rational utility-
maximisers, A and B, happen to meet each other in the state of nature and seize the opportunity 
to find out whether mutually advantageous cooperation between the two of them is possible. 
After a long and particularly exhausting period of time, they finally manage to reach a rational 
compromise. Suppose, furthermore, that a third individual, C, enters the scene immediately after 
A and B reach their agreement. In the absence of transaction costs, it makes sense to hold that it 
is rational for A and B to engage in a new bargaining process with C in order to see once more 
whether cooperative interaction between the three of them is mutually beneficial. If we take 
these costs into account, however, then it might very well be the case that A and B’s exhaustion 
(one of the costs of their negotiations) is such that the expected costs of engaging in a new 
bargaining process outweigh the anticipated benefits (for instance because their fatigue makes it 
likely that they strike a bad bargain). So under these circumstances, it might be argued, it is 
rational for A and B to decline C’s invitation to meet each other at the bargaining table. 
 One way to respond to this line of reasoning is this: what the argument shows is not that it is 
irrational for A and B to engage in a bargaining process with C at all but rather that it is irrational 
for them to do so immediately after they have concluded their own negotiations. Given that 
cooperation holds the promise of reduced costs and increased benefits, and given that C is a 
potential partner for mutually advantageous cooperation, it is still rational for A and B to find 
out whether cooperative interaction with C is advantageous for them. Consequently, it is rational 
for them to make an appointment with C to meet each other at the bargaining table at some later 
moment when A and B have regained their strength. 
 This response, however, seems to underestimate the deeper problem. At a more fundamental 
level, it might be argued, it is irrational for an individual to engage in a bargaining process every 
single time a new individual enters the fray, because it might very well be the case that this 
makes it impossible for that individual to live his life. That is to say, what may ultimately happen 
is that one’s life consists of nothing else than a continuous series of negotiations, as opposed to 
pursuing the ends that these negotiations make possible (by reaping the benefits of one’s 
bargains). I do not think that this criticism is fatal, however. The solution here is that there may 
be circumstances in which it is rational for individuals not to engage directly in a bargaining 
process themselves, but rather to engage indirectly in a bargaining process, by hiring another 
individual who acts as their representative and bargains on their behalf. In other words, the 
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Against this background, the following situation will arise in the state of 
nature someday. A random individual A will encounter another random 
individual B. Considering B as a potential partner for cooperative interaction, A 
will seize the opportunity to invite B to the bargaining table in order to see 
whether cooperation with B is advantageous for him. In turn, B, who is of a like 
mind, will accept the invitation because he wants to know whether it is 
advantageous for him to engage in cooperative interaction with A. Since both 
individuals seek to maximise their own utility, they accept, again as a condition of 
rational cooperation, the requirement that their cooperative interaction must be 
mutually advantageous (as measured against the non-cooperative baseline of the 
state of nature). In other words, the acceptance of this requirement is, just like 
the acceptance of the open character of the bargaining procedure, not the product 
but rather a necessary presupposition of rational agreement. After all, if 
individuals A and B do not gain from cooperative interaction, then they have no 
reason whatsoever to consent to engage in it. It follows from this that the 
justification of cooperation proceeds in two steps: cooperative interaction 
between A and B – or indeed between any two (mentally and physically) free and 
equal utility-maximisers – is justified (1) in so far as it is based on their mutual 
consent; and their mutual consent, in turn, is justified (2) in terms of the given 
interests of each of them, which is to say that each individual will agree to engage 
in cooperative interaction only if doing so is instrumental to the pursuit of his 
idiosyncratic interests. 
Though rational individuals accept the requirement that cooperative 
interaction must be mutually advantageous, it does not follow that they will 
always cooperate. Whether individuals engage in cooperative interaction is 
dependent on the outcome of a bargaining process. Let us therefore take a closer 
look at the nature of bargaining. A bargaining process takes the following general 
form. In a first stage, each of the parties involved makes an offer for mutual 
acceptance. Since these offers are generally incompatible, a second stage follows 
in which at least one party makes a concession by modifying his original offer, 
usually by withdrawing some portion of the original claim advanced in it. This 
process of concession-making continues either until a set of mutually compatible 
offers is reached or deadlock brings it to a halt. In the first scenario, the (given) 
interests of the parties involved in the bargaining process finally coincide, which 
makes possible mutually advantageous cooperation. It is rational for each party 
to agree with the other to engage in cooperative interaction because doing so 
                                                                                                                                                               
problem can be solved by means of a division of labour. This “division of labour argument” 
enables me to maintain in an internally consistent and coherent yet qualified way that rational 
utility-maximisers will always agree to engage in a bargaining process, even in the face of 
transaction costs. 
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maximises his utility (as measured against the non-cooperative baseline of the 
state of nature). In the second scenario, however, the parties’ (given) interests 
deviate, which makes mutually advantageous cooperation impossible. The terms 
of cooperation put forward by each of the parties are such that it is rational for 
each of them to agree not to engage in cooperative interaction with one another. 
Prolonged residence in the state of nature maximises the utility of both. In short, 
then, cooperative interaction is the result of the degree to which individuals are 
willing and able to make and accept concessions during a bargaining process. 
When the interests of individuals A and B coincide, they will, through mutual 
acts of consent, bind themselves to one another and set themselves apart from 
other individuals for the purpose of mutually advantageous cooperative 
interaction. (Though, for reasons given above, the consensual boundary they 
establish does not reflect a deliberate decision on their part to exclude others 
from cooperation.) Sooner or later, however, other individuals will appear on the 
bargaining scene. Suppose that A and B, having established their own small 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage, encounter another individual C at 
some moment. Since these individuals consider each other as potential partners 
for mutually advantageous cooperation, a new bargaining process is started in 
which A and B bargain with C in order to see whether cooperation between them 
is mutually advantageous. As we have already seen, this bargaining process may 
result in a set of agreements between A, B and C to cooperate. Alternatively, the 
process may result in deadlock, in which case there are two conceivable 
scenarios. In the first scenario, the incompatibility of the mutual offers of each of 
the parties (except A and B, who have already agreed to cooperate in an earlier 
stage) are such that there is no hope of attaining a mutually acceptable resolution 
of the bargaining process, as a result of which A and B’s cooperative venture will 
not be enlarged so as to include C. In the second scenario, there is a set of offers 
that is mutually compatible with the antecedent interests of some but not all of 
the parties. For instance, B and C agree to cooperate, yet A and C agree not to do 
so. Without going into great detail (at least not until the next section), this 
outcome of the bargaining process opens a new realm of possible combinations of 
cooperative and non-cooperative interaction among A, B and C: enlargement of A 
and B’s cooperative venture with A receiving compensation for the costs 
incurred; non-enlarged continuance of A and B’s cooperative venture (e.g. if 
compensation proves to be impossible); cooperation of B with A and C, who, in 
turn, do not cooperate with each other; or B maximising his utility by 
discontinuing cooperation with A and engaging in cooperation with C (again, 
perhaps with compensation for A). 
This bargaining process is repeated for all subsequent individuals entering 
the fray. Given that utility-maximising individuals consider each other as 
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potential partners for mutually advantageous cooperation (which, as said, it is 
rational for them to seek), it follows that they will accept the requirement that the 
bargaining procedure must be serial; and once more the acceptance of this 
requirement itself is – in exactly the same way as the acceptance of the 
requirements that the bargaining procedure must be open and cooperative 
interaction must be mutually advantageous – not the object or product of rational 
agreement, but rather a necessary presupposition of such agreement. It is by 
becoming aware of this that one can see why in the contractarian view the 
legitimate constitution of the people is best not characterised in terms of a single 
agreement struck between a (given) number of individuals at one moment in 
time, but rather in terms of a serial process of consensual binding. According to 
the contractarian view, the constitution of the people is legitimised as the ever 
temporary result of a series of mutual acts of consent on the part of those 
individuals for whom it is mutually advantageous, i.e. instrumental to the pursuit 
of their given personal interests, to bind themselves together for the purpose of 
cooperative interaction. 
There are two possible ways of understanding this contractarian 
legitimisation of the people. On the first interpretation, the constitution of the 
people is characterised not as the object of the contracting parties’ agreement, but 
rather as an unintended consequence supervening upon their serial constitution of 
a mutually advantageous scheme of cooperative interaction. Guided by an 
“invisible hand,” to borrow a familiar term (introduced in Chapter 3.2), 
cooperative interaction between individuals gradually evolves into a spontaneous 
(as opposed to constructed) order that de facto possesses all the characteristics of 
a people. A good example, as we have seen in Chapter 3, is offered by Nozick in his 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, where he develops an invisible-hand explanation of 
the state. In the state of nature, he argues, an individual may (for reasons of 
effectiveness and efficiency) decide that it is in his interest to hire another 
individual to perform protective functions for him rather than to (continue to) 
perform these himself. Other, similarly motivated individuals may do the same, 
and so we arrive at a situation in which some of the inhabitants of the state of 
nature independently of one another happen to contract with the one protective 
agency and some might in the same way join another. In the case of the 
abovementioned individuals A, B and C, this would, for instance, mean that A and 
B would independently engage in a bargaining process with C in order to see 
whether a particular form of cooperative interaction between them would be 
mutually advantageous, namely that in which C, for a certain price agreed upon, 
provides a set of protective services for A and B separately. Every subsequent 
individual entering the bargaining scene could similarly engage in a bilateral 
bargaining process with C or, alternatively, with another individual D for instance, 
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should he run into him. What would ultimately result from the “spontaneous 
groupings, mutual-protection associations, division of labor, market pressures, 
economies of scale, and rational self-interest” is, Nozick argues, a single dominant 
protective agency (e.g. C) or a group of geographically distinct dominant 
protective agencies (e.g. C and D) “very much resembling a minimal state.”244 To 
this, as I have argued in Chapter 3.2, we should add that Nozick’s argument does 
not only yield an invisible-hand explanation of the state but of the people as well: 
for the constitution of the people is essentially a side effect of any number of 
individuals who independently of one another happen to act in the same way by 
binding themselves to the same (dominant) protective agency through bilateral 
acts of consent. 
If we follow this line of reasoning, however, then it is not possible to 
understand contractarianism as providing a genuine social contract theoretical 
account of the legitimacy of the people. In Chapter 2.1, recall, I have divided the 
reciprocal transactions involved in contract theories into bilateral and 
multilateral undertakings, each corresponding with a particular kind of contract 
theory: an individual contract view and a genuinely social contract view. In the 
former, legitimate sets of obligations and/or institutions (e.g. political obligations, 
states or constitutional rules) originate from a series of bilateral or private 
agreements among separate pairs of individuals. If contractarianism legitimises 
the constitution of the people as a side effect of any number of utility-maximising 
individuals who independently of one another bind themselves to the same 
(dominant) protective agency through bilateral agreements, then it is clear that 
we are dealing with an individual contract view here. Simplifying greatly for the 
sake of argument, we can illustrate this point by saying that in our imaginary 
situation the people, consisting of individuals A and B, are the unintended 
consequence of the bilateral agreements struck between A and C on the one hand 
and B and C on the other (where C assumes the role of protective agency, de facto 
constituting the political organisation of the spontaneously emerging people). 
This is, however, not the only way in which the contractarian legitimisation of 
the constitution of the people can be understood. A second way is to provide a 
contractarian explanation of the emergence of the people in terms of a genuine 
social contract. What makes a contract view a social one is that the origin of sets 
of obligations and/or institutions is grounded in a multilateral or public 
agreement among all individuals involved (instead of paired subsets of the total 
set of individuals involved). Applied to the constitution of the people, this means 
                                                   
244 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 12-17. I do not mean to portray Nozick as a 
contractarian. (He is a Lockean, as we have seen in the previous chapter.) Instead, I merely refer 
to Nozick because his invisible-hand explanation of the (minimal) state is relevant to 
understanding one way in which the people can be constituted in a contractarian view. 
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that utility-maximising individuals, through an open and serial process of public 
bargaining, collectively determine the appropriate terms of their political 
association. Under terms all individuals involved can agree to, they bind 
themselves to one another and thereby constitute a cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage: a people. This is, for example, the kind of contractarian 
agreement that Hobbes has in mind when he speaks of a contract “of every man 
with every man,”245 and to which Buchanan explicitly refers when he writes that 
“social contracting,” which he (in line with my definition) defines as “those 
negotiations which involve all members of the community,” takes place at both 
the aforementioned constitutional and post-constitutional contractual stage (see 
Section 4.2).246 This process is exemplified by the imaginary situation in which 
individuals A, B and C happen to meet each other in the state of nature, and agree 
at the bargaining table that it is mutually advantageous for them to bind 
themselves together as a people. This bargaining process will be re-opened for 
any subsequent individuals entering the scene, and will involve contractual 
negotiations among all individuals involved, namely A, B, C and, for instance, D, 
which may but need not result in a redefinition of the boundaries of the people. 
Regardless of the individual or social character of the agreement(s) resulting 
from the contractarian bargaining procedure, the contractarian demarcation of 
the people is random yet legitimate: random because it is the result of any 
number of individuals who “happen” to encounter each other and subsequently 
engage in cooperative interaction; and legitimate because their cooperation is 
based on a “coincidence of their given interests.” (Note that the meaning of the 
word “coincidence” captures both elements of the constitution of the people as 
well.)247 Moreover, both forms of contractarianism are capable of providing a 
procedural solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that does not 
cause an infinite regress. In order to understand this, notice first that the kind of 
agreement involved in the contractarian consensual binding procedure – 
individual or social – does in no way whatsoever affect its open and serial 
character. Regardless of the number of parties involved in the bargaining process 
(i.e. all individuals or paired subsets of all of them), the fact remains that every 
individual is conceived of as a potential partner for mutually advantageous 
cooperative interaction, and that it is, consequently, rational for utility-
maximising individuals to accept a bargaining procedure that is accessible to all 
                                                   
245 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 17, p. 87. 
246 Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, p. 40. 
247 In the case of an individual (as opposed to social) contractarian view, there is a further 
element of randomness involved in the demarcation of the people. For the legitimate 
constitution of the people is a “side effect” of any number of individuals who independently and 
irrespectively of one another happen to bind themselves to the same (dominant) protective 
agency. 
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individuals and can always be re-opened by any individual if the status quo 
changes (e.g. if another individual enters the scene). 
The second, and for our purposes crucial, thing to notice is that it follows 
from the conjunction of the open and serial character in the contractarian 
bargaining procedure that the legitimisation of the people does not result in an 
infinite regress. For the open and serial process of consensual binding establishes 
a perfectly inclusionary push:248 since every individual is a potential partner for 
mutually advantageous cooperation, it is rational to engage in a bargaining 
process for any free and equal, utility-maximising individuals who happen to 
encounter each other. This means that nobody is excluded a priori from the 
bargaining process – the only limitation on inclusion being that individuals 
actually come across each other. If individuals would be excluded from the 
collective decision-making procedure, then it would already presuppose the 
us/them distinction that it is meant to generate, and this would indeed trigger an 
infinite regress of collective decision-making procedures presupposing prior 
collective decision-making procedures necessary to legitimise the posterior ones. 
However, since nobody is excluded from the outset in the contractarian view, the 
people are not presupposed by but instead the genuine result of the open serial 
consensual binding procedure (henceforth: OSCB-procedure), and so the dreaded 
infinite regress never arises because the necessity of legitimising a “presupposed” 
us/them distinction is wholly absent.249 Given that the open and serial character 
of the consensual bargaining procedure prevents the contractarian legitimisation 
of the people from collapsing into an infinite regress, and given that this character 
is preserved in both individual and social contractarianism, it follows that both 
forms of contractarianism are capable of providing a procedural solution to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people that does not fall prey to an infinite 
regress. 
At this point, however, one might wonder what distinguishes the 
contractarian from the Lockean political voluntarist solution to the problem of 
the legitimacy of the people. The Lockean None Rejected Principle assumes a 
foundational situation in which potential members choose each other openly and 
freely. What this means, as I have argued in Chapter 3.2, is that the None Rejected 
                                                   
248 I borrow the term “inclusionary push” from Miller, “Democracy’s Domain,” p. 207. 
249 Note that though the open and serial character of the contractarian bargaining procedure 
naturally follows from the premises of rational choice, contractarians have never developed this 
aspect of their theory – let alone considered its significance for solving the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. Of course, this is understandable because the need to conceptualise the 
open and serial character of the contractarian bargaining procedure only arises when one 
approaches the problem of the legitimacy of the people from a contractarian perspective, which, 
as said above, is precisely what contractarians, such as Hobbes, Gauthier and Buchanan (as well 
as all other kinds of social contract theorists), have never aspired to do. 
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Principle yields an acceptance procedure that is open and serial in the sense that 
all individuals who are in the state of nature with respect to one another are 
always free to approach each other in order to find out whether they are (still) 
(un)acceptable to one another as members of the (same) people. Since nobody is 
a priori excluded from this procedure, it follows that the people are not 
presupposed by but instead the genuine result of it, and so the infinite regress 
never arises because the necessity of legitimising a “presupposed” us/them 
distinction is absent. But if this is correct, then, or so one might be inclined to 
think, there seems to be no difference whatsoever between the Lockean political 
voluntarist and the contractarian solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people. 
While it is certainly true that Lockean political voluntarism and 
contractarianism have in common that their procedural solutions to the problem 
of the legitimacy of the people do not result in an infinite regress, and that this is 
due to the open and serial character of their procedures, there is nevertheless a 
significant difference between both views. This difference can be explained in 
terms of the democratic nature of the procedural accounts of the legitimacy of the 
people offered by both social contract views. This, of course, assumes that both 
Lockean political voluntarism and contractarianism provide procedurally 
democratic solutions to the problem of the legitimacy of the people. Now, I have 
already argued (in Chapter 3.2) that the Lockean None Rejected Principle 
generates a democratic procedure, according to which the legitimate constitution 
of the people is based on multilateral acts of consent on the part of all and only 
those individuals who do not reject each other as a member of it. I have not yet, 
however, provided any reasons for believing that the contractarian OSCB-
procedure is democratic as well. In Section 4.5, I shall develop an argument to 
that effect. Let us therefore assume, for the sake of argument, that the 
contractarian OSCB-procedure is actually democratic. 
What this assumption enables me to argue is that the democratic moment in 
the Lockean political voluntarist account of the constitution of the people is 
rather limited in comparison to that in the contractarian account. The conditions 
under which any number of individuals can bind themselves to one another are 
not the object of a rational compromise, as is the case with contractarianism. 
Rather, these conditions are derived from natural law. Though individuals can 
deliberately and voluntarily agree with one another to become politically bound, 
natural law specifies the nature of their political relationships: if they decide to 
bind themselves to one another as a people, then natural law requires that they 
all give up their natural freedom and transfer it to a common political authority 
for the sole purpose of preserving their property (i.e. life, liberty and estate). 
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The crucial difference, then, between both views is this. In a contractarian 
view, which is based on a subjective theory of value, the common good is a social 
construction or human artefact. In a Lockean political voluntarist view, which is 
based on an objective theory of value, the common good is not the object of a 
rational compromise but instead reflects the eternal rules of an independently 
existing natural moral order. So, whereas the democratic moment in the Lockean 
political voluntarist (re)constitution of the people merely concerns the people’s 
composition, the democratic moment in the contractarian (re)constitution of the 
people concerns the composition of the people, as well as the set of rules (i.e. the 
common good) regulating the people. In Chapter 6.2, I shall consider the moral 
significance of this difference. 
4.4 To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate: That is the Question 
In the previous section, I have claimed that a bargaining process continues either 
until a set of mutually compatible offers is reached or deadlock brings it to a halt. 
Contrary to my claim, however, Gauthier, in his discussion of rational bargaining 
behaviour in Morals by Agreement, seems to suggest that the scenario of deadlock 
will never take place among utility-maximising individuals. Since cooperation is 
mutually advantageous in that it offers the individuals involved in it the prospect 
of reduced costs and increased benefits in comparison to what they could expect 
in a non-cooperative state of nature, it is rational for utility-maximising 
individuals to engage in it. In turn, this means that each of the individuals 
gathered around the bargaining table (for the purpose of striking a mutually 
advantageous agreement) “has no interest in causing the bargaining process to 
fail,” and is therefore “constrained by the recognition that he must neither drive 
others away from the bargaining table, nor be excluded by them.”250 As a result, 
or so Gauthier argues, each individual will refrain from offering other individuals 
terms of cooperation that, if accepted by them, would cause them to be worse off 
in comparison to the non-cooperative baseline of the state of nature. For in that 
case, there is no personal advantage to be gained for them from voluntary social 
interaction.251 
Let us take a closer look at the nature of Gauthier’s claim. In a contractarian 
view, it is rational for utility-maximising individuals to engage in cooperative 
interaction with each other if and only if (1) they are in the circumstances of 
justice with respect to one another (i.e. if there is potential for mutually 
advantageous cooperative interaction between them), and they are, and know of 
                                                   
250 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, pp. 133-134. 
251 Ibid. 
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each other that they are, both (2) capable and (3) willing to constrain their 
behaviour towards one another.252 When Gauthier claims that each individual 
engaged in a bargaining process “has no interest in causing the bargaining 
process to fail,” and is therefore “constrained by the recognition that he must 
neither drive others away from the bargaining table, nor be excluded by them,” he 
is in effect claiming that conditions (1), (2) and (3) are always met. In this section, 
however, I shall argue that Gauthier’s argument – that conditions (1), (2) and (3) 
are always met – fails and explain the implications of this failure for the 
contractarian account of the legitimacy of the people. 
Let us begin by briefly considering the implications of Gauthier’s argument 
for the contractarian account of the legitimacy of the people. It is a consequence 
of Gauthier’s argument – were it to be valid – that the OSCB-procedure (as 
discussed above) will lead to a steady increase of the number of individuals 
involved in mutually advantageous cooperative interaction. This process 
continues until a single cooperative venture arises, which will encompass all 
individuals inhabiting the earth: a world state. This is, of course, to assume the 
presence of perfect mobility of and communication between individuals, which, 
due to various contingencies, such as oceans and mountains preventing 
individuals from engaging in cooperative interaction, may be an implausible 
assumption. However, what is important to see here, and perfectly consistent 
with Gauthier’s argument, is that the resulting proliferation of cooperative 
ventures, and thus of peoples, will be the result not of individuals’ deviating 
interests but rather of physical and territorial limits to cooperative interaction. 
Is Gauthier’s argument valid? In a contractarian view, the decision to 
cooperate is the result of a cost-benefit analysis in which one compares the utility 
acquired through cooperative interaction with the utility acquired through non-
cooperative interaction in the state of nature. It is rational to cooperate only if the 
utility one acquires through cooperation exceeds the utility one acquires through 
non-cooperation. Since contractarian views are underpinned by a subjective 
theory of value in which morality is reduced to (instrumental) rationality (as we 
have seen above), the utility assigned to a particular state of affairs is measured in 
terms of one’s idiosyncratic preference ordering, i.e. it is a measure of how well 
that state of affairs enables one to pursue one’s given interests. A necessary 
condition of rational cooperation is, as I have just argued, that the circumstances 
of justice must obtain; there must be potential for mutually advantageous 
cooperation. Now, the degree to which the circumstances of justice obtain can be 
said to depend on the characteristics of (i) a scheme of cooperation, (ii) the initial 
                                                   
252 Cf. Christopher W. Morris, “Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 21 (1991), p. 59. 
128  
 
bargaining situation and (iii) an individual’s preference ordering. To illustrate, to 
the extent that violent death is what individuals fear most (i.e. prefer least), and 
the initial bargaining situation is a Hobbesian state of nature, rational (i.e. utility-
maximising) individuals will, in order to avoid the worst-case scenario of a war of 
everyone against everyone, eventually stumble upon a “more profitable” form of 
interaction: a mutually advantageous cooperative scheme in which they subject 
themselves to a higher political authority for their common security and peace. 
Under these conditions, the circumstances of justice clearly obtain. (And 
assuming that the individuals who are in the circumstances of justice with respect 
to one another are also both capable and willing to constrain their behaviour, it is 
rational for them to engage in cooperative interaction.) However, given an 
alternative characterisation of one or more of these conditions it may very well 
be the case that the circumstances of justice are absent, which would make it 
irrational to engage in cooperative interaction. Consider, for instance, the 
situation in which a Christian and Muslim encounter one another and have to 
decide on the question whether engaging in cooperative interaction with each 
other maximises their utility in comparison to life in a Hobbesian state of nature. 
To be more specific, suppose that they have the following options: they can jointly 
constitute (a) a Christian political order, (b) an Islamic political order, (c) a 
religiously tolerant liberal political order, or (d) they can refrain from cooperative 
interaction altogether and continue their separate lives in a Hobbesian state of 
nature. One might be tempted to think that it is rational, i.e. a utility-maximising 
strategy, for both the Christian and Muslim to engage with one another in a 
religiously tolerant liberal scheme of cooperation (c) – which, indeed, is a 
historically tried and tested solution during the age of the religious wars. This is, 
however, not necessarily true. Whether this is so or not depends actually on the 
specific preference orderings of the Christian and Muslim. 
Suppose, for instance, that the Christian rejects the religiously tolerant liberal 
political order because the separation between church and state that is inherent 
to it conflicts with his radically orthodox view that “outside the church there is no 
salvation” (extra ecclesiam nulla salus). The “orthodox” Christian, who wishes to 
establish God’s kingdom on earth, cannot reconcile his conscience with life in a 
religiously tolerant liberal political order let alone an Islamic political order – 
indeed, cooperative schemes (b) and (c) are equally unacceptable to him as 
alternatives to (a). He is prepared to live in a Christian political order, and should 
this turn out to be an impossible object of rational agreement, then his conscience 
compels him to stay in the Hobbesian state of nature. So, this orthodox Christian 
has the following transitive and complete preference ordering: he prefers (a) to 
(d), (d) to (b) and is indifferent between (b) and (c). (In more formal terms: aPd, 
dPb and bIc.) Now turn to the Muslim. He is also radically orthodox, and so has 
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the same preference ordering as the Christian, except of course for the fact that 
he is prepared to leave the Hobbesian state of nature only for life in an Islamic as 
opposed to Christian political order. This results in a transitive and complete 
preference ordering as well in which bPd, dPa and aIc. 
Given their preference orderings over the set of alternatives, the Christian 
and Muslim are not in the circumstances of justice with respect to each other. On 
the contrary, they find themselves in a situation where one party’s gain is always 
another’s loss. The Christian and Muslim are, to put it more formally, involved in 
a game with a zero-sum character. Since it is typical of such a game that there is 
no potential for mutually advantageous cooperation, it has only one (i.e. 
dominant) rational outcome: non-cooperation. The crucial point to notice here is 
that we can indefinitely continue expanding the range of alternatives involved in 
the equation, but that for every set of alternatives it is always possible to conceive 
of a preference ordering according to which the circumstances of justice do not 
obtain, and it is therefore irrational to cooperate. Consequently, Gauthier’s 
argument that it is always irrational to bargain in such a way that drives others 
away or inclines them to exclude yourself fails. 
There is, however, an additional reason why Gauthier’s argument is 
unpersuasive. In order to see this, consider the following situation. Once more, 
the Christian and Muslim run into each other in the state of nature. Only in this 
case, their preference orderings differ from the ones ascribed to them in the 
previous example. The both of them still prefer most to live in a religious political 
order that expresses their own religious views. However, the Christian and 
Muslim are both “moderate” in the sense that, if such a religious political order 
turns out to be an impossible object of rational agreement, they are prepared to 
live in a religiously tolerant liberal political order. After all, or so they reason, in a 
liberal order they are able to practice their religions in a way that is more secure 
than in the state of nature or even worse a religious political order that is 
intolerant of their religions. As a result, they prefer living in a liberal order 
allowing them both to practice their mutually conflicting and irreconcilable 
religions to living in a Hobbesian state of nature. (This, as we have seen above, is 
anathema to the radically orthodox Christian and Muslim.) In addition, life in an 
Islamic political order prohibiting him from practicing his religious beliefs is what 
the Christian prefers least. In turn, and for the same reason, the Muslim least 
prefers to live in a Christian political order. So, the Christian and Muslim have the 
following transitive and complete preference ordering: the former’s ordering is 
aPc, cPd and dPb, whereas the latter’s ordering is bPc, cPd and dPa. 
In this situation, there is clearly potential for mutually advantageous 
cooperation between the Christian and Muslim. This potential is represented by 
cooperative scheme (c). Although it seems mutually advantageous for the 
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Christian and Muslim to agree with one another to engage in cooperative 
interaction, however, they will nevertheless decide not to do so because it is, and 
they know of each other that it is, even more advantageous for each of them not 
to cooperate. Regardless of the Christian’s behaviour (i.e. whether he cooperates 
or not), it is always rational for the Muslim not to do so (this is his dominant 
strategy). Given that the Christian and Muslim are equally rational, the Christian 
reasons similarly, as a result of which it is rational for them to decide not to 
cooperate at all. Put in more formal terms, we can say that the Christian and 
Muslim have the same preference orderings as the players in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. Though I shall provide a more detailed analysis of this kind of game in 
Section 4.6, it is, for my present purposes, sufficient to see that it is characteristic 
of such a game that there is potential for mutually advantageous cooperation but 
that this potential is not realised because “non-cooperation” (d) is the dominant 
strategy for both players. In such a situation, it is, despite the potential for 
mutually advantageous cooperation, rational to decide not to engage in 
cooperative interaction. 
What are the implications of this line of reasoning for Gauthier’s argument 
that it is always irrational to bargain in such a way that drives others away or 
inclines them to exclude yourself? In a contractarian view, I have argued, it is 
rational for utility-maximising individuals to engage in cooperative interaction 
with each other if and only if (1) they are in the circumstances of justice with 
respect to one another, and they are, and know of each other that they are, both 
(2) capable and (3) willing to constrain their behaviour towards one another. We 
have already seen that Gauthier’s argument fails because there are circumstances 
conceivable in which condition (1) is violated. To this we can now add that 
Gauthier’s argument also fails because it is possible to conceive of situations in 
which condition (3) is violated. This is the case in situations that have the 
structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
There is, however, a third, and for our purposes even more important, reason 
why Gauthier’s argument is unconvincing. Although it may be rational for two 
individuals to cooperate with each other, this may be so only in the absence of 
other individuals. Imagine a situation in which a Christian having preference 
ordering aPc, cPd and dPb is considering whether or not to engage in cooperative 
interaction with a Muslim who has preference ordering bPc, cPd and dPa or 
another Christian who has the same preference ordering as himself. In that case, 
it is obviously rational, i.e. a utility-maximising strategy, for the Christian to 
engage in cooperative interaction with the other Christian but not with the 
Muslim. Though the Christian happens to be in the circumstances of justice with 
respect to both the Muslim and the Christian, this potential cannot be realised in 
the case of the Muslim and the Christian. They are, as we have seen above, 
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involved in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, the only rational outcome of which is 
non-cooperation (d). In the case of the Christians, however, the identical nature of 
their preference orderings guarantees that the potential for mutually 
advantageous cooperation, which comes in the form of cooperative scheme (a), 
can indeed be realised. Given the Christian’s preference ordering – he prefers (a) 
to (d) – it follows that it is rational for him to (try to) engage in cooperative 
interaction with the other Christian. (And given that the other Christian has the 
same preference ordering, it is rational for him as well.) 
This is so even if the (same) Muslim and Christian happen to be able to solve 
their Prisoner’s Dilemma. (In Section 4.6, I shall argue that this is possible, though 
not necessarily always.) Suppose that they actually succeed in doing so and 
engage in the kind of mutually advantageous cooperative interaction exhibited by 
scheme (c), a religiously tolerant liberal political order. However, when the 
Christian encounters a third individual who happens to share his religious beliefs 
as well, it is no longer rational for him to continue the liberal cooperative venture 
with the Muslim. The potential for mutually advantageous cooperation that once 
existed between them has disappeared with the arrival of another individual. 
Given that cooperative interaction with this third individual is more 
advantageous for him – it enables him to live in a Christian political order (a), 
which he prefers to living in a liberal political order (c) – it is rational for the 
Christian to drive a hard bargain with the Muslim. It is rational for him to make 
the Muslim a non-negotiable offer to discontinue their liberal cooperative venture 
and instead to start a Christian cooperative venture with him. Given his 
preference ordering, it is rational for the Muslim to refuse this offer, as a result of 
which they agree not to continue their cooperative interaction. The Christian and 
the third person, whose interests do coincide, will subsequently proceed to found 
their own Christian cooperative venture. 
What these two examples illustrate is that there are circumstances 
conceivable in which it is, contrary to what Gauthier contends, perfectly rational 
to bargain in such a way as to drive some, but not all, of the others away or run the 
risk of being excluded yourself by some, but not all, of the others. (Though the 
term “excluded,” which is explicitly used by Gauthier, is entirely misplaced since 
the decision not to cooperate is based on mutual consent.) This becomes all the 
more apparent if one imagines that what features in a bargaining process as the 
object of cooperative interaction are not only, and perhaps not even primarily, 
security and peace, as Hobbes would have it, but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, economic interests, shared religion, common language, culture, 
kinship and nationhood, to mention a few things. Each of these can be understood 
as providing the basis (or bases) of mutually advantageous cooperative 
interaction, and, moreover, as providing individuals with instrumental reasons to 
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engage in cooperation with one set of individuals instead of another. Taking these 
possible objects of rational cooperation into consideration makes it is easy to see 
that the serial process of consensual binding, contrary to (the logical implications 
of) the process described by Gauthier in his theory, may (but need not) lead to the 
constitution of a multiplicity of cooperative ventures instead of one all-
encompassing cooperative venture; and that the proliferation of such cooperative 
ventures is not only, and not even primarily, the result of contingent factors, but 
also, and fundamentally, the result of the degree to which individuals’ (given) 
interests coincide. In conclusion, the contractarian view contains all the 
conceptual tools needed to provide an internally consistent and coherent account 
of the legitimate demarcation of (a multiplicity of) peoples. 
4.5 Contractarian Democracy 
Thus far I have argued that contractarianism, regardless of the variant one 
endorses, is capable of providing a procedural solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people that does not result in an infinite regress. It remains to be 
seen whether the OSCB-procedure deduced from the contractarian view in the 
previous sections is strongly compatible with a democratic framework. 
Democracy is often depicted as centring around the ideas of (1) a collectively self-
governing people and (2) collective self-government as an expression of the 
people’s common good. In what follows, I argue that in so far as (1) and (2) 
warrant talk of “democracy,” the kind of contractarianism that is predicated on 
the idea of social (as opposed to individual) agreement is democratic as well, 
because it supports a particular interpretation of these ideas. 
Contractarian views, as we have seen above, work from the intuitive idea of 
mutually advantageous agreement among (physically and mentally) free and 
equal utility-maximisers: social structures of cooperative interaction between 
individuals are justified only in so far as they are based on their mutual consent; 
and their mutual consent, in turn, is justified in terms of the given interests of each 
of them. This intuitive idea is compatible with a particular interpretation of 
collective self-government aimed at the realisation of a common good. To see this, 
recall that contractarian views are based on a subjective theory of value, 
according to which morality is derived from individuals’ given interests. Since 
contractarians take morality to be subordinate to rationality, it follows that the 
common good has to be defined in such a way as to be logically posterior to the 
(given) goods of the members of the public: it is a set of conditions that support 
individuals’ goods. As such, the common good is subordinate to a prior notion of 
an individual’s good; it is merely instrumental to the furtherance of his personal 
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interests, rather than that it is constitutive and partially defining of those 
interests.253 According to the contractarian view, then, democracy is understood 
as collective self-government aimed at establishing and regulating forms of 
cooperative interaction through which (common) goods are created and 
sustained that are instrumental to the realisation of the given interests of the 
individuals participating in it. 
With this at the backs of our minds, we are in a better position to analyse the 
democratic character of the contractarian approach to the legitimacy of the 
people. I have argued that the constitution of the people is, depending on the kind 
of contractarianism involved (i.e. individual or social), either a side effect or an 
intended consequence of a number of utility-maximising individuals who happen 
to encounter one another and who, through an open and serial process of 
(bilateral or multilateral) consensual binding, engage in cooperative interaction 
because their given interests happen to coincide. In the case of social 
contractarianism, to begin with, the decision whether or not to engage in 
mutually advantageous cooperation is clearly democratic: first, because it is the 
result of a collective decision-making process which involves bargaining among all 
(as opposed to paired subsets of) potential members of a people who happen to 
have met each other; and second, because this collective decision-making 
procedure is aimed at creating and sustaining a common good that is instrumental 
to the realisation of the given interests of those individuals participating in it. 
Furthermore, since the multilateral agreement to cooperate or not to cooperate 
reached in such a public is democratic, it follows that both the OSCB-procedure, 
which essentially constitutes such a public, and the demarcation of the 
cooperative venture resulting from it, are democratic as well. 
The case of individual contractarianism, however, differs significantly. This is 
so for the same two (related) reasons that the bilateral consensual transactions 
involved in the Lockean political voluntarist account of the legitimate 
demarcation of the people cannot be qualified as democratic (see Chapter 3). The 
first reason, as one might recall, revolves around the notion of legitimacy that is 
at work in a democratic theory. Within a democratic framework, a political state 
of affairs is legitimate if it is the object of a collective decision. Contractarianism 
requires that this collective decision is made unanimously and that it results from 
a bargaining procedure. According to this view, then, a state of affairs is legitimate 
if it is the object of (instrumentally) rational agreement. It follows that the side 
effects of such a collective decision (if there are any) are democratically 
                                                   
253 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, “Politics, Philosophy and the Common Good,” in The MacIntyre Reader, 
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134  
 
illegitimate, because they are by definition not part of the object of agreement. 
This is precisely the case with individual contractarianism in which the people 
emerge as a side effect of a series of private agreements. (Still, it does not follow 
from this that the individual contractarian constitution of the people is 
necessarily illegitimate, although it does of course follow that it is democratically 
illegitimate). 
The second reason, as we have seen, starts from the observation that in an 
individual contractarian view there is no collective decision-making process 
involving bargaining among all potential members of a people who happen to 
have met each other. In fact, there is no collective decision-making process 
generating a people at all. What we find here instead is a multiplicity of 
individuals who independently of one another and, as a matter of coincidence, 
happen to act similarly by binding themselves to the same entity (e.g. a protective 
agency), an entity which gradually evolves into a spontaneous (as opposed to 
constructed) order that de facto possesses all the characteristics of a people. 
Though each of these separate bilateral agreements are democratic in the way 
just described (they can be said to be the result of a collective decision-making 
process aimed at the realisation of an instrumental common good), their side 
effect, “the people,” does not have a democratic origin. Though individual 
contractarianism demonstrates that individuals can become bound to one another 
as a people independently of one another, individuals cannot independently of 
one another bind themselves to each other as a people through multilateral acts of 
consent. Yet this is precisely what is required for their becoming bound to one 
another to qualify as democratic. Consequently, the individual contractarian 
legitimisation of the people cannot be understood in democratic terms. 
Based on this analysis, it is possible to conclude that contractarianism is fully 
capable of providing a complete account of the legitimacy of the people. Because 
of the perfectly inclusionary push engendered by its open and serial character, I 
have argued in the previous two sections that the contractarian bargaining 
procedure is capable of generating a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of 
the people that does not result in an infinite regress. This conclusion is valid, 
regardless of whether one endorses an individual or social contractarian view. In 
this section, however, I have argued that only the latter kind of contractarianism, 
the one which is predicated on the idea of social agreement, is fundamentally 
democratic. In its social contractarian form, the OSCB-procedure constitutes a 
genuine collective decision-making procedure. Consequently, the social 
contractarian account of the legitimacy of the people is strongly compatible with a 
democratic framework. 
 135 
 
4.6 The Compliance Problem 
In the previous sections, I have presented the contractarian framework and 
argued that (social) contractarianism is capable of providing a solution to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people that is strongly compatible with a 
democratic framework. In this and the next section, I want to discuss two well-
known criticisms of the contractarian framework in general: the compliance 
problem (this section) and the problem of moral standing (Section 4.7). Should 
either of these problems turn out to be unsolvable, then contractarianism, 
together with its solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people, becomes 
untenable. 
A classic formulation of the compliance problem can be found in Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, where he writes: 
 
The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and 
sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans 
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there 
could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought 
conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or 
not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduces to ones 
benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that 
they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of 
them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he 
questioneth, whether Injustice (...) may not sometimes stand with that 
Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good.254 
 
Essentially, the fool asks the question “Why be moral?.” After all, he thinks, it 
may very well be rational not to comply with an agreement that it was 
nevertheless rational to make. If one is a utility-maximiser – as the “Foole” clearly 
is – and non-compliance, i.e. cheating on the agreement by taking advantage of 
others’ cooperative efforts without making these efforts oneself, maximises one’s 
utility, then this is what rationality demands. However, in a contractarian world, 
i.e. a world populated by utility-maximisers only, one individual’s irrationality of 
complying with the terms of an agreement necessarily implies the irrationality of 
compliance for all other contracting parties. Under these circumstances, then, 
cooperation is impossible in a contractarian world: the individual rationality of 
non-compliance with an agreement inevitably seems to lead to the collectively 
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irrational outcome in which the (instrumental) common good that is supposed to 
be generated through cooperative interaction is not provided at all.255 
At first glance, it might perhaps seem that the compliance problem does not 
pose a direct threat for the contractarian account of the legitimacy of the people, 
because collective action problems can only arise after the constitution of the 
people. In a contractarian framework, recall, a people are understood as a 
cooperative scheme for mutual advantage through which (common) goods are 
created and sustained that are instrumental to the realisation of the given 
interests of the individuals participating in it (see Section 4.5). Only once a set of 
individuals have agreed to found such a cooperative scheme does it become 
possible for each of them to free ride on others’ contributions. 
There are, however, two reasons why it would be a mistake to conclude that 
the compliance problem is irrelevant to the contractarian account of the 
legitimacy of the people. Indirectly, to begin with, the compliance problem does 
threaten the contractarian account of the legitimacy of the people because the 
irrationality of compliance will make cooperation unstable; it will, indeed, make 
continued cooperative interaction impossible. The problem, however, goes 
deeper. At a more fundamental level, the problem is not so much that the 
irrationality of compliance makes contractarianism incapable of explaining the 
rationality of continued cooperation among individuals, but rather makes it 
incapable of explaining why rational utility-maximisers will engage in 
cooperative interaction to begin with. In other words, the fundamental problem is 
that the cooperative venture for mutual advantage – i.e. the people – will not even 
be founded. Suppose, for example, that a set of individuals meet each other in the 
state of nature and decide to engage in a bargaining process in order to see 
                                                   
255 There is some ambiguity in Hobbes’s Leviathan. On the one hand, Hobbes repeatedly asserts 
that it is irrational to keep one’s agreements in the state of nature. Because of this, Hobbes 
deems it necessary to invoke a coercive mechanism, in the form of the all-powerful sovereign, in 
order to ensure compliance. On the other hand, however, he also claims, particularly in Chapter 
15 of Leviathan, that it is rational to keep one’s agreements (even) in the state of nature. But if 
this is so, then one may wonder why coercive measures of some kind are needed to secure 
compliance at all. I shall not try to resolve this apparent contradiction in Hobbes’s Leviathan. I 
am indebted to Robert H. Lieshout for bringing this point to my attention. See Robert H. 
Lieshout, The Struggle for the Organization of Europe. The Foundations of the European Union 
(Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 1999), pp. 32-33; and Robert H. Lieshout, 
“Anarchy in International Relations,” in Encyclopedia of Power, ed. K. Dowding (Thousand Oaks 
Cal.: Sage, 2011), p. 21. For simplicity’s sake, I shall endorse the standard interpretation of 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, which is upheld by many modern contractarians such as Buchanan, and 
according to which stable cooperation requires external constraint in the form of political 
authority. This is not to say that I shall ignore Hobbes’s suggestion that the compliance problem 
can be solved by means of internal as opposed to external constraint. Later in this section, I shall 
consider Taylor’s and Axelrod’s, as well as Gauthier’s arguments that coercion is unnecessary to 
guarantee compliance. 
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whether mutually advantageous cooperative interaction between them is 
possible. In the course of the bargaining process the individuals realise that they 
are in the circumstances of justice with respect to one another and, as it happens, 
eventually stumble upon a mutually advantageous form of cooperative 
interaction. They will not continue to bind themselves to one another and found 
this cooperative venture (a people indeed), however, if it is, and they know of 
each other that it is, rational for each of them not to comply with the agreement 
regardless of what the others do (i.e. whether they comply or not). In that case, 
the potential for mutually advantageous cooperation will not be realised. But if 
contractarianism cannot provide a rational explanation as to why individuals 
cooperate, then it is of very little or no practical relevance. So, unless it is possible 
to solve the compliance problem, I will have succeeded in providing a complete 
contractarian legitimisation of the people, but only so at the cost of depriving my 
argument from all practical value whatsoever. 
How, then, can a contractarian deal with the compliance problem? To begin 
with, the compliance problem arises under very specific circumstances only. In 
order to see this, it is helpful to analyse Gauthier’s distinction between what he 
calls type I, II and III situations.256 Each of these types of situations can be said to 
correspond to a particular form of cooperative interaction. In order to 
understand Gauthier’s distinction between forms of cooperation, it is helpful 
briefly to introduce a number of concepts that are central to his rational choice 
methodology. Utility-maximising individuals will only engage in cooperative 
interaction with one another if each of them expects to benefit from doing so. This 
means that each of the participants in a cooperative scheme expects that the 
utility acquired through cooperation exceeds (or equals in any case) the utility 
acquired through non-cooperation. This means that the outcome of cooperation 
should be better (or no worse at least) than the non-cooperative, or what 
Gauthier calls the “natural,” outcome. Furthermore, and this is something I have 
not made explicit until now (but did tacitly assume all along), not only should the 
cooperative outcome simply be better (or no worse as a minimum) than the 
natural outcome, it should also be (Pareto) optimal. An outcome is strongly 
Pareto optimal if there is no alternative outcome in which at least one individual 
is better off and no individual is worse off. An outcome is weakly Pareto optimal if 
there is no alternative outcome in which every individual is better off. While a 
strong Pareto optimum is necessarily a weak Pareto optimum, the converse is not 
necessarily true. Finally, and not the least important, an outcome can but need 
not be stable. An outcome is stable if no individual can unilaterally bring about an 
alternative outcome which is better for himself (in which case, to put it in formal 
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terms, the outcome, i.e. the combination of strategies of the individuals involved, 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium).257 The compliance problem, as we shall see 
shortly, arises precisely when a cooperative outcome is unstable. 
Let us now turn to Gauthier’s threefold distinction between forms of 
cooperation. “A situation is of type I,” Gauthier writes, “if and only if (1) there are 
some outcomes which are (a) stable, (b) optimal, (c) no worse for anyone than 
the natural outcome.” Furthermore, “(2) there is a nonempty set of outcomes, 
each satisfying (1), such that no member of the set is strongly dispreferred to any 
outcome satisfying (1) by any person.”258 Individuals who happen to find 
themselves in a type I situation are involved in an Assurance Game. An example of 
such a game, and the kind of cooperation that might arise from it, is that of two 
persons, say taxi drivers, who jointly have to decide whether to drive on the left 
or right side of the road. Both are indifferent with respect to the particular side of 
the road they drive – left or right – but they are especially concerned to prevent 
the potentially catastrophic situation in which their driving on opposite sides of 
the same road results in a frontal collision. It follows that only two out of the four 
possible outcomes satisfy (1), namely those in which both taxi drivers drive 
either on the left or the right side of the road. Conditions (b) and (c) are met 
because the two outcomes in which both persons drive their taxi’s on the same 
(left or right) side of the road are both better than the two natural outcomes in 
which they independently of one another decide to drive on a particular side of 
the road (and so run the risk of driving on opposite sides of the road), and 
because there is no conceivable alternative outcome which would be better for 
one of the taxi drivers without being worse for the other. Condition (a) is satisfied 
as well since it is impossible for either taxi driver to bring about an alternative 
outcome which is better for himself by unilaterally changing his way of acting. 
Finally, given that both taxi drivers are indifferent between the two outcomes 
satisfying (1), condition (2) is met as well. In a type I situation, such as this one, 
we can see that both the emergence and compliance with the terms of 
cooperation are based on spontaneous interaction(s). Consequently, there is no 
compliance problem in this type of situation. Instead, there is merely a 
coordination problem, which concerns the selection of one particular outcome 
from the set of (two) outcomes satisfying (1) in order to make sure that both taxi 
drivers adhere to the same “rule of the road”; and this kind of problem can be 
solved rather easily, provided that communication between the taxi drivers is 
possible. Once selected, it is, given that conditions (1) and (2) are met, irrational 
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for both taxi drivers not to comply voluntarily with the terms of their cooperative 
interaction. 
As is the case with type I situations, type II situations are such that “(1) there 
are some outcomes which are (a) stable, (b) optimal, (c) no worse for anyone 
than the natural outcome.” What distinguishes type II from type I, however, is 
that “(2) any outcome which satisfies (1) is strongly dispreferred by some person 
to some other outcome satisfying (1).”259 Consider the following illustration of a 
type II situation. Imagine a sawmill where timber is sawed into boards that are 
high in demand among the local population. In the process, however, the factory 
also produces significant amounts of noise pollution in its local environment. The 
locals would like to see the owner of the sawmill making his factory sound-proof. 
In this case, there are initially two conceivable cooperative outcomes which may 
and, let us suppose, do meet conditions (1) and (2): one outcome, desired by the 
locals only, in which they and the sawmill owner engage in cooperative 
interaction on the condition that the sawmill’s production of boards is made 
sound-proof; and another outcome, desired by the sawmill owner only, in which 
he and the locals cooperate on the condition that the factory can (continue to) 
cause noise pollution. 
This situation can best be characterised as a bargaining problem. If the locals 
compensate the sawmill owner for sound-proofing his factory, where the 
adequate level of compensation is determined through their negotiations, then 
his cooperative alternative becomes unattractive. Once their bargaining, i.e. 
compensation, problem is solved, a particular cooperative scheme results 
spontaneously from their interactions. This scheme, furthermore, commands the 
rational compliance of the locals and the owner of the sawmill, for each party – 
the sawmill owner and the local community – realises that his own behaviour 
directly influences the subsequent behaviour of the other party. The members of 
the local community, for instance, cannot bring about an alternative outcome 
which is better for themselves by unilaterally changing their way of acting, 
because the locals realise that if they do not hold up their end of the bargain (by 
not providing the level of compensation agreed upon) then the owner of the 
sawmill will immediately respond by refraining from sound-proofing his factory. 
Since the owner stands to lose from his cooperative efforts, he will not allow the 
locals to get away with their non-cooperative behaviour. Instead, he will improve 
his own situation by not making his factory sound-proof, thereby effectively 
forcing upon the locals a return to the initial cooperative outcome in which they 
are subject to noise pollution. Likewise, the owner’s non-compliance with the 
agreement (by not making his factory sound-proof despite the compensation 
                                                   
259 Ibid., p. 143. 
140  
 
received) will provoke an immediate response from the local community as well. 
Seeing that the sawmill owner’s defective behaviour has caused a predicament 
for them that is similar to their predicament in the natural outcome, their only 
rational response is, as we have seen in Section 4.2, to adopt the strategy that is 
appropriate to the non-cooperative situation in which everyone has a right to 
everything: to impose negative externalities on each other through investment in 
defence and attack. Consequently, there is no compliance problem in this type of 
situation. Stable cooperation arises from their spontaneous interactions because 
each party realises that his own defective behaviour directly generates parallel 
behaviour by the other party, which in turn creates a reciprocal externality 
relationship that makes everyone worse off. 
Finally, a type III situation occurs “if and only if (1) there are some outcomes 
which are (a) optimal, (b) no worse for anyone than the natural outcome, but (2) 
no outcome satisfying (1) is stable.”260 The crucial reason why a type III, as 
opposed to a type II, situation is unstable can be found in the size of the group of 
individuals involved in cooperative interaction. In a two-person setting, as is the 
case with my illustration of a type II situation, the quid pro quo (something given 
for something received) that is characteristic of the bargaining process in a type II 
situation ensures that one party’s behaviour directly influences the other party’s 
behaviour. It ensures that one party’s non-adherence to some agreement, because 
it results in the other party receiving nothing in return for something he gave (i.e. 
it makes impossible the reception of a good desired by that party (or both), such 
as a sound-proof sawmill or adequate compensation), is immediately met by a 
similar, i.e. defecting, response. 
In the many-person setting, by contrast, especially once the size of the group 
has reached a critical threshold, one party’s behaviour ceases to have any 
influence on the behaviour of the other parties at all. The reason for this is that 
under these circumstances both individuals’ behaviour and its effects become 
(sufficiently) invisible. This is so first because the larger the size of the group the 
smaller, and therefore less noticeable, my personal contribution to the provision 
of the group’s common good becomes. In fact, my contribution becomes 
insignificant in the sense that in a many-person setting my defection does not 
make it impossible for other parties to benefit (it still makes possible the 
provision of a common good). Furthermore, the larger the size of the group the 
better my chances are of becoming anonymous and making my (defective) 
behaviour invisible to the other members of the group in which I participate. 
Taken together, then, the many-person setting is, metaphorically speaking, 
functionally equivalent to “the ring of Gyges” in Plato’s story of the king of 
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Lydia:261 it enables individuals to become invisible. And it is precisely this ability 
that can be used by individuals to cheat in a way that is unavailable for him in a 
two-person setting. Under these circumstances, it is, regardless of whether the 
other parties involved cooperate or not, always rational for me to defect, i.e. not 
to contribute to the production of the common good. Non-contribution, to put it 
in formal terms, is my dominant strategy. But if it is rational for me not to 
contribute, then it follows from the assumption of equal rationality (see Section 
4.2) that doing so is rational for all individuals. It is this structure of what is well-
known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma that is inherent to type III situations, and which 
makes individual rationality lead to collective irrationality.262 Consequently, it is 
in these situations that the provision of a common good will not emerge 
spontaneously. For our purposes, it is important to see that the people, in so far 
as they are understood in contractarian terms as a cooperative scheme for mutual 
advantage through which common goods are created and sustained that are 
instrumental to the realisation of the given interests of the individuals 
participating in it, has a built-in Prisoner’s Dillemma structure as well and can 
therefore be analysed in terms of a type III situation. 
It is in type III situations, where spontaneous compliance with agreements is 
not to be had, that constraints on individuals’ behaviour become inevitable. These 
constraints can be of two kinds: external and internal. Hobbes, and contemporary 
contractarians such as Buchanan, have argued that external constraints are 
required to guarantee general compliance with agreements. According to Hobbes, 
“Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a 
man at all.”263 Stable cooperation requires external constraint: a state that 
(coercively) enforces the contract. Buchanan adopts a similar position, when he 
writes: 
 
If individual parties to an initial contract in which property assignments 
are established mutually acknowledge the presence of incentives for 
each participant to default and, hence, recognize the absence of viability 
in any scheme that requires dependence on voluntary compliance, they 
will, at the time of the contract, enter into some sort of enforcement 
arrangement.264 
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The underlying idea here is the following: (1) if there is potential for mutually 
advantageous cooperative interaction between a set of individuals; (2) and if all 
of them have good reason to suspect that none will nevertheless contribute to 
their cooperative scheme for mutual advantage (should they proceed to found 
one), as a result of which their individually rational strategies will result in a 
collectively irrational outcome; (3) then it follows that it is rational for each of 
them to agree on an enforcement arrangement as part of the initial agreement, 
because doing so still maximises their utility – participation in a cooperative 
scheme that includes external constraints affords them a greater utility than that 
which they acquire when their general non-compliance returns them to the non-
cooperative state of nature. Stable cooperative interaction is then possible, and 
this suffices to show that peoples, which are understood as cooperative ventures 
for mutual advantage within the framework of contractarianism, can be 
constituted (and can continue to exist once constituted). 
A more interesting line of reasoning, however, can be found in the writings of 
those who believe that the compliance problem can be solved without external 
constraints. We do not necessarily have to resort to enforcement arrangements 
(e.g. by erecting a “Leviathan”) in order to guarantee individuals’ compliance with 
(rational) agreements. Instead, the stability of cooperative interaction can be 
guaranteed through internal constraints. This argument comes in two forms: the 
compliance problem, it is said, can be solved either (1) by replacing the ordinary 
“one-shot” Prisoner’s Dilemma with the so-called “Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” 
or (2) by adjusting contractarianism’s maximising conception of practical 
rationality. I shall discuss these arguments in turn. 
Starting with the first line of reasoning, it might be helpful to recall that the 
logic of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma leads to a rather pessimistic conclusion 
about the possibilities for cooperation between individuals. It is useful to discuss 
in a bit more detail why this is the case. Suppose, for instance, that two 
individuals, A and B, are in the circumstances of justice (i.e. mutually 
advantageous cooperation is possible between them), and that both are, and 
know of each other that they are, capable of constraining their behaviour. We 
have seen that it is only rational for individuals to engage in cooperative 
interaction if they are, and know of each other that they are, also willing to 
constrain their behaviour. Suppose, now, that A and B have to decide whether or 
not to engage in cooperative interaction with one another. Each of them has two 
options, namely to cooperate or to defect, and each of them attaches utilities to 
the four possible outcomes, as indicated in the following Figure 4.1: 
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Person B 
 
 
 
Cooperate Defect 
Person A Cooperate 3,3 1,4 
 
Defect 4,1 2,2 
    Figure 4.1. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 
Although it seems mutually advantageous for A and B to agree with one 
another to engage in cooperative interaction (doing so, after all, affords each of 
them a utility of 3 as opposed to 2), they will nevertheless decide not to do so 
because it is, and they know of each other that it is, even more advantageous for 
each not to cooperate. If A cooperates, B reasons, then it is rational for him to take 
advantage of A’s cooperation by taking a free ride, i.e. by defecting, since this 
gives him a utility of 4 instead of 3. If, however, A defects, then it also rational for 
B to defect, because this grants him a utility of 2 as opposed to 1. In other words, 
the “strategy defect” is dominant: it is always rational for B to defect, regardless of 
A’s behaviour (i.e. whether A cooperates or not). Given that A and B are equally 
rational, A reasons similarly, as a result of which it is rational for A and B to 
decide not to cooperate at all. Consequently, they end up in a stable yet Pareto-
suboptimal equilibrium in which each of them acquires a utility of 2 (as opposed 
to a utility of 3 that the Pareto-optimal equilibrium – i.e. the situation in which 
they both adopt the “strategy cooperate” – would have afforded them). 
Michael Taylor and (later) Robert Axelrod have shown that the prospects for 
cooperation are better if individuals take into consideration that they may have to 
deal with each other again in the future.265 In their views, repeated interaction in 
situations that have the structure of the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma can 
sustain the (Pareto-optimal) cooperative outcome. Moreover, this is so even if in 
every single game (of the total number of games involved in an iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma) individuals attach the same utilities to the four possible outcomes as do 
the players in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Figure 4.1). 
However, this result can only be achieved if the players are uncertain about 
the exact number of separate games the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains. If 
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma consists of n rounds and the players involved are 
aware of this, then it is always rational for them to defect in all rounds. For 
suppose that the players – e.g. A and B – know the game will last exactly n rounds. 
Since the players cannot be punished for defective behaviour, it is (once more) 
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rational, i.e. the dominant strategy, for each of them to refrain from engaging in 
cooperative interaction. It follows that the last game in an iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma will turn into a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, this makes the 
penultimate game – i.e. round n-1 – essentially the last game. Accordingly, it is 
rational for the players – who know that, regardless of what they do now, they 
will both defect in the next round – to defect in this round as well. By repeating 
this so-called “backward induction argument” a sufficient number of times (i.e. n 
times), rational players will deduce that they should defect in every single game. 
If, however, the probability that the players will meet again is not negligible 
but instead sufficiently high – i.e. if, as Axelrod has poetically called it, “the 
shadow of the future” looms large – then it is rational to adopt a strategy of 
conditional cooperation. Based on his famous research of computer simulations 
on the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Axelrod has argued that this strategy is “tit-
for-tat.” It is a strategy which prescribes that a player, when involved in an 
infinitely (as opposed to finitely) iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperates in the 
first round and proceeds to copy the other player’s previous move thereafter. In 
an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma of infinite length, in other words, player A will 
conditionally adopt the “strategy cooperate” in the first game, and continue to do 
so in each successive game if and only if the other player B adopts the “strategy 
cooperate” in the preceding game; if, however, B fails to do so, and instead adopts 
the “strategy defect,” then A will conditionally adopt the “strategy defect.” 
According to Taylor and Axelrod, the compliance problem can be solved without 
having to impose external constraints: in an infinitely, instead of a finitely, 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is rational for utility-maximising individuals to 
constrain their behaviour by internalising the “strategy tit for tat,” and this 
strategy makes possible the realisation of the Pareto-optimal cooperative 
outcome. 
What is interesting to see here is just how demanding this theory is. The idea 
of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma relies heavily on the possibility of making 
credible threats to sanction defecting players. It follows that iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games imply repeated interaction between the same players. This 
explains why the assumption of an infinitely (as opposed to finitely) iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is crucial to a successful game-theoretical explanation of the 
possibility of cooperative interaction; it models the requirement of long-standing 
relations between the players, which enables them to threaten and sanction 
defecting players in next rounds. The Pareto-optimal cooperative outcome can be 
realised if the chance that players A and B will continue to meet one another is 
sufficiently high; otherwise, as the backward induction argument shows, it is 
rational for each players to defect because there is no way for each of them to 
prevent the other from exhibiting exploitative behaviour. 
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This is not a sufficient condition of cooperative interaction, however. The 
relations between players should not only be long-standing but also non-
anonymous. The possibility of “giving tit for tat,” i.e. of threatening and 
sanctioning defecting players in subsequent rounds, does not only presuppose 
that the same individuals continuously interact but also that they are capable of 
identifying defecting players in earlier rounds. Now, in a two-person game, which 
is precisely the kind of game involved in Axelrod’s computer simulations, it is 
evident that this condition is met; defecting behaviour of one player is 
immediately detected by the other. In n-person games, however, the chance of 
detecting defectors decreases when the size of the group increases. In Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games that are repeatedly played against a large and anonymous 
population of different players (without long-standing relations), and defections 
cannot be observed and attributed to a specific player, it becomes impossible to 
threaten with and actually impose sanctions. Under these circumstances the 
“strategy tit for tat” fails; the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma will once more turn 
into a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, making the Pareto-optimal cooperative 
outcome unattainable.266 
Moreover, as Huib Pellikaan has convincingly argued, precisely these 
circumstances dominate “real-life” political societies. Consequently, it is not at all 
obvious that actual problems of collective action should be understood 
exclusively in terms of an infinitely iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.267 If this is 
correct, then the implications for the “contractarian people” are obvious: to the 
extent that the people, which are a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, 
consist of a large number of members, and the relationships between these 
members are neither long-standing nor non-anonymous, it is irrational for utility-
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Michael Taylor, Community, Anarchy, and Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982). A similar argument has later been developed by Elinor Ostrom. Like Taylor, she has 
argued that stable cooperation is possible even in Type III situations without having to impose 
external constraints in the form of state coercion. This is possible if (among other things) all 
parties are involved in the decision-making process, and if mechanisms of social control and 
moral consensus are sufficiently strong. See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons, The 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990); see 
also Elinor Ostrom, “A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action, 
Presidential Address, APSA,” American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), pp. 1-22. 
267 Huib Pellikaan, Anarchie, Staat en het Prisoner’s Dilemma (Delft: Eburon, 1994), pp. 166-168, 
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maximising individuals to constrain their behaviour by internalising the “strategy 
tit for tat,” and so the Pareto-optimal cooperative outcome cannot be realised. 
Under these circumstances, then, it seems that the constraints on individuals’ 
behaviour, constraints that are required to make possible mutually advantageous 
cooperation between them, cannot have an internal origin but instead must be 
imposed by an external political authority. 
I deliberately say that it “seems” to be necessary to appeal to an external 
political authority in order to solve the compliance problem. There is, as I have 
said above, a second way in which the compliance problem might be solved 
without having to resort to external constraints. This second line of reasoning has 
been developed by David Gauthier in his Morals by Agreement. In fact, one of his 
most distinctive contributions to contractarian theory is his argument that 
(stable) cooperative interaction can be guaranteed through internal constraints, 
namely by adjusting contractarianism’s maximising conception of practical 
rationality. 
Gauthier has tried to solve the compliance problem by arguing that it is 
rational for individuals to internalise the disposition not to take advantage of 
those with whom we cooperate. He built his case by making a distinction between 
two kinds of persons first: a straightforward maximiser (SM) and a constrained 
maximiser (CM). A SM tries to maximise his own expected utility 
“straightforwardly” in the sense that he considers it rational to cooperate if and 
only if the utility he expects from adopting a cooperative strategy exceeds (or is at 
least equal to) the utility he would expect from adopting a non-cooperative 
strategy. In type III situations, as we have seen in Figure 4.1, this disposition 
defeats the end of cooperation: in such a situation, after all, “defect” is the 
dominant strategy of SMs, and so they will end up in a stable yet Pareto-
suboptimal equilibrium in which each of them acquires a utility of 2 (as opposed 
to a utility of 3 that the Pareto-optimal equilibrium – i.e. the situation in which 
they both adopt the “strategy cooperate” – would have afforded them). 
By contrast, a CM, who happens to be in the circumstances of justice with 
respect to certain other persons, subjects his utility-maximising behaviour to the 
constraint that one is to act on a cooperative strategy, provided that (a sufficient 
number of) these others are similarly disposed.268 This means that a CM’s 
disposition is conditional; he only constrains his direct pursuit of maximum utility 
if he is reasonably certain that he is among like-minded persons. (It is rational for 
a CM to behave as a SM when he interacts with a SM because the resulting non-
cooperative outcome makes him better off than the outcome in which the SM 
exploits his cooperative efforts.) Were we all to internalise the norm of 
                                                   
268 See Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, pp. 166-170. 
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constrained maximisation, then (stable) cooperative interaction would, even in 
type III situations, be guaranteed. Since CMs do not have to worry that other CMs 
will cheat on (i.e. fail to comply with) the agreement while they keep their end of 
the bargain, CMs can gain each others’ trust and so cooperate successfully. In 
other words, if a sufficient number of individuals involved in a bargaining process 
is disposed to act as a constrained maximiser, cooperation would once more 
emerge spontaneously without any need to resort to some kind of external 
constraint mechanism (e.g. state coercion). 
What Gauthier needs to explain, then, is why it is rational for individuals to 
internalise the requirements of constrained maximisation. This is exactly what he 
sets out to do in Chapter Six of Morals by Agreement. His defence of the rationality 
of constrained maximisation is based on a fundamental distinction he makes 
between the level at which individuals make choices and the meta-level at which 
individuals choose their dispositions for making choices. Gauthier shifts the focus 
of his enquiry from the level of rational choice to the meta-level of rational choice 
among dispositions to choose. In his view, the choice for a disposition is rational if 
it is utility-maximising. His central claim is that it is rational to (choose to) comply 
with the terms of an agreement even if doing so does not directly maximise one’s 
utility, provided that the choice to be disposed to comply with the agreement 
does directly maximise one’s utility.269 It follows that if Gauthier is to solve the 
compliance problem, then, to use his own words, he needs to defend “the 
rationality of constrained maximisation as a disposition to choose by showing 
that it would be rationally chosen.”270 Should Gauthier succeed in doing this, he 
will have actually managed to come up with a unique solution to the problem of 
compliance: through internal (as opposed to the traditionally proposed external) 
constraint. 
Notice, moreover, that Gauthier’s argument, if successful, entails that I should 
adopt the disposition of CM and follow it when interacting with you, “even,” as 
Holly Smith eloquently puts it, “you and I will only interact on this single occasion, 
and even if our interaction will have no effect on my future opportunities to 
cooperate with other individuals.”271 Gauthier explicitly rejects solutions to 
Prisoner’s Dilemmas that are based on iterated occasions for cooperation, and 
claims to have demonstrated that it is rational to cooperate voluntarily even in 
the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma.272 So, if his argument is sound, he will not only 
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have succeeded in developing a solution to the compliance problem that is 
superior to that of Hobbes and Buchanan (who rely on an external enforcement 
mechanism), but one that is also superior to the solutions proposed by Taylor and 
Axelrod. For in that case we can apply “Occam’s Razor” and argue that we no 
longer need to assume that “the shadow of the future” obtains, i.e. we no longer 
have to incorporate into the contractarian framework the assumption that 
players are uncertain about the exact number of single games the iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma contains. 
The important question to ask, then, is why it is rational to be disposed to act 
in ways consistent with the dictates of constrained maximisation. Gauthier’s 
answer is based on an ingenious (game-theoretic) re-interpretation of Hobbes’s 
answer to the fool. According to Hobbes, the person who “breaketh his Covenant, 
and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be 
received into any Society.”273 Gauthier’s version of this argument proceeds as 
follows. It is rational for CMs to interact with CMs only (whereas it is rational for 
SMs to free ride on the cooperative efforts of CMs). If a person is conditionally 
disposed to act as a constrained maximiser, then he will only engage in 
cooperative interaction with other persons if he has good reason to believe that 
they are CMs (as opposed to SMs). If persons appear in their true colours – i.e. if 
they are what Gauthier calls “transparent” or sufficiently “translucent”274 – then a 
person who has adopted the disposition of SM will be excluded from beneficial 
cooperative arrangements by CMs because they do not trust him (they see him 
for what he truly is, namely a person who takes advantage of other persons 
should the occasion arise). It follows that the choice to be conditionally disposed 
to act as a CM yields more utility than choosing the disposition of the SM.275 Thus, 
Gauthier concludes, “if persons are transparent, or if persons are sufficiently 
translucent and enough are like-minded,” then it follows that “the disposition to 
make constrained choices, rather than straightforwardly maximizing choices, is 
utility-maximizing.”276 
Gauthier’s argument has been subjected to a considerable amount of 
criticism.277 Smith, for instance, has argued rather convincingly that Gauthier has 
                                                   
273 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 73. For Gauthier’s discussion of Hobbes’s answer to the fool, see 
Morals by Agreement, pp. 158-165. 
274 If individuals are translucent then one cannot with certainty tell whether another individual 
is disposed to cooperate or not (as is the case with transparent dispositions) but neither does 
one’s inquiry amount to mere guesswork (as is the case with opaque dispositions). See Gauthier, 
Morals by Agreement, p. 174. 
275 Ibid., pp. 162, 170-177. 
276 Ibid., p. 177, 183. 
277 In fact, David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement has sparked an enormous amount of scholarly 
work on contractarianism. The following is a partial list of collections of essays on Gauthier’s 
 149 
 
not succeeded in showing that adopting the disposition of CM maximises 
individuals’ expected utility in a significant number of cases. Furthermore, even 
in the cases where it was rational to adopt the disposition of CM, Gauthier has not 
succeeded in demonstrating that acting in accordance with the disposition of CM 
is rational for a significant number of individuals.278 In what follows, I shall 
discuss another criticism of Gauthier’s enterprise. This specific criticism focuses 
on Gauthier’s assumption of translucency, and has the same effect as Smith’s 
critique of Gauthier’s theory: it is not always rational, i.e. a utility-maximising 
strategy, to adopt the disposition of CM. 
One of the requirements Gauthier imposes on his own theory – or any other 
moral theory for that matter – is that it should be of practical relevance. “We 
want,” he writes, “to relate our idealizing assumptions to the real world.” This 
means, he continues, that “we shall have to show (...) that under actual, or 
realistically possible, conditions, moral constraints are rational.”279 At some point, 
Gauthier realises that the assumption of transparency violates this requirement. 
Transparency is too strong a condition to apply in any meaningful sense to actual 
persons. So, if constrained maximisation defeats straightforward maximisation 
only on the condition that all persons are transparent, then, Gauthier 
acknowledges, assuming transparency deprives the argument of any practical 
significance it might (otherwise) have.280 Consequently, he decides to appeal to 
what he takes to be the “more realistic” assumption of translucency, and 
promises to “show that for beings as translucent as we may reasonably consider 
ourselves to be, moral solutions are rationally available.”281 Unfortunately, he 
never makes good on his promise, and for good reasons perhaps because 
translucency, although weaker than transparency, is a seriously problematic 
assumption. The reason why this is so can be seen by analysing Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord’s criticism of it. 
                                                                                                                                                               
seminal book (and other philosophically related works). There are (at least) two collections of 
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Sayre-McCord asks whether the translucency assumption is of any practical 
relevance whatsoever.282 His answer to this question is that this is not the case 
because the assumption is not weak enough to apply to almost everyone. The 
reason he offers for this is that many actual persons are not as translucent as 
Gauthier’s ideal theory requires us to be. According to Sayre-McCord, the 
dispositions of a lot of individuals are sufficiently opaque to make it impossible to 
justify cooperative interaction on (economically) rational grounds. Though he 
does not provide any empirical evidence for this claim, his argument nevertheless 
reveals an important lacuna in Gauthier’s argument. The fundamental problem 
here is that if individuals are capable of successfully deceiving the individuals 
with whom they interact – if they are what Sayre-McCord calls “transopaque” or 
“megaopaque” – then they “will not be shunned by others” and “can expect to gain 
all the benefits of being constrained by morality without suffering its 
cumbersome constraints.”283 He writes: 
 
[D]eceptive people will be careful to provide the requisite (though 
misleading) evidence for those with whom they interact. They will 
develop winning smiles, travel with a glowing reputation, and cultivate 
an honest manner. Sadly, this sort of magic is worked (without a ring of 
Gyges) all too frequently. Such people seem both translucent and 
trustworthy.284 
 
Appearances can be deceiving and for those who have the skills to deceive 
without being detected, Gauthier cannot offer any argument as to why they 
should cooperate with others rather than take advantage of them. Thus, Sayre-
McCord rightly concludes, as long as an individual can successfully deceive his 
companions, he has no self-interested reason to become moral.285 The problem is 
that the nature of type III situations (which enable individuals to become 
invisible) is such that it becomes relatively easy for individuals to deceive others 
without being caught. The dictates of rational choice compel utility-maximising 
                                                   
282 See Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “Deception and reasons to be moral,” in Contractarianism and 
Rational Choice. Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement, ed. P. Vallentyne (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 181-195. 
283 Ibid., p. 192. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid., p. 195. For an argument to the same conclusion, see Alan Nelson, “Economic Rationality 
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individuals to exploit others by keeping up appearances. If, then, a sufficient 
number of these individuals are capable of deceiving others without being caught, 
which is certainly to be expected in type III situations, it follows that the level of 
compliance required for the provision of common goods will not be reached 
spontaneously. Under these circumstances, when it, contrary to what Gauthier 
claims, does not pay to internalise the norm of constrained maximisation, 
external constraints are required to guarantee compliance with agreements. 
But if this is correct, then Gauthier’s solution to the compliance problem is not 
superior to that of Taylor and Axelrod.286 In fact, both theories suffer from the 
same defect: they cannot show that it is always rational to comply voluntarily 
with mutually advantageous agreements. There are circumstances conceivable 
under which it is irrational for utility-maximising individuals to constrain their 
behaviour by internalising either the “strategy tit for tat” or the norm of 
constrained maximisation, and so the Pareto-optimal cooperative outcome will 
not be realised. This is not to say that cooperation is impossible under these 
circumstances, however. For it is still, as I have argued above, rational, i.e. a 
utility-maximising strategy, for individuals to agree on an enforcement 
arrangement as part of the initial agreement to cooperate. Stable cooperation can 
be guaranteed by means of external constraints imposed by a political authority. 
4.7 The Problem of Moral Standing 
Contractarianism, as we have seen in Section 4.2, works from the intuitive idea of 
agreement among (rationally and physically) free and equal utility-maximisers. A 
critique frequently levelled at contractarians is that their assumption of free and 
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superior to the one developed by Gauthier. The reason for this is as follows. (1) Despite 
appearances to the contrary, both theories are based on the same fundamental maximising 
conception of practical rationality (or, to put it differently, both rely on the same explanatory 
principle: straightforward utility-maximisation). Although Gauthier claims that the maximising 
conception of practical rationality underlying CM “is not parallel” to the conception underlying 
“such strategies as ‘tit-for-tat’ that have been advocated for so-called iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma’s,” namely SM, the contrary is in fact true. This is so because the rationality of adopting 
the disposition of CM depends ultimately on whether this straightforwardly maximises one’s 
utility. (2) Both theories are equally problematic in the sense that neither can explain that it is 
always rational to comply voluntarily with mutually advantageous agreements. (3) Despite the 
fact that both theories rely on the same explanatory principle, and that both are equally 
(un)successful, we should prefer the theory developed by Taylor and Axelrod to that of Gauthier 
because the theory of the latter is more complex. Gauthier’s theory is more complex because, 
unlike Taylor and Axelord, he adds to the level at which individuals make choices a meta-level at 
which individuals choose their dispositions for making choices. Given (1) and (2), this 
complexity is needless, and so we should use “Occam’s Razor” and prefer Taylor and Axelrod’s 
theory. See Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, p. 169n. 
152  
 
equal utility-maximisers is deeply problematic. The plausibility of this 
assumption seems to disappear in the face of the inequalities that exist between 
actual persons: in practice persons differ significantly in regard to the 
development of their physical and rational capacities. The combination of 
contractarianism’s utility-maximising conception of practical rationality and the 
inequality between persons (in terms of physical and rational capacities) in 
reality has profound effects on the prospects of the “weak” for engaging in 
cooperative interaction with the “strong.” (Here the strong are defined in terms of 
their having developed the relevant, i.e. physical and rational, capacities to a 
greater extent than the weak.) The problem identified here is that of the moral 
standing of the weak in contractarian views. This problem is frequently said to 
come in two forms: contractarianism encourages (1) exploitation and (2) 
exclusion of the weak by the strong. 
In what follows, I shall defend contractarianism against this critique. I will 
start with providing a more detailed analysis of the two ways in which the 
problem of moral standing might arise in contractarianism. I will elucidate the 
nature of the problem dialectically by discussing a number of fairly obvious 
responses to it. Although each of these responses ultimately fails, I shall 
nevertheless argue that this does not spell doom for contractarianism. The reason 
for this is that a lack of moral standing for the weak does not affect the internal 
consistency and coherency of the contractarian framework. Strictly speaking, 
then, the issue of moral standing poses no problem at all for contractarianism. I 
shall argue, furthermore, that it is even possible to re-interpret the contractarian 
framework in such a way that the weak can actually acquire moral standing in a 
contractarian world. 
In its first form, namely that in which the weak are exploited by the strong, 
the problem of moral standing appears because the contractarian OSCB-
procedure may result in an outcome which very much resembles what Buchanan 
calls the “slave contract.” In this situation, “the “weak” agree to produce goods for 
the “strong” in exchange for being allowed to retain something over and above 
bare subsistence, which they may be unable to secure in an anarchistic setting.”287 
What the slave contract illustrates, or so it might be objected to contractarians, is 
that an unequal bargaining position of the parties to an agreement makes it 
always rational for the stronger party to drive as hard as possible a bargain so as 
to take full advantage of the unequal position of the weaker party in contract if he 
can – regardless of the consequences for the weaker party. In other words, 
contractarianism encourages exploitation of the weak by the strong. 
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There are two possible ways in which one may reply to this argument. As a 
first reply, one might claim that the argument is based on a misunderstanding of 
the nature of contractarianism’s assumption of individuals’ equal freedom. This 
assumption should not be taken in the literal sense that all individuals are equally 
strong and bright. Rather, the assumption should be taken to entail that all 
individuals have reached the critical threshold of physical and mental 
development, as a result of which they are all sufficiently capable of 
understanding and applying the rules of rational choice (theory). Furthermore, 
the reply might continue, all individuals, even those whose strength or 
intelligence is considerably lower than that of others, pose a threat to other 
individuals because each of them, as Hobbes so eloquently puts it, “has strength 
enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with 
others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.”288 Individuals, in other words, 
are equally free in the sense that they all pose a potential threat to each other. It 
is, consequently, always possible to conceive of a power greater than the greatest 
power conceived. Since this means that every coalition can be overpowered by 
another coalition, it follows that it is rational for the members of a particular 
coalition, in particular for the strong members in relation to the weaker 
members, to offer each other terms of cooperation that are as advantageous as 
possible for all of them. If the strong do not exploit the predicament of the weak 
but instead offer them terms of cooperation that are better than those of the slave 
contract, the strong can ensure that the weak do not destabilise their joint 
venture for mutual advantage by forming a coalition with others who share their 
predicament. 
The problem with this argument, however, is that it is only valid on the 
implausible assumption that the weak are always capable of destabilising 
cooperative schemes. It is a truism that it is always possible to conceive of a 
power greater than the greatest power conceived, but the imaginary powers of 
the weak will not get them very far if the asymmetries of the interpersonal power 
relations between the strong and the weak are such that the latter are utterly 
unable to resist the former’s power. Under these circumstances – when there is 
what Hobbes calls “Power Irresistible” on earth289 – it is irrational for the strong 
not to use their power and to subject the weak to their dominion. 
Perhaps the second reply fares better. This reply does not entail that it is 
rational for the strong to refrain from performing exploitative acts of 
enslavement in order to prevent the weak from destabilising their cooperative 
interaction, but rather because the slave contract itself is not (Pareto) optimal. 
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The strong, or so the argument runs, can always do better for themselves by 
offering the weak non-exploitative terms of cooperation.290 Unfortunately, this 
argument is untenable because it is also based on an implausible assumption, 
namely that slave contracts are never (Pareto) optimal. Gijs van Donselaar has 
convincingly argued that there are circumstances conceivable in which it is 
irrational for the strong not to take full advantage from the unequal bargaining 
position of the weaker party in contract because they would worsen their own 
situation by doing so.291 
At best, then, both replies succeed only partially: it is not always rational for 
the strong to exploit the vulnerability of the weak in contract. In order to succeed 
completely, however, the replies must establish that which they cannot do: that it 
is never rational for the strong to exploit the weak. The slave contract, however, 
constitutes only one possible way in which the problem of moral standing can 
appear in contractarian views. An alternative outcome of the contractarian OSCB-
procedure may be that the weak who do not have the requisite capacity for 
rational agency, such as profoundly and irrecoverably comatose patients, will be 
excluded from cooperative schemes for mutual advantage altogether because they 
are incapable of reciprocating benefits in any way whatsoever. The strong do not 
consider these persons as potential partners for mutually advantageous 
cooperative interaction; they are, to put it bluntly, without utility for them. (As a 
shorthand, I shall henceforth refer to this category of persons as the “severely 
disabled.”) This is the second way in which the problem of moral standing 
appears in contractarian views. It is also the reason why, for instance, Robert E. 
Goodin dismisses contractarianism as a proper solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. According to him, the contractarian “formula 
                                                   
290 Cf. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, ch. 7. 
291 Gijs van Donselaar, The Right to Exploit. Parasitism, Scarcity, Basic Income (Oxford: Oxford 
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alternative, non-exploitative set of terms of cooperation (because every other point on the 
Pareto border would result in an outcome that is Pareto-optimal but nevertheless affords him a 
lower utility). 
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implausibly risks leaving large proportions of the world’s population blackballed 
and stateless.”292 
This second criticism of contractarianism, however, may give rise to the 
impression that the severely disabled are actually excluded from the outset in the 
contractarian view. In Section 4.3, I have argued that the open and serial 
character of the contractarian consensual binding procedure ensures that nobody 
is excluded a priori from the bargaining process – the only limitation on inclusion 
being that individuals actually come across each other. If individuals would be 
excluded from the collective decision-making procedure, then it would already 
presuppose the us/them distinction that it is meant to generate, and this would 
trigger an infinite regress of collective decision-making procedures presupposing 
prior collective decision-making procedures necessary to legitimise the posterior 
ones. Since nobody is excluded from the outset in the contractarian view, 
however, I have concluded that the people are not presupposed by but instead 
the genuine result of the OSCB-procedure, and so the infinite regress never arises 
because the necessity of legitimising a “presupposed” us/them distinction is 
wholly absent. If valid, however, the second critique would undermine my 
conclusion because in that case the OSCB-procedure would presuppose the 
us/them distinction that it is supposed to generate, and consequently would 
trigger an infinite regress from which no procedural escape is possible. 
As a refutation of the open character of the contractarian OSCB-procedure, 
however, the second critique of contractarianism would be seriously misplaced. 
The reason why the strong and the severely disabled do not cooperate is not 
because the latter are a priori excluded from the bargaining process, but rather 
because the severely disabled, who cannot reciprocate benefits, have nothing to 
offer to the strong. I have argued that it is rational for a utility-maximiser – who 
knows that he has nothing to lose and everything to gain from cooperative 
interaction – to see what another individual, whom he conceives of as a potential 
partner for mutually cooperative interaction, has to offer. This, indeed, is what 
guarantees the open character of the contractarian OSCB-procedure. Now, the 
only way in which some individual A can ascertain whether cooperative 
interaction with another individual B – an individual whom he has not met until 
now, and of which he (therefore) does not yet know that he is severely disabled – 
is instrumental to the realisation of his given interests, is through actual 
interaction with that individual. The problem, then, is not that A does not want to 
engage in a bargaining process with B in order to see whether mutually 
advantageous cooperative interaction between them is possible. The problem is 
rather that A, when he encounters B and tries to interact with him, will soon 
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realise that B’s condition deprives him of any of the cooperative potential that he 
assumed B to have prior to their encounter. Essentially, it is B’s inability to 
reciprocate benefits that provides A with a conclusive reason to refrain from 
engaging in cooperative interaction with B.293 So, the conclusion reached in 
Section 4.3 still stands: the OSCB-procedure is capable of providing a procedural 
solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that does not cause an 
infinite regress. 
Of course, this does not change the fact that those who cannot reciprocate 
benefits will not be agreeable to others as members of their cooperative scheme 
for mutual advantage. So it might be concluded that contractarianism cannot 
guarantee any moral standing to the weak and severely disabled. The most 
obvious reply for contractarians is to bite the bullet and to acknowledge that the 
assumption of individuals’ natural equality in physical and mental power is 
indeed often false, but nevertheless to insist, in Will Kymlicka’s words, that 
“[t]heir claim is not that individuals are in fact equals by nature, but that morality 
is only possible in so far as this is so.”294 Thus understood, the issue of moral 
standing poses, strictly speaking, no problem at all for contractarianism. The 
objection that this conclusion is counter-intuitive and therefore discredits 
contractarianism as a moral theory should not worry contractarians. For this 
objection presupposes a moral intuitionist or reflective equilibrium-based meta-
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maximisers accept, as a condition of rational cooperation, the requirement that cooperation 
must be mutually advantageous (as measured against the non-cooperative baseline of the state 
of nature). It follows that cooperative interaction between individuals is justified in so far as it is 
based on their mutual consent, which, in turn, is justified in terms of the given interests of each 
of them. If it is not instrumental to the realisation of the given interests of some individual to 
cooperate with another individual, then it is rational for each of them to agree not to engage in 
cooperative interaction with one another. Consequently, it follows that the terms “excluded” and 
“blackballed” are, even in the case of severely disabled, entirely misplaced. That a severely 
mentally disabled individual, such as a profoundly and irrecoverably comatose patient, lacks the 
rational capacity to make this inference (let alone the ability to perform voluntary and deliberate 
acts of consent) is irrelevant. What matters here is that he would accept, as a necessary 
presupposition of rational cooperative interaction, the requirement that cooperation must be 
mutually advantageous, if he would have the requisite capacity for rational agency. 
 From a contractarian perspective, indeed, the case of the severely disabled individual is in no 
relevant sense different from the case (discussed in Section 4.4) in which a Christian, who 
prefers life in a Christian political order to that in a liberal political order, considers it irrational 
to start a liberal cooperative venture with a Muslim if cooperative interaction with another 
Christian, who also happens to share his religious beliefs, enables him to live in a Christian 
political order. And in this case as well, I have concluded that the Christian’s refusal to engage in 
cooperative interaction with the Muslim could not be understood as an act of exclusion because 
the decision not to cooperate is based on their mutual consent. 
294 Kymlicka, “The Social Contract Tradition,” p. 190. 
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ethical standard that is clearly ruled out by the contractarian methodology of 
rational choice.295 
That said, I do not actually think that contractarians have to draw this 
conclusion. In fact, I think it is premature to conclude that the weak and severely 
disabled are, as Gauthier writes, beyond the “pale of a morality tied to 
mutuality.”296 In the remaining part of this section, I will explain why this is so. 
Let us, to begin with, consider a brief but nonetheless significant section of 
Buchanan’s The Limits of Liberty, where he discusses the relation between 
individuals’ capacities and behavioural motivations on the one hand and the 
conclusion of a social contract in the state of nature on the other.297 Buchanan is 
particularly concerned here with the criticism that the (contractarian kind of) 
social contract will reflect, and as such institutionalise, the natural inequalities 
among the contracting parties in the state of nature. He responds in the following, 
intriguing way: 
 
Those who have referred to the strong enslaving the weak may well 
have exaggerated the differences. The romantic moderns, on the other 
hand, who adopt their own variants on Rousseau’s noble savage may be 
equally off the mark in the opposing direction. (...) Nor need the analysis 
depend critically on the acceptance or rejection of any particular model 
or hypothesis about human behavior. We need not follow Hobbes and 
assume that men behave from narrowly defined self-interest. We could 
assume, equally well, that even in some state of nature men behave in 
accordance with self-interest tempered by regard for their fellows. Or, 
in the other limit, we might also assume that individuals adopt precepts 
for behavior that reflect the interests of the human species.298 
 
This quote reveals (at least) two things. First, whether a particular social 
contract reflects the differences in personal capacities depends, in Buchanan’s 
view, on the types of behaviour actually adopted by the contracting parties. 
Second, and for our purposes more important, is Buchanan’s suggestion that a 
contractarian need not necessarily be committed to the idea that all individuals 
are egoists, but can remain agnostic with respect to the content of their 
preferences. 
In Section 4.1, we have seen that contractarians endorse a subjective theory 
of value. Since morality is reducible to instrumental rationality in such a theory, 
contractarians conceive of persons as maximisers of subjective value. This means 
                                                   
295 Gauthier is most explicit on this in Morals by Agreement, p. 269. 
296 Ibid., p. 268. 
297 Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, pp. 33-35. 
298 Ibid., p. 34. 
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that values are determined solely by a person’s coherent (i.e. completely and 
transitively ordered) preferences. Since subjective values make an ineliminable 
reference to a particular person’s preference, they are relative to an individual’s 
points of view, i.e. agent-relative. Now, if the contractarian utility-maximisation 
conception of rationality merely involves coherent and agent-relative preference, 
then it follows that preference need not necessarily be self-interested – or, if it is, 
then it is so in the weakest conceivable way. Such a conception of rationality, as 
Gauthier puts it, is based on a purely “formal selfishness” that in no way 
whatsoever implies any “material selfishness.”299 This is so because the 
requirements of coherent and agent-relative rational choice say nothing about 
the object of a person’s preference; they demand, instead, only that a person acts 
in such a way as to maximise the (expected) satisfaction of his coherent 
preferences, whatever the objects of these preferences are. Though such a person 
may formally still be characterised as an egoist, in material terms we still may, as 
Gauthier rightly points out: 
 
(…) think of the egoist as maximizing whatever actor-relative value he 
pleases – perhaps his own happiness, perhaps not. He is then simply the 
person whose interests, whatever they may be, have no necessary link 
with the interests of his fellows, so that his values provide a measure of 
states of affairs quite independent of their values.300 
 
Thus understood, the contractarian conception of rationality places no 
constraints on the content of preference. It requires only that an individual’s 
values are independent in the agent-relative sense: a person’s values should not 
be dependent on the (coherent) preferences of other persons. That is to say, they 
are his values, which he forms autonomously, i.e. independently of another 
person. 
It is possible, however, to incorporate into this minimal understanding of the 
contractarian utility-maximising conception of rationality various types of 
material self-interestedness, as a result of which individuals’ values become 
independent in a sense that is stronger than mere agent-relativity. What these 
stronger types of self-interestedness have in common is that they, when assumed 
to hold for persons, imply not only that individuals have preferences 
independently of those of others, but that they also have utility functions that are 
independent, i.e. they have preferences that do not range over the preferences of 
others. If individuals do not take any interest in the interests of the persons with 
                                                   
299 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, p. 73. 
300 David Gauthier, “The Incompleat Egoist,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Stanford 
University, 1983, p. 73. 
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whom they interact, then their self-interestedness takes the form of non-tuism.301 
A stronger type of self-interestedness is that of mutual unconcern, according to 
which individuals take no interest in the interests of other persons at all (i.e. 
regardless of whether they interact with them or not). 
Notice that the stronger the type of self-interestedness, i.e. the higher the 
degree of self-interestedness, the more independent individuals’ values become. 
This is so because the incorporation of the requirement of non-tuism into the 
motivational assumption of coherent, agent-relative preference introduces 
constraints on the content of individuals’ preferences. This is even more so when 
the requirement of non-tuism is replaced with that of mutual unconcern. Notice, 
furthermore, that the acceptance of any of these three types of self-interestedness 
has direct implications for the moral standing of persons in contractarian views. 
Following Christopher W. Morris, we may say that in a contractarian view: 
 
[S]ome individual A has moral standing in relation to some person B if 
and only if (1) A and B are in the circumstances of justice, (2) A and B 
are capable of imposing constraints on their behavior towards one 
another, and (3) A so constrains his or her behavior toward B.302 
 
In other words, it is rational, i.e. a utility-maximising strategy, for an 
individual to grant what Morris calls “primary moral standing” to other 
individuals, and correspondingly to constrain his own behaviour with respect to 
these others, if and only if (1) mutually advantageous cooperative interaction 
between them is possible, (2) the others have the requisite capacity for rational 
agency and as such are capable of constraining their behaviour and (3) the others 
are willing to constrain their behaviour. If these conditions are met, it is rational 
for a set of individuals to constrain their behaviour; they all have reason to give 
up their right to everything that is characteristic of life in the state of nature, and 
to subject themselves, through multilateral acts of consent, to a common set of 
principles or rules which make possible mutually advantageous cooperation 
between them. 
Notice that this way of formulating the contractarian account of moral 
standing has two important implications. The first is that this account still allows 
for the possibility of a slave contract. If the conditions enumerated are met in the 
case of a particular slave contract, then the parties to it have moral standing in 
                                                   
301 Philip H. Wicksteed first coined the term “non-tuism” in his The Common Sense of Political 
Economy, and Selected Papers and Reviews on Economic Theory, ed. L. Robbins (London: 
Routledge, 1933). 
302 Christopher W. Morris, “Moral standing and rational-choice contractarianism,” in 
Contractarianism and Rational Choice. Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement, ed. P. 
Vallentyne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 86-87. 
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relation to each other (though, of course, the “weak” have less moral standing 
than they could have negotiated for themselves if only they would have been 
stronger). A second implication of the contractarian account of moral standing is 
that the severely disabled, in so far as cooperative interaction between them and 
the “strong” is not mutually advantageous, will not have any moral standing. In 
that case, as we have seen above, the strong do not consider the severely disabled 
as potential partners for mutually advantageous cooperative interaction; they are 
without utility for them. 
It may seem, then, that only those individuals who are parties to a social 
contract have moral standing in contractarian views. This conclusion, however, is 
too quick because it follows only if we ascribe to individuals the motivational 
assumption of mutual unconcern. In a world inhabited by mutually unconcerned 
utility-maximisers, an unequal bargaining position of the parties to an agreement, 
as is for instance the case with the slave contract, makes it rational for the 
stronger party to drive as hard as possible a bargain so as to exploit the unequal 
position of the weaker party in contract if he can – regardless of the 
consequences for the weaker party. It pays the stronger party to grant the weaker 
party moral standing – albeit in the most minimal degree possible. Should the 
stronger party at some point during the bargaining process discover that it is not 
advantageous for him to engage in cooperative interaction with the weaker party, 
as is the case with severely and irrecoverably disabled persons, then rationality 
dictates that he does not constrain his behaviour in relation to that weaker party, 
but instead remain in the state of nature with respect to that weaker party, where 
each of them are at liberty to treat each other as they see fit. It does not pay for 
the stronger party to grant the weaker any moral standing. Under these 
circumstances, then, Gauthier is indeed quite right to claim that the weak and 
severely disabled fall beyond the pale of a morality of mutuality.303 
In a world inhabited by non-tuistic utility-maximisers, however, things may 
turn out to be quite different. For the requirement that individual A’s preferences 
do not involve another individual B with whom he interacts, does not rule out the 
possibility that A’s preference involves a third individual C who is no party to A 
and B’s interaction. What Morris calls “secondary moral standing” becomes at 
least a conceptual possibility here.304 Suppose that A and B are in the 
circumstances of justice with respect to one another, that they are both capable of 
constraining their actions towards each other, and that A constrains his actions to 
B (which, taken together, makes it rational for B to grant primary moral standing 
to A in return, and correspondingly to constrain his own behaviour with respect 
                                                   
303 In my discussion of the problem of moral standing in contractarianism so far, I have tacitly 
assumed that individuals are mutually unconcerned. 
304 Morris, “Moral standing and rational-choice contractarianism,” p. 90. 
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to him). Suppose, furthermore, that A cares deeply about C, who is severely and 
irrecoverably mentally disabled. C is, then, the object of A’s preferences. In fact, A 
cares so much about C that it is irrational for him to engage in cooperative 
interaction with B unless C is granted moral standing in his relations with B. 
Given that he is a non-tuistic utility-maximiser and therefore takes no interest in 
the interests of B, however, A still tries to drive as hard as possible a bargain with 
B, and this will involve taking advantage of any potential weakness(es) of B in 
contract – which may indeed be a slave contract. 
The conceptual possibility of secondary moral standing – which Morris labels 
as such only because primary moral standing is an existence condition of 
secondary moral standing – shows that contractarianism is not necessarily 
committed to the view that those who cannot reciprocate benefits to others will 
not be agreeable to others as members of their cooperative scheme for mutual 
advantage, i.e. people. The motivational assumption of non-tuism ensures this. 
What this assumption does not and cannot guarantee, however, is that 
contractarianism need not involve slave contracts. If individuals are motivated in 
such a way as to take an interest in the interests of those with whom they interact 
– which is ruled out by the motivational assumptions of mutual unconcern and 
non-tuism – then they will not enslave others. If some individual A cares 
sufficiently about some other individual B sitting at the opposite end of the 
bargaining table, then A will instead grant moral standing to B, and 
correspondingly constrain his own behaviour with respect to B during the 
ensuing bargaining process by refusing to take any, or at least full, advantage of 
B’s vulnerability in contract. (Notice that A may even treat B in this way 
regardless of whether they are in the circumstances of justice, and regardless of 
whether B is able and willing to constrain his behaviour.) This scenario is 
possible if we make the motivational assumption that individuals merely 
maximise agent-relative value (in the sense described above). Though it is 
certainly true that this motivational assumption still allows for the possibility that 
individuals act on the basis of considerations that do not take into account the 
interests of any other individuals at all, or the interests of those individuals with 
whom they interact only, it is nevertheless equally true that this motivational 
assumption allows for the possibility that individuals do take into account the 
interests of other individuals when deliberating about what course of action 
maximises their own utility. 
Thus far, I have discussed three motivational assumptions that are in one way 
or another put to work in contractarian views: mutual unconcern, non-tuism and 
agent-relativity. Next, I have considered the various implications that each of 
these contractarian assumptions can have for the moral standing of persons, as 
well as for the terms under which what kinds of persons can be acceptable as 
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members of a people – where a “people” are conceptualised in contractarian 
terms as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. Depending on the kind of 
motivational assumption one makes, a contractarian can claim with perfect 
consistency that the “weak” (including even the severely disabled) can be 
agreeable to others – the “strong” – as parties to the (same) social contract, and 
that this contract need not be based on exploitative acts of enslavement. Still, this 
is not yet sufficient to provide an answer to the question as to who can have 
moral standing according to contractarianism. It is one thing to know what the 
implications of the contractarian motivational assumptions of mutual unconcern, 
non-tuism and agent-relativity are for the moral standing of persons. It is quite 
another thing to know which of these assumptions a contractarian should 
endorse. In fact, it is necessary to answer precisely this question in order to 
provide a more definitive answer to the question of moral standing in 
contractarianism. 
If contractarians are to remain true to their contractarian framework then 
they have no choice but to embrace the minimalist conception of instrumental 
rationality; a conception which merely involves the maximisation of coherent and 
agent-relative preference. The reason for this can be spelled out as follows. The 
characteristic feature of contractarianism is that it is based on a subjective theory 
of value in which morality is derived from the non-moral premises of rational 
choice. In order to derive morality from instrumental rationality, contractarians 
cannot build any moral substance into their description of both the hypothetical 
agents and the initial bargaining situation, and as such can place no moral 
constraints on the (kind of) rational agreement to be reached by these agents (as 
we have seen see Section 4.1). In so far, however, as contractarians endorse the 
motivational assumption of mutual unconcern or that of non-tuism, they betray 
their commitment to deriving morality from rationality. The reason for this is, as I 
have argued above, that the incorporation of the motivational assumptions of 
mutual unconcern or non-tuism into the motivational assumption of coherent, 
agent-relative preference introduces (different degrees of) constraints on the 
content of the hypothetical agent’s preferences. In that case, after all, individuals 
are assumed to take no interest in the preferences of others at all or in the 
interests of those with whom they interact. These assumptions, which determine 
what is included and excluded as the “possible” object of individuals’ preferences, 
are then clearly incompatible with the subjective theory of value that lies at the 
heart of contractarianism. If individuals are conceived of as maximisers of 
subjective value, then any a priori restriction on the content of these values, or 
the preferences of which they are a measure, comes at the cost of internal 
inconsistency and incoherence. By endorsing either the assumption of mutual 
unconcern or that of non-tuism, contractarians would tacitly incorporate into 
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their theory the very moral substance that should instead result from it. 
Consequently, contractarians would essentially commit the same error as that of 
which they accuse contractualists.305 The motivational assumption of coherent, 
agent-relative preference does not suffer the same fate as the other two 
assumptions, because it remains fully agnostic with respect to the content of the 
values that individuals try to maximise. It follows, then, that contractarians 
should endorse this assumption, and that they, if they would, can seriously 
maintain that it may be perfectly rational for utility-maximising individuals to 
grant moral standing to the weak, and that this may (in various ways discussed) 
mean that the weak are agreeable as parties to a non-exploitative social contract, 
the conclusion of which makes them members of a people. 
Of course, this solution to the problem of moral standing in contractarianism 
comes at a cost: it incorporates an element of contingency into the theory. The 
weak and the severely disabled will only acquire moral standing if their interests 
are the object of the preferences of the strong. This is true, but I do not think it 
constitutes a logical weakness of the theory. Contractarians should simply stress 
the all-important point that morality is impossible if individuals are not equals by 
nature and if they do not take any interest in the interests of others. In fact, the 
element of contingency is essential to contractarianism; this is, I have argued, as it 
should be in a proper contractarian view. 
One might even go so far as to claim, quite plausibly in my view, that this 
characterisation of the contractarian utility-maximising conception of practical 
rationality ensures that the contractarian OSCB-procedure offers a perfect 
example of pure procedural justice. This form of justice obtains, Rawls famously 
wrote, “when there is no independent criterion for the right result; instead there 
is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, 
whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed.”306 
                                                   
305 See note 212. 
306 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 75. Of course, Rawls was not the first person to develop the idea 
of pure procedural justice. Adam Smith, for instance, provides us with an intuitive account of 
pure procedural justice as well, when he writes: “In the race for wealth, and honours, and 
preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to 
outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of 
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his The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. K. Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), pt. II, sec. II, ch. II. The underlying idea here is that any state of affairs resulting from the 
implementation of contract-oriented competition conforms with the requirements of pure 
procedural justice, provided certain conditions of “fairness” are satisfied. These conditions, as 
Michel Rosenfeld observes, “are the ones that underlie Smith’s conception of a market society in 
which the ‘invisible hand’ transforms the clash of private interests into the realisation of the 
public interest.” Subject to the fair conditions of a market society, then, contract-oriented 
competition between free and equal individuals (i.e. sellers and buyers) bridges the gap between 
private and public interest and consequently guarantees pure procedural justice. See Michel 
164  
 
Applied to the case at hand, we can see that the OSCB-procedure is the correct 
contractarian bargaining procedure because, as I have argued in Section 4.3, its 
conditions – most notably its “open” and “serial” character, as well as the 
requirement that its outcomes be “mutually advantageous” – are accepted by 
rational utility-maximising individuals (not as the products of agreement but 
instead) as necessary presuppositions of such agreement. In this section, 
furthermore, I have argued that the underlying maximising conception of 
practical rationality is correctly described as a minimal conception which merely 
involves the maximisation of coherent and agent-relative preference. 
This has two important implications. First, since individuals are (properly) 
understood to maximise the (expected) satisfaction of their coherent preferences, 
whatever the nature of these preferences, it is impossible to determine in the 
abstract, i.e. prior to their actually engaging in a bargaining process, which 
cooperative arrangements are mutually advantageous for which set(s) of 
individuals.307 (This would not be the case if the motivational assumption of 
mutual unconcern or non-tuism would be incorporated into the basic 
requirement of coherent and agent-relative utility-maximisation. For then it 
would, for instance, be possible to determine, prior to any individuals actually 
engaging in a bargaining process, that the severely disabled would not be 
agreeable to others – the “strong” – as members of their cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage.) The second, and related, implication is that the “minimalist” 
maximising conception of practical rationality involved in the OSCB-procedure 
may cause its outcomes to vary greatly. If the OSCB-procedure and its underlying 
“minimalist” maximising conception of practical rationality are correct, however, 
then it follows that the outcome (i.e. agreement) reached by the individuals 
                                                                                                                                                               
Rosenfeld, Just Interpretations: Law between Ethics and Politics (Berkely: University of California 
Press, 1998), pp. 125-126. For a similar account of the idea of pure procedural justice, see Hayek, 
Law, Legislation, and Liberty, ch. 7. Needless to say perhaps, although philosophers, such as 
Rawls, Hayek and Smith, generally agree that pure procedural justice obtains when there is no 
independent criterion for the right outcome, but instead a correct or fair procedure such that the 
outcome (whatever it is) is likewise correct or fair, they do of course disagree fundamentally 
with respect to what qualifies as the correct or fair procedure. My aim here has merely been to 
develop the correct contractarian procedure: the OSCB-procedure. 
307 This is precisely the reason why it is incorrect to claim, as Gauthier does, that an individual 
“has no interest in causing the bargaining process to fail,” and is therefore “constrained by the 
recognition that he must neither drive others away from the bargaining table, nor be excluded 
by them.” See Morals by Agreement, pp. 133-134. It is, as I have argued in Section 4.4, always 
possible to conceive of circumstances such that it is irrational to engage in cooperative 
interaction, and whether or not this is so depends ultimately on the nature of an individual’s 
preference ordering and the degree to which cooperation with others actually enables him to 
maximise his preferences (which, as the imaginary bargaining process between the Christian 
and the Muslim illustrates, is not necessarily the case). 
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participating in the OSCB-procedure, whatever it is (provided, of course, that the 
procedure is properly followed), is nevertheless purely procedurally just. 
This, then, completes our discussion of the contractarian account of the 
legitimacy of the people. In this chapter, I have approached the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people from a contractarian perspective. I have argued that the 
contractarian approach is fully capable of solving the problem of the legitimacy of 
the people in a way that is strongly compatible with a democratic framework; it 
provides us with a procedural democratic legitimisation of the people that does 
not result in an infinite regress. Furthermore, I have argued that contractarianism 
also contains the conceptual tools to provide a solution to the problems of 
compliance and of moral standing as well – problems which, should either of 
these have turned out to be unsolvable, would have caused contractarianism, 
together with its solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people, to 
become untenable. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Rawlsian Contractualism  
and the 
Legitimacy of the People 
In this chapter, I approach the problem of the legitimacy of the people from a 
Rawlsian contractualist perspective. Can the Rawlsian contractualist approach 
provide us with a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that is 
strongly compatible with a democratic framework? The argument pursued in this 
chapter goes somewhat beyond the confines of Rawls’s contractualist theory of 
justice. “Somewhat,” because although Rawls’s primary concern was not to 
develop an approach to the legitimate demarcation of the people, but rather to 
develop a set of principles of justice for the general regulation of an already 
demarcated, “closed” society, it is possible to argue that his theory of justice 
contains, albeit unintentionally, at least two approaches to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people: the strategy of avoidance and the relational strategy. I 
will refer to both as “Rawlsian approaches” instead of “Rawls’s approaches”: 
although Rawls nowhere in his writings explicitly claimed to follow either 
approach, they are, or so I argue, nevertheless implicit in his theory of justice. 
This chapter is divided into three parts (5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). The aim of the first 
part of this chapter is to provide a general outline of the key elements of 
contractualism. I shall compare the two dominant versions of contemporary 
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contractualism, namely the Rawlsian and Scanlonian ones, and explain my 
reasons for approaching the problem of the legitimacy of the people exclusively 
from a Rawlsian contractualist point of view. Doing so paves the way for the 
discussion in the two subsequent parts of the chapter. 
In the second part of this chapter, I discuss the first Rawlsian approach to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people: the strategy of avoidance. This approach 
takes seriously the problem of the legitimacy of the people, but instead of solving 
aims at preventing it from arising, and from becoming a morally relevant problem 
at all. According to this approach, it is possible to prevent the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people from arising by perfecting justice within existing, i.e. 
already demarcated, societies. In Part 5.2, I argue that the Rawlsian strategy of 
avoidance, if it is to succeed, has to be able to provide a coherent and consistent 
account of what constitutes a just society. Such an account, I insist, must contain 
both an account of justice and an account of political obligation. The latter 
account must, furthermore, be able to meet the particularity requirement: it must 
be capable of explaining why individuals have a moral duty (or obligation) 
specially to obey the political institutions of one particular political society above 
all others. Finally, I argue (1) that the Rawlsian strategy of avoidance entails an 
account of political obligation that is capable of meeting the particularity 
requirement, but that the specific way in which it does so (2) constitutes an 
account of the legitimacy of the people (3) that is inconsistent with the Rawlsian 
contractualist approach to and account of justice. Therefore, I conclude that the 
Rawlsian strategy of avoidance fails by its own standards, a conclusion which 
necessitates further development of and reflection on alternative approaches to 
the problem of the legitimacy of the people. 
In the third part of this chapter, I shall consider such an alternative approach. 
I shall continue my analysis of the Rawlsian contractualist view from a different 
angle. Based on a re-interpretation of Rawls’s writings, in particular The Law of 
Peoples, I shall argue that it is not only possible to uncover a strategy of avoidance 
but also, and more interestingly, an alternative conceptual framework that is 
actually capable of solving the problem of the legitimacy of the people in a way 
that is consistent with a Rawlsian contractualist view. In order to demonstrate 
this, I shall start with situating Rawls’s approach to justice within the broader 
debate on international justice. I rehearse Rawls’s initial reasons for developing 
principles of justice for the domestic (as opposed to global) context, and next 
introduce the cosmopolitan critique of Rawls’s theory of justice. In one way or 
another, cosmopolitans argue that Rawls’s restriction of the application of 
principles of justice to the members of states results in a serious incoherence in 
his liberal thought. I explain the reasons cosmopolitans have for levelling their 
criticism at Rawls. Next, I develop a possible Rawlsian reply to the cosmopolitan 
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critique which implicitly contains the conceptual tools required to solve the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people. I argue that this reply is based on a 
relational approach to justice that can explain how it is possible to determine who 
legitimately make up the group of individuals who are to reach a reasonable 
agreement on a set of principles of just immigration, emigration and secession. 
Finally, I argue that this particular Rawlsian approach to the legitimacy of the 
people is strongly compatible with a democratic framework. 
5.1 Rawlsian Contractualism 
5.1.1 Contractualism: An Outline 
Let us, by way of setting the scene, provide an outline of the key elements of 
contractualism. Contractualism, as we have seen in Chapter 2.4.1, has Kantian 
roots. Central to Kant’s political philosophy is the idea that individuals are 
autonomous beings. In Kant’s view, an individual is autonomous if and only if he 
acts in accordance with that maxim through which he can at the same time, and 
without contradiction, “will” that it should become a universal law. This is Kant’s 
famous categorical imperative, which essentially provides a procedure for moral 
reasoning(henceforth CI-procedure). It constitutes a criterion for testing whether 
a particular (moral) principle for the general regulation of interpersonal 
interactions is impartial in the sense that it is capable of being universalised. 
Kant’s categorical imperative conveys the idea that the positive laws imposed by 
rulers or states are legitimate if all individuals subject to them could in some 
qualified sense understand themselves as their authors.308 The idea of a social 
contract is reflected in the CI-procedure. For Kant, the social contract was an 
“idea of reason” which has “undoubted practical reality” in the sense that “it can 
oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been 
produced by the united will of a whole nation.”309 
We can spell out the key features of contractualism by looking more closely at 
the nature of the Kantian CI-procedure. It is, to begin with, a hypothetical 
procedure. It is so in the sense that it works from the fundamental idea of an 
agreement which a group of idealised individuals would reach under idealised 
circumstances. In its most abstract and general form, a hypothetical contract 
theory aims to justify a set of principles by positing an idealised (or counter-
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factual) choice situation which is occupied by idealised agents who have to agree 
to a set of rules for the general regulation of their interactions with one another 
when they are in actual, non-idealised society. 
Depending on how one characterises the choice situation and the agents in it, 
the kind of agreement involved in a hypothetical contract view will vary. If one, 
like contractarians (as we have seen in Chapter 4), conceives of the agents as 
having a maximising capacity for practical reason and of the initial situation as a 
non-cooperative baseline against which the rationality of engaging in cooperative 
interaction is evaluated by each of these agents, then it follows that the kind of 
agreement reached by these agents under these circumstances is a rational 
bargain or compromise. Unlike contractarians, however, who seek to derive 
morality from the non-moral premises of rational choice, contractualists build 
moral substance into their description of both the hypothetical agents and their 
circumstances, and as such place moral constraints on the (kind of) rational 
agreement to be reached by the agents. 
With respect to the hypothetical agents, the moral substance comes in the 
form of a specific “counter-factual” conception of the person. The agents are 
conceived of as naturally free and equal moral persons. They are so in virtue of 
their having a dual moral capacity, containing both a rational and reasonable 
component. A person’s rationality refers to the ability to form, revise and 
rationally pursue a conception of his rational advantage or good.310 This aspect of 
a person’s moral capacity, which might be called “the rational,” mirrors Kant’s 
hypothetical imperative with its directive to take effective and efficient means to 
one’s self-imposed ends.311 A person’s reasonableness consists in his having a 
normally effective desire (a) to interact with others on terms that can be publicly 
justified, i.e. terms that other, similarly motivated individuals can reasonably 
endorse (or alternatively, cannot reasonably reject); and (b) to act from, as 
opposed to merely in accordance with, these terms.312 This element of a person’s 
moral capacity, which can be referred to as “the reasonable,” corresponds to 
Kant’s categorical imperative, according to which (as we have seen) the validity of 
a person’s precept for practical action has to be determined by asking whether it 
“could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of universal law.”313 
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How are the rational and the reasonable related in a contractualist view? We 
can elucidate the contractualist understanding of the relationship between the 
rational and the reasonable by contrasting it with the contractarian 
understanding of it. All social contract theorists assume that individuals have a 
desire to justify themselves to others. What this means is that an individual is 
concerned with other people’s points of view; justifying one’s behaviour towards 
others, or a set of principles for the general regulation of interpersonal behaviour, 
involves taking into account others’ interests. This does not necessarily imply that 
individuals have an intrinsic desire to take other’s interests into account. What it 
does imply, however, is that individuals are, at the very least, instrumentally 
concerned with other people’s points of view, namely in so far as this is necessary 
to justify themselves to others. Contractarianism exemplifies this instrumental 
account of justification. According to this view, individuals are limited to means-
ends reasoning, and so they have a desire to propose, and act in accordance with, 
principles that are instrumental to the realisation of the objects of their interests. 
It follows that their desire to justify themselves to others is merely instrumental 
as well. This is so because it enables an individual to get others to do what serves 
his own interests; a utility-maximising person knows that if he is to reap the 
benefits of cooperation then he must take others’ interests into account; if he fails 
to do so, then it is irrational for others to engage in cooperative interaction with 
him. So, others’ interests have no intrinsic moral status, taking them into account 
is simply a necessary precondition of cooperation (which it is rational to seek for 
utility-maximisers) – indeed, others are merely means towards the realisation of 
one’s ends. Consequently, morality consists in those forms of cooperative 
behaviour that it is mutually advantageous for utility-maximising individuals to 
engage in. What this means is, ultimately, that the reasonable, understood as a set 
of principles regulating cooperative interaction, is derived from the rational in a 
contractarian view.314 
In a contractualist view, by contrast, the rational and the reasonable are, as 
John Rawls puts it, “distinct in that there is no thought of deriving the one from 
the other; in particular, there is no thought of deriving the reasonable from the 
rational.”315 Rather, they are complementary ideas: 
 
[N]either the reasonable nor the rational can stand without the other. 
Merely reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted 
to advance by fair cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of 
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justice and fail to recognize the independent validity of the claims of 
others.316 
 
If the rational and the reasonable are complementary in a contractualist view, 
then the question, of course, is how they work in tandem. What separates 
contractualists from one another is their answer to this question. Basically, the 
answer comes in two forms: a Rawlsian and a Scanlonian. Let us begin with the 
former, Rawlsian answer – named after the founder of the underlying 
contractualist position, John Rawls. In his seminal A Theory of Justice, Rawls has 
developed one of the most famous interpretations of Kant’s CI-procedure. He 
invites us to engage in a thought experiment: the original position. He wishes us 
to imagine a number of parties coming together to reach a social agreement on 
principles of justice. The contracting parties are mutually disinterested, and have 
a desire to do as well as they can for themselves. They are, however, placed 
behind the so-called veil of ignorance that causes them to suffer from temporary 
amnesia with respect to certain morally irrelevant (i.e. arbitrary) facts, such as 
the relative distribution of their desires, talents, convictions and ends, as well as 
the particular economic, political and cultural circumstances of their own 
society.317 Making it impossible to tailor principles to one’s advantage, the veil of 
ignorance guarantees that the hypothetical parties in the counter-factual original 
position only select principles that would be acceptable from the perspective of 
every conceivable position each of them might turn out to occupy in actual, non-
idealised society (once the veil of ignorance is lifted). 
How the rational and reasonable work in tandem can be seen from the set up 
of the original position. Principles of justice are the outcome of rational choice 
under reasonable conditions. The parties in the original position are conceived of 
as utility-maximisers, and so engage in a pair-wise comparison of potential 
principles of justice, rank these alternatives by their worst possible outcomes, 
and subsequently “adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior 
to the worst outcomes of the others.”318 Their efforts to do as well as they can for 
themselves, however, are limited by their ignorance of themselves. Essentially, 
the original position models “the natural equality of moral status, which makes 
each person’s interests a matter of common or impartial concern.”319 The veil of 
ignorance ensures that the parties are symmetrically positioned in such a way 
that they cannot tailor principles of justice to their own advantage. Consequently, 
Rawls writes, “[w]hatever one’s temporal position is, each is forced to choose for 
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all.”320 So, the moral baseline of impartiality implicit in the original position 
functions as a reasonable constraint on the deliberations of the rationally self-
interested parties. Given that the original position is “the appropriate initial 
status quo,” the fundamental agreements in it, whatever their content, are fair. 
(Indeed, this why Rawls refers to his theory as “justice as fairness”).321 
What distinguishes a Rawlsian contractualist view from a contractarian view, 
then, is that the former conceives of the reasonable and the rational as 
complementary notions, whereas the latter conceives of the reasonable as a 
derivative of the rational. There is, however, an additional, and related, 
difference: in a Rawlsian contractualist view, the choice for principles of justice 
cannot be understood in terms of a rational bargain or compromise. In the 
original position “each is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced 
by the same arguments,” and therefore each is led to choose the same conception 
of justice. “The veil of ignorance,” in other words, “makes possible a unanimous 
choice of a particular conception of justice.”322 Though it makes possible a 
unanimous choice, this choice cannot be characterised as a rational bargain or 
compromise. After all, the veil of ignorance – as Rawls himself explicitly 
acknowledged323 – ensures that the parties have no basis for bargaining.324 The 
crucial point here is that it is only in the light of our ends that we can actually 
engage in a bargaining process. In the absence of all knowledge of our ends, we 
would not be able to know whether the offers we exchange are instrumental to 
the realisation of our ends or not. Yet the original position achieves just that; 
though, presumably, our ends will partially conflict and overlap, the veil of 
ignorance makes it impossible to know what our ends are, and as such renders 
the entire notion of bargaining inapplicable to the choice of a conception of 
justice.325 As a result, principles of justice cannot be the object of a rational 
bargain or compromise in the context of the original position. 
Let us now consider how the rational and the reasonable are related in a 
Scanlonian contract view. According to T. M. Scanlon, the founder of this version 
of contractualism, “[a]n act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances 
would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of 
behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement.”326 Each of these three qualifiers of his contractualist formula 
                                                   
320 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 121. 
321 Ibid., p. 10. 
322 Ibid., pp. 118-121. 
323 Ibid., p. 120. 
324 Jean Hampton, “Contracts and Choices: Does Rawls have a Social Contract Theory?,” The 
Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980), pp. 324-326. 
325 Cf. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 58. 
326 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 153, my emphasis. 
174  
 
– that agreement on principles ought to be reasonable, informed and unforced – 
can, if violated, provide grounds for rejection. What is interesting to see, however, 
is that Scanlon, unlike Rawls, does not model the contractual circumstances in 
such a way that the parties involved cannot, for instance, be “forced to accept an 
unconscionable agreement by being in a weak bargaining position.”327 Rawls’s 
veil of ignorance ensures that the parties in the original position have no basis for 
bargaining. Given that the veil of ignorance deprives the parties in the original 
position of knowledge of their personal identities and circumstances, Rawls’s 
hypothetical social contract view is, as we have seen in Chapter 2.4, a-historical. 
In Scanlon’s view, however, it is unnecessary to impose a veil of ignorance on the 
parties in order to make sure that their deliberations result in a non-coercive 
agreement – let alone any agreement at all. Instead, Scanlon’s hypothetical agents 
are allowed full knowledge of their personal identities and circumstances, 
because he thinks that their moral motivation creates a pressure that is 
sufficiently strong to reach (reasonable, informed and unforced) agreement. 
Consequently, the circumstances in which Scanlon’s hypothetical agents have to 
reach an agreement on principles are counter-factual in that they abstract from 
considerations that are unreasonable, uninformed or subject to coercion, but he 
models these counter-factual circumstances in such a way that the agreement 
reached is (still) historical. 
What distinguishes Scanlon’s historical version of contractualism from 
Rawls’s a-historical version of contractualism is its particular motivational claim. 
According to Scanlon, our thinking about right and wrong is structured by a 
particular kind of motivation: 
 
(...) the aim of finding principles that others, insofar as they too have 
this aim, could not reasonably reject. This gives us a direct reason to be 
concerned with other people’s points of view: not because we might, for 
all we know, actually be them, or because we might occupy their 
position in some other possible world, but in order to find principles 
that they, as well as we, have reason to accept.328 
 
In a Rawlsian contractualist view, it is rational self-interest combined with 
ignorance of oneself that makes each of the parties in the original position take 
into account everyone’s interests, but not, as is the case in a Scanlonian 
contractualist view, their concern to justify themselves to everyone else. 
According to Scanlon, individuals are endowed with a highest-order desire to 
justify themselves to others, and this is something they want for its own sake. 
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This is, as Freeman writes, “not a desire for any particular object of action (like 
the well-being of others or oneself), but is a desire to regulate the objects of one’s 
desires and their pursuit in ways (according to principles) none could reasonably 
reject.”329 
What this shows is that Scanlonian contractualists side with Rawlsian 
contractualists against contractarians in their insistence that the reasonable 
should not be understood as being derived from the rational. Furthermore, it also 
shows in what sense Scanlonian and Rawlsian contractualists part company. If, as 
Scanlon would have it, individuals have a highest-order desire to regulate the 
objects of their desires, as well as the ways in which these are pursued, on the 
basis of principles that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement, then it is unnecessary to abstract away from many 
concrete features of individuals’ lives, for instance by placing them behind 
Rawls’s veil of ignorance, in order to guarantee the fairness of their agreement. 
This is so because an individual, thus motivated, does not want to be the kind of 
narrowly self-interested person who coerces others into an agreement by means 
of threats of force or violence, or who exploits others by taking unfair advantage 
of their relatively weak bargaining position in contract. 
So, although Scanlonian and Rawlsian contractualists converge in their 
negative characterisation of the relationship between the rational and the 
reasonable, namely that the reasonable is not derived from the rational, they 
diverge in their positive characterisation of the relationship. Of course, both work 
from the fundamental idea of agreement which a group of idealised agents would 
reach under idealised circumstances. What ultimately distinguishes them from 
each other, however, is that Rawlsian contractualism aims to ensure the validity 
of the agreement by situating rational agents in circumstances in which they are 
subject to certain appropriate conditions expressing the reasonable, whereas 
Scanlonian contractualism aims to guarantee the validity of the agreement by 
attributing, as a part of their moral psychology, a particular kind of moral 
motivation or disposition (i.e. reasonableness) to agents that is regulative of their 
rational pursuit of ends. 
5.1.2 Towards a Rawlsian Contractualist Approach to the Problem of the 
Legitimacy of the People 
In my outline of contractualism thus far, I have followed the standard way of 
distinguishing between Rawlsian and Scanlonian contractualism. In this section, I 
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shall continue my analysis of contractualism by raising certain doubts concerning 
this distinction. In fact, I shall argue that this distinction is relevant only if one 
analyses the original position in total isolation from other, essential parts of 
Rawlsian contractualism. A more comprehensive analysis of Rawlsian 
contractualism shows, or so I shall argue, that it does not differ significantly from 
Scanlonian contractualism. Finally, and partially based on this argument, I shall 
explain my reasons for approaching the problem of the legitimate constitution of 
the people exclusively from a Rawlsian contractualist perspective. 
In a brief comment on the relation between his and Scanlon’s version of 
contractualism in Political Liberalism, Rawls interestingly claims that “in setting 
out justice as fairness we rely on the kind of motivation Scanlon takes as basic.”330 
Curiously, however, we have seen that the contracting parties in the original 
position are not motivated by this “basic” highest order desire to propose, and act 
from, principles of justice that others similarly motivated could reasonably 
accept. On the contrary, the contracting parties are mutually disinterested utility-
maximisers who seek to do as well as they can for themselves. How can we make 
sense of Rawls’s claim? We can answer this question by taking a closer look at the 
nature of “justice as fairness.” This notion, we have seen, expresses the idea that 
principles of justice are valid if they are agreed to by rational self-interested 
agents who are situated in an initial situation that is fair. According to Rawls, the 
original position constitutes “the appropriate initial status quo which insures that 
the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.”331 But what makes it so? What 
method of justification, in other words, does Rawls use to ground his claim that 
the original position is indeed the appropriate initial status quo? 
This is the so-called method of reflective equilibrium. In its most basic or 
narrow form, this is a coherence model of moral justification, according to which 
(a) moral principles are justified if they cohere, or are in reflective equilibrium 
with, (b) our considered moral judgments. The quest for reflective equilibrium 
starts with a phase in which a set of considered moral judgments is identified. 
These are, what Rawls calls, “provisional fixed points,” i.e. initially credible moral 
judgments that have to be taken into account as starting points when developing 
justifiable moral principles.332 In order to develop justifiable principles “one tries 
to find a scheme of principles that match people’s considered judgments and 
general convictions in reflective equilibrium.”333 Thus, the phase in which a set of 
considered judgments is identified should be followed by a phase in which a set of 
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moral principles is developed that systematises and generalises the total range of 
identified considered judgments.334 Of course, it is not unimaginable that the first 
attempt to reach reflective equilibrium fails, which necessitates a third phase in 
which one responds to the divergence between our considered judgments and 
moral principles. This phase involves a dialectical process of mutually adjusting 
and pruning our considered judgments and moral principles – a process involving 
a refinement and specification of our principles, a systematisation and 
generalisation of our considered judgments, as well as a rejection of certain 
principles and/or judgments. “Taking this process to the limit,” Rawls writes, 
“one seeks the conception, or plurality of conceptions, that would survive the 
rational consideration of all feasible conceptions and all reasonable arguments 
for them.”335 It is through this process that narrow reflective equilibrium can 
eventually and ideally be achieved.336 
This is how the method of reflective equilibrium operates in its most basic 
form. Rawls himself, however, endorses a more elaborate or wider variant of this 
method, and considers a reflective equilibrium to be a coherently ordered 
quadruple of sets of (a) moral principles, (b) considered judgments, (c) 
interrelated background theories and (d) the original position. According to 
Rawls, justice as fairness is a “conception-based” or an “ideal-based” view. One 
should think of such a view “as working up into idealized conceptions certain 
fundamental intuitive ideas” that “reflect ideals implicit or latent in the public 
political culture of a democratic society.”337 These idealised conceptions are the 
so-called background theories, and they contain the fundamental ideas of society 
as a fair system of cooperation, of citizens as free and equal persons, of a well-
ordered society and of a public conception of justice. In Rawls’s view, “[t]he 
original position is a device of representation that models the force (...) of the 
essential elements of these fundamental intuitive ideas as identified by the 
reasons for principles of justice that we accept on due reflection.”338  
The “on due reflection”-clause is crucial here. Rawls uses it as a shorthand to 
refer to the reflective equilibrium-based approach to moral justification that lies 
at the heart of his philosophical enquiry. Starting from the fundamental intuitive 
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ideas implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society, we construct 
the original position in such a way that it models these ideas, and subsequently 
see whether the moral principles agreed to by the parties in the original position, 
match our considered judgments on due reflection. It is “[b]y going back and 
forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at 
others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to a principle,” that 
Rawls thinks we shall eventually find “a description of the initial situation that 
both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our 
considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”339 What makes the original 
position the “appropriate initial status quo,” then, is, according to Rawls at least, 
that the principles it generates are in wide reflective equilibrium with the 
considered moral judgments of the members of a democratic society, and a set of 
interrelated background theories implicit in the public political culture of such a 
society.340 
Now, I have said that a proper understanding of Rawls’s reasons for 
defending the view that the original position constitutes the appropriate status 
quo, holds the key to answering the question why, despite impressions to the 
contrary, justice as fairness relies on the kind of moral motivation Scanlon takes 
as basic. We can see this by analysing carefully one specific background theory, 
namely that of a well-ordered society (henceforth WOS). A WOS has a number of 
features. Discussing only those features that are relevant for my present 
purposes, a WOS is, to begin with, effectively regulated by a public conception of 
justice. This means that it is “a society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows 
that the others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the basic social 
institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy the principles of 
justice.”341 In addition, (3) a public conception of justice characterises what Rawls 
calls “the fair terms of cooperation.” Fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of 
reciprocity: they are “terms that each participant can reasonably accept, provided 
that everyone else likewise accepts them.”342 So, reciprocity is essentially a 
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relation between the members of a WOS expressed by its public conception of 
justice.343 
It is, furthermore, characteristic of a WOS that its members are, and view 
themselves as, free and equal moral persons. That is, they each have, and conceive 
of themselves as having, a twofold moral capacity, consisting of a capacity (4) for 
a conception of the good and (5) for a sense of justice. Essentially, the first aspect of 
a person’s moral capacity constitutes his rationality and the second aspect 
constitutes his reasonableness (in the sense described in Section 5.1.1). According 
to Rawls, the sense of justice “implies a desire on the part of individuals and 
groups to advance their good in ways which can be explained and justified by 
reasons which all can and do accept as free and equal moral persons.”344 
Elsewhere, he explicitly states that the members of a WOS share a fundamental 
collective pre-commitment to this form of practical justification, and that this 
commitment assumes a particular kind of motivational requirement, namely a 
common “desire for free and uncoerced agreement.”345 
What this analysis shows is not only that the idea of a WOS is fundamentally 
contractualist, but also, and crucially, that it is so in the Scanlonian sense. For the 
aforementioned collective pre-commitment shared by the members of a WOS 
expresses nothing else than a highest-order desire on their part to propose, and 
to act from, principles for the general regulation of behaviour that they could 
reasonably accept as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. Now, in 
Rawls’s view, and as I shall explain more extensively in this section later on, 
reflective equilibrium is best understood as a method of public justification for a 
democratic society. In so far as the fundamental ideal of a WOS is implicit in the 
public political culture of our democratic society – and Rawls thinks that “we do 
in fact accept” this idea346 – we conceive of ourselves as persons who share, and 
know of each other that they share, a fundamental pre-commitment or highest-
order desire to cooperate with others on terms they cannot reasonably reject. It 
is, I submit, in this sense that we should understand Rawls’s claim that “in setting 
out justice as fairness we rely on the kind of motivation Scanlon takes as basic.” In 
making this claim, Rawls is not ascribing this particular kind of moral motivation 
to the parties in the original position, but rather to the citizens of a democratic 
society. 
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If this line of reasoning is sound, however, then it is has an important 
implication: there is no need whatsoever to invoke an a-historical initial choice 
situation, such as the original position. According to “justice as fairness,” as we 
have seen, principles are valid if they can be the object of an agreement made by 
rational agents in circumstances in which they are subject to certain appropriate 
conditions expressing the reasonable. What this means is that these agents “must 
be situated reasonably, that is, fairly or symmetrically, with no one having 
superior bargaining advantages over the rest.”347 Given that the veil of ignorance 
makes it impossible for the parties in the original position to tailor principles to 
their own advantage, for instance, by coercing others into an agreement by means 
of threats or force or violence, or by exploiting the relatively weak bargaining 
position of others in contract, the original position ensures that the fundamental 
agreements reached in it are fair, i.e. free and non-coercive. 
In Rawls’s view, however, the original position is a device of representation 
that models the force of certain considered moral judgments held by the citizens 
of a democratic society, and a set of fundamental intuitive ideas implicit in the 
public political culture of their society. If, however, these citizens themselves 
have a highest-order desire to regulate their interactions on the basis of 
principles that they can reasonably accept as a basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement, then the original position becomes redundant. For in that case, 
as we have seen in the previous section, their shared moral motivation itself 
already suffices to guarantee that agreements are free and non-coercive. 
Although Rawls conceives of the original position as a special feature of his 
broader reflective equilibrium-based approach to moral justification, it follows, 
from what I have said so far, that the original position fails to add any justificatory 
force to the principles – i.e. justificatory force that the principles do not already 
have in a reflective equilibrium consisting only of a coherently ordered triple of 
sets of (a) moral principles, (b) considered moral judgments and (c) interrelated 
background theories (including the contractualist account of moral motivation). 
In fact, it is this kind of reflective equilibrium-based approach to moral 
justification – a kind that excludes a device of representation, such as the original 
position – that is endorsed by Scanlon himself.348 
If the original position is supposed to add justificatory force to principles, 
then its failure to do so presents us with no other choice than to apply “Occam’s 
razor,” and to remove it as a superfluous element of a reflective equilibrium-
based approach to moral justification. If, however, the original position only 
serves as a heuristic device which aims at illustrating an antecedent contractualist 
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348 Thomas Michael Scanlon, “The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory,” Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 12 (1992), pp. 1-23. 
 181 
 
account of moral motivation, then it can have its place. In that case, to put it in 
Kantian terms, the original position plays no justificatory role but instead merely 
brings our understanding of the categorical imperative “closer to intuition.”349 
Regardless of what decision we make, however, the important point to see is that 
there is basically no difference whatsoever between the Scanlonian and Rawlsian 
version of contractualism in the sense that they both appeal to a reflective 
equilibrium-based approach to moral justification that includes, as an essentially 
constituent element, the same fundamental background theory according to 
which individuals are endowed with the contractualist moral motivation. 
That said, I shall, in the remaining parts of this Chapter (5.2 and 5.3), focus my 
attention on Rawlsian instead of Scanlonian contractualism. (Hence the title of 
this chapter “Rawlsian Contractualism and the Legitimacy of the People.”) Given 
that both Rawlsian and Scanlonian contractualism are premised on the same 
account of moral motivation, nothing of significant importance is left out by 
focusing on Rawls exclusively. More importantly, however, there are reasons why 
we even stand to gain from doing so. 
One reason for focusing on Rawls’s instead of Scanlon’s version of 
contractualism is this. Rawls can best be characterised as a political philosopher 
who has been mainly interested in developing a contractualist theory of that part 
of morality that is concerned with justice, whereas Scanlon can best be described 
as an ethicist who has been mainly interested in developing a general 
contractualist theory of morality. As opposed to Scanlon, Rawls has written on 
various issues that are indirectly related to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people, as a consequence of which his writings provide us with far more starting 
points for a meaningful discussion of this problem than Scanlon’s. 
There is, however, a second, and for our purposes more fundamental, reason 
for focusing on the Rawlsian instead of Scanlonian version of contractualism. 
Although both Rawls and Scanlon endorse the method of reflective equilibrium as 
an approach to moral justification, Rawls’s reflective equilibrium approach, 
unlike Scanlon’s,350 is best understood as a democratic method for public 
justification: it depicts (as I shall demonstrate below) an ideal deliberative 
democratic discourse in which actual citizens of a democratic society through 
actual dialogue jointly determine the content of principles of justice. Given that 
the aim of this dissertation is to find out whether it is possible to develop a 
solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that is strongly compatible 
                                                   
349 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4: 436-437. See also Rawls, Lectures on the 
History of Political Philosophy, pp. 211-214. 
350 Scanlon is explicit about the non-democratic character of his version of contractualism. See 
his What We Owe to Each Other, p. 191 n5. 
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with a democratic framework, the decision to focus on Rawls’s version of 
contractualism, and to ignore Scanlon’s version of it for the most part, is justified. 
Now, my claim (for which I shall present reasons below) that Rawls’s 
reflective equilibrium constitutes a democratic method for public justification 
might come as a surprise. Indeed, a criticism frequently levelled against Rawls by 
deliberative democratic theorists, such as Seyla Benhabib and Jürgen Habermas, 
is that his theory is fundamentally non-democratic. According to this criticism, 
both the (1) construction of the original position as the appropriate initial status 
quo and (2) the subsequent selection of principles in the original position are 
monological (as opposed to dialogical) in nature. This, so the argument runs, has 
the serious fault of leaving it ultimately to “the philosopher” as an expert and not 
to the citizens of an ongoing society to determine the conception of justice. It is 
the solitary thought process performed by the philosopher that leads him to 
figure out what information within the original position is still available for the 
parties and what lays hidden behind the veil. 351 
Should this critique be valid, then it would have the immediate implication 
that Rawlsian contractualism is fundamentally a technocratic, as opposed to 
democratic, theory, and therefore cannot generate a solution to the problem of 
the legitimacy of the people that is compatible with a democratic framework. But 
is this a valid criticism of Rawlsian contractualism? From what we have gathered 
so far, the answer must be that it is not. This critique is seriously misplaced in 
that it completely ignores that, as I have argued above, Rawls endorses a 
reflective equilibrium-based approach to moral justification, and that the original 
position is, at most, merely a heuristic element of this approach (that adds no 
justificatory force to moral principles). 
One may, of course, still wonder from what point of view reflective 
equilibrium is to be reached. Is the quest for reflective equilibrium a solitary or 
collective enterprise? If there is to be any validity in the charge of Benhabib and 
Habermas that Rawlsian contractualism is non-democratic, then they must hold 
(and, more importantly, demonstrate) that reflective equilibrium is a monological 
thought process performed by the philosopher as an expert. Michael Saward 
actually thinks that the search for reflective equilibrium is monological, though 
not in an expertocratic sense. As discussed in A Theory of Justice, he claims, 
reflective equilibrium is “a solitary thought process, engaged in (ideally) by all 
citizens on their own, conducted in order to reach a specific conception of an 
initial situation that accords with our considered convictions about the content of 
                                                   
351 See Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992), pp. 148-177; 
Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, pp. 66-68; Jürgen Habermas, 
“Reconciliation through the Public use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” 
Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1995), pp. 116-119. 
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justice.”352 Despite their difference concerning the kind of monological thought 
process that is supposed to be involved in reflective equilibrium, both are 
committed to the view that the struggle for reflective equilibrium is a private as 
opposed to a public matter. 
However, I do not think that this is an adequate characterisation of the way in 
which the method of reflective equilibrium features in Rawlsian contractualism – 
nor do I think that the thought process involved in the quest for reflective 
equilibrium necessarily has to be monological.353 In Reply to Habermas, Rawls 
explicitly states that the aim is to look for a reasonable conception of justice for 
the basic structure of a constitutional democracy, and that the overall criterion of 
the reasonable is reflective equilibrium. According to Rawls, the proper point of 
view from which reflective equilibrium has to be reached is that of civil society, 
which includes all citizens of a democratic society. He writes: 
 
It is there that we as citizens discuss how justice as fairness is to be 
formulated, and whether this or that aspect of it seems acceptable – for 
example, whether the details of the set-up of the original position are 
properly laid out and whether the principles selected are to be 
endorsed.354 
 
Now, one of the fundamental intuitive ideas implicit in the public political 
culture of a democratic society is the contractualist notion of a well-ordered 
society. This is a regulative normative idea in the sense that citizens want, and 
know of each other that they want, their democratic society to come as close as 
possible to being well-ordered. As we have seen above, this means that their 
society must be effectively regulated by a public conception of justice. In his reply 
to Habermas, moreover, Rawls adds: 
 
In such a society, not only is there a public point of view from which all 
citizens can adjudicate their claims of political justice, but also this 
point of view is mutually recognized as affirmed by them all in full 
reflective equilibrium. This equilibrium is fully intersubjective: that is, 
                                                   
352 Michael Saward, “Rawls and Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy as Public Deliberation: 
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each citizen has taken into account the reasoning and arguments of 
every other citizen.355 
 
Contrary to what Rawls’s critics contend, then, the quest for reflective 
equilibrium is not monological: the kind of reflective equilibrium involved in 
Rawlsian contractualism is neither the result of a solitary thought process 
performed by the philosopher as an expert, nor is it the result of a series of 
unilateral thought processes performed by the citizens of a democratic society 
who independently and irrespectively of one another happen to affirm the same 
public conception of justice. Instead, the quest for reflective equilibrium is 
dialogical: it is ideally the result of an actual deliberation among the actual 
members of an ongoing society.356 This, in turn, means that Rawlsian 
contractualism is fundamentally democratic; it demands, after all, a particular 
deliberative democratic discourse: reflective equilibrium as a public (as opposed 
to private) method of moral justification. 
Of course, Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium says nothing about the 
scope of justification, i.e. about which set of individuals can participate in the 
democratic quest for reflective equilibrium. But it is essential to answer this 
question if we are to solve the problem of the legitimacy of the people. After all, 
and as we have already seen in Chapter 1, the legitimacy of collective decision-
making, especially concerning the proper demarcation of (peoples’) boundaries, 
depends, at least in good part, on the legitimacy of the demarcation of the 
relevant constituency. The question, then, is whether Rawlsian contractualism 
can answer the question as to how to determine who constitute the people, and 
whether it can do so in a way that is strongly compatible with a democratic 
framework. 
  
                                                   
355 Ibid., p. 141 n16, my emphasis. In Political Liberalism, Rawls also argues that a shared fund of 
principles of justice must be found that is capable of generating an “overlapping consensus” 
between the members of a society who hold a variety of mutually conflicting and ultimately 
irreconcilable religious, philosophical and moral comprehensive doctrines. See Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, pp. 10-11, 134, 147-148. 
356 According to Rawls, justice as fairness should be thought of as no more than a contribution to 
this ongoing debate among the members of a democratic society. 
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5.2 The Legitimacy of the People and the Rawlsian Strategy of 
Avoidance 
5.2.1 The Rawlsian Strategy of Avoidance 
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.”357 These are the famous words 
with which Rawls characterised the nature of the concept of justice. For Rawls, 
the domain or subject of a theory of justice is not primarily individual morality 
but the basic structure of society. Justice does not concern individual choices but 
the background institutions within which these choices are made. This basic 
structure refers to “the way in which the major social institutions – the political 
constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements – distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from 
social cooperation.”358 According to Rawls, this is: 
 
a structure of basic institutions we enter only by birth and exit only by 
death. … [W]e have no prior public or nonpublic identity: we have not 
come from else into this social world. Political society is closed: we come 
to be within it and we do not, and indeed cannot, enter or leave it 
voluntarily.359 
 
Rawls acknowledges that the assumption of a closed political society is a 
“considerable abstraction,” and claims that its closed nature is “justified only 
because it enables us to focus on certain main questions free from distracting 
details.”360 These main questions are those that arise in the case of domestic 
justice (i.e. a closed political society). In Rawls’s view: 
 
It is natural to conjecture that once we have a sound theory for this 
case, the remaining problems of justice will prove more tractable in the 
light of it. With suitable modifications such a theory should provide the 
key for some of these other questions.361 
 
Rawls gives a number of examples of such “other questions.” Among these are 
questions concerning intergenerational justice, international justice, justice for 
the (severely) disabled and animal rights. Since Rawls identifies each of these 
                                                   
357 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 3. 
358 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 11; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 6. 
359 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 135-136, my emphasis. 
360 Ibid., p. 12. 
361 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 7. 
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questions as problems of “extension,”362 his reasons for (temporarily) excluding 
them from the realm of justice are purely practical. In other words: the notion of a 
closed society is just a simplifying assumption. 
To Rawls’s list of problems of extension we can, of course, also add the 
question of the legitimacy of the people. The assumption of a closed society, after 
all, forecloses any questions that may otherwise arise concerning (how to 
determine) who can be legitimately excluded from or included within political 
society – thus for whom political society is literally closed or open. What this 
demonstrates is that Rawls tacitly externalises the question of the legitimacy of 
the people by excluding it from the realm of legitimacy because he identifies it, at 
least initially, as a problem of extension. 
There is, however, more than meets the eye because, although Rawls initially 
bracketed the problem of the legitimacy of the people in A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism, he nevertheless confronted it in one of the articles he wrote 
afterwards: “Reply to Habermas.”363 There Rawls discusses, among other things, 
the meaning of political autonomy and how it is realised in his theory of justice. 
Individuals are politically autonomous if they live in a WOS (well-ordered 
society). The idea of a WOS is, as we have seen in Section 5.1.2, fundamentally 
contractualist. It is a society in which free and equal individuals, endowed both 
with a rational and a reasonable moral capacity, have a highest-order desire to 
cooperate with others similarly motivated on terms they can reasonably accept. It 
is, furthermore, a society that is effectively regulated by a public conception of 
justice that specifies the fair terms of cooperation. This means that it is a society 
in which everyone accepts, and knows that the others accept, the same principles 
of justice, and the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally 
known to satisfy the principles of justice.364 
At some point in his discussion of political autonomy, Rawls takes on a 
particular democratic critique developed by Jürgen Habermas. According to 
Habermas, justice as fairness is incapable of realising the ideal of political 
autonomy. This is so, he contends, because all individuals who are addressed as 
subjects by the constitution but who could never have been involved in the 
original act of founding it, cannot consider the constitution, even if it is just, as 
self-imposed. After all, current generations cannot repeat the act of founding the 
constitution under the institutional conditions of an already constituted just 
                                                   
362 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 20-21, 244-245. 
363 In 1995, Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls engaged in a discussion on each other’s work. The 
result was the publication of Habermas’s “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: 
Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” directly followed by Rawls’s “Reply to Habermas” 
in a special edition of The Journal of Philosophy, 92, pp. 109-131 and 132-180. 
364 Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” pp. 155-156. See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 4. 
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society;365 they cannot, so to speak, “actually give themselves what they view as a 
just constitution when they already have one.”366 
Rawls, however, dismisses Habermas’s democratic critique as too radical 
when he writes: 
 
[N]ot every generation is called upon (…) to give itself a new and just 
constitution. Whether a generation can do this is determined not by 
itself alone but by a society’s history: that the founders of 1787-91 
could be the founders was not determined solely by them but by the 
course of history up until that time. In this sense, those already living in 
a just constitutional regime cannot found a just constitution, but they 
can fully reflect on it, endorse it, and so freely execute it in all ways 
necessary.367 
 
Rawls acknowledges that not every generation can be involved in the act of 
founding a new and just constitution, and that contingent historical factors 
determine whether a generation can do so. On Rawls’s view, however, from the 
fact that individuals cannot found a just constitution when they already live in a 
just constitutional regime, it does not follow that they cannot be politically 
autonomous. He rejects the idea that individuals “can be politically autonomous 
only if they are autonomous from top to bottom”:368 what is crucial to the 
realisation of political autonomy is not that individuals have actually participated 
in the original act of founding the constitution – which is practically impossible 
given the fact that most individuals already live under a (just) constitutional 
regime – but rather that they can critically reflect on it, endorse it and, if 
necessary, revise and adjust it so that they (who are subject to it) can 
nevertheless understand themselves as its authors. 
According to Habermas, however, Rawls understands the constitution not as 
an unfinished project but instead as a finished structure, the content of which is 
determined once and for all by a particular generation (as determined by 
historical factors). And it is this fixed nature of the content of the constitution – 
i.e. its eternal truth – that renders redundant the question whether all (later) 
generations can understand themselves as authors of a constitution that they 
have not founded themselves. Whether individuals can or cannot endorse the 
constitution on critical reflection – and as such realise their political autonomy – 
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is irrelevant since its content has already been established for once and for all by 
the founders. To put it in Habermas’s words: 
 
From the perspective of [Rawls’s] theory of justice, the act of founding 
the democratic constitution cannot be repeated under the institutional 
conditions of an already constituted just society (…). It is not possible 
for citizens to experience this process as open and incomplete, as the 
shifting historical circumstances nonetheless demand. They cannot 
reignite the radical democratic [m]embers of the original position in the 
civic life of their society, for from their perspectives all the essential 
discourses of legitimation have already taken place within the theory; 
and they find the results of the theory already sedimented in the 
constitution.”369  
 
Contrary to what Habermas claims, however, Rawls does not understand the 
constitution as a finished structure but as a project. In Section 5.1.2, I have argued 
that Rawls endorses a reflective equilibrium-based approach to moral 
justification. Rawls believes that the ideal of political autonomy can be realised if 
the content of the constitution is in reflective equilibrium with the considered 
moral judgments of all the individuals living under a constitutional regime. The 
constitution, then, can be understood as the result of society’s democratic quest 
for reflective equilibrium. The struggle for reflective equilibrium, however, 
continues indefinitely because it is fallible and therefore always provisional. It 
constitutes mankind’s historically accumulated moral insight, which is always 
capable of improvement.370  
How does this all relate to the question of the legitimacy of the people? A 
radical democrat might argue that if Rawls takes the realisation of the ideal of 
political autonomy seriously, then this does not only imply (a) that the legitimate 
constitution of authoritative political institutions (such as the constitution) among 
a given group of individuals requires that everyone consents to it, but also (b) 
that the legitimate constitution of this group of individuals itself, a group that is 
set apart and bound together as a people for the purpose of collective self-
government from other people(s), requires that everyone consents to it. The 
legitimate constitution of a specific people ought to be the outcome of an 
autonomous act of each individual’s consent; not of the heteronomous forces of a 
contingent and morally arbitrary history. The radical democrat might contend 
that justice as fairness is incapable of realising the ideal of political autonomy not 
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only because all individuals who are addressed as subjects by the constitution but 
who could never have been involved in the original act of founding it, cannot 
consider the constitution as self-imposed, but also because all individuals who 
belong to a particular people – and indeed all individuals who do not belong to it 
– cannot consider the boundary that determines who is and who is not a member 
of it as self-imposed. After all, to put it in Habermasian phraseology, individuals 
who happen to be born in an already constituted people cannot repeat the act of 
founding the people. 
Though this radical democratic critique is obvious, Rawls’s reply is equally 
obvious. If individuals can be politically autonomous without being so from top to 
bottom, then it does not matter at all whether individuals have actually 
participated in the original act of founding the people – which is practically 
impossible given that individuals are always born in an already constituted 
people. Rather, what matters to the realisation of political autonomy is that 
individuals can critically reflect on the normative principles regulating the 
composition of the people, endorse them and, if necessary, revise and adjust them 
so that they (who are subject to them) can nevertheless understand themselves 
as their authors. Rawls, then, would presumably argue that we can accept the 
historically contingent nature of the original constitution of the people without 
necessarily having to give up the quest for the legitimacy of the people. 
The obvious reason for this, it might be suggested, is that we can acknowledge 
the de facto division of the world into peoples (as states) as the outcome of 
contingent and morally arbitrary historical factors, while simultaneously 
emphasising that this does not rule out the options of migration and secession. 
Since the question of the legitimacy of the people concerns the proper 
composition of the people, and both migration and secession affect the 
composition of the people, one might suggest that the problem of the legitimacy 
of the people can be solved by allowing individuals to immigrate or to secede. In 
that case, the immigrating and seceding individuals are politically autonomous 
because they become members of a people they choose for themselves. 
From the perspective of the ideal of political autonomy, however, this 
suggestion presupposes what requires legitimisation, namely: whose consent is 
required to establish the legitimate boundary of the people. For whose consent is 
required in the case of migration? Is it that of each separate individual who 
wishes to immigrate? Is it the consent of the members of the political society 
receiving the immigrants? Is it that of the (other) members of the political society 
that the immigrants wish to leave? Or is it the consent of all of them? Similarly, is 
the consent required in the case of secession that of the group of individuals who 
jointly wish to secede and constitute a new people? Is it the consent of the (other) 
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members of the political society from which the group of individuals wish to 
secede? Or is it that of all of them? 
If one endorses the ideal of political autonomy, then the legitimate 
constitution of the people requires a collective decision that is capable of 
generating a reasonable consensus. Now, if one suggests migration and secession 
as possible solutions to the problem of the legitimacy of the people, then 
obviously the decisions as to who can migrate and who can secede require 
reasonable agreement for them to be legitimate as well. Unfortunately, this is, as 
we have seen, where the suggestion runs into trouble, or to be more precise, into 
an infinite regress. The fundamental problem here is that before a unanimous 
decision can be made on the substantive issue who can migrate and secede, a 
prior decision has to be made as to whose (unanimous) consent is required. In 
order to remain faithful to the ideal of political autonomy, this prior decision, 
which will be determinative of the ensuing substantive issue, requires unanimous 
consent for it to be legitimate. But, clearly, this again begs the question as to 
whose (unanimous) consent is required, thus causing an infinite regress from 
which no procedural escape is possible. Essentially, then, if one takes the ideal of 
political autonomy seriously, then migration and secession inevitably reproduce 
rather than solve the problem of the legitimacy of the people, and as such merely 
constitute specific articulations of the problem of the legitimacy of the people. 
Interestingly, Rawls, when he discusses the role of boundaries in The Law of 
Peoples, problematises migration and secession on different, though for our 
purposes relevant grounds – as we shall see shortly. Rawls does not even 
consider voluntary membership of a political society to be an ideal worth striving 
for. So, instead of justifying the assumption of a closed society because it enables 
him to focus on certain main questions free from distracting details – as, recall, he 
did in a Theory of Justice – Rawls defends a qualified right to close borders (e.g. by 
limiting immigration) on moral instead of practical grounds. From the fact that 
boundaries are historically arbitrary it does not follow, in Rawls’s view, that their 
role cannot be justified. “On the contrary,” he writes, “to fix on their arbitrariness 
is to fix on the wrong thing.”371 Notwithstanding their arbitrariness, he contends 
that “there must be boundaries of some kind” because the ability of the members 
of a society to “exercise self-respect of themselves as a people” with their own 
distinctive political culture and constitutional principles, depends on it.372 In a 
way reminiscent of Michael Walzer’s view on the role of boundaries,373 Rawls 
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deems the distinctiveness of peoples’ political cultures a desirable feature of 
human life. Without a right to limit membership (e.g. by closing borders), 
however, it cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life. If membership 
of society is voluntary, Rawls argues in Walzerian vein, then it is impossible to 
preserve some cohesive culture for long. Both migration and secession, for 
instance, undermine a people’s common political culture: migration because the 
incessant stream of people moving in and out inevitably undermines the 
cohesion; and secession because it tears down the walls of the state and creates a 
“thousand petty fortresses.”374 Ultimately, if the preservation of distinct and 
cohesive political cultures is an ideal worth striving for, then, Rawls concludes, 
this rules out the ideal of voluntary membership.375 
Moreover, Rawls thinks it is both possible and desirable to remove the causes 
of migration and secession. Consider, for example, the case of an individual who is 
born and raised in a society, the political institutions of which systematically 
privilege certain (groups of) individuals at the expense of certain other (groups 
of) individuals. Think, for instance, of the former “apartheid” regime in South 
Africa. Suppose that this individual, because of certain personal characteristics 
(e.g. ethnicity, race or gender), happens to be one of those underprivileged 
individuals. Now, because neither one’s birth in this society nor the fact that one 
has certain innate characteristics are acts that one performs, or things for which 
one can be held responsible, this individual asks why, if at all, he is under a 
political obligation to comply with and to support what he sincerely considers to 
be unjust political institutions. Thus reflecting on the injustice of his society, this 
individual concludes that he is under no such obligation. Moreover, because he 
rejects the idea that he owes allegiance to society at birth, but instead endorses 
the idea that membership of society ought to be based on individuals’ consent, he 
even claims to have a right to immigrate to a (more) just society or to secede and 
constitute a new, just society together with other similarly yet unjustifiably 
disprivileged individuals. 
Rawls’s response to this person is as follows. Though he does not deny that 
there can be circumstances in which individuals should be allowed to emigrate to 
a (more) just society or to secede and constitute a new, (more) just society, Rawls 
thinks it is better to make the society in which he is born and raised itself more 
just so that there is no need for him to (claim to have a right to) leave his society 
in the first place. In fact, Rawls claims that injustice – which, remember, refers to 
the basic structure of society – is the main cause of migration and secession, and 
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that migration and secession can be eliminated as serious problems by perfecting 
justice within existing societies.376 
What makes Rawls’s response remarkable, to me at least, is that it seems to 
be that his reasons for abandoning the ideal of voluntary membership constitute 
a strategy to deal with the problem of the legitimacy of the people – albeit 
unintentionally, of course. If individuals have no reason to migrate or to secede if 
their own society is just, and if migration and secession constitute the typical 
articulations of the problem of the legitimacy of the people,377 then the question 
of the legitimacy of the people can be prevented from arising by perfecting justice 
within existing societies. Succinctly put, implicit in Rawls’s theory of justice seems 
to be the idea that it is possible to prevent the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people from arising and (as such) becoming a morally relevant problem by 
removing its source: injustice. 
This analysis, then, provides another way in which we can understand 
Rawls’s claim that individuals can be politically autonomous without being so 
“from top to bottom”: individuals can be politically autonomous without having 
consented to be a member of the specific group of individuals who jointly 
constitute a people. Although the ideal of political autonomy requires a 
legitimisation of both political authority and the people, preventing the 
occurrence of situations in which the question of the legitimacy of the people 
arises, removes the necessity to provide an account of the legitimacy of the 
people. Given that just societies (i.e. societies in which the conception of justice 
that underlies the way in which political institutions exercise authority over a 
given people is based on a reasonable agreement among individuals) do just this, 
perfecting justice within given or existing societies will in the end suffice to meet 
the ideal of political autonomy. 
Of course, an obvious problem with this Rawlsian strategy is that there are 
considerations other than those of justice that may give rise to rights to migration 
and secession (border transcending friendship or love, for instance). 
Consequently, the problem of the legitimacy of the people cannot be prevented 
from arising by pursuing the Rawlsian strategy of perfecting justice within 
existing societies only. Notwithstanding the (prima facie) plausibility of this 
objection, I will not consider it more closely. The reason for this is that I want to 
argue (in the next section) that even if we accept, for the sake of argument, 
Rawls’s (implausible) assumption that individuals do not have any reason to 
migrate or to secede if their society is just, perfecting justice within existing 
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societies would only reproduce instead of prevent the problem of the legitimacy 
of the people from arising. 
5.2.2 The Legitimacy of the People, the Particularity Requirement and the 
Rawlsian Strategy of Avoidance 
In the previous section, I have argued that implicit in Rawls’s theory of justice is 
the idea that it is possible to prevent the problem of the legitimacy of the people 
from arising by perfecting justice within existing political societies. If this strategy 
of avoidance is to succeed, then obviously Rawls has to develop an account of 
what actually constitutes a just society: a theory of justice. This, indeed, is the 
main task he has set himself throughout his political philosophy. For Rawls, as we 
have seen above, the domain or subject of a theory of justice is the basic structure 
of society. According to Rawls, it is necessary to develop a set of principles of 
social justice that regulate this basic structure of society, i.e. “provide a way of 
assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society” and “define the 
appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”378 
On Rawls’s view, however, a complete theory of justice should include not 
only principles that apply to the set of institutions constituting the basic structure 
of society, but also principles that apply to individuals.379 Among the latter are 
principles of natural duty and obligation, which Rawls considers to be an 
essential part of any theory of justice because “they define our institutional ties 
and how we become bound to one another.”380 To understand what this means, 
we only need to take a look at what Rawls considers to be the most important 
natural duty: the duty of justice. The natural duty of justice defines our 
institutional ties and how we become bound to one another. It does so by 
providing an explanation of why individuals are morally required to obey the 
political institutions of the society in which they live.381 In other words, a theory 
of justice is incomplete until a principle of political obligation, which explains why 
individuals have a moral duty (or obligation) to obey political institutions, is 
accounted for. 
In turn, however, a complete principle of political obligation must not only be 
able to explain what, if anything, grounds an individual’s moral duty (or 
obligation) to obey political institutions in general. In addition, it should be able 
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to meet the so-called particularity requirement.382 According to this requirement, 
a principle of political obligation must be: 
 
able to explain why the moral duty (or obligation) to obey is owed 
specially to one particular political society (or its subjects or governors) 
above all others (namely “our own” societies), rather than offering only 
some moral reason for obedience that would bind one equally or more 
imperatively to obey or support the laws or political institutions of 
other societies.383  
 
A complete theory of justice, then, must be able to provide not only an 
account of what constitutes a just basic structure of society, but also “a principle 
of political obligation which binds the citizen to one particular state above all 
others, namely that state in which he is a citizen.”384 In other words, the Rawlsian 
strategy to prevent the problem of the legitimacy of the people from arising by 
perfecting justice within existing political societies must contain both a 
conception of justice and a conception of particularised political obligation. 
Although the Rawlsian strategy seems to be intuitively plausible, on closer 
inspection it nevertheless turns out to be problematic for the following reason: 
the principle of particularised political obligation proposed by Rawls – the 
natural duty of justice – does not prevent the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people from arising, because it constitutes an account of the legitimacy of the 
people that, moreover, is inconsistent with his contractualist approach. Let me 
explain this. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls develops an account of political obligation. In 
Chapter 6 (and earlier in Sections 18 and 19), Rawls claims that individuals have 
a “natural duty of justice,” which binds each member of a political society to 
support and to further the just institutions of their society. More specifically, the 
natural duty of justice has two parts: 
 
first, we are to comply with and to do our share in just institutions 
when they exist and apply to us; and, second, we are to assist in the 
                                                   
382 For the original formulation and defence of the particularity requirement, which has come to 
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383 A. John Simmons, “The Particularity Problem,” APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law 
07/:2007, <http://www.apaonline.org/publications/newsletters/v07n1_index.aspx>, my 
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establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at least 
when this can be done with little cost to ourselves.385 
 
Now, before taking up the question whether Rawls’s natural duty of justice 
can be appropriately particularised, it is necessary to examine briefly how natural 
duties, in particular the natural duty of justice, and Rawls’s contractualist 
approach are related. It is characteristic of natural duties that “they do not 
presuppose an act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in 
order to apply,” but hold “unconditionally.”386 However, although this implies that 
a natural duty presupposes a specific non-contractualist point of view, Rawls 
argues that it does not follow that the application of a natural duty is necessarily 
inconsistent with his contractualist approach. Those natural duties that would be 
agreed to by the parties in the original position – which, according to Rawls, 
“generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the 
social contract”387 – are consistent with his contractualist approach; and indeed, 
Rawls argues that he can consistently integrate the natural duty of justice in his 
contractualist approach, because it would be acknowledged in the original 
position.388 However, in what follows, and contrary to what Rawls claims, I argue 
that the natural duty of justice cannot be consistently integrated in his 
contractualist approach, because it can only meet the particularity requirement in 
a way that is inconsistent with it. 
In order to see why this is the case, let us take a closer look at Rawls’s natural 
duty of justice. It is the “application clause” of the first part of the natural duty of 
justice that is of particular importance here. Consider, first, the implications of 
excluding this clause, in which case the natural duty of justice would only require 
individuals to support and to further just institutions. The immediate 
consequence of excluding the application clause from the natural duty of justice is 
that it then fails to meet the particularity requirement. This is so because the just 
character of political institutions in itself cannot provide an explanation of why 
individuals have a political obligation to support and to comply with just 
institutions, let alone with the just political institutions of their particular society 
– a moral duty (or obligation) to support and to further just institutions is 
required; and although a natural duty of justice (stripped of its application 
clause) can bind individuals to support and to further just institutions, it cannot 
bind them to the just political institutions of their particular society. The 
impossibility consists therein that a duty to support and to further just 
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institutions has an unlimited scope of application: a natural duty of justice binds 
me to support and to further all just institutions, wherever they may be, the 
consequence of which is that our political obligations cannot be properly 
particularised. As Simmons aptly puts it: 
 
[E]ven if you had perfectly general duties to promote justice and 
happiness, say, and consequently duties to support just or happiness-
producing states, these duties would require of you that you support all 
such states, providing you with no necessary reason to show any special 
favoritism or unique allegiance to your own just state, and providing 
none of those states with any special right to impose on you additional 
duties.389 
 
Of course, by including the “application clause,” the natural duty of justice 
meets the particularity requirement because it no longer has an unlimited scope 
of application. Rawls claims that individuals have a natural duty to support and to 
comply with just political institutions that apply to them. However, this clearly 
begs the question as to what it exactly means for a just political institution to 
“apply to us.” According to Simmons, there are three possible ways in which an 
institution can be said to apply to us. First, if I have done things which seem to tie 
me to an institution, e.g. consent to be bound by its rules, then the institution 
applies to me “strongly.” But clearly, this mode of strong institutional application 
cannot be the one endorsed by Rawls, because if an institution applies to me only 
if I freely make its rules apply to me, then the appeal to a natural duty of justice, 
which, remember, applies to me unconditionally, becomes redundant.390 
If an institution applies to me solely “by virtue of my meeting a certain 
(morally neutral) description, the institution “applies to me weakly”.”391 This is 
the view that “institutions apply to us when they name or address us (explicitly or 
implicitly) as subject to their rules.”392 This is the second way in which an 
institution can apply to us. Interestingly, if Rawls endorses this mode of weak 
institutional application, then he, albeit unintentionally, provides an answer to 
the question (how to determine) who legitimately constitute the people. The 
reason why this is so is the following. By endorsing a natural duty of justice that 
includes a weak application clause (henceforth: weak natural duty of justice), one 
essentially “gives moral sanction to the status quo,”393 because then the de facto 
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division of the world into (sovereign) states, who all claim to have the exclusive 
right to exercise political authority over a territory and its population – which 
typically includes the right to impose binding duties on subjects, to have subjects 
comply with these duties and to use coercion to enforce the duties – determines 
individuals’ moral duties of legal obedience. If, however, individuals have a weak 
natural duty of justice, then (only) those individuals who are addressed by the 
same state as its subjects, and who consequently owe allegiance to it, legitimately 
constitute the people. In that case, the boundary between who is and who is not a 
member of the specific group of individuals who jointly constitute the people is 
legitimately established by the political institutional status quo. Essentially, then, 
a weak natural duty of justice constitutes an account of the legitimacy of the 
people because of the specific way in which it particularises the moral duty to 
support and to comply with just political institutions; it, so to speak, legitimises 
the constitution of the people as a side effect of individuals’ moral duty to obey the 
political institutions that address them as subject to their rules. 
Although a weak natural duty of justice constitutes an account of the 
legitimacy of the people, it nevertheless is an account that cannot be consistently 
integrated in Rawls’s contractualist approach. The reason for this is that Rawls 
claims that it is not the empirical reality but the ideal theoretical moral 
standpoint of the original position that constitutes “the appropriate initial status 
quo.”394 The original position is a heuristic device that allows us to stand back 
momentarily from the contingent empirical reality of our society, and to reflect 
critically on what justice demands and whether our society conforms to its 
demands. Of course, critical reflection might produce principles of justice that are 
congruent with the principles of justice that are actually endorsed in society, and 
as such might affirm the empirical status quo; but according to Rawls’s 
contractualist approach, critical reflection on principles of justice ought not to 
presuppose or proceed from the empirical status quo, nor ought principles of 
justice themselves be mere expressions of the empirical status quo (but vice 
versa). 
However, if this line of reasoning is correct, then, in order to remain 
consistent, principles of political obligation, and (for our purposes) specifically 
principles that particularise political obligations, ought not to be grounded by or 
be mere expressions of the empirical status quo. Yet according to the weak 
natural duty of justice, the empirical status quo, i.e. the de facto division of the 
world into subject populations, which is the result of the contingent and morally 
arbitrary forces of history, without argument grounds and particularises an 
individual’s moral duty of legal obedience. This leads me to conclude that a weak 
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natural duty of justice cannot be consistently integrated in Rawls’s contractualist 
approach, because it can only meet the particularity requirement in a way that is 
inconsistent with his contractualist approach. Moreover, since a weak natural 
duty of justice legitimises the constitution of the people as a side effect of 
individuals’ particularised moral duty to obey the political institutions that name 
or address them, the fact that a weak natural duty of justice meets the 
particularity requirement in a way that is inconsistent with Rawls’s contractualist 
approach inevitably causes the side effect, the constitution of the people, to be 
inconsistent with it as well. 
A third and final way in which an institution can apply to us is “territorially.” 
This is the case when an institution applies to me merely by virtue of “my birth 
and growth in a territory within which the institution’s rules are enforced.”395 If, 
however, Rawls endorses this mode of territorial institutional application, he 
“reproduces the old doctrine that demands allegiance to society at birth.”396 But 
clearly, a natural duty of justice that includes a territorial application clause 
(henceforth: territorial natural duty of justice) provides an answer to the 
question (how to determine) who legitimately constitute the people. For if 
individuals owe allegiance to society at birth, then (only) those individuals who 
are born in the same society, and who therefore owe allegiance to it, legitimately 
constitute the people. In that case, the boundary between who is and who is not a 
member of the specific group of individuals who jointly constitute the people is 
legitimately established by one’s place or, to be more precise, society of birth. 
Essentially, then, a territorial natural duty of justice constitutes an account of the 
legitimacy of the people because of the specific way in which it particularises the 
moral duty to support and to comply with just political institutions; it, so to 
speak, legitimises the constitution of the people as a side effect of individuals’ 
particularised moral duty to obey society at birth. 
Although a territorial natural duty of justice constitutes an account of the 
legitimacy of the people, the substance of the account is inconsistent with Rawls’s 
contractualist approach. Let me explain this. What makes the original position (in 
large part) the appropriate initial status quo in Rawls’s view, is (as have seen in 
Part 5.1) that the specific way in which it is modelled reflects our fundamental 
considered moral judgment that morally arbitrary and irrelevant considerations 
should be rejected as possible grounds for principles of justice. The contracting 
parties in the original position are situated behind the veil of ignorance which 
causes them to suffer from temporary amnesia with respect to certain kinds of 
particular facts that Rawls considers to be morally arbitrary and irrelevant when 
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deliberating about what justice demands.397 Our class position or social status, 
and natural assets and abilities (e.g. ethnicity, gender, race, talent) – to name a 
few of the particular kinds of facts Rawls has in mind – are excluded as morally 
arbitrary and irrelevant considerations, because the distribution of them is not 
the result of acts that individuals perform or something for which individuals can 
be held responsible, but rather the result of “natural chance and social 
contingency.”398 If, then, principles of justice would be an expression of or work 
to the advantage of certain class positions, social status, or favour certain natural 
assets and abilities over others, then they would be the outcome of arbitrary 
contingencies, and essentially morally sanction the natural lottery, and since 
“[n]o one deserves his place in the distribution of natural assets any more than he 
deserves his initial starting place in society,”399 that would make them morally 
arbitrary. 
However, the fact that individuals are born in a particular society, just like the 
fact that individuals have certain natural assets and abilities, is also not an act 
they perform, or something for which they can be held responsible. But if “birth” 
is in this relevant sense conceptually similar to “natural assets and abilities,” then 
in order to remain consistent, “birth” should (again) just like “natural assets and 
abilities” be considered a morally arbitrary and irrelevant contingency when 
deliberating about what constitutes a proper particularisation of an individual’s 
moral duty to obey the political institutions of his own particular society, and 
should therefore be rejected as a possible way to meet the particularity 
requirement. Yet the territorial natural duty of justice particularises an 
individual’s moral duty to obey the political institutions of his own society 
through an appeal to the doctrine that demands allegiance to society at birth, and 
is therefore inconsistent with Rawls’s contractualist approach. Needless to say, 
since a territorial natural duty of justice legitimises the constitution of the people 
as a side effect of individuals’ particularised moral duty to obey society at birth, 
the fact that the territorial natural duty of justice meets the particularity 
requirement in a way that is inconsistent with Rawls’s contractualist approach 
inevitably causes the side effect, the constitution of the people, to be inconsistent 
with it as well. 
In sum: I have analysed a possible Rawlsian approach to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. According to this approach – which I have labelled “the 
Rawlsian strategy of avoidance” – it is possible to prevent the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people from arising by perfecting justice within existing 
societies. I have argued that if this strategy is to succeed, then it must contain 
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both an account of justice and an account of particularised political obligation. 
Based on an analysis of the natural duty of justice, which is the account of 
particularised political obligation Rawls endorses, I have demonstrated that the 
Rawlsian strategy of avoidance fails. The first reason why this strategy fails is that 
its aim is to prevent the question of the legitimacy of the people from arising, 
whereas the account of particularised political obligation that it contains – the 
natural duty of justice – ultimately provides an answer to it. The second, and 
more fundamental, reason why the Rawlsian strategy fails is that the natural duty 
of justice, on every conceivable, i.e. weak or territorial, interpretation of it, 
inevitably constitutes an account of the legitimacy of the people that is 
inconsistent with Rawls’s contractualist approach, and therefore only re-
introduces the problem on a different level in his theory. 
I want to close this section by reflecting briefly on this conclusion. One may 
have noticed that it is drawn from an analysis of certain features of Rawls’s 
contractual device of the original position. In Part 5.1, however, I have argued 
that the original position, although Rawls conceives of it as a special feature of his 
broader reflective-equilibrium based approach to moral justification, adds 
nothing to the justification moral principles already receive when they are in 
wide reflective equilibrium with our considered moral judgments and 
interrelated background theories. The original position plays no justificatory role, 
but can at best serve as a heuristic device that brings our understanding of the 
categorical imperative closer to intuition. But if this is correct, then one may 
wonder why I have criticised the Rawlsian strategy of avoidance by appealing to 
the contractual device of the original position instead of the underlying, and 
therefore more fundamental, method of reflective equilibrium. How, in other 
words, does the argument developed in this part (5.2) square with the argument 
developed in the previous part (5.1)? 
In Section 5.1.2, I have argued that the device of the original position models 
the force of certain considered moral judgments held by the citizens of a 
democratic society, and a set of fundamental intuitive ideas implicit in the public 
political culture of such a democratic society. Rawls believes that the 
contractualist account of moral motivation – i.e. the fundamental idea that 
individuals have a highest-order desire to propose, and to act from, principles for 
the general regulation of behaviour that they cannot reasonably reject as a basis 
for informed, unforced general agreement – is part of the public political culture 
of a democratic society. The original position, we have seen, is meant to illustrate 
this antecedent contractualist account of moral motivation. The argument 
developed in this section shows how, in Rawls’s view, the original position models 
this highest-order desire. According to Rawls, the original position reflects our 
considered moral judgments that (a) critical reflection on moral principles (e.g. of 
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justice and of political obligation) should not presuppose or proceed from the 
empirical (political institutional) status quo, and that (b) morally arbitrary and 
irrelevant considerations should be excluded as possible grounds for moral 
principles. In Rawls’s view, principles that violate considered moral judgments 
(a) and (b) can reasonably be rejected as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement. 
What makes the original position the appropriate heuristic device, then, is 
that the specific way in which it is modelled, as well as the principles it generates, 
are ideally in wide reflective equilibrium with the considered moral judgments of 
the members of a democratic society, and a set of interrelated background 
theories implicit in the public political culture of such a society. The original 
position helps us to see what certain considered moral judgments and 
background theories commit us to. Consequently, in so far as the contractualist 
desire is actually part of the public political culture of our democratic society, i.e. 
in so far as we, as citizens of a democratic society, conceive of ourselves as persons 
with a highest-order desire to cooperate with others on terms they cannot 
reasonably reject; and in so far as the specific way in which the original position 
models this contractualist disposition – namely, through (a) and (b) – is actually 
in wide reflective equilibrium with our considered moral judgments and 
contractualist self-conception, then we are committed to the conclusion drawn in 
this section: that (1) both a weak and territorial natural duty of justice – the 
former because it is inconsistent with (a) and the latter because it is inconsistent 
with (b) – should be rejected as principles of particularised political obligation; 
and (2) that the resulting accounts of the legitimacy of the people implicit in the 
weak and territorial natural duty of justice should be rejected as well. In that case, 
to put it in other words, (1) and (2) are in wide reflective equilibrium with our 
considered moral judgments as well as the background theories implicit in the 
public political culture of our democratic society. Evidently, of course, if we, or 
some of us, can reasonably object to this conclusion on due reflection, then we 
have no choice but to continue our democratic quest for reflective equilibrium. 
5.3 Rawlsian Contractualism: A Relational Account of the Legitimacy 
of the People 
5.3.1 Rawlsian Justice and the Cosmopolitan Challenge 
In the previous part of this chapter, I have argued that the Rawlsian strategy of 
avoidance fails by its own standards as an approach to the legitimacy of the 
people. It seems, then, that we, in so far as we are committed to Rawlsian 
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contractualism, have no choice but to continue the quest for the legitimacy of the 
people. This is exactly what I will do in the third part of this chapter. Based on a 
re-interpretation of Rawls’s writings, in particular The Law of Peoples, I shall 
argue that it is not only possible to uncover a strategy of avoidance but also, and 
more interestingly, an alternative conceptual framework that is actually capable 
of solving the problem of the legitimacy of the people in a way that is consistent 
with a Rawlsian contractualist view. I will do so by situating Rawls’s approach to 
justice within the broader debate on international justice, and subsequently by 
developing a reply to the cosmopolitan critique of Rawls’s approach which 
implicitly contains the conceptual tools to solve the problem of the legitimacy of 
the people. 
The starting point for this endeavour is, again, that which I have identified in 
Section 5.2.1, namely Rawls’s characterisation of justice as the first virtue of 
social institutions. Remember that for Rawls the domain or subject of a theory of 
justice is not primarily individual morality but the basic structure of society. 
Justice does not concern individual choices but the background institutions 
within which these choices are made. Moreover, and as we have also seen, the 
primary subject of Rawlsian justice is the basic structure of a closed political 
society. 
One of the most persistent critiques of Rawls’s domestic theory of justice has 
been developed by cosmopolitans. Regardless of which variant of 
cosmopolitanism one endorses, the core of each is the same: restricting the 
application of principles of justice to states, or societies, results in a serious 
incoherence in his liberal thought. More specifically, the core idea shared by all 
cosmopolitans consists, as Thomas W. Pogge writes, of three ideas: (1) 
individuals are to be treated as the ultimate units of moral concern (the 
individualism requirement); (2) this status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to 
every living human being equally (the universality requirement); and (3) 
individuals are ultimate units of concern for everyone (the generality 
requirement).400 Cosmopolitans categorically rule out that justice ought to rest on 
morally arbitrary facts about or relationships between persons. The 
individualism requirement rules out collectives, such as families, tribes, ethnic, 
cultural or religious communities, nations, states or societies as the ultimate 
moral units of concern; the universality requirement forbids that the status of 
ultimate unit of concern attaches merely to some subset of individuals (whether 
that be men, whites, aristocrats, Muslims, etc.); and the generality requirement 
forbids that individuals are the ultimate units of concern only for a subset of other 
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individuals (such as their fellow citizens, religionists, etc.).401 These three 
requirements exclude these facts about or relationships between persons – such 
as ethnicity, gender or race – as morally arbitrary and therefore irrelevant when 
contemplating the requirements of justice, because they are not the result of acts 
that individuals knowingly and willingly perform and for which they can be held 
responsible, but rather of features of individuals’ unchosen circumstances. The 
idea here is that principles of justice, and in particular those of distributive 
justice, should not morally sanction the natural lottery but instead neutralise or 
even mitigate inequalities in individuals’ socio-economic prospects that are the 
result of morally arbitrary contingencies. 
Within cosmopolitanism, it is possible to distinguish between relational and 
non-relational approaches to distributive justice.402 What distinguishes these 
approaches from one another is the answer each gives to the question whether 
individuals have to stand in certain kinds of special (social, cultural, economic or 
political) relationships with each other before their situation can be said to be 
subject to the demands of justice. Non-relational approaches to justice explicitly 
“reject the idea that the content, scope, or justification of those principles [of 
justice] depend on the practice-mediated relations in which individuals stand.”403 
On this view, the formulation, justification and application of principles of 
distributive justice do not presuppose but instead take place prior to and 
independently of any actual or conceivable forms of interaction among 
individuals. Though the existence of social and political practices may certainly be 
required, this is so only because such shared practices are instrumental to the 
realisation of independently existing demands of justice, not because they are, 
what Arash Abizadeh calls, an “existence condition of justice” (i.e. a condition that 
must be met before the demands of justice can arise).404 Distributive justice, then, 
is essentially a pre-political moral value that applies not to individuals in virtue of 
their standing in a special relationship to one another. Rather than receiving its 
application from such shared practices, principles of distributive justice are 
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grounded in certain universal and general features of individual human beings, 
which they, in virtue of their humanity, possess regardless of their social and 
political ties. 
Non-relational cosmopolitans rely on what Simon Caney has called the 
concept of “universal personal morality.” The idea here is that (1) if distributive 
justice is grounded in a certain morally relevant feature of some moral agent(s), 
and (2) if this feature is possessed by all human beings, then (3) it follows that the 
scope of distributive justice is global.405 The kinds of features in virtue of which 
individuals are taken to be similar in morally relevant ways vary greatly, of 
course. Peter Singer, who famously developed a utilitarian form of non-relational 
cosmopolitanism, argues for instance that justice is grounded in the capacity to 
experience pain and pleasure, and concludes that the scope of justice is global 
because this capacity is possessed by all human beings.406 Liberal non-relational 
cosmopolitans, by contrast, defend the global scope of justice by locating the 
content of our universal personal morality in the capacity for autonomy.407 
Despite their disagreement on the proper interpretation of the morally 
relevant feature, however, non-relational cosmopolitans do agree at least on this: 
that membership of (a particular) society is a morally arbitrary feature of human 
beings. Liberal philosophers, however, have traditionally applied egalitarian 
principles of justice only within the boundaries of the territorial state. But 
obviously, or so cosmopolitans argue, this limitation renders liberal thought 
incoherent because it betrays its commitment to the value of autonomy 
(particularly, its commitment to the universality requirement). Regarding Rawls’s 
alleged luck-egalitarian interpretation of autonomy, non-relational cosmopolitans 
have argued that his “argument from moral arbitrariness,” according to which (as 
we have seen in Section 5.2.2) it is unjust that individuals are worse off through 
no fault of their own, regardless of whether they share any practices with other 
individuals, is universal in nature and should therefore not be limited to the 
members of a particular society. After all, citizenship of or residency in a particular 
society seems just as morally arbitrary as ethnicity, gender or race (none of us 
                                                   
405 Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 77-78. 
406 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1 (1972), pp. 229-
243. 
407 Other non-relational cosmopolitan approaches can be found in Brian Barry, “International 
Society from a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” in International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, 
eds. D. R. Mapel and T. Nardin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 144-163; Kok-
Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Caney, Justice 
Beyond Borders; David A. J. Richards, “International Distributive Justice,” in Ethics, Economics, 
and the Law: NOMOS XXIV, eds. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University 
Press, 1982), pp. 275-295; and Charles R. Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” 
The Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983), pp. 591-600. (Notice that Beitz defended a form of 
relational cosmopolitanism in his earlier work). 
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can be held responsible for who our parents are or what our place of birth is). But 
by making the administration of justice dependent on such contingent factors as 
birth and residency, one morally sanctions the natural lottery in a way that seems 
to build, as Joseph Carens emphatically puts it, a distinctively modern equivalent 
of feudal birthright privilege into the heart of liberalism.408 
Let us now turn to relational approaches to justice. These approaches are, as 
Sangiovanni writes, based on the fundamental idea that “the practice-mediated 
relations in which individuals stand condition the content, scope, and justification 
of those principles.”409 The defining feature of a relational approach is that 
relationships between or shared practices among individuals constitute an 
existence (instead of instrumental) condition of justice. Of course, relational 
approaches vary significantly with respect to which relationships in what way 
condition the content, scope and justification of those principles. At base, 
however, they are united in their conviction that “the degree, extent, or depth of 
social interaction is (...) relevant in the basic formulation and justification of 
principles of justice.”410 Two main kinds of relational approaches to justice can be 
distinguished: cultural conventionalism and institutionalism.411 
Cultural conventionalists claim that social goods acquire value and meaning 
from the culturally distinct practices through which they are distributed among 
those who participate in it, and that these culturally contingent values and 
meanings provide the content, scope and justification of principles of justice. 
Typically, those who endorse this kind of relational approach to justice claim that 
these principles cannot be properly applied at the global level but have to be 
restricted to the national context, either (1) because the inevitably situated 
character of morality makes the preservation of local practices or communities a 
precondition of moral thinking (i.e. it is a requirement of having morality at all) or 
(2) because of the moral significance of a flourishing cultural sphere.412 
                                                   
408 Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics, 49 
(1987), p. 252. Moreover, as Michael Blake points out, the problem here is especially poignant 
since state boundaries do not merely divide administrative jurisdictions from each other, but 
rather the rich from the poor as well. Being born on the right side of an arbitrary state boundary 
can sometimes literally mean the difference between life and death (through no fault of one’s 
own). See his “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
30 (2002), p. 257. The “argument from the moral arbitrariness of birth” is, as Simon Caney 
notices, “either implicitly or explicitly present in almost all defenses of cosmopolitanism.” See his 
Justice Beyond Borders, p. 115. 
409 Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State,” p. 5. 
410 Andrea Sangiovanni, “Global Justice and the Moral Arbitrariness of Birth,” The Monist, 94 
(2011), p. 572. 
411 I borrow this distinction from Sangiovanni, “Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality,” p. 
138. 
412 Thomas Hurka distinguishes these two positions from one another and labels them, 
respectively, the “cultural perfectionist argument” and the “metaethical particularist argument.” 
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Institutionalists, whose views I will focus on mostly (for obvious reasons 
given below), claim by contrast that the content, scope and justification of 
principles of justice are not determined by socially or culturally shared meanings, 
but rather by the nature of the institutional and political relationships between 
individuals. It has been argued, for instance, that the content, scope and 
justification of principles of justice are a function of those individuals who are 
bound together by a common coercive power or,413 alternatively, a function of 
those individuals who are bound together through reciprocal ties (which are such 
that individuals who contribute to a cooperative scheme that generates benefits 
for themselves and others are owed a fair return from those other individuals 
who benefit from their cooperative efforts).414 Though cultural conventionalist 
approaches to justice are anti-cosmopolitan, institutionalist approaches are not 
(necessarily so). In fact, it is in response to Rawls’s institutionalist theory of 
domestic justice that cosmopolitans have developed institutionalist approaches 
to global justice.415 
Throughout his work, Rawls has always been explicit about the fact that he 
was not concerned with applying his principles of justice to “institutions and 
social practices generally,” but rather to a special case: the basic structure of 
                                                                                                                                                               
See his “The Justification of National Partiality,” in The Morality of Nationalism, eds. R. McKim 
and J. McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 139-157. The communitarian 
theories of Michael Walzer and Alasdair MacIntyre provide us with examples of metaethical 
particularist arguments against the cosmopolitan position. See Walzer, Spheres of Justice; and 
Alasdair MacIntyre, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?,” in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. R. Beiner (New York: 
State New York University Press: 1995), pp. 209-228. Liberal-nationalist theories of justice, such 
as those of David Miller, Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka, exemplify the cultural perfectionist 
argument against the cosmopolitan position. See Miller, On Nationality; David Miller, Principles 
of Social Justice (Harvard University Press, 1999); David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989); and Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. 
413 See, for instance, Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
33 (2005), pp. 113–47; and Blake, “Distributive justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy.” 
414 See, for instance, Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State.” 
415 Examples of anti-cosmopolitan institutionalists are Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”; 
Blake, “Distributive justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy”; Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, 
Reciprocity, and the State”; and Aaron James, “Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls 
and the Status Quo,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33 (2005), pp. 281–316. Examples of 
cosmopolitan institutionalists are Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989); Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: 
Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Darrel Moellendorf, 
Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002); and Leif Wenar, “Contractualism and 
Global Economic Justice,” Global Justice, ed. T. W.  Pogge (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 76-90. 
 207 
 
society.416 Since the basic structure is defined as “the way in which the major 
social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the 
division of advantages from social cooperation,”417 it necessarily refers to a group 
of individuals cooperating in a social practice. Rawlsian justice does not apply to 
individuals independent of what institutional relationships they share with one 
another. On the contrary, (institutional) responsibilities of justice are owed 
towards those individuals only who stand in a special (institutional) relationship 
towards each other. In Rawls’s theory, the content, scope and justification of 
principles of justice are a function of those individuals who are bound together by 
a common basic structure. (In the next sections, I shall provide a detailed analysis 
of the exact nature of this special relationship.) 
Institutionalist cosmopolitans agree with Rawls that principles of justice 
apply only to individuals sharing special institutional ties, and so they accept the 
view that without institutionalised interaction, the requirements of moral 
cosmopolitanism do not trigger (institutional) responsibilities of justice towards 
those not part of a shared system of social cooperation. The disagreement 
between institutionalist cosmopolitans and Rawls concerns (as we will see in 
detail below) the different answers they give to the question whether the special 
relationship relevant for the application of his principles of justice can also be 
found at the global level. 
According to institutionalist cosmopolitans, Rawls’s limitation of his 
principles of justice to the basic structure of a domestic society is morally 
illegitimate, because there is institutionalised interaction (of the relevant type) on 
the global level – namely a global basic structure.418 This view is nicely captured 
in the following quote from Charles R. Beitz: 
 
[I]f evidence of global economic and political interdependence shows 
the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation, we should not 
view national boundaries as having fundamental moral significance. 
                                                   
416 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 7; Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 11; Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 
15; and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, ed. E. Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), p. 10. 
417 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 6, my emphasis. 
418 Note that it is also possible to argue that the absence of institutional interaction is not a 
justification for limiting our focus to making current institutions more just, but rather that we 
have to make changes to world politics, i.e. create institutionalised interaction on the global level 
– though this does not necessarily mean that moral cosmopolitanism requires legal 
cosmopolitanism (e.g. a world state, rather than a system of multi-level governance or a 
federal/con-federal legal-political order). By pursuing this strategy, however, one parts with the 
(Rawlsian) relational approach to justice defined above, because then institutional interaction is 
no longer an existence condition of justice but merely an instrumental condition of it. Beitz, for 
instance, develops this strategy in Political Theory and International Relations, p. 156. 
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Since boundaries are not coextensive with the scope of social 
cooperation, they do not mark the limits of social obligation. Thus the 
parties in the original position cannot be assumed to know that they are 
members of a particular national society, choosing principles of justice 
primarily for that society. The veil of ignorance must extend to all 
matters of national citizenship, and the principles chosen will therefore 
apply globally.419 
 
The idea here is that (1) if justice is grounded in a particular morally relevant 
set of features of a certain institutional relationship, and (2) if this relationship 
exists between all individuals at the global level (instead of the domestic level 
only), which institutionalist cosmopolitans think is the case, then (3) it follows 
that justice is global in scope. Consequently, institutionalist cosmopolitans insist 
that a coherent liberalism taking off from Rawls’s argument must apply his 
principles – in particular the difference principle – at the global level. 
Rawls explicitly rejects the institutionalist cosmopolitan approach to justice 
on two grounds. First, he claims that the global (as opposed to domestic) original 
position proposed by Beitz and Pogge violates the liberal respect for autonomy 
and tolerance of diversity. In Rawls’s view: 
 
Just as a citizen in a liberal society must respect other persons’ 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines provided 
they are pursued in accordance with a reasonable political conception 
of justice, so a liberal society must respect other societies organized by 
comprehensive doctrines, provided their political and social institutions 
meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable 
law of peoples.420 
 
Building here on central views developed in Political Liberalism, Rawls argues 
that just as the continued existence of moral pluralism is an inevitable 
consequence of the way in which democratic institutions work,421 so is the 
continued existence of illiberal political systems throughout the world an 
inevitable consequence of liberalism itself. Rawls criticises institutionalist 
cosmopolitans because they, by insisting that the parties in the original position 
should not be conceived of as the representatives of peoples (or any corporate 
                                                   
419 Charles R. Beitz, “Justice and International Relations,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 
p. 376. Similar views can be found in, for instance, Pogge, Realizing Rawls, pt. 3, ch. 5-6; and Allen 
Buchanan, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World,” Ethics, 110 
(2000), pp. 697-721. 
420 John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples,” in On Human Rights, eds. S. Shute and S. Hurley (New York: 
Basic Books, 1993), p. 43. 
421 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 36-37, 54-58. 
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entity for that matter) but as individuals, rely on a set of controversial premises 
that form part of a comprehensive liberal moral doctrine which is incapable of 
generating an overlapping consensus among both liberal and (a subset of) 
illiberal peoples. Rawls rejects a global original position because he believes it 
leads to the conclusion that all societies have to be liberal, a conclusion which is 
irreconcilable with his aim to “apply the principle of toleration to philosophy 
itself.”422 
Rawls’s second reason for rejecting institutional cosmopolitanism is that he 
thinks that the arbitrariness of the unequal distribution of resources does not 
give us a moral reason to develop a global theory of distributive justice. This is so 
because Rawls believes that “the crucial element in how a country fares is its 
political culture – its members’ political and civic virtues – and not the level of 
resources.”423 He writes: 
 
                                                   
422 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” p. 388. Note that one might wonder, 
again, why this discussion of a global or domestic original position is relevant if the original 
position is, as I have argued in Section 5.1.2, a superfluous part of Rawls’s reflective equilibrium-
based approach to moral justification. It is superfluous, as we have seen, in the sense that it adds 
nothing to the justification moral principles already receive when they are in wide reflective 
equilibrium with our considered moral judgments and interrelated background theories. The 
original position plays no justificatory role, but can at best serve as a heuristic device that brings 
our understanding of the categorical imperative closer to intuition. But if this is correct, then one 
may wonder why I have focused on the contractual device of the original position in my 
discussion of the debate on cosmopolitanism instead of the underlying, and therefore more 
fundamental, method of reflective equilibrium. How, in other words, does the discussion in this 
part (5.3) square with the argument developed in the first part (5.1)? 
 Basically, this question is a variant of the one we have already answered in Section 5.2.2. My 
reply is the same as I have given there. What makes the original position the appropriate 
heuristic device is that the specific way in which it is modelled, as well as the principles it 
generates, are ideally in wide reflective equilibrium with our considered moral judgments and 
background theories. The contractual device of the original position models the force of a set of 
considered moral judgments and background theories. It follows that the global and domestic 
original position reflect a different (or at least partially different) set of considered moral 
judgments and background theories. Depending on which of these sets we actually accept on due 
reflection (and this is of course what really divides institutional cosmopolitans and institutional 
anti-cosmopolitans), either the global or domestic original position is the appropriate heuristic 
device that helps us to bring our understanding of the categorical imperative closer to intuition. 
 The question, of course, is who “we” are. That is to say, who constitute the group of 
individuals who are (or indeed ought) to participate in the quest for reflective equilibrium? 
Since Rawls limits the scope of justice to the domestic sphere (i.e. to peoples), and consequently 
develops a domestic original position, the group of individuals who are to participate in the 
quest for reflective equilibrium consists of the citizens of a democratic society only. In the next 
sections, I shall take a closer look at the set of considered moral judgments and background 
theories underlying Rawls’s relational approach to justice, and explain the implications of this 
approach for the legitimate demarcation of the group of individuals who are to participate in the 
democratic quest for reflective equilibrium. 
423 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (2002), p. 117. 
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I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes 
lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral 
traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social 
institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of 
its members, all supported by their political virtues. I would further 
conjecture that there is no society anywhere in the world – except for 
marginal cases – with resources so scarce that it could not, were it 
reasonably and rationally organized and governed, become well-
ordered.424 
 
Inequalities in resources between peoples, then, are not the result of global 
interdependence, as the institutionalist cosmopolitan would have it, but instead 
have to do with reasons pertaining to both the internal organisation of a people’s 
institutional structure and the nature of the relations among its members. 
Consequently, Rawls concludes, no global theory of distributive justice is needed. 
Both strands of thought have generated (unsurprisingly perhaps) a significant 
degree of attention, criticism and debate. I will not, however, engage in this 
debate because it has no (direct) bearing on the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people. Instead, I will analyse a third argument for focusing on peoples rather 
than individuals in a liberal theory, an argument that is not explicitly given by 
Rawls but which, I think, is nevertheless implicit in his theory and of great 
relevance should one try to approach the problem of the legitimacy of the people 
from a Rawlsian contractualist perspective (as I aim to do in this chapter). This 
third argument is based on the idea that institutional interaction is an existence 
condition of justice, and so entails that justice is grounded in special relationships 
between individuals. In order to understand and appreciate the full force of this 
argument, it is necessary to revisit Rawls’s account of the natural duty of justice 
first (Section 5.3.2), and next to take a closer look at the kind of requirements or 
obligations that relational approaches to justice in general, and Rawls’s account of 
it in particular, generate (Section 5.3.3). I shall argue that the scope of obligations 
generated by Rawls’s relational approach to justice is limited to those individuals 
who stand in a specific (coercive) institutional relation, and that this institutional 
account of obligations, when combined with Rawls’s account of the natural duty 
of justice, does not only help to explain why the demands of distributive justice 
are local instead of global in scope, but, and more importantly (for our purposes), 
also provides us with an essential building block for a Rawlsian contractualist 
legitimisation of the people. 
                                                   
424 Ibid., p. 108. 
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5.3.2 Social Embeddedness, the Natural Duty of Justice and Rawlsian 
Contractualism 
In the previous chapters on Lockean and contractarian views (see Chapters 3 and 
4), I have considered the idea of constituting “the people” through voluntary 
interactions of individuals. More specifically, I have argued that it is possible for a 
group of previously unattached individuals to bind themselves together 
legitimately as a people, and set themselves apart from other people(s): through 
deliberate and voluntary acts of mutual consent. By interacting in this way, these 
individuals create a special political bond that is characterised by a set of political 
obligations and rights that each of them has only with respect to others inside the 
group (i.e. those with whom they have interacted in morally relevant ways that 
bind them to one another) rather than to any others outside the group (i.e. those 
with whom they have not interacted in morally relevant ways that bind them to 
each other). And since the insider/outsider (or us/them) distinction is not 
presupposed by but instead the result of contractual interactions, I have 
concluded that their constituting a people is legitimate. 
The idea that special political bonds can be generated only through 
(deliberate and voluntary) contractual interactions between individuals lies at 
the heart of the tradition of the social contract. Considering this, it is remarkable 
to see that Rawls, a self-proclaimed social contract theorist,425 explicitly rejects 
the political voluntarism that this self-proclamation seems to commit him to. In 
this section, I argue that Rawls does not reject the ideal of political voluntarism 
altogether, but only the unqualified, radical versions of it defended by Lockeans 
and contractarians. Rawls defends the alternative view that membership of 
political society is involuntary but that the acceptance of principles of justice for 
the general regulation of society in which one’s membership is given is 
nevertheless voluntary because based on reasonable agreement among its 
members. This is an important argument because of its implications for the quest 
of the legitimacy of the people. The alternative approach endorsed by Rawls does 
not only transform the very question of the legitimate constitution of the people, 
but (and partially because of this) also provides us with the conceptual tools to 
make a first step to answering this question. 
According to Rawls, society cannot be understood as a voluntary association. 
In Political Liberalism, he writes: 
 
The context of a social contract is strikingly different [from other kinds 
of agreement], and must allow for three facts, among others: namely, 
that membership in our society is given, that we cannot know what we 
                                                   
425 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 10. 
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would have been like had we not belonged to it (perhaps the thought 
itself lacks sense), and that society as a whole has no ends or ordering 
of ends in the way that associations and individuals do.426 
 
This is what Simon Cushing has called Rawls’s “thesis of social 
embeddedness,”427 which is the basis for his rejection of the analogy between 
political societies and voluntary associations. In particular, this thesis enables 
him to question two basic assumptions made by both Lockeans and 
contractarians alike: the assumption of the consensual construction of society 
and the assumption of the anarchist baseline. 
To begin with, our social embeddedness is a morally significant empirical fact. 
Society, Rawls reminds us, cannot be “a scheme of cooperation which men enter 
voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in some 
particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this position 
materially affects his life prospects.”428 Moreover, the moral relevance of this 
empirical observation stems from the fact that the thesis of the consensual 
construction of society should be rejected as, what we might call, a false ideology: 
states are, as a matter of historical fact, not based on an original contract among 
groups of individuals (indeed, most, if not all, of us have never been in the 
position to consent to the state into which we are born). Of course, it may be 
replied, membership of society can be said to be voluntary because individuals 
can emigrate (they can “vote with their feet”). According to Rawls, however, this 
is only apparently so, because, as we have already seen in Chapter 3, “the 
attachments formed to persons and places, to associations and communities, as 
well as cultural ties, are normally too strong to be given up, and this fact is not to 
be deplored.”429 
Moreover, the problem with Lockean and contractarian views is not just that 
they rely on the implausible assumption that membership in society is voluntary, 
but that they also work from the assumption of an anarchist baseline that is 
“conceptually bankrupt.”430 Not only is membership of our society non-voluntary, 
we also cannot possibly know what we would have been like had we not 
belonged to it. In Cushing’s words: 
 
                                                   
426 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 276. 
427 Simon Cushing, “Justification, Legitimacy, and Social Embeddedness: Locke and Rawls on 
Society and the State,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 37 (2003), p. 221. 
428 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 12. 
429 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 277. 
430 Cushing, “Justification, Legitimacy, and Social Embeddedness: Locke and Rawls on Society and 
the State,” p. 226, my emphasis. 
 213 
 
Our interests are almost entirely products of our social environment, 
combined with our natural talents and our resources, and our resources 
and even our natural talents cannot be abstracted from our social 
environment to be used to justify the political structure that itself 
shapes that environment. We cannot say that a state is justified because 
it would be rational for certain individuals to agree to it, because what 
is rational for any individual is a function of her interests, and her 
interests are shaped by her state. (…) Therefore we cannot say that one 
society is better than another, or than a state of nature, for us, because 
we are a product of one society, and in another we would be 
different.431 
 
So, the anarchic freedom that Lockeans and contractarians value is not 
available to us. For Rawls, “[t]his would be to be free from the very prerequisites 
of freedom.”432 This is, however, not merely so because of the social dependence of 
our personal identity; there is an additional reason for this as well. This view, 
typically held by Hobbesians and Kantians alike, claims that the state or, to be 
more precise, the legal coercion it exerts is a necessary precondition of 
autonomous human agency. Faced with Hobbes’s scenario we have already met 
and criticised in Chapter 4 (especially Section 4.4), namely that of a pre-political 
state of nature in which the ever present threat of a war of everyone against 
everyone makes it rational for utility-maximising individuals to agree with one 
another to engage in a “more profitable” form of interaction: a mutually 
advantageous cooperative scheme in which they subject themselves to a higher 
political authority which, because it coercively guarantees their common security 
and peace, constitutes a necessary existence condition of the exercise of their 
autonomy (i.e. the free pursuit of their interests). 
The same view can be found in Kant’s writings, who argues that individuals 
have an innate right to freedom (i.e. “independence from being constrained by 
another’s choice”), but only in so far as one individual’s freedom can “coexist with 
the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law.”433 In Kant’s state 
of nature (which does not refer to an actual or historical state of affairs, but is a 
regulative idea of reason), however, this condition cannot be met; in the absence 
of a common political authority that is capable of maintaining public order, the 
                                                   
431 Ibid., p. 229. For a similar argument, see Freeman, “Reason and Agreement in Social Contract 
Views.” 
432 Cushing, “Justification, Legitimacy, and Social Embeddedness: Locke and Rawls on Society and 
the State,” p. 229. 
433 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 6: 237. 
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right to freedom cannot be anything else but “provisional.”434 In Kant’s view, no 
individual can be prohibited from violating another individual’s freedom if that 
individual gives him no equal assurance that he will observe the same restraint 
towards him. The problem, however, is precisely that the circumstances of the 
state of nature are such that this kind of mutual assurance is not to be had. For 
any other individual living with me in a state of nature “robs me of any (...) 
security and injures me by virtue of this very state in which he coexists with me.” 
It is because of the “very lawlessness of this state” that others are a permanent 
threat to me.435 Since Kant holds that rights correlate with obligations, our right 
to freedom correlates with an obligation to create the conditions under which the 
enjoyment and preservation of reciprocal freedom is possible. According to Kant, 
state coercion is a necessary existence condition of our freedom, and so every 
individual has a duty to accept membership of society regulated by coercive law 
“under which alone everyone is able to enjoy rights.”436 
Rawls endorses a similar Kantian view. According to him, individuals are 
autonomous in virtue of their having a twofold moral capacity for (1) a conception 
of the good and (2) a sense of justice. As I have explained in Section 5.1.1, the 
capacity for a conception of the good refers to an individual’s ability to form, 
revise and rationally pursue a conception of his rational advantage or good. This 
aspect of a person’s moral capacity constitutes his rationality and mirrors Kant’s 
hypothetical imperative with its directive to take effective and efficient means to 
one’s self-imposed ends. The capacity for a sense of justice refers to an 
individual’s fundamental and normally effective desire to cooperate with others 
on terms they can reasonably accept. This element of a person’s moral capacity 
constitutes his reasonableness and corresponds to Kant’s categorical imperative, 
according to which only those moral principles are valid that are capable of being 
universalised. It is this capacity for autonomous human agency that makes 
individuals free and equal moral persons. 
The realisation of autonomy constitutes a demand of justice: all human beings 
have, in virtue of their capacity for autonomous agency, a right to equal moral 
consideration with respect to the distribution of the burdens and benefits of 
social cooperation. Now, as we have seen above, Rawls defends a relational 
approach to justice in which institutionalised interaction is a necessary existence 
condition of justice. This means that it is only against the background of an 
existing and properly functioning basic structure of a society, the state in 
particular, that the egalitarian demands of justice can arise and be met. It is 
                                                   
434 Ibid., 6: 312. 
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against this background that the significance of Rawls’s natural duty of justice, 
which I have introduced in the second part of this chapter, becomes evident: (1) if 
autonomy is an important moral value; and (2) if distributive justice is of central 
importance to the realisation of individuals’ autonomy; and finally, (3) if society’s 
basic structure is an existence condition of justice, then it follows, in Rawls’s view, 
that individuals have a natural duty to support just institutions, because this is 
the best way to create the conditions under which the exercise of autonomous 
human agency is possible. Needless to say, the natural duty of justice is radically 
at odds with the assumptions of society as a voluntary association and the 
anarchist baseline. 
There is, then, a clear presumption in favour of political organisation in 
Rawls’s contractualist view. Now, let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
Rawls is right about this. Suppose, indeed, that his theses of social embeddedness 
and of institutional interaction as a necessary existence condition of justice count 
as conclusive evidence against both the thesis of the consensual creation of 
society and the thesis of the anarchist baseline. Of course, this conclusion may be 
false. In that case, however, we can simply fall back on the Lockean and 
contractarian positions, and discuss their potential for solving the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. Since we have already done this in Chapters 3 and 4, it is 
interesting to see in this chapter what the implications are of accepting the 
Rawlsian contractualist framework for the quest of the legitimacy of the people. 
One immediate implication is this: if society is best understood as a non-
voluntary association, i.e. if membership in society is given, then it follows that 
the problem of the legitimacy of the people cannot be understood meaningfully in 
terms of the original constitution of a people among a previously unattached 
group of individuals (in the non-cooperative or anarchic state of nature). 
Essentially, this transforms the quest for the legitimacy of the people from a 
problem of the original demarcation of peoples into a problem of the demarcation 
of already existing peoples. Issues concerning emigration, immigration and 
secession, as well as the cosmopolitan debate on international justice, all 
constitute specific articulations of this particular interpretation of the problem of 
the legitimacy of the people. 
Of course, it is one thing to provide a Rawlsian definition of the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. It is quite another to provide a Rawlsian solution to it, 
especially considering my criticism of the natural duty of justice in the second 
part of this chapter (especially Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). There, I have argued, 
first, that if the question whether there exists a principle of political obligation 
that meets the particularity requirement is answered in the affirmative by 
appealing to a natural duty of justice, then an individual’s political obligation is 
particularised by an appeal to either the empirical (political institutional) status 
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quo (i.e. by means of a “weak” institutional application clause), or the doctrine 
which demands allegiance to society at birth (i.e. by means of a “territorial” 
institutional application clause). Moreover, subsequent analysis of Rawls’s 
natural duty of justice in relation to the problem of the legitimacy of the people 
has enabled me to argue, next, that both the weak and territorial interpretation of 
the natural duty of justice constitute accounts of the legitimacy of the people that 
are inconsistent with Rawls’s contractualist approach. To add insult to injury, this 
chapter’s analysis can be used to show that the natural duty of justice in itself 
cannot provide the relational aspect of Rawls’s approach to justice. It is, after all, a 
non-relational moral requirement that grounds justice in a universal and general 
feature of individuals, which they, in virtue of their humanity, and regardless of 
the special relationships in which they stand to one another, possess: their 
capacity for autonomy. 
Despite these seemingly inescapable defects, I shall nevertheless argue in the 
next section that neither the morally arbitrary fact that we are born into a 
particular society (i.e. a territorial institutional application clause), nor the 
morally arbitrary fact that the political authorities of that society name or address 
us as subjects to their rules (i.e. a weak institutional application clause) need 
necessarily ground the particularisation of the general natural duty of justice, and 
so need not have any bearing on the legitimate demarcation of the people. I 
demonstrate how Rawls’s The Law of Peoples can be interpreted as offering 
(among other things) an alternative way to particularise the natural duty of 
justice. Central to Rawls’s relational approach to justice is the so-called All 
Coerced Principle. This principle is capable of particularising the natural duty of 
justice in a way that is consistent with Rawls’s contractualist approach. I contend, 
furthermore, that the resulting mixed account of political obligation, contains 
within itself all the conceptual tools required to solve the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people as well. 
5.3.3 Institutional Ties, Coercion and the Rawlsian Contractualist 
Legitimisation of the People 
It is a widely held view that there is a distinction between general obligations, 
which we owe to all individuals in virtue of their humanity, and special 
obligations, which we have to, and as such are limited to, those individuals only 
with whom we have had certain sorts of interactions or with whom we stand in 
certain sorts of relationships.437 As I see it, it is possible to understand the 
                                                   
437 See, for instance, Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?”; and W. D. Ross, The Right and the 
Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 27. 
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difference between non-relational and relational approaches to justice in terms of 
this distinction between general and special obligations. In Section 5.3.1, I have 
argued that non-relational approaches to justice are predicated on the idea of 
“universal personal morality,” according to which entitlements to distributive 
justice are grounded in certain universal features of individual human beings, 
which they possess in virtue of their humanity. Since all individuals should be 
included within the scope of distributive justice simply because they are fellow 
human beings, those who endorse a non-relational approach to justice essentially 
defend a general obligation of distributive justice.438 In relational approaches, by 
contrast, the content, scope and justification of principles of justice are 
conditioned by shared social practices. Since principles of distributive justice 
apply to those individuals only who stand in a particular (culturally conventional 
or institutional) relationship, those who endorse a relational approach to justice 
basically understand the requirements of justice as special obligations. 
For the purpose of my argument, the category of special obligations is 
particularly relevant. Before taking a more detailed look at the nature of this 
category of obligations, however, it is useful – indeed necessary – to explain what 
bearing an analysis of the relational approach to justice in terms of special 
obligations has on the problem of the legitimacy of the people. The explanation is 
that the problem of the legitimacy of the people can be analysed in terms of the 
generation of special obligations. When we ask how a number of individuals can 
legitimately become politically bound to one another as a people, we are basically 
asking how this group of individuals can legitimately acquire special political 
obligations (and correlated rights) to one another; obligations (and rights) which 
they do not have with respect to other people(s). It is this question – “How can a 
set of special political obligations be legitimately generated among a group of 
individuals?” – that bears directly on the question of the legitimacy of the people. 
The same point can also be made in the following, somewhat different way. In 
general, having a special obligation means that one owes more to insiders (i.e. 
those with whom one has had a certain sort of interaction x or stands in a certain 
relationship y giving rise to this special obligation) than to outsiders (i.e. those 
                                                   
438 Cf. David Arneson, “Do Patriotic Ties Limit Global Justice Duties?,” Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005), 
pp. 153n, 157-161; Barry, Theories of Justice: A Treatise on Social Justice, Volume 1, pp. 238-241; 
Brian Barry, Why Social Justice Matters (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 17, 33-34; Beitz, 
“Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” p. 593; Allen Buchanan, “Justice as Reciprocity 
versus Subject-Centered Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (1990), pp. 227-252; Simon 
Caney, “Humanity, Associations, and Global Justice: in Defence of Humanity-Centred 
Cosmopolitan-Egalitarianism,” The Monist, 94 (2011); Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice and 
Equalizing Opportunities,” Metaphilosophy, 32 (2001), pp. 113-134; Caney, Justice Beyond 
Borders; Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitanism and Justice,” in Contemporary Debates in Political 
Philosophy, eds. T. Christiano and J. Christman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2009), pp. 387-
407; Richards, “International Distributive Justice,” pp. 282-292; Tan, Justic Without Borders. 
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with whom one has not had interaction x or stands in relationship y). Since a 
people can be (partially) defined as a politically organised group of individuals, 
its members – the insiders – have interacted in ways or share a certain 
relationship with one another that generates a set of special political obligations 
and correlated rights. Each member has these special political obligations and 
rights only with respect to other insiders, rather than to any outsiders. But, and 
this is where the problem of the legitimacy of the people comes in, how do we 
determine who legitimately constitute the insiders and outsiders? The crucial 
question, in other words, is how to determine who legitimately acquire special 
political obligations (and correlated rights) to one another. 
Bearing this in mind, we are now in a position to start analysing the category 
of special obligations. This category contains a variety of special obligations, such 
as reparative obligations, obligations of gratitude, obligations of fairness, 
contractual obligations and associative obligations. The character of each of these 
types of special obligations explains how they are generated, and so helps to 
determine who legitimately constitute the insiders and outsiders. If relational 
approaches to justice can be analysed in terms of special obligations, and if 
special obligations vary greatly in kind, then our next task is to uncover the 
nature of the special obligations involved in Rawls’s relational approach to 
justice. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that “the correct regulative principle for a 
thing depends on the nature of that thing.”439 Rawls makes a distinction between 
principles of justice that apply to the design of institutions on the one hand and 
principles of ethics or morality that apply to the behaviour of individuals on the 
other hand. In his view, “principles of justice for institutions must not be confused 
with the principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular 
circumstances.”440 Since the nature of these moral units (i.e. institutions and 
individuals) differs, the correct regulative principles for each of them must differ 
as well. 
In The Law of Peoples, where he discusses international distributive justice, 
Rawls extends this distinction to institutional principles. There he argues that the 
correct regulative principle for the design of institutions depends on the nature of 
these institutions. And since Rawls thinks that the nature of domestic institutions 
differs from the nature of those found on the global level, the correct principles 
regulating them must also differ. Fundamentally, this differentiated system of 
principles is grounded in the dissimilar nature of the relationships shared by 
                                                   
439 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 25. 
440 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 47. Further on, Rawls discusses the principles for the general 
regulation of the basic structure of society (sec. 18, 52) and those for the general regulation of 
individuals (sec. 19, 51). 
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individuals at various institutional levels in their lives. In order to understand the 
nature of these institutional ties, and the resulting pluralistic system of rights and 
obligations, it is helpful to analyse the nature of Rawls’s concept of a people (i.e. to 
take a closer look at what kind of entity Rawls’s people is). 
Rawls makes a distinction between five types of domestic societies in The Law 
of Peoples: liberal peoples, decent peoples, outlaw states, burdened societies and 
benevolent absolutisms.441 For our purposes, liberal and decent peoples are 
interesting, and I will discuss them in a moment. Before I do that, let us first take 
a look at what I think is an extremely important feature of a “Rawlsian people.” A 
morally significant aspect of the concept of a people is that it refers to a group of 
individuals that is politically organised. This political organisation comes in the 
form of a set of institutions, such as a constitution and government. One of the 
most salient features of these political institutions is that they are coercive. 
“Political power, to use Rawls’s own words, “is always coercive power backed by 
the government’s use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use 
force in upholding its laws.”442 Given the fundamental importance of the moral 
value of autonomy in his contractualist approach (as we have seen in Section 
5.3.2), it is Rawls’s view that this basic fact of the coercive power of the state 
stands in need of justification. 
Notice that Rawls does not argue that state coercion should be removed. In the 
previous section, I have argued that Rawls’s contractualism contains a 
presumption in favour of political organisation. In Rawls’s view, membership in 
society is given not only because individuals are socially embedded creatures, but 
also because the presence of a coercive framework of political and legal 
institutions is an existence condition of the exercise of individuals’ autonomy – 
which is precisely why they have a natural duty of justice. It follows that the 
coercive aspect of society’s basic structure should not be removed but instead be 
justified. (Notice, furthermore, that this is, among others, what distinguishes 
Rawlsian contractualism from Lockean political voluntarism, which, as we have 
seen in Chapter 3, holds that political bonds cannot be enforced upon individuals 
who do not want to acquire them.) 
If state coercion should not be removed but instead be justified in a Rawlsian 
contractualist framework, what, then, is the nature of this justification? According 
to Rawls, this legitimisation is to be found in a special feature of the political 
authority relationship between the government and its people, namely that 
“political power is ultimately the power of the public (...) as a collective body.”443 
The fundamental idea here is that the government has to act as “the 
                                                   
441 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 4, 63. 
442 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 136. 
443 Ibid., pp. 136-137; and Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 26, 38. 
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representative and effective agent of the people”; a government’s exercise of 
political authority is legitimate only if it subjects its people to coercion in their 
name.444 We should, in the words of Thomas Nagel, be able to understand 
ourselves as “participants in the general will,” i.e. as “both putative joint authors 
of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms.”445 
Under what conditions can a people be said to play this dual role (and, 
consequently, can its government be considered legitimate)? A government’s 
coercive power is legitimate if it is exercised in accordance with a public 
conception of justice that its people could reasonably be expected to impose on 
itself.446 If a government meets this condition, then its people are what Rawls calls 
“well-ordered.”447 In liberal and decent peoples, which are both well-ordered in 
Rawls’s view, the public conception of justice reflects a generally accepted notion 
of the common good. In a liberal people, this is “the common good of achieving 
political justice for all its citizens over time and preserving the free culture that 
justice allows.”448 Here political justice specifies an idea of reciprocity among the 
citizens of a constitutional democracy. It characterises the fair terms of social 
cooperation that each citizen, as a free and equal moral person, could reasonably 
accept, provided that everyone else likewise could accept them.449 So, reciprocity 
is essentially a relation between the free and equal members of a well-ordered 
liberal people expressed by its public conception of justice.450 In a decent people, 
by contrast to a liberal people, the conception of justice is also public but in a 
different way. Here, the fair terms of social cooperation are not specified in terms 
of reciprocity; individuals are not represented as separate autonomous (i.e. free 
and equal moral) agents, but instead as members of various societal groups 
(endorsing religious, philosophical and moral comprehensive doctrines). Though 
the public conception of justice favours the views of certain groups over others, 
there is a hierarchical consultation procedure which gives a fair hearing to the 
representatives of all groups, including those less favoured. The fairness of this 
“decent consultation hierarchy” ensures that the system of laws enforced by a 
decent people’s government is guided by a common good idea of justice and has a 
public character.451 
                                                   
444 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 38. 
445 Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” p. 128. See also p. 129. Nagel, of course, (implicitly) 
refers to the famous idea of the “volonté générale” that is central to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
political philosophy. See his The Social Contract. 
446 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 77, 217. 
447 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 4, 63. 
448 Ibid., p. 71n. 
449 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 16. 
450 Ibid., p. 17. 
451 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 65-67, 71-72. 
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How does this analysis of the institutional ties shared by the members of a 
Rawlsian people – who are both authors and subjects of a scheme of institutions – 
help us to understand Rawls’s relational approach to justice? It shows us that the 
relevant kind of institutional tie involved here is, as Michael Blake calls it, “a 
shared liability to a coercive system of political and legal institutions.”452 
Moreover, such a coercive system of political and legal institutions (or basic 
structure, to use Rawls’s own terminology) is legitimate if and only if it is 
regulated by a public conception of justice, i.e. a set of principles of justice that all 
and only those individuals who are subject to its coercive effects can reasonably 
be expected to accept. (What this amounts to exactly depends, of course, on 
whether the society in question is liberal or decent.) Call this the All Coerced 
Principle. 
If this line of reasoning is sound, then we have found ourselves a possible way 
to particularise the natural duty of justice. In Section 5.3.2, we have seen that a 
natural duty of justice that does not include an application clause cannot in itself 
meet the particularity requirement. Though a natural duty that entails a weak or 
a territorial application clause is indeed capable of meeting the particularity 
requirement, we have also seen that the resulting account of political obligation is 
ultimately inconsistent with Rawls’s contractualist view. However, a mixed 
account of political obligation, which combines a natural duty of justice with the 
All Coerced Principle just described, is capable of particularising individuals’ 
political obligations, and, moreover, is so in a way that does not jeopardise the 
consistency of Rawls’s contractualist view. Think of the All Coerced Principle as 
an alternative application clause that complements the natural duty of justice. In 
that case, the natural duty of justice binds us generally to (all) just institutional 
structures, whereas the All Coerced Principle in turn binds us to that particular 
just state which subjects us to coercion in our name. 
Unlike a territorial or weak account of natural duty of justice, however, the All 
Coerced Principle grounds (the particularisation of) one’s political bonds neither 
in the mere fact that one is born in a particular society nor in the mere fact that 
the basic structure of that society actually names one as subject to its rules. 
Instead, it grounds (the particularisation of) one’s political bonds in certain 
morally relevant features of social interaction – namely, coercion (in accordance 
with a public conception of justice). But these features, to use Sangiovanni’s 
words, only “contingently track” where people happen to be born and which basic 
structure actually happen to address them as subject to its rules.453 Whether or 
not one is addressed by a particular basic structure as subject to its rules, and 
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284. 
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whether or not one is born into a particular coercive basic structure, what 
ultimately matters for a Rawlsian contractualist is whether or not one is subject 
to coercion. And it is quite possible for someone to be subject to a coercive basic 
structure without either being named by it as subject to its rules or being born 
into it (I shall have more to say on this matter in the next section). Since the 
mixed account of political obligation just developed does not particularise an 
individual’s political obligation by appealing to either the empirical (political 
institutional) status quo or the doctrine which demands allegiance to society at 
birth, it is fully compatible with Rawls’s contractualist view. For this view, as we 
have seen, requires that (1) critical reflection on principles (of justice and of 
political obligation) should not presuppose or proceed from the empirical 
(political institutional) status quo, and (2) morally arbitrary and irrelevant 
considerations should be excluded as possible grounds for principles. 
We can conclude, then, that Rawls’s The Law of Peoples offers an alternative 
particularisation of the natural duty of justice (that is consistent with his 
contractualist view), namely by combining it with the All Coerced Principle. What 
is interesting to see, moreover, is that this mixed account of our political bonds – 
which combines a natural duty of justice with the All Coerced Principle – also 
provides Rawlsian contractualists with the conceptual tools to develop a 
relational approach to distributive justice that has non-cosmopolitan 
consequences and, relatedly, an account of the legitimacy of the people. Let me 
explain this. 
How does the mixed account of our political bonds enable Rawlsian 
contractualists to develop a relational approach to distributive justice that has 
non-cosmopolitan implications? In order to answer this question, consider first 
how the Rawlsian All Coerced Principle creates demands of distributive justice 
that apply to those individuals only who stand in that relevant coercive 
institutional relationship. The basic structure of a Rawlsian society consists of a 
set of coercive institutions that regulate the division of burdens and benefits of 
social cooperation. In Rawls’s contractualist view, the coercive basic structure of 
society is legitimate if and only if the way in which it functions is consistent with 
the All Coerced Principle. This means that those individuals who are subject to its 
regulations should be capable of understanding themselves as its authors. And 
this, we have seen, will only be the case if the way in which the basic structure 
generates and distributes the benefits and burdens of social cooperation is 
compatible with a public conception of justice. That is to say, the basic structure 
should be regulated by a set of principles of distributive justice that all 
individuals who are subject to its coercive effects can reasonably be expected to 
accept. Here, the relational aspect of Rawls’s approach to justice comes to the 
fore: institutional interaction is an existence condition of distributive justice, and 
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the relevant kind of institutional interaction is explained in terms of individuals’ 
subjection to the same coercive institutions. The demands of distributive justice 
apply to those individuals only who stand in this sort of special relationship. In 
other words: the coercive aspect of social interaction relevantly alters the moral 
relations in which we stand, and hence the scope of principles of distributive 
justice. 
What is important to see, however, is that the Rawlsian All Coerced Principle 
does not only limit the scope of principles of distributive justice but also the scope 
of the contractualist justification of these principles to those individuals who 
stand in that relevant institutional relationship. In order to understand this, let us 
take a closer look at my definition of a relational approach to justice, and see in 
what sense Rawls’s approach to justice can be qualified as “relational.” In Section 
5.3.1, I have defined a relational approach to justice as one in which the scope, but 
not necessarily the content and justification, of principles, is conditioned by the 
social relations in which individuals stand. 
Unlike the scope of Rawls’s principles of distributive justice, which is limited 
to those individuals who are subject to a coercive basic structure, the content of 
these principles is not derived from reflection on the coercive nature of social 
interaction. Instead, content of principles of justice is the outcome of a (suitably 
defined) Categorical Imperative procedure – the original position. Concerning the 
justification of Rawls’s principles, however, a more nuanced picture arises. To be 
sure, Rawls’s contractualist method of justification is not derived from reflection 
on the coercive aspect of social interaction, but is instead supposed to regulate 
these forms of interaction. Justifiable principles are those that could be the object 
of reasonable agreement, the substance of which can be discovered by adopting 
the perspective of the original position (which, according to Rawls, is “the 
appropriate initial status quo which ensures that the fundamental agreements 
reached in it are fair.”)454 This is not the whole story, however, because although 
Rawls’s contractualist method of justification is not derived from reflection on the 
coercive nature of this relationship, the scope of this justification, i.e. the 
individuals to whom justification is owed, is nevertheless altered by the coercive 
aspect of social interaction. The scope of Rawls’s contractualist method of 
justification is limited to those individuals only who stand in the morally relevant 
sort of institutional relationship with respect to one another, namely that in 
which they are subject to coercion by the same system of political and legal 
institutions. 
The implications of these considerations can be seen most clearly by taking 
up an argument that I have already developed in Part 5.1 of this chapter. There, I 
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have discussed the extent to which Rawls’s contractualist view is compatible with 
a democratic framework. In my view, and as I have explained in Section 5.1.2, 
Rawls’s original position is a special feature of his broader approach to moral 
justification: it is, so to speak, the vehicle through which a reflective equilibrium-
based justification for moral principles is run. As I have argued, Rawls’s reflective 
equilibrium approach is best understood as a democratic method for public 
justification: it depicts an ideal deliberative democratic discourse in which actual 
persons through actual dialogue jointly determine the content of principles of 
justice. If this democratic interpretation of Rawls’s contractualist method of 
justification is correct, and if the scope of justification is limited to those 
individuals only who are subject to the same coercive scheme of political and 
legal institutions, then it follows that all individuals who are subject to such 
coercion have a right to participate in the democratic quest for reflective 
equilibrium. So, the scope of Rawls’s contractualism is limited in two ways then: 
though he endorses the view that principles of justice should be based on 
reasonable agreement, his relational approach to justice commits him to the view 
that the coercive nature of social interaction relevantly alters the moral relations 
in which we stand, and hence the set of individuals (1) to whom these principles 
of justice apply and (2) to whom a justification is owed. 
This analysis of Rawls’s relational approach to justice enables me to draw a 
number of conclusions. The first one is that Rawls’s approach offers an additional, 
third reason for rejecting institutional cosmopolitanism (for the other two 
reasons, see Section 5.3.1). Just like Rawls, institutional cosmopolitans endorse 
the fundamental idea that justice is grounded in a particular morally relevant set 
of features of a certain institutional relationship. Because this relationship exists 
between all individuals at the global level according to institutional 
cosmopolitans, they insist that a coherent liberalism must apply principles of 
justice globally. Based on my analysis of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples, however, it is 
possible to develop an argument in favour of the view that the shared 
institutional relationship between individuals who are subject to a coercive basic 
structure is not present on the global level. In formal terms, the argument runs as 
follows. It is characteristic of a relational approach to justice (a) that we have 
obligations of distributive justice towards those individuals only with whom we 
stand in a particular relationship, and (b) that we are not obliged to enter into 
this sort of relationship with those individuals with whom we do not (yet) share 
such a particular relationship. Now, (1) if the institutional tie can be defined in 
terms of individuals’ subjection to the same coercive basic structure, (2) and if 
the conditions of peoplehood, where the “people” are defined in terms of this 
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particular coercive institutional tie, are not met at the global level; then it follows 
(3) that the demands of justice are not global in scope.455 
This conclusion has a number of important implications. The first implication 
is that the Rawlsian limitation of justice to the domestic sphere need not be 
justified in terms of a simplifying assumption. Instead, it can be grounded in a 
moral argument that is premised on a relational approach to justice, i.e. an 
approach that works from the fundamental ideas that institutional interaction is 
an existence condition of distributive justice, and that the relevant kind of 
institutional interaction is to be specified in terms of individuals’ subjection to the 
same coercive scheme of political and legal institutions. 
The second implication is the following. If the anarchist baseline is 
conceptually bankrupt in virtue of our social embeddedness and natural duty of 
justice, then membership in political society is given. If, in addition, a world state 
is not (yet) an option because it does not (yet) meet the conditions of peoplehood 
(the shared institutional ties are absent at the global level), then it follows that a 
world of states (or, to put it more neutral, a world divided into distinct political 
entities) is legitimised by default. 
The third implication is that the argument leading to the conclusion that 
Rawls’s (1) principles of distributive justice and (2) his contractualist method of 
justification are not global in scope does not support the further conclusion that 
                                                   
455 Though Rawls could invoke this line of reasoning in order to support his view that the 
demands of justice are not global, institutional cosmopolitans could reply to it by arguing that 
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nevertheless incorrect because the second premise is empirically false; there is a global coercive 
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(1) whether these ties are coercive, and, even if they are so, (2) whether the coercive nature of 
these ties is the same as the kind of coercion exercised by states. 
 Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that institutional cosmopolitans are correct in 
claiming that the second premise is empirically false. This does not discredit the Rawlsian 
relational approach to justice as such, but rather the limitation of the scope of the Rawlsian 
contractualist method of justification to the domestic sphere of states. In fact, I shall, when 
presenting the third implication of my analysis of Rawls’s relational approach to justice, argue 
that the scope of the Rawlsian contractualist method of justification is not necessarily limited to 
the domestic sphere of states. If there is a global coercive basic structure, then it follows that the 
Rawlsian relational approach to justice supports a system of multi-level governance in which 
political decisions are made at various levels, and where the appropriate level depends on the 
set of individuals who are subject to its coercive effects. This could, for instance, mean that the 
scope of the Rawlsian contractualist justification of political decisions is sometimes limited to a 
particular domestic sphere (e.g. The Netherlands), at other times extended to a particular 
transnational sphere (e.g. Europe), and sometimes even expanded to the global sphere. 
Furthermore, if the presence of a global coercive basic structure does not discredit the Rawlsian 
relational approach to justice, then the most important claim I wish to make below, namely that 
the Rawlsian relational approach to justice is able to provide us with a solution to the problem of 
the legitimacy of the people, remains unchallenged. 
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their scope is necessarily limited to the domestic sphere of states. If the demands 
of justice – in the form of (1) and (2) – are limited to those individuals who stand 
in the relevant sort of institutional relationship, namely a coercive one, then the 
scope of coercive social interaction may but need not converge with the 
boundaries of currently existing states. And when it does, moreover, this is only 
contingently so because the coercion exercised by a state does not extend beyond 
its own citizens. In other words, though a world of states is legitimised by default, 
it may nevertheless be the case that a set of policies coercively enforced by a state 
still stands in need of justification not only with respect to its own citizens but 
also to certain foreigners. This would for instance be the case when the particular 
state in question coercively enforces its policies against these foreigners as well. 
(I will say more on this in the next section.) 
The final, and for our purposes most important, implication is that the 
Rawlsian relational approach to justice is able to provide us with a solution to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people. In this section, I have argued that having 
a special obligation generally means that one owes more to insiders (i.e. those 
with whom one has had a certain sort of interaction x or stands in a certain 
relationship y giving rise to this special obligation) than to outsiders (i.e. those 
with whom one has not had interaction x or stands in relationship y). Since a 
people can be (partially) defined as a politically organised group of individuals, 
its members – the insiders – can be said to have interacted in ways or share a 
certain relationship with one another, which generates a set of special political 
obligations and correlated rights. Each member has these special political 
obligations and rights only with respect to other insiders, rather than to any 
outsiders. We can now see that, in the case of Rawls, the legitimate constitution of 
the people, i.e. the demarcation between insiders and outsiders, is grounded in a 
particular institutional relation that insiders share with one another (but not with 
outsiders): subjection to the same coercive system of political and legal 
institutions. This coercive system is legitimate if it functions in ways that are 
consistent with the All Coerced Principle. Crucially, this principle specifies what 
kind of justification is required and to whom it is owed. The demarcation of the 
people is legitimate if it is based on a public conception of justice, i.e. if it is 
regulated by a set of principles of justice that individuals can reasonably accept. 
The scope of this justification, i.e. the set of individuals who should be able to 
understand themselves as the authors of the rules regulating the demarcation of 
the people, is limited to all and only those individuals upon whom a scheme of 
political and legal institutions coercively imposes policies concerning the 
constitution of the people, such as those pertaining to emigration, immigration 
and secession. 
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5.3.4 The All Coerced Principle and Its Implications 
In the previous section, I have argued that the specific relational approach to 
justice endorsed by Rawls implicitly contains an account of the legitimacy of the 
people. The constitution of the people is legitimate if it is consistent with the All 
Coerced Principle. I now want to examine in greater detail a number of 
implications of this principle. According to the All Coerced Principle, a coercive 
system of political and legal institutions is legitimate if and only if it is regulated 
by a public conception of justice, i.e. a set of principles of justice that all and only 
those individuals who are subject to it can reasonably be expected to agree to. 
Since the contractualist idea of reasonable agreement can be understood as part 
of Rawls’s democratic method of public justification, as I have argued in Section 
5.1.2, the coercion principle can be restated in the following way: all individuals 
who are forced to comply with the decisions of a particular coercive scheme of 
political and legal institutions are entitled to a democratic justification. This 
means that, in order to understand themselves as the joint authors of the 
coercively imposed system, they should in one way or another have the right to a 
say in its decisions and procedures. So, Rawls’s contractualist account of 
democratic justification is not owed to all but instead to those individuals only 
who are jointly subject to a coercive basic structure. 
For obvious reasons, the All Coerced Principle has direct bearing on the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people. In Rawls’s view, as we have seen in 
Section 5.3.2, this problem does not concern the original constitution of a people 
among a previously unattached group of individuals in the state of nature, but 
rather the reconstitution of already existing (and thus demarcated) peoples. This 
essentially means that the problem of the legitimacy of the people is reduced to, 
and as such becomes manifest only, when issues concerning immigration, 
emigration and secession arise. If we interpret these specific articulations of the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people in terms of the All Coerced Principle 
deduced from Rawls’s relational approach to justice, then it follows that 
immigration, emigration and secession policies can be legitimately enforced by a 
coercive system of political and legal institutions if it does so on the basis of a set 
of principles of just immigration, emigration and secession that could be the 
object of reasonable agreement among all individuals subject to it. 
What are the implications of this Rawlsian account of the legitimacy of the 
people for issues concerning immigration, emigration and secession? Let us first 
consider the case in which individuals wish to emigrate from one state and that in 
which individuals wish to divorce themselves from the particular state of which 
they are citizens and constitute a state of their own. Since would-be emigrants 
and would-be secessionists are subject to the same coercive scheme of political 
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and legal institutions as the citizens from whom they wish to detach themselves, 
it follows that the particular emigration and secession policy enforced by this 
scheme should be based on a conception of justice that could reasonably be 
accepted by all of them. In other words: the would-be emigrants or would-be 
secessionists and (what are until now still) their fellow citizens owe each other 
such a justification. 
The case in which an individual wants to immigrate into another state is more 
challenging. There is considerable disagreement in the literature on the question 
whether a particular state’s border control regime stands in need of democratic 
justification with regard to would-be immigrants. According to Blake, for 
instance, no democratic justification is owed to would-be immigrants. He 
expresses his view in the following way: 
 
[T]he state has to offer different guarantees to different persons, not 
because it cares more about one set or the other, but because it is doing 
different things to some – things that stand in need of justification. To 
insiders, the state says: Yes, we coerce you, but we do so in accordance 
with principles you could not reasonably reject. To outsiders, it says: 
We do not coerce you, and therefore do not apply our principles of 
liberal justice to you.456 
 
According to Arash Abizadeh, however, Blake’s claim that outsiders are not 
subject to state coercion flies in the face of the facts. In his view, “it is one of the 
most salient features of the contemporary Westphalian interstate system that 
individuals are subject to a vast network of ongoing coercion by foreign states 
that restrict their movement across state borders.”457 Combining this empirical 
claim, which involves the descriptive observation that a state’s regime of border 
control subjects both members and non-members to its coercive exercise of 
political power, with the normative claim that a state’s coercive exercise of 
political power has to be democratically justified to all those who are subject to it, 
enables Abizadeh to draw the conclusion that a state has no right to unilaterally 
control its own borders. A state can implement an exclusionary immigration 
policy, and consequently forcibly prevent would-be immigrants from entering its 
territory, only if this practice is (based on a conception of justice that is) 
democratically justified to them.458 “Anyone who accepts a genuinely democratic 
theory of political legitimisation domestically is,” to quote Abizadeh, “thereby 
                                                   
456 Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” p. 287. 
457 Abizadeh, “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of 
Distributive Justice,” p. 348. 
458 Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your 
Own Borders,” pp. 44-45. 
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committed to rejecting the unilateral right to control and close the state’s 
boundaries (...).”459 
In turn, however, David Miller rejects Abizadeh’s argument. He does so by 
denying that a state’s border control regime actually coerces outsiders in any 
morally relevant sense at all (thus rejecting Abizadeh’s second, empirical 
premise). The fundamental problem, he claims, is that Abizadeh does not 
distinguish between being subject to coercion on the one hand and being subject 
to prevention on the other. According to Miller, coercion and prevention stand at 
opposite ends of a spectrum.460 Coercion paradigmatically involves an agent x 
intentionally closing the options of another agent y in such a way that y is 
effectively left with a forced choice between two evils, one of which is intolerable 
and therefore ineligible to it, while the other is revolting but the lesser of the evils 
y has to choose between. Whereas coercion “means that there is some course of 
action that the agent is forced to take,” prevention, by contrast, “means that some 
course of action that might otherwise have been available is now blocked.”461 
Prevention, then, typically entails an agent x closing one (instead of all but one) 
option from the available set of another agent y. 
The distinction between coercion and prevention is reflected in society’s legal 
system, where some laws are coercive and others merely preventive. What is 
characteristic of a modern democratic society, Miller writes, is that its “web of 
laws is sufficiently directive that virtually everyone is intermittently subject to 
coercion.” This is what justifies the intuition that those who are bound by the 
legal system of such a society have a right to participate in the decisions that are 
to govern it.462 Unlike the citizens of a modern democratic society, however, 
would-be immigrants who are denied entry to such a society are not caught in the 
same web of coercive and preventive laws. They do not, so to speak, share the 
institutional tie of co-citizenship. The reason for this is that the restrictive 
immigration laws to which would-be immigrants are subjected are preventive in 
nature; they, after all, rule out only one possible course of action. Since 
democratic justification is owed to those individuals only who are subject to a 
coercive (as opposed to a preventive) scheme of political and legal institutions, 
the citizens of a modern democratic society can unilaterally decide on questions 
concerning immigration. 
Central to Miller’s argument is his insistence on making a distinction between 
the “coercive nature of a law or policy” and the “use of coercion to enforce it.”463 
                                                   
459 Ibid., p. 38. 
460 Miller, “Democracy’s Domain,” 220n. 
461 Ibid., p. 220. 
462 Ibid., pp. 221-222. 
463 Ibid., p. 225. 
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While the act of enforcing a law is always coercive, the coercively enforced law 
itself need not always be coercive. This is the case, Miller claims, if the law in 
question is preventive, i.e. rules out merely one particular course of action (rather 
than requiring that a particular course of action is taken). In response, however, 
Abizadeh has argued against Miller that “preventative laws are coercive laws.”464 
Following Abizadeh, I do not accept Miller’s view that closing one available option 
rather than all but one of the available options makes any difference in the 
assessment of a law’s coercive nature. What makes a law coercive is that it 
imposes a conditional threat. This threat typically takes one of two forms: (1) 
“Take this course of action x; if you do not, y will be imposed on you,” or, 
alternatively, (2) “Do not take course of action x; if you do, y will be imposed on 
you.” In the latter case, the nature of the coercive law is preventive. Now, it is of 
course true that an individual can avoid the imposition of the sanction, but this is 
irrelevant to the matter at hand; whether a law is coercive or not does not in the 
least depend on whether the individual who is subject to it actually refrains from 
carrying out the prohibited course of action. All that matters is that the law 
imposes a coercive threat on an individual; and this is clearly the case with a 
preventative law. Moreover, as Abizadeh convincingly argues: 
 
Such a threat invades a person’s autonomy, regardless of whether she 
has any interest in carrying out the proscribed action (…), because such 
a threat invades her independence. It invades her independence 
because it threatens to interfere with the setting and pursuit of her own 
ends by using her body for purposes that are not her own.465 
 
Contrary to what Miller claims, then, a state’s border control regime does coerce 
outsiders in a morally relevant way. Preventative immigration laws impose 
coercive threats on would-be immigrants, and given that such threats violate 
their autonomy, they are owed a justification. 
This conclusion has a number of important implications for the Rawlsian 
relational account of the legitimacy of the people. Since a would-be immigrant is 
subject to coercion by the same scheme of political and legal institutions as the 
citizens of the state in which he wishes to settle, one rather obvious implication is 
that a state’s immigration policy should be based on a conception of justice that 
could reasonably be accepted by each of them (i.e. both the citizens and the 
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would-be immigrant). In other words: the would-be immigrant and the citizens of 
the state he permanently wishes to enter owe each other such a justification. 
The second implication bears directly on a comment I have made in the 
previous section. There, I have explained that the argument leading to the 
conclusion that Rawls’s (1) principles of distributive justice and (2) his 
contractualist method of justification are not global in scope does not support the 
further conclusion that their scope is necessarily limited to the domestic sphere 
of states. If the demands of justice – in the form of (1) and (2) – are limited to 
those individuals who stand in the relevant sort of institutional relationship, 
namely a coercive one, then the scope of coercive social interaction may but need 
not converge with the boundaries of currently existing states. In other words, 
though a world of states is legitimised by default, it may nevertheless be the case 
that a set of policies coercively enforced by a state still stands in need of 
justification not only with respect to its own citizens but also to certain 
foreigners. As the arguments in this section demonstrate, this is precisely the case 
with a state’s immigration policy (though not with its emigration and secession 
policies). It follows, then, that there is at least one respect in which the Rawlsian 
relational approach to justice can limit neither the scope of principles of justice 
nor the scope of the contractualist justification of these principles to the domestic 
sphere. This is so in the case of principles of just immigration. In the cases of 
emigration and secession, however, both the scope of principles of justice and the 
scope of the contractualist justification of these principles contingently converge 
with the boundaries of currently existing states. 
5.3.5 Rawlsian Contractualism, Democracy and the Legitimacy of the 
People 
Where does this leave us? It is now time to pull the threads together and answer 
the question whether a Rawlsian contractualist framework has the conceptual 
tools to solve the problem of the legitimacy of the people in a way that is strongly 
compatible with a democratic framework. Democracy, as I have said before, is 
frequently depicted as centring around the ideas of (1) a collectively self-
governing people and (2) collective self-government as an expression of the 
people’s common good. How do these ideas feature in Rawlsian contractualism? 
I have argued that Rawls’s relational approach to justice yields a particular 
principle of legitimacy: the All Coerced Principle. According to this principle, a 
coercive system of political and legal institutions is legitimate if and only if it is 
regulated by a public conception of justice, i.e. a set of principles of justice that all 
and only those individuals who are subject to it can reasonably be expected to 
agree to. Furthermore, I have explained that this contractualist idea of reasonable 
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agreement is an essential part of Rawls’s reflective equilibrium-based approach 
to moral justification, and that this reflective equilibrium-based approach is best 
understood as a democratic method for public justification. It depicts an ideal 
deliberative democratic discourse in which actual citizens of a democratic society 
through actual dialogue jointly determine the content of principles of justice. So, 
Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium constitutes a particular collective 
decision-making procedure. 
Moreover, the resulting public conception of justice – justice as fairness – 
accounts for the common good of a well-ordered society. According to Rawls, “the 
successful carrying out of just institutions is the shared final end of all the 
members of [a well-ordered] society, and these institutional forms are prized as 
good in themselves.”466 In contractualist views, such as Rawls’s, individuals have 
a highest-order desire to justify themselves to others and this is something they 
want for its own sake; it is an intrinsic desire. This means, as we have seen in 
Section 5.1.1, that it is not a desire for any particular object of action, but rather a 
desire to regulate the objects of one’s desires and their pursuit in ways (according 
to principles) none could reasonably reject. Furthermore, individuals share this 
highest-order desire in the sense that they undertake a mutual pre-commitment 
to cooperate with each other on terms that express their self-conception as free 
and equal moral persons. They do this most adequately by acting from (and 
complying with institutions enforcing) principles that can be the object of a wide 
reflective equilibrium. Consequently, since the Rawlsian contractualist common 
good corresponds (and gives substance) to the highest-order desire of the 
members of a well-ordered society, it is not instrumental to the realisation of 
individuals’ given interests, as is the case in contractrarian views (see Chapter 
4.5), but is, rather, constitutive and partially defining of individuals’ interests. 
It follows, then, that Rawlsian contractualism can be interpreted in 
democratic terms because it offers a democratic method of public justification 
aimed at articulating the common good of a public conception of justice for the 
basic structure of society, the substance of which is responsive to the intrinsic 
highest-order desire of individuals to interact in ways that all could reasonably 
accept. In so far as the ideas of (1) collective self-government (2) aimed at the 
realisation of a common good warrant talk of “democracy,” Rawlsian 
contractualism is democratic as well because it supports a particular 
interpretation of these ideas. 
Though Rawls’s reflective equilibrium-based approach to moral justification 
is fundamentally democratic, it says nothing about the scope of justification, i.e. 
about which set of individuals can participate in the democratic quest for 
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reflective equilibrium. But, as I have said before, it is essential to answer this 
question if we are to solve the problem of the legitimacy of the people. After all, 
the legitimacy of collective decision-making, especially concerning the proper 
demarcation of (peoples’) boundaries, depends, at least in good part, on the 
legitimacy of the demarcation of the relevant constituency. In Part 5.3 of this 
chapter, I have argued that Rawlsian contractualism can answer the question as 
to how to determine who constitute the people, and that it can do so in a way that 
is strongly compatible with a democratic framework. Here the All Coerced 
Principle plays an important role once more. In a Rawlsian contractualist 
framework, a coercive system of political and legal institutions is legitimate if it 
functions in ways that are consistent with the All Coerced Principle. Crucially, this 
principle does not only specify what kind of justification is required but also to 
whom this justification is owed. The demarcation of the people is legitimate if it is 
based on a public conception of justice, i.e. if it is regulated by a set of principles 
of justice that individuals can reasonably accept as the object of a wide reflective 
equilibrium. The scope of this democratic justification, i.e. the set of individuals 
who should be able to understand themselves as the authors of the rules 
regulating the demarcation of the people, is limited to all and only those 
individuals upon whom a scheme of political and legal institutions coercively 
imposes policies concerning the constitution of the people, such as those relating 
to emigration, immigration and secession. 
What this shows is that although the demarcation of the people is ultimately 
the outcome of a collective decision-making procedure (namely, the democratic 
quest for reflective equilibrium), the prior demarcation of the relevant 
constituency, i.e. the collective that is to determine who constitute the people, is 
not determined by appeal to democratic procedure, but rather by appeal to 
democratic theory (understood as an underlying set of normative values or ideals 
that justify democratic procedures). In a Rawlsian contractualist framework, that 
is to say, the demarcation of the relevant constituency is determined by the All 
Coerced Principle. And by demanding that political decisions, including those 
concerning the constitution of the people, ought to be made by all and only those 
individuals who are subject to its coercive effects, the All Coerced Principle offers 
a particular interpretation of the fundamental democratic value of autonomy 
(which entails that individuals ought not to be subjected to pure coercion, but 
that coercion should always be justified in such a way that they can reasonably 
regard it as being self-imposed).467 
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This enables me to conclude that Rawlsian contractualism offers an account 
of the legitimacy of the people that is strongly compatible with a democratic 
framework. It is so in the sense that the demarcation of the people is legitimised 
by appealing to the democratic method of reflective equilibrium, and that the 
prior demarcation of the relevant constituency is legitimised by appealing to an 
underlying democratic theory. In conclusion, then, the Rawlsian contractualist 
solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people succeeds because it 
appeals both to democratic procedure and theory. This completes my discussion 
of Rawlsian contractualism. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
legitimate constitution of the people, such as those pertaining to emigration, immigration and 
secession, merely being cases in point. This means that the All Coerced Principle has 
implications far broader than those uncovered in this dissertation. One interesting area to which 
the All Coerced Principle can be applied, for instance, is that of nuclear deterrence. According to 
this principle, a coercive system of political and legal institutions is legitimate if and only if it is 
regulated by a public conception of justice, i.e. a set of principles of justice that all and only those 
individuals who are subject to it can reasonably be expected to agree to. Following Arash 
Abizadeh, we can say that the coercion to which individuals are subjected by a scheme of legal 
and political institutions includes both “coercive acts” and “coercive threats.” A coercive act, he 
writes, “directly and preemptively deprives a person of some options that she would otherwise 
have had,” whereas a coercive threat “simply communicates the intention to undertake an action 
in the future whose (anticipated) effect is to prevent a person from choosing an option that she 
otherwise might choose.” In both cases, an individual is subjected to (either an act or threat of) 
coercion, and given that coercion invades one’s autonomy, this individual is owed a justification. 
See Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your 
Own Borders,” esp. p. 40. See also pp. 57-60. Applied to the case at hand – nuclear deterrence – it 
seems that nuclear deterrence can be qualified as a coercive threat, and so has to be justified 
with respect to all individuals against whom the threat is made. 
 235 
 
Chapter 6  
 
Conclusion 
6.1 Social Contract Theory and the Quest for the Legitimacy of the 
People: Acceptance and Impact-Based Solutions 
“Let us imagine a society (…) and then consider what form of government would 
be just for it,” Craig Calhoun writes in order to expose political theory’s blind spot 
for problems of political belonging by assuming nation-states to be the basis of 
politics.468 This dissertation has joined sides with Calhoun by claiming that social 
contract theory, which offers one of the most dominant normative frameworks 
for evaluating political structures and (interpersonal) acts, has altogether ignored 
the problem of political belonging. Regardless of which particular social contract 
theory one selects – and the historical overview in Chapter 2 has demonstrated 
that social contract theories come in many forms and shapes – it is without 
exception the case that they are not, and have not been, in the least concerned 
with normative questions concerning political membership. 
Classical social contract theorists have been primarily concerned with 
answering the normative question of how political authority can be established 
among a group of previously unattached individuals, rather than with confronting 
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the logically prior, and therefore more fundamental, normative question of “how 
determinate communities come to be set off from one another in the boundary-
less state of nature” in the first place.469 The same goes for modern social contract 
theorists, who have been, and still are, mainly interested in developing principles 
of justice, or of morality in general, among the citizens of an already existing 
political society, usually a democratic nation-state. They do not, however, 
confront the prior normative questions of how political societies can be 
demarcated legitimately, and why the nation-state is the proper political unit 
within which agreement on principles of justice is to be reached. Instead of 
answering these questions concerning the legitimate constitution of the people – 
which one would have expected them to confront – both classical and modern 
social contract theorists essentially work from the assumption of a given people: 
they simply presuppose what requires legitimisation, namely the existence of a 
delimited group of individuals, and subsequently ask how they could agree 
among themselves to establish a political and moral order. 
This dissertation has aimed at filling this gap in social contract theory, 
thereby making it a more complete moral theory. Doing so, however, is not only 
of theoretical significance. On the contrary, from a practical perspective, as I have 
explained extensively in Chapter 1, there is ample reason to embark on a quest 
for the legitimate constitution of the people as well. To see this, one only has to 
take a brief look at the many disputes that may, and historically do, arise 
concerning (the drawing of peoples’) boundaries. Disputes over secession and 
migration – phenomena which are becoming increasingly more common in an 
ever “shrinking globalising world” – essentially constitute specific articulations of 
the problem of the legitimacy of the people. This dissertation is practically 
relevant in that it has aimed at settling these disputes concerning the 
(re)constitution of the people from a social contractual perspective. 
Now, at first glance, these theoretical and practical aims might seem futile. 
There seems, after all, to be little point in approaching the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people from a social contractual perspective. Social contract 
theory works from the intuitive idea of agreement among free and equal 
individuals. The fundamental problem that seems to arise here is that social 
contract theory’s requirement of agreement reveals a commitment to the 
democratic idea of collective self-government, which, when applied to the 
constitution of the people, causes a social contract theoretical quest for the 
legitimacy of the people to result in an infinite regress. After all, before a 
collective decision can be made on the substantive issue as to who constitute the 
people, a prior decision has to be made as to whose consent is required. In order 
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to remain consistent, however, this prior decision, which will be determinative of 
the ensuing substantive issue, requires a collective decision for it to be legitimate 
as well. But, clearly, this only begs the question as to whose consent is required 
once more, thus causing an infinite regress of decision-making procedures from 
which no procedural escape is possible. As a result, democracy as collective self-
legislation appears essentially to be impossible as a legitimate form of rule, for 
the very constitution of the people that embodies sovereignty cannot itself be 
established in a democratically legitimate way. 
Based on my analysis of social contract theory, however, we can now see that 
this point of view is incorrect. I have argued, first, that the claim that the quest for 
the democratic legitimacy of the people is bound to fail, holds if and only if it turns 
out to be impossible to provide a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people that is strongly (as opposed to weakly) compatible with a democratic 
framework. Next, and building on a distinction between democratic theory, 
understood as a set of substantive values or normative ideals, and democratic 
method, understood as a set of procedures for collective decision-making that can 
be derived from these values or ideals, I have argued that such a strong solution 
can, at least in theory, take two forms. A solution to the problem of the legitimacy 
of the people can be said to be strongly compatible with a democratic framework: 
(1) if the legitimate demarcation of the people is the outcome of a collective 
decision-making procedure that does not cause an infinite regress; or (2) if the 
legitimate demarcation of the people is derived from a particular democratic 
theory. As a result, the aim of this dissertation has been to answer the question 
whether it is possible to provide such a strong solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of the people. I have argued that it is indeed possible to meet this 
challenge. The gap that is generally supposed to lie at the heart of democracy can 
actually be closed by each of the three types of social contract views identified 
and discussed in this dissertation: Lockean political voluntarism, 
contractarianism and Rawlsian contractualism. 
In Chapter 3, I have developed a Lockean political voluntarist approach to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people. This kind of social contract view is 
premised on the idea that individuals are naturally free in the sense that they all 
have a natural right to political self-determination. Given that this right entails 
both a negative claim right to be free from political bonds and a positive liberty 
right to acquire political bonds, it follows that the constitution of the people ought 
to be consistent with the so-called None Rejected Principle. According to this 
principle, the group of individuals that sets itself apart and binds itself together as 
a people ought to include all and only those individuals each of whom is not 
rejected by any of the others as a member. 
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Chapter 4 centred around the Hobbesian or contractarian approach to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people. Contractarians endorse the view that 
moral principles are justifiable if they can be the object of a rational compromise 
or mutually advantageous agreement among utility-maximising individuals 
whose (given) interests are partially overlapping and conflicting. This rational 
compromise is the outcome of a bargaining procedure which I have referred to as 
the “Open and Serial Consensual Binding procedure” (OSCB-procedure). This 
procedure yields a particular account of the legitimacy of the people: the people 
are a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, and accordingly consist of all and 
only those individuals for whom it is mutually beneficial to bind themselves 
together. 
What Lockean political voluntarism and contractarianism have in common is 
that their acceptance-based solutions to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
people, as we may call these, do not result in an infinite regress. This, I have 
argued, is due to the open and serial character of their acceptance procedures. 
The Lockean None Rejected Principle assumes a foundational situation in which 
potential members choose each other openly and freely. What this means is that 
the None Rejected Principle yields an acceptance procedure that is open and 
serial in the sense that all individuals who are in the state of nature with respect 
to one another are always free to approach each other in order to find out 
whether they are (un)acceptable to one another as members of the people. The 
same goes for the contractarian acceptance procedure in which the open and 
serial process of consensual binding establishes a perfectly inclusionary push: 
since every individual is a potential partner for mutually advantageous 
cooperation, it is rational to engage in a bargaining process for any free and equal 
utility-maximising individuals who happen to encounter each other. The 
conjunction of the open and serial character in both the Lockean and 
contractarian acceptance procedures ensures that nobody is excluded a priori 
from the decision-making process – the only limitation on inclusion being that 
individuals actually come across each other. If individuals would be excluded 
from the collective decision-making procedure, then it would already presuppose 
the us/them distinction that it is meant to generate, and this would indeed trigger 
an infinite regress of collective decision-making procedures presupposing prior 
collective decision-making procedures necessary to legitimise the posterior ones. 
However, since nobody is excluded from the outset in either the Lockean political 
voluntarist view or the contractarian view, the people are not presupposed by but 
instead the genuine result of their acceptance procedures, and so the infinite 
regress never arises because the necessity of legitimising a “presupposed” 
us/them distinction is wholly absent. 
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Furthermore, in so far as democracy centres around the ideas of (1) a 
collectively self-governing people and (2) collective self-government as an 
expression of the people’s common good, I have argued that both the Lockean and 
contractarian acceptance-based solutions to the problem of the legitimacy are 
democratic. I have argued that the kind of contractarianism that is predicated on 
the idea of social (as opposed to individual) agreement is democratic because it 
supports a particular interpretation of these ideas. In the case of social 
contractarianism, the decision whether or not to engage in mutually 
advantageous cooperation is democratic: first, because it is the result of a 
collective decision-making process which involves bargaining among all (as 
opposed to paired subsets of) potential members of a people who happen to have 
met each other; and second, because this collective decision-making process is 
aimed at creating and sustaining a common good that is instrumental to the 
realisation of the given interests of those individuals participating in it. 
The Lockean political voluntarist acceptance procedure is democratic as well. 
The None Rejected Principle generates a democratic procedure, according to 
which the legitimate constitution of the people is based on multilateral acts of 
consent on the part of all and only those individuals who do not reject each other 
as a member of it. However, the democratic moment in the Lockean political 
voluntarist account of the constitution of the people is rather limited in 
comparison to that in the contractarian account. The conditions under which any 
number of individuals can bind themselves to one another are not the object of a 
rational compromise, as is the case with contractarianism (nor are they the object 
of reasonable consensus, as is the case with Rawlsian contractualism). Rather, 
these conditions are derived from natural law. Though individuals can 
deliberately and voluntarily agree with one another to become politically bound, 
natural law specifies the nature of their political relationships: if they decide to 
bind themselves to one another as a people, then natural law requires that they 
all give up their natural freedom and transfer it to a common political authority 
for the sole purpose of preserving their property (i.e. life, liberty and estate). 
The crucial difference, then, between both views is this. In a contractarian 
view, which is based on a subjective theory of value, the common good is a social 
construction or human artefact. In a Lockean political voluntarist view, which is 
based on an objective theory of value, the common good is not the object of a 
rational compromise but instead reflects the eternal rules of an independently 
existing natural moral order. So, whereas the democratic moment in the Lockean 
political voluntarist (re)constitution of the people merely concerns the people’s 
composition, the democratic moment in the contractarian (re)constitution of the 
people concerns the composition of the people, as well as the set of rules (i.e. the 
common good) regulating the people. 
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What this comparative analysis ultimately shows, however, is that Lockean 
political voluntarism and contractarianism are both capable of providing an 
account of the legitimate constitution of the people that is strongly compatible 
with a democratic framework. Both social contract views are so in the sense that 
their acceptance-based solutions to the problem of the legitimacy of the people 
are procedurally democratic and do not cause an infinite regress. 
Let us now turn to the Rawlsian contractualist account of the legitimacy of the 
people. Whereas Lockean political voluntarism and contractarianism offer 
acceptance-based solutions to the problem of the legitimacy of the people, 
Rawlsian contractualism, by contrast, offers what might be called an impact-based 
solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people. In Chapter 5, I have argued 
that Rawls defends a relational approach to justice. This means that principles of 
justice apply to, and have to be justified to, all and only those individuals who 
stand in a particular relationship. The morally relevant kind of tie here is an 
institutional one in which a set of individuals is subject to the same coercive basic 
structure (i.e. a scheme of political and legal institutions). Consequently, Rawls’s 
relational approach to justice yields a particular principle of legitimacy: the All 
Coerced Principle. According to this principle, a coercive system of political and 
legal institutions is legitimate if and only if it is regulated by a public conception 
of justice, i.e. a set of principles of justice that all and only those individuals who 
are subject to its coercive effects can reasonably be expected to agree to. 
I have argued, furthermore, that this contractualist idea of reasonable 
agreement is an essential part of Rawls’s reflective equilibrium-based approach 
to moral justification, and that this approach is in turn best understood as a 
democratic method for public justification. It depicts an ideal deliberative 
democratic discourse in which actual citizens of a democratic society through 
actual dialogue jointly determine the content of principles of justice. So, Rawls’s 
method of reflective equilibrium constitutes a specific collective decision-making 
procedure. 
In a Rawlsian contractualist view, then, the demarcation of the people is 
legitimate if it is based on a public conception of justice, i.e. if it is regulated by a 
set of principles of justice that individuals can reasonably accept as the object of a 
wide reflective equilibrium. The scope of this democratic justification, i.e. the set 
of individuals who should be able to understand themselves as the authors of the 
rules regulating the demarcation of the people, is limited by the All Coerced 
Principle to all and only those individuals upon whom a scheme of political and 
legal institutions coercively imposes policies concerning the constitution of the 
people, such as those relating to emigration, immigration and secession. 
What this shows, however, is that the Rawlsian contractualist impact-based 
solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people, unlike the Lockean 
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political voluntarist and contractarian acceptance-based solutions, does a priori 
exclude individuals from participating in the collective decision-making 
procedure that is supposed to legitimise the demarcation of the people. 
Consequently, the Rawlsian collective decision-making procedure already 
presupposes the us/them distinction that it is meant to generate, and this 
requires legitimisation. This legitimisation is unnecessary in the case of Lockean 
political voluntarism and contractarianism, because in these views the people are 
not presupposed by but instead the genuine result of democratic acceptance 
procedures. In the case of Rawlsian contractualism, however, a legitimisation is 
required. We have seen that any attempt to legitimise this presupposed us/them 
distinction by appeal to a prior collective decision would trigger an infinite 
regress from which no procedural escape is possible. Interestingly, however, 
Rawlsian contractualism legitimises the us/them distinction not by appealing to 
democratic procedure but rather by appealing to democratic theory. In a 
Rawlsian contractualist view, the demarcation of the set of individuals that ought 
to be allowed to participate in the collective decision-making procedure that is 
supposed to legitimise the demarcation of the people, is legitimised by the All 
Coerced Principle. And by requiring that those who are subject to coercion have a 
right to democratic justification, this principle offers a specific interpretation of 
the democratic value of individual autonomy. 
It follows, then, that Rawlsian contractualism offers an impact-based solution 
to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that is strongly compatible with a 
democratic framework. It is so in the following sense: the demarcation of the 
people is legitimised by appealing to the democratic method of reflective 
equilibrium, and the prior demarcation of the relevant constituency is legitimised 
by appealing to an underlying democratic theory. 
6.2 In Defence of the Rawlsian Contractualist Legitimisation of the 
People 
Each of the three types of social contract theories discussed in this dissertation – 
Lockean political voluntarism, contractarianism and Rawlsian contractualism – is 
capable of providing a solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people that 
is strongly compatible with a democratic framework. This raises the question as 
to which one of these democratic solutions should ultimately be preferred and 
why (i.e. on the basis of which criteria)? I shall answer this question by means of 
a reflection on the idea of democracy. In this dissertation, I have defined 
democracy as centring around the ideas of a collectively self-governing people, 
and collective self-government aimed at the realisation of the people’s common 
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good. I shall reflect on four aspects of this idea of democracy: (1) the scope of 
collective self-government, (2) the relationship between collective self-
government and the common good, (3) the conditions of legitimate collective self-
government and (4) the value of individual autonomy. By defining each of these 
aspects of the idea of democracy in increasingly more demanding terms, I shall 
argue that it becomes possible to explain which one of the three social contractual 
accounts of the legitimacy of the people should in the end be preferred. 
Let us start, then, with a reflection on the scope of collective government. In 
Chapter 1.1, I have argued that if one appeals to a democratic framework for 
guidance on the best political institutions and decision-making procedures to be 
adopted, then one should, in order to remain consistent, demand not only that 
decisions within an already constituted people (whose domain is fixed) be made 
democratically, but also that the decision as to who is included in the collectively 
self-governing political unit be made democratically. The reverse is, of course, 
true as well. If we are committed to democracy as a general account of legitimate 
political decision-making, then we cannot consistently limit the scope of 
collective self-government either to the particular decision as to who constitute 
the people or to any (subsequent) particular decisions that will have to be made 
within the demarcated people. 
Do contractarianism, Rawlsian contractualism and Lockean political 
voluntarism offer general accounts of (the scope of) collective self-government? 
Central to contractarianism is the idea that social structures of cooperative 
interaction between individuals are justified only in so far as they are based on 
their mutual consent; and their mutual consent, in turn, is justified in terms of the 
given interests of each of them. On the version of contractarianism defended by 
me (in Chapter 4.4 and 4.7), it is impossible to determine in the abstract, i.e. prior 
to individuals actually engaging in a bargaining process, which cooperative 
arrangements are mutually advantageous (and thus acceptable) for which set(s) 
of individuals. Since the people are a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it 
follows that both the decision as to who constitute the people and any subsequent 
decisions that will have to be made within this demarcated people have to be the 
outcome of an actual bargaining process. And since this bargaining process is best 
understood as a specific form of collective self-government, contractarianism is 
committed to the idea of democracy as a general account of legitimate political 
decision-making.470 
                                                   
470 In this sense my version of contractarianism differs fundamentally from Hobbes’s version. He 
distinguishes three kinds of sovereigns: a monarchy (one representative), a democracy (a 
representative assembly of all) and an aristocracy (a representative assembly of a part of all). 
Since democracy is inferior to monarchy in Hobbes’s view, his version of contractarianism limits 
the scope of collective self-government to the particular decision concerning the constitution of 
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The same goes for Rawlsian contractualism. The All Coerced Principle (that is 
central to this relational approach to justice) stipulates that a coercive system of 
political and legal institutions is legitimate if and only if it is regulated by a public 
conception of justice, i.e. a set of principles of justice that all and only those 
individuals who are subject to it can reasonably be expected to agree to. This 
contractualist idea of reasonable agreement is part of Rawls’s reflective 
equilibrium-based approach to moral justification, and this reflective 
equilibrium-based approach is best understood as a democratic method for 
public justification. It depicts, in conjunction with the All Coerced Principle, an 
ideal deliberative democratic discourse in which those individuals who are 
subject to a common coercive system of political and legal institutions jointly 
determine the content of principles of justice through actual dialogue. Since all 
public policies coercively imposed by a state – regardless of whether they are 
related to the constitution of the people or not – ought to be based on a public 
conception of justice that is the object of reflective equilibrium, it follows that 
Rawlsian contractualism, just like contractarianism, is committed to the idea of 
democracy as a general account of legitimate political decision-making. 
Unlike contractarianism and Rawlsian contractualism, however, Lockean 
political voluntarism does not necessarily entail that both the decision concerning 
the demarcation of the people and any subsequent decisions that will have to be 
made within this demarcated people should be the outcome of a collective 
decision-making process. Locke, for instance, does not require but instead merely 
allows for the possibility of democratic decision-making within a democratically 
demarcated people.471 His version of political voluntarism remains silent on the 
particular form that the government of a particular society ought to have. It only 
demands that a government, regardless of its form, must on balance be just, and 
that an individual’s subjection to a government, again irrespective of its form, 
should be voluntary. So, if the idea of democracy requires (and not merely allows) 
that the scope of collective self-government is general, then it follows that 
contractarianism and Rawlsian contractualism should be preferred to Lockean 
political voluntarism.  
Turn now to the second aspect of the idea of democracy: the relationship 
between collective self-government and the common good. According to the 
democratic logic, in which the doctrine of popular sovereignty takes centre stage, 
the common good tracks the will of the people. Consequently, the notions of 
                                                                                                                                                               
the people. Consequently, Hobbes’s contractarianism is not committed to the idea of democracy 
as a general account of legitimate political decision-making. See Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 19, pp. 
129-138. 
471 Locke, in fact, allows for various forms of government, of which democracy is but one 
possibility. Locke, II, 132. 
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collective self-government and the common good are intrinsically tied to one 
another; that is to say, it is by means of a collective decision-making procedure 
that the people jointly determine the nature of their common good. A Lockean 
political voluntarist framework, however, operates (as we have seen in Chapter 
3.2), for the most part, from a liberal logic in which the doctrine of the rule of law 
takes centre stage. Here individuals should be able to understand themselves as 
the authors of their political relationships only but not of the laws regulating their 
political ties. Here the common good, which comes in the form of a set of rights 
and obligations, does not track the will of the people but instead natural law. 
Though individuals can agree with one another to become politically bound, 
natural law specifies the nature of their political relationship: if they decide to 
bind themselves to one another as a people, however, then the fundamental 
natural law demands that all individuals involved (conditionally) give up their 
natural right to execute the natural law, and transfer it to a common political 
authority to which they subject themselves as the supreme interpreter, judge and 
enforcer of natural law. Although this political authority can (but does not have 
to) be of a democratic kind in a Lockean political voluntarist framework, that 
does not change the fact that natural law is still sovereign. The reason for this is 
that the government of a Lockean society, even when it is democratic, has to act in 
accordance with natural law. In a Lockean framework, then, the relationship 
between collective self-government and the common good becomes disentangled, 
and collective self-government acquires a rather limited meaning: the people rule 
themselves in a way consistent with natural law, which provides the ultimate 
standard for the general regulation of political society. 
The democratic logic, however, requires more than this, and it does so 
precisely because it conceives of collective self-government and the common 
good as intrinsically connected. It demands that the people rule themselves in 
accordance with self-imposed laws (as opposed to externally imposed natural 
laws). That is to say, they should be able to understand themselves as the authors 
of the laws regulating their society. What is interesting to see here is that 
contractarianism and Rawlsian contractualism, unlike Lockean political 
voluntarism, preserve the intrinsic relationship between collective self-
government and the common good. In a contractarian view, this is so because it 
offers a democratic bargaining procedure that aims at establishing and regulating 
forms of cooperative interaction through which common goods are created and 
sustained that are instrumental to the realisation of the interests of individuals 
(endowed with a maximising conception of practical rationality). In a Rawlsian 
contractualist view, the intrinsic relation between collective self-government and 
the common good is also preserved, because it offers a democratic method of 
public justification – namely, the (wide) reflective equilibrium approach – that 
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aims at articulating the common good of a public conception of justice for the 
basic structure of a democratic society, the substance of which is responsive to 
the highest-order desire of free and equal individuals to interact with others in 
ways that all can reasonably accept. 
If we define democracy merely as collective self-government aimed at the 
realisation of a common good without making any further demands concerning 
the nature and derivation of the common good, then each of the three social 
contract views identified is democratic. Suppose, however, that we do make such 
further demands by defining democracy as collective self-government aimed at 
the realisation of a self-imposed common good (thus understanding the common 
good as being derived from the people’s will rather than from an externally 
imposed natural law). In that case, Lockean political voluntarism is insufficiently 
democratic and should, consequently, be rejected (once more) in favour of its 
contractarian and Rawlsian contractualist counterparts (which are both 
sufficiently democratic). 
Consider next the third aspect of the idea of democracy: the conditions of 
legitimate collective self-government. Central to democracy is the idea that 
individuals should be able to understand themselves as the authors of laws. 
Otherwise, these laws are coercively imposed on them and this violates the 
fundamental democratic value of individual autonomy. Consequently, the 
outcomes of collective decision-making procedures are legitimate if they track the 
will of those individuals who (ought to) participate in it. This democratic 
requirement is reflected by the contractarian idea of a rational (i.e. mutually 
advantageous) compromise and the Rawlsian contractualist idea of reasonable 
consensus. 
It might be argued, however, that the idea of democracy requires more than 
mere agreement. After all, the fact that a collective decision is based on 
multilateral acts of consent does not yet guarantee that it is non-coercive. This is 
so because an agreement can still be exploitative. The nature of an exploitative 
agreement is such that it is coercively extracted by the stronger from the weaker 
party (and contains harsh terms). It is typical of this kind of agreement that the 
coercion or duress involved does not stem from threats of violence or force, but 
rather from the unequal bargaining position of the parties to the contract itself, 
and the unfair advantage taken of that inequality by one of the parties in contract. 
If this is correct, then it follows that, although all parties signed the contract, their 
agreement is nonetheless democratically illegitimate because it violates the 
autonomy of the weaker party. 
Here an important difference between contractarian and Rawlsian 
contractualist views comes to the surface. In a Rawlsian contractualist view, as 
we have seen in Chapter 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, individuals have a highest-order desire 
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to regulate the objects of their desires, as well as the ways in which these are 
pursued, on the basis of principles that no one could reasonably reject as a basis 
for informed, unforced general agreement. It follows that individuals, thus 
motivated, are neither willing to coerce others into an agreement by means of 
threats or force or violence, nor prepared to exploit others by taking unfair 
advantage of their relatively weak bargaining position in contract. What this 
means is that Rawlsian contractualism unconditionally tracks the democratic 
value of individual autonomy. 
Contractarianism, however, tracks this democratic value in a significantly 
different way. I have argued that an internally consistent and coherent form of 
contractarianism should not assume that individuals take no interest in the 
interests of any others at all or in the interests of those with whom they interact 
only – i.e. we should reject the motivational assumptions of mutual unconcern 
and non-tuism. Instead, it should embrace a minimalist conception of 
instrumental rationality which merely involves the maximisation of coherent and 
agent-relative preference (and so remains agnostic regarding the objects of 
individuals’ preferences). I have demonstrated that contractarians, by endorsing 
this minimalist conception of practical rationality, can seriously maintain that it 
may be perfectly rational for utility-maximising individuals to grant moral 
standing to the weak, and that this can mean that the weak are agreeable as 
parties to non-exploitative agreements. I deliberately say “can,” however, because 
the weak will only acquire moral standing if their interests are the object of the 
preferences of the strong. This is a theoretical possibility but it may not be an 
actuality. Consequently, contractarianism does not unconditionally track the 
democratic value of individual autonomy but merely contingently. 
If we are committed to the democratic view that non-coercive agreement is a 
condition of legitimate collective self-government, then it seems that Rawlsian 
contractualism should be preferred to contractarianism. To this, of course, 
contractarians could reply by saying that it is not a weakness of their theory that 
it is only capable of contingently tracking the democratic value of individual 
autonomy. Indeed, they could argue that morality – or in this case, collective self-
government compatible with the democratic value of individual autonomy – is 
impossible if individuals are not equals by nature and if they do not take any 
interest in the interests of others. But although this element of contingency is 
essential to a correct contractarian view, as I have argued in Chapter 4.7, it does 
not follow that contractarianism is necessarily a correct (moral) view. In order to 
see this, it is worthwhile to reflect briefly on the nature of the maximising 
conception of practical rationality that lies at the very heart of contractarianism. 
In a contractarian view, an individual is conceived of as a homo economicus 
who interacts with others on the basis of economically rational considerations. 
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This means, as we have seen in Chapter 4.7, that an individual acts in such a way 
as to maximise the (expected) satisfaction of his coherent and agent-relative 
preferences. How should we characterise this maximising conception of practical 
rationality? We have seen that contractarianism’s fundamental aim is to derive 
morality from the non-moral premises of rational choice. It follows that the 
contractarian account of practical reason itself cannot be characterised in 
normative terms. For in that case, the entire contractarian enterprise would be 
compromised from the very outset; if individuals ought to act instrumentally 
rational, then morality is no longer derived from non-moral premises. If the 
contractarian enterprise is to make any sense, then it seems that the maximising 
conception of practical reason on which it is built should be taken to refer to an 
underlying empirical, or more precisely, philosophical anthropological account of 
the nature of human beings and their interpersonal relationships. In that case, 
individuals are conceived of as beings who are maximisers of coherent and agent-
relative preference only, and who do interact with others solely on the basis of 
economically rational considerations. However, this way of characterising the 
contractarian maximising conception of practical reason is also problematic 
because the underlying philosophical anthropology is empirically false. An 
individual’s capacity for practical reason is not limited to means-ends reasoning. 
In fact, contractualists are right in claiming that individuals’ capacity for practical 
reason contains both a rational and reasonable element. They are capable not 
only of acting economically rational, i.e. of taking effective means towards the 
realisation of the objects of their desires, but also of regulating the objects of their 
desires and their pursuit in ways (according to principles) that others could 
reasonably accept. 
Granted, the contractualist claims more than this: he defends the view that 
individuals do not only have this dual capacity for practical reason, but also a 
fundamental highest-order desire (or meta-preference) for realising it. However, 
the contractualist’s claim concerning what he thinks it is we desire is irrelevant 
here. What is relevant, rather, is what we ourselves desire. If we acknowledge the 
fact that individuals have a dual capacity for practical reason, then we have no 
choice but to ask ourselves the following practical, indeed moral, question: “What 
kind of person can we most closely identify with and do we finally want to come 
to be?”472 Do we conceive of ourselves as individuals who can, and do, take 
responsibility for their desires, characters and social relations by proposing, and 
acting from, principles for the general regulation of interpersonal relations that 
other similarly motivated individuals can reasonably accept as a basis for 
informed, unforced agreement? Or, alternatively, do we conceive of ourselves as 
                                                   
472 Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy, p. 44. 
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individuals who merely want to maximise expected utility by proposing, and 
acting in accordance with, principles for the general regulation of interpersonal 
relations that are instrumental to the realisation of their given desires (without 
regard to their origin or what they are desires for)? This is a moral question 
because of the significant implications it has for the way in which political 
relationships between individuals should be regulated. The answer to this 
question – whether we conceive of ourselves as contractualists or contractarians 
– determines, for instance, the substantive issue concerning the legitimate 
demarcation of the people. 
If we want to be (or act) as autonomously as possible, and now I come to the 
fourth aspect of the idea of democracy, I think we should adopt the Rawlsian 
contractualist disposition, the reason being that a person acting from the 
Rawlsian contractualist disposition is more autonomous than a person acting 
from the contractarian disposition. Unlike the latter, the former person does not 
merely want his life and interpersonal relationships to be regulated by whatever 
principles that happen to be in accordance with his contingently held desires 
(without regard to their origin or what they are desires for). Rather, he wants to 
take control over his desires by regulating the objects of his desires, as well as 
their pursuit, in ways that other similarly motivated individuals can reasonably 
accept. In other words, the scope of his autonomy is wider: he is rational and 
reasonable. 
In conclusion, then, I have developed three social contractual solutions to the 
problem of the legitimacy of the people that are strongly compatible with a 
democratic framework. Now, (1) if we accept the democratic idea that the scope 
of collective self-government should be general; (2) if we accept the democratic 
idea that the relationship between collective self-government and the common 
good should be intrinsic; (3) if we do not wish to live in a society in which 
legitimate, i.e. non-coercive, self-government is a mere theoretical possibility but 
(always) actuality; and, finally, (4) if we want to be fully autonomous moral 
agents; (5) then we are committed to Rawlsian contractualism, as well as its 
solution to the problem of the legitimacy of the people. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Een klassieke vraag die in de politieke filosofie wordt gesteld, is onder welke 
voorwaarden individuen een morele plicht hebben om de staat te gehoorzamen. 
Deze vraag wordt in democratische theorieën van politieke legitimiteit 
beantwoord door te verwijzen naar het idee van volkssoevereiniteit. Volgens deze 
theorieën is een staat slechts legitiem als haar burgers zichzelf als auteurs in de 
wetten kunnen herkennen waaraan zij zijn onderworpen. Het beeld dat hier 
wordt geschetst, is dat van een politieke samenleving waarin het volk (dèmos), 
als bron van legitiem politiek gezag, zichzelf op collectieve wijze bestuurt. 
Een vraag die binnen democratische theorieën van politieke legitimiteit 
echter nauwelijks wordt gesteld – laat staan beantwoord – is die naar de 
legitimiteit van het volk zelf. In plaats van zich te richten op de klassieke vraag 
naar het volk als bron van legitimiteit, richt deze dissertatie zich op de logisch 
daaraan voorafgaande, en derhalve fundamentelere, vraag hoe het volk zelf op 
legitieme wijze geconstitueerd kan worden. Dat wil zeggen, wat is de legitieme 
afbakening van de politieke eenheden (dèmoi) waarbinnen democratie 
gepraktiseerd wordt? Kortom, in deze dissertatie wordt het volk als het object 
van legitimiteit begrepen. 
Hoewel deze vraag naar de legitimiteit van het volk binnen de politieke 
filosofie tot op heden nauwelijks aandacht heeft gekregen, is zij maatschappelijk 
uiterst relevant. Zo komt het probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk concreet 
tot uiting in conflicten over secessie en migratie – conflicten die als gevolg van 
processen van globalisering steeds vaker voorkomen. Deze dissertatie beoogt een 
bijdrage te leveren aan een democratische oplossing van deze conflicten over de 
afbakening van volken. 
In de wetenschappelijke literatuur wordt doorgaans beargumenteerd dat het 
volk niet op democratische wijze kan worden afgebakend. De redenering daarbij 
is als volgt. Voordat een collectief besluit genomen kan worden over de vraag 
welke individuen deel uitmaken van het volk, moet eerst een besluit genomen 
worden over de vraag welke individuen tot het collectief behoren. Om 
democratisch legitiem te zijn, dient dit besluit echter op collectieve wijze tot 
stand te komen. Dit roept wederom de vraag op welke individuen deel uitmaken 
van het collectief en leidt daarmee tot een oneindige regressie van collectieve 
besluitvormingsprocedures. 
In deze dissertatie beargumenteer ik dat het wel degelijk mogelijk is om het 
probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk op democratische wijze op te lossen. Ik 
hanteer daarbij om drie redenen een sociaal contracttheoretisch perspectief. 
Allereerst is de sociaal contracttheorie in de politieke filosofie een van de meest 
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dominante modellen voor het normatief verantwoorden van politieke structuren 
en (interpersoonlijke) handelingen. Daarnaast vloeit het moderne democratische 
gedachtegoed voort uit de traditie van het sociaal contract denken. Hierdoor ligt 
het voor de hand om de zoektocht naar de legitimiteit van het volk te 
ondernemen met behulp van de conceptuele middelen die deze traditie bevat. Tot 
slot stelt de keuze voor een sociaal contracttheoretisch perspectief mij niet alleen 
in staat een hiaat binnen de theorievorming over democratie maar ook binnen de 
sociaal contracttheorie op te vullen. Zowel klassieke als moderne sociaal 
contracttheoretici hebben namelijk de fundamentele vraag naar de legitieme 
afbakening van het volk genegeerd. Zij hanteren de zogenaamde assumptie van 
een gegeven volk. Dit betekent dat zij veronderstellen wat gelegitimeerd dient te 
worden, namelijk het bestaan van een reeds afgebakende groep individuen. 
Na de probleemstelling van mijn onderzoek in hoofdstuk 1 uiteengezet te 
hebben, presenteer ik in hoofdstuk 2 op basis van een historisch overzicht drie 
typen sociaal contracttheorieën: (a) het Lockeaans politiek voluntarisme, (b) de 
Hobbesiaanse sociaal contracttheorie en (c) de Kantiaanse sociaal 
contracttheorie. Deze driedeling maakt een meer systematische analyse van het 
probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk mogelijk. In hoofdstuk 3, 4 en 5 
beargumenteer ik vervolgens dat elk van deze drie typen sociaal 
contracttheorieën in staat is het probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk op 
democratische wijze op te lossen. 
In hoofdstuk 3 ontwikkel ik een Lockeaans politiek-voluntaristische 
benadering van het probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk. Het centrale 
uitgangspunt van dit op het natuurrecht gebaseerde type sociaal contracttheorie 
is dat individuen “van nature” vrij zijn. Om de aard van deze natuurlijke vrijheid 
te kunnen begrijpen, maak ik gebruik van het Hohfeldiaanse onderscheid tussen 
claimrechten en vrijheidsrechten. Zowel een claimrecht als vrijheidsrecht op x 
verwijzen naar de vrijheid van een individu om x te doen of te hebben. In het 
geval van een claimrecht correleert deze vrijheid met een plicht voor anderen om 
daar niet mee te interfereren (in het geval van een negatief claimrecht) of het 
individu zelfs in staat te stellen x te doen of te hebben (in het geval van een 
positief claimrecht), terwijl dit niet zo is in het geval van een vrijheidsrecht. Op 
basis van dit onderscheid beargumenteer ik dat de Lockeaanse natuurlijke 
vrijheid verwijst naar het negatieve natuurlijke claimrecht op persoonlijke 
zelfbeschikking. Onder dit recht valt ook het natuurlijke claimrecht op politieke 
zelfbeschikking. Dit natuurlijke recht omhelst zowel een negatief claimrecht om 
vrij te zijn van politieke banden als een positief vrijheidsrecht om politieke 
banden aan te gaan. Hieruit volgt dat de afbakening van het volk overeen dient te 
stemmen met het zogenaamde Geen Afgewezenen Principe. Volgens dit principe 
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behoort het volk te bestaan uit enkel en alleen die individuen die elkaar niet 
afwijzen als leden. 
In hoofdstuk 4 richt ik mij op de Hobbesiaanse sociaal contracttheoretische 
benadering van het probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk. Kenmerkend voor 
dit type contracttheorie is dat moraliteit wordt afgeleid uit de non-morele 
premissen van rationele keuze. Aangezien moraliteit in een dergelijke 
contracttheorie wordt gereduceerd tot economische of instrumentele 
rationaliteit, zijn morele principes gerechtvaardigd als zij het object zijn van een 
rationeel compromis tussen individuen die hun nut – dat wil zeggen, de verwachte 
bevrediging van hun agent-relatieve, coherente preferenties (die als gegeven 
worden beschouwd) – te maximaliseren. Dit rationele compromis is de uitkomst 
van een onderhandelingsproces, waarnaar ik verwijs als de Open en Seriële 
Consensuele Bindingsprocedure. Deze procedure genereert een specifieke 
Hobbesiaanse contracttheoretische legitimatie van het volk: het volk wordt 
beschouwd als een wederzijds voordelig samenwerkingsverband waarvan de 
afbakening het steeds tijdelijke resultaat is van een aaneenschakeling van 
wederkerige instemmingshandelingen van enkel en alleen die individuen voor 
wie het wederzijds voordelig is om zich aan elkaar te binden. 
Wat de Lockeaanse en Hobbesiaanse sociaal contracttheorieën met elkaar 
gemeen hebben, is dat hun zogenaamde op wederzijdse acceptatie gebaseerde 
oplossingen voor het probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk verenigbaar zijn 
met een democratisch raamwerk. Beide sociaal contracttheorieën bieden 
namelijk een procedureel-democratische oplossing voor het probleem van de 
legitimiteit van het volk die niet leidt tot een oneindige regressie. Dit is een gevolg 
van het open en seriële karakter van beide acceptatieprocedures. Dat wil zeggen, 
het is een voortvloeisel van de in beide procedures ingebouwde vereisten dat zij 
voor iedereen toegankelijk dienen te zijn en op elk moment heropend dienen te 
kunnen worden. Het Lockeaanse Geen Afgewezenen Principe veronderstelt een 
uitgangspositie waarin potentiële leden van een volk elkaar “openlijk” en “vrij” 
kiezen. Dit betekent dat het Lockeaanse Geen Afgewezenen Principe een 
acceptatieprocedure genereert die open en serieel is in de zin dat het individuen 
altijd geheel vrij staat elkaar te benaderen met als doel te achterhalen of zij al dan 
niet wederzijds acceptabel zijn als leden van hetzelfde volk. Hetzelfde geldt voor 
de Hobbesiaanse acceptatieprocedure. Aangezien elk individu een potentiële 
partner is voor wederzijds voordelige samenwerking, is het rationeel voor vrije 
en gelijke, nutsmaximaliserende individuen om een onderhandelingsprocedure te 
accepteren die voor iedereen toegankelijk is en op elk moment heropend kan 
worden. De verwerping van het open en seriële karakter van de 
onderhandelingen is onverenigbaar met het idee van rationele samenwerking. 
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Het samengaan van het open en seriële karakter in zowel de Lockeaanse als 
de Hobbesiaanse wederzijdse acceptatieprocedure garandeert dat geen enkel 
individu a priori wordt uitgesloten van het besluitvormingsproces. Als individuen 
bij voorbaat uitgesloten zouden worden van de besluitvormingsprocedure, dan 
zou het wij/zij onderscheid dat deze procedure dient te genereren reeds daarin 
voorondersteld worden. Dit zou een oneindige regressie van collectieve 
besluitvormingsprocedures tot gevolg hebben. Echter, aangezien er in zowel de 
Lockeaanse als de Hobbesiaanse conttracttheorie niemand bij voorbaat wordt 
uitgesloten, wordt het volk niet reeds door hun acceptatieprocedures 
voorondersteld, maar is het volk het daadwerkelijke resultaat van deze 
procedures. Het gevolg hiervan is dat er geen oneindige regressie ontstaat, omdat 
de noodzaak tot het legitimeren van een “voorondersteld” wij/zij onderscheid 
geheel afwezig is. 
Voor zover democratie verwijst naar de ideeën van (1) een zichzelf besturend 
volk en (2) collectief zelfbestuur als uitdrukking van het gemeenschappelijk goed 
van het volk, beargumenteer ik bovendien dat zowel de Lockeaanse als de 
Hobbesiaanse op wederzijdse acceptatie gebaseerde oplossingen voor het 
probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk democratisch zijn. De Hobbesiaanse 
contracttheorie is democratisch, omdat deze een bepaalde interpretatie van beide 
ideeën ondersteunt. Het besluit om al dan niet een samenwerkingsverband met 
elkaar aan te gaan is om twee redenen democratisch. Ten eerste omdat het 
besluit de uitkomst is van een collectieve besluitvormingsprocedure waarin 
multilaterale onderhandelingen plaatsvinden tussen alle potentiële leden van een 
volk (die elkaar hebben ontmoet). Ten tweede omdat deze procedure gericht is 
op het creëren en het in stand houden van een gemeenschappelijk goed dat 
bijdraagt aan de realisering van de gegeven belangen van alle betrokken 
individuen. 
De Lockeaanse politiek-voluntaristische acceptatieprocedure is eveneens 
democratisch. Het Geen Afgewezenen Principe genereert een democratische 
procedure waarin de legitieme afbakening van het volk gebaseerd is op 
multilaterale instemmingshandelingen van enkel en alleen die individuen die 
elkaar niet afwijzen als leden. Het democratische moment in de Lockeaanse 
legitimatie van het volk is echter zeer beperkt in vergelijking met dat in de 
Hobbesiaanse legitimatie. In tegenstelling tot de Hobbesiaanse benadering, waar 
de voorwaarden waaronder individuen zich aan elkaar binden het object van 
overeenstemming zijn, worden deze voorwaarden in de Lockeaanse benadering 
uit het natuurrecht afgeleid. Het natuurrecht laat individuen geheel vrij om al dan 
niet politieke banden met elkaar aan te gaan. Als individuen echter op 
weloverwogen en vrijwillige wijze besluiten zich aan elkaar te binden door een 
volk te stichten, specificeert het natuurrecht de aard van hun politieke relaties. In 
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dat geval eist het natuurrecht namelijk dat alle betrokken individuen hun 
natuurlijke vrijheid (voorwaardelijk) opgeven en overdragen aan een 
gemeenschappelijke politieke autoriteit met als enige doel het behoud van hun 
eigendom (dat wil zeggen, hun leven, vrijheid en bezittingen). 
Het cruciale onderscheid tussen beide sociaal contracttheorieën komt in 
essentie hierop neer. In een Hobbesiaanse contracttheorie, die gebaseerd is op 
een subjectieve waardetheorie, is het gemeenschappelijke goed een sociale 
constructie of menselijk artefact. In de Lockeaanse benadering, die gebaseerd is 
op een objectieve waardetheorie, is het gemeenschappelijk goed niet het object 
van een rationeel compromis, maar reflecteert het de eeuwige, onveranderlijke 
regels van een onafhankelijk van mensen bestaande natuurlijke morele orde. 
Kortom, daar waar het democratische moment in de Lockeaanse politiek-
voluntaristische afbakening van het volk slechts betrekking heeft op de 
samenstelling van het volk, heeft het democratische moment in de Hobbesiaanse 
afbakening van het volk zowel betrekking op de samenstelling van het volk als de 
verzameling regels (dat wil zeggen, het gemeenschappelijk goed) ter regulatie 
van het volk. 
Na het probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk vanuit het perspectief van 
zowel de Lockeaanse als de Hobbesiaanse sociaal contracttheorie behandeld te 
hebben in hoofdstuk 3 en 4, benader ik hetzelfde probleem in hoofdstuk 5 vanuit 
een andere invalshoek: de Kantiaanse sociaal contracttheorie. Ik richt mij daarbij 
in het bijzonder op de Rawlsiaanse (in plaats van de Scanloniaanse) variant van 
het Kantiaanse sociaal contract denken. 
In dit type contracttheorie wordt moraliteit niet beschouwd als een afgeleide 
van economische rationaliteit. In tegenstelling tot Hobbesiaanse 
contracttheorieën, waarin principes ter regulering van samenwerkingsverbanden 
louter uitdrukking geven aan de gegeven belangen van de deelnemende 
individuen, gaat de Rawlsiaanse contracttheorie uit van de veronderstelling dat 
individuen een intrinsiek, hoogste orde verlangen hebben om zichzelf tegenover 
anderen te rechtvaardigen. Het betreft hier geen verlangen naar een specifiek 
object van iemands handelen (zoals welzijn), maar veeleer een verlangen om de 
objecten van iemands verlangens, en de wijze waarop deze worden nagestreefd, 
te reguleren overeenkomstig principes die iedereen redelijkerwijs zou kunnen 
accepteren. In een Rawlsiaanse contracttheorie zijn morele principes het object 
van een redelijke consensus – en niet van een rationeel compromis. 
Volgens vele politiek filosofen is deze aanduiding echter misleidend omdat de 
Rawlsiaanse conttracttheorie in hun optiek fundamenteel ondemocratisch is. 
Volgens hen vindt de selectie van principes in Rawls’ contracttheorie namelijk 
plaats op basis van het gedachte-experiment van de oorspronkelijke positie 
waarin veralgemeniseerde, lichaamsloze subjecten achter de sluier van 
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onwetendheid op monologische wijze bepalen welke principes zij acceptabel 
achten. In tegenstelling tot deze standaardinterpretatie van Rawls’ 
contracttheorie, beargumenteer ik echter dat de oorspronkelijke positie, hoewel 
deze methode volgens Rawls zelf deel uitmaakt van zijn bredere, op het reflectief 
evenwicht gebaseerde benadering van morele rechtvaardiging, uiteindelijk niets 
toevoegt aan de morele rechtvaardiging die principes reeds krijgen in een 
reflectief evenwicht dat slechts bestaat uit een op coherente wijze geordende 
verzameling van (a) principes, (b) weloverwogen morele intuïties en (c) de 
idealen die impliciet aanwezig zijn in publieke politiek cultuur van een 
democratische samenleving. De oorspronkelijke positie speelt geen enkele 
rechtvaardigende rol, maar is slechts een heuristisch instrument dat ons begrip 
van de categorisch imperatief op intuïtieve wijze inzichtelijk maakt. Bovendien, 
zo beargumenteer ik, dient de zoektocht naar reflectief evenwicht begrepen te 
worden als een democratische methode voor publieke rechtvaardiging. Hier hangt 
een bepaalde visie op een rechtvaardige samenleving mee samen: een 
democratische gemeenschap waarin burgers middels een daadwerkelijk 
gevoerde dialoog (een moreel discours) gezamenlijk over de inhoud van hun 
publieke conceptie van rechtvaardigheid beraadslagen. 
Hieruit volgt dat Rawls’ methode van het reflectief evenwicht een specifieke 
collectieve besluitvormingsprocedure vormt. Zij biedt immers een democratische 
methode voor publieke rechtvaardiging die gericht is op de articulatie en 
realisering van een gemeenschappelijk goed (te weten, een publieke conceptie 
van rechtvaardigheid), waarvan de inhoud beantwoordt aan het hoogste orde 
verlangen van individuen om met elkaar om te gaan op een manier die iedereen 
redelijkerwijs kan accepteren. Voor zover democratie gebaseerd is op de ideeën 
van (1) een zichzelf besturend volk en (2) collectief zelfbestuur als uitdrukking 
van het gemeenschappelijk goed van het volk, volgt dat de Rawlsiaanse sociaal 
contractttheorie als democratisch bestempeld dient te worden, aangezien zij een 
specifieke interpretatie van beide ideeën ondersteunt. 
Hoewel Rawls’ reflectief evenwicht een democratische methode voor 
publieke rechtvaardiging is, zegt dit nog niets over de reikwijdte van deze 
rechtvaardigingsmethode. Dat wil zeggen, zij geeft ons nog geen antwoord op de 
vraag welke individuen deel kunnen nemen aan de democratische zoektocht naar 
reflectief evenwicht. Om het probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk met behulp 
van de Rawlsiaanse sociaal contracttheorie op te kunnen lossen, is het echter 
essentieel deze vraag te beantwoorden. 
Ter beantwoording van deze vraag heb ik in hoofdstuk 5 een ander aspect van 
Rawls’ contracttheorie geanalyseerd: het relationele karakter van zijn theorie van 
rechtvaardigheid. Een relationele benadering van rechtvaardigheid gaat uit van 
het idee dat principes van rechtvaardigheid slechts van toepassing zijn op, en 
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gerechtvaardigd dienen te worden tegenover, enkel en alleen die individuen die 
in een specifieke relatie ten opzichte van elkaar staan. De moreel relevante relatie 
betreft hier een institutionele waarin een verzameling individuen onderhevig is 
aan dezelfde dwingende basisstructuur (dat wil zeggen, een stelsel van politieke 
en juridische instituties). Als gevolg hiervan genereert Rawls’ relationele 
benadering van rechtvaardigheid een specifiek principe van legitimiteit: het 
Dwang Principe. Volgens dit principe is een dwingend stelsel van politieke en 
juridische instituties enkel en alleen legitiem als het wordt gereguleerd door een 
publieke conceptie van rechtvaardigheid, dat wil zeggen, door een verzameling 
principes van rechtvaardigheid waarvan redelijkerwijs verwacht kan worden dat 
alle daaraan onderworpen individuen ermee in kunnen stemmen. 
In een Rawlsiaanse contracttheorie vindt de afbakening van het volk plaats 
overeenkomstig een publieke conceptie van rechtvaardigheid. Dit betekent dat de 
afbakening van het volk legitiem is voor zover zij gereguleerd wordt door een 
verzameling principes van rechtvaardigheid die individuen redelijkerwijs kunnen 
accepteren als het object van een reflectief evenwicht. De reikwijdte van deze 
democratische rechtvaardiging, dat wil zeggen, de verzameling individuen die 
zichzelf dienen te kunnen beschouwen als de auteurs van de principes op basis 
waarvan het volk wordt afgebakend, wordt door het Dwang Principe beperkt tot 
enkel en alleen die individuen die door een dwingend stelsel van politieke en 
juridische instituties onderworpen worden aan beleid dat betrekking heeft op de 
afbakening van het volk. Hierbij kan gedacht worden aan immigratie- en 
emigratiebeleid, alsmede secessiebeleid. 
Daar waar de Lockeaanse en Hobbesiaanse contracttheorieën acceptatie 
gebaseerde oplossingen voor het probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk 
genereren, biedt de Rawlsiaanse contracttheorie een zogenaamde impact 
gebaseerde oplossing voor dit probleem. Een essentieel verschil tussen beide 
oplossingen is dat er in het geval van de laatstgenoemde oplossing bij voorbaat 
individuen worden uitgesloten van deelname aan de collectieve 
besluitvormingprocedure die uitsluitsel moet geven over de specifieke 
afbakening van het volk. Als gevolg hiervan vooronderstelt de Rawlsiaanse 
collectieve besluitvormingsprocedure reeds het wij/zij onderscheid dat zij dient 
te genereren, hetgeen legitimatie vereist. In het geval van de Lockeaanse en 
Hobbesiaanse contracttheorieën is deze legitimatie overbodig, aangezien het volk 
in beide typen contracttheorieën niet wordt voorondersteld maar daadwerkelijk 
de uitkomst is van democratische acceptatieprocedures. In het geval van de 
Rawlsiaanse contracttheorie, waar deze legitimatie wel degelijk vereist is, wordt 
het wij/zij onderscheid echter niet gelegitimeerd met behulp van een 
democratische procedure maar door een beroep te doen op een democratische 
theorie. De afbakening van de individuen die deel dienen te kunnen nemen aan de 
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collectieve besluitvormingsprocedure ter afbakening van het volk, wordt 
gelegitimeerd door het Dwang Principe. Dit principe, dat stelt dat alle individuen 
die aan dwang worden onderworpen recht hebben op een democratische 
rechtvaardiging, biedt een specifieke interpretatie van de democratische waarde 
van individuele autonomie. Kortom, de Rawlsiaanse (versie van de Kantiaanse) 
sociaal contracttheorie biedt een impact gebaseerde oplossing voor het probleem 
van de legitimiteit van het volk die verenigbaar is met een democratisch 
raamwerk; de afbakening van het volk wordt middels de democratische methode 
van het reflectief evenwicht gelegitimeerd en de daaraan voorafgaande 
afbakening van de relevante groep kiesgerechtigden wordt middels een 
onderliggende democratische theorie gelegitimeerd. 
In hoofdstuk 6 concludeer ik dat de sociaal contracttheorie een zeer 
vruchtbare voedingsbodem biedt om het probleem van de legitimiteit van het 
volk op te lossen. Tevens reflecteer ik nog eenmaal op het in de dissertatie 
gehanteerde democratiebegrip – te weten, collectief zelfbestuur gericht op de 
realisering van een gemeenschappelijk goed. Door dit democratiebegrip te 
definiëren in termen die steeds veeleisender zijn, termen waaraan uiteindelijk 
alleen de Rawlsiaanse sociaal contracttheorie kan voldoen, wordt het mogelijk te 
beargumenteren dat dit type contracttheorie, alsmede de daaruit afgeleide 
oplossing voor het probleem van de legitimiteit van het volk, boven de 
Lockeaanse en Hobbesiaanse alternatieven verkozen dient te worden. 
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